any distinct policy-an opinion justified by his numerous changes, and his want of a Parliamentary following. He has, by accidental circumstances, obtained a credit for liberal views in Continental politics which he did not hold. His antecedents in the Foreign Office furnish the proof of this. Often has there been a display of liberalism, and sometimes an attempt at bullying, well nigh approaching to an embroilment of his country; but it is doubtful if an instance can be found in which Lord Palmerston maintained a truly liberal policy. On the contrary, there is a prominent case in which the present Premier threw away a fine opportunity of advancing European liberty. It was entirely owing to him that Poland did not become an independent kingdom in 1830. Both France and Austria were agreed on this, but Lord Palmerston defeated this project.

His present position is evidently one of restraint. Otherwise, why did he not at once declare for the policy which made him the candidate of popular favor and gained for him the Premiership? Had he adopted the sentiments for which the voice of the country called him to power, he would have carried all along with him. He would have lost the support of those who have left him, but he would have more readily secured the waverers, and have obtained the aid of the most influential in Parliament, and of the country at large. Though we confess to having desired to see Lord Palmerston Minister at War instead of the Duke of Newcastle, and we are still of opinion that he would have been then the right man in the right place,-we are far from being sanguine of his success at the head of the ministry. The remark attributed to the late Sir Robert Peel, seems to have been verified by the short reign of Lord Palmerston: "Endeavour to have Palmerston in every ministry, but never let him be Premier."

The Opposition in Parliament and the successes of the Allies have not only contributed to the more vigorous prosecution of the war, but have brought the Vienna Conferences to a close, and placed Austria in a sort of dead lock. What is Austria's position, and what are the probable intentions of that Power in the present stage of the struggle, is a most interesting question. We had intended to have traced the progress of the Court of Vienna during the last two years-if progress it can be called, for no advance has she made towards a more distinct mode of action now than then. Vain, however, would be the labor both to the writer and to the reader, as it would be an uninteresting recital of fruitless negotiations. It has all along been difficult to say exactly what Austria would do; and now as ever, the same mystery envelops her conduct. In one course she has been most consistent, her neutrality and want of active share in the contest,-proving beyond question her deliberate and well weighed policy of non-interference. Shortsighted she may have been, as selfish States as well as selfish individuals ever are,— yet she has throughout played her cards well for the moment. It may come to pass, however, that as she lost the opportunity of preventing the war, she may also finally find herself overreached and involved in the war, with ruin to herself. We have reiterated this opinion of Austria's part almost ad nauseum, but this repetition has been ever necessitated

in contradiction of the as often repeated assertion, that this State was on the point of taking an active share. Where now are all these high pretensions? What is the result of all the delay, of all the vacillation, of all the waste of time, life, and treasure, to gain this slippery Power, "this natural ally of Britain," according to the procrastinating Aberdeen? The most promising feature in the present juncture, is the conclusion of the negotiations which had their centre at Vienna. By this, matters are brought into more workable order. The Allies are now free to prosecute the war untramelled by irritating and useless attempts at negotiation; and the benefit is already apparent. The question, however, naturally occurs, what alteration will this defeat of the great object of the Court of Vienna have in the relations of Austria, with the Western Powers, with Russia, and with Germany? Have the Western Powers

at last thrown off the interference of the Court of Vienna, and are they now resolved to act for themselves, and to leave that State to take what course she may think proper? In this event, what will Austria do; or, supposing that the conferences are simply closed, will she endeavour to re-open them? These are important questions. That the independent action of the Allies may be the result of the termination of these abortive negotiations is sincerely to be desired; for, unless this be the case, the matters in dispute cannot be satisfactorily arranged. The attempts which were ever being made, through the intervention of Austria, to accomplish peace, have throughout been most damaging to the interests of the Allies and of Europe. Through this ever recurring annoying impediment, we have never been able to become ripe for a peaceful arrangement of the questiones vexatae. In no way can these be effectively brought to an issue in the present crisis, but by the results of the warlike operations. The means of pacification were exhausted before the commencement of the war. It is, therefore, utterly vain and profitless to resort to devising terms of peace, till the appeal which has been made to the sword, be decisively settled. The treaty between the Western Powers and the two German States, is a vast anomaly. As the inevitible result of this vicious anomaly-this ill assorted and incongruous coalition the two parties have been pulling different ways; and the natural consequence has been, that the two neutral allies have been dragging the other Powers, with whom they were in nominal alliance, into the adoption of their views. In these days of commercial civilisation, when the peace party will ever have the tendency to prevail over the war party, the result of the Vienna conferences may be regarded as evidence of the justice of the cause for which the allies have engaged in war, and as a cheering augury of the future.

If not before, the time seems now to have arrived, when the position of the several parties should be fixed-when no alliance can subsist, save an alliance offensive and defensive. The Western Powers have already suffered enough by the vacillating conduct of Austria, and by their foolish dependence on her aid; and the occasion now offers itself for bringing their relations with Austria to a definite understanding. Let them at once avail themselves of the opportunity, and strike the iron while it is hot. Prussia has very properly been shown the cold shoulder in the late

ers.

Conference, and by her conduct has excluded herself from any title to participate in the arrangements which may be made by the Allied PowAustria has now placed herself in a similar position, and has forfeited all right to consideration in the negotiations which may hereafter take place. While these two States persist in their neutrality and want of active interference in the war; in fact, while they continue to be merely nominally our allies, at the same time that they are acting so as to benefit our foe, it is fair that they should be altogether excluded from any participation in the negotiations between the belligerents. What right has Austria shewn to the office of Arbiter which she has assumed? It is far more reasonable, that the principals should treat directly, than have the interference of an arbiter so evidently biassed, and so devoted to accomplish her own selfish purposes by the dispute. Russia and the Western Powers would have managed much better without the interference of the Court of Vienna. They would have never carried on peace negotiations and war operations at one and the same time, if they had been left to themselves but the pretext for this singular mode of proceeding was afforded by the position of Austria.

There are several features in the conduct of Austria since the closing of the last Vienna conference which deserve attention, as in some degree indicative of the character of her intended policy, or, at any rate, of her leanings. The most prominent movement is the strange announcement of the proposed reduction of her forces by 145,000 men. It is indeed difficult to understand the object of this measure, at a period when not only warlike operations are going on around her, but when her own einbroilment in the contest seems imminent. Unless it be altogether a ruse, it distinctly expresses her confidence in the safety of her neutrality, and her want of fear of attack by any of the belligerent parties. If it be a genuine movement, and if these be the motives, it is a declaration that she is determined to abide by her neutrality, and not to unsheathe the sword at all. There is no doubt that her exchequer is very low, and that there is a deficiency of 81,000,000 florins on the revenue, and the reduction may be alleged as a prudential measure. It can hardly be believed that this cause alone, in the present crisis, would induce her to take a step so important,-indeed, without some other motive, this reduction is impossible. Whatever be the intention, -and that we pretend not to be able to discover, yet we may be certain that it is a scheme planned and matured with her wonted diplomatic skill. It behoves us, therefore, to be on our guard, lest she be yet enabled to steal a march on our simplicity. Let us not be longer deceived by German tricks. Whatever may be the pretext of this reduction, it cannot in any view be favorable to the Western Powers; for if there ever was any honest intention of carrying out the understanding of the treaty of 2d December 1854, and of forming a close offensive and defensive alliance with us, this shews that this is now abandoned. The movement at once overturns any supposed object of this kind, and points in a totally different direction. If, then, it be not favorable to the Allies, it must be, if not directly advantageous, at least not unfavorable to our enemy. Another event equally worthy of notice, is the offer to confer with Prussia,-significant of a drawing

towards that State, in order that the two may again plot together. Prussia has for a considerable time been avowedly on the side of Russia; and, if Austria desires to act in concert with Prussia, it shews her distinet leaning towards Russia. Whoever doubted her leaning? Her selfish interest, as well as the grand purpose of despotism, however, are much better served by a pretended neutrality, than by an open declaration against the Western Powers. She has much to gain by her present double dealing, whereas she would risk all by joining either side. Russia, in the examination of Count Walewski's note on the four points, thinks that the door is still open for negotiation. If defeated in the field, the Czar will try his hand at diplomacy, well knowing that therein lie his strength, and the chances of success. The Czar, even though he may not have a secret understanding with the Court of Vienna, is perfectly aware of their willingness to enter anew on the work of negotiation, and will accordingly use Austria as his tool. While Parliament is met we feel pretty safe, but we dread the approach of the recess; because then again as before, every nerve will be strained, every exertion will be made, by our foe and our quasi-allies to renew the Vienna conferences. Unless the country is on the alert, the same procrastination will again be reenacted. Let us be warned then by the fate which we have escaped by the Parliament being met, and let the Parliament not separate before extracting from the Ministry some distinct declaration of their policy. This want of policy has been the main cause of our many blunders; and until the Ministry have laid down some definite objects, the same weakness, vacillation, and disaster will characterise all our war proceedings.

Austria saw from the first her advantage in the occupation of the Principalities, and well she has wielded this advantage to the injury of the population and the disadvantage of the Allies. This false step on the part of the Allies has been of vast benefit to Russia, by having these Principalities under the protection of a State not hostile to her, and by thus enabling her to use the troops which would have been required there for direct purposes against the Western Powers.

On the whole, the position of Austria is now more manifest. The evil consequence of our trifling with that State ought to be a warning to us to avoid getting into the snare again. She has been defeated in the meantime in gaining her object at the expense of the Allies; but she will still insist on her proposed neutrality, and wait the chances of the war. In this way she will be enabled to profit by the weakness of the belligerents, and will take part, if finally obliged to do so, with the party from which she will derive the most advantage. It is evident, however, that she is preparing for contingencies by strengthening her interest in Germany. Let her not be any longer the arbiter, but let us act independently till the time arrives when we can dictate to her, and oblige her to take an active part.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Clerical Misrule; or the Voice of Chalmers on Church Offices and Finance. Specially addressed to the Deaconship. By some of the People. Edinburgh: Thomas C. Jack.

Reform in the Free Church; or the True Origin of our Recent Debates; being Suggestions respectfully addressed to the Members of the approaching Assembly. By James Begg, D.D. Edinburgh: J. Nichol.

HAVE our readers forgotten a pamphlet entitled "Uncle Tom in the Free Church, or an Appeal against the Usurpation of Patronage by the Clergy," containing a withering exposure of the incipient clerical "selfishness and despotism" which has at length precipitated that Church on the brink of a second disruption? The author-a probationer of the church-was blackballed and virtually excommunicated, and his character assailed in a way by no means characteristic of Christianity. Will it be credited that Dr Begg has boldly homologated the charges of Uncle Tom,-for we know not how we can better introduce his brochure to public notice, -and laid bare "the real root of bitterness which festers beneath all our (F.C.) difficulties, and the true key to the recent contentions which have startled the country and alarmed our people,”—viz., that “the Free Church is as completely managed by an Oligarchy at this moment, as ever the British Government was; and as a necessary consequence certain Crimeas and Balaklavas are beginning to startle and alarm some of the other members of the Institution who are capable of thinking and can dare to think. I use these expressions, because I have lately met with some of our younger Ministers who profess not to see the evils which are obvious to all the rest of the world. This may arise partly from their inexperience. They do not know, by any previous experience, what Presbyterian parity and liberty really mean; they did not see the glory of the first house. Besides, a vast number of our ministers are miserably dependent. Out of 750 Ministers, only about 190 are self-sustaining. The rest are carried more or less on the shoulders of others. Some with rich congregations carry, of course, a large burden of them, and this is all very well; but it is not very consistent with the rigid maintenance of Presbyterian parity. Many of the Ministers exhibit a painful sense of dependence. The evil is greatly aggravated by our loose system of Committee administration, and was consummated by the 'Rating' scheme, which virtually gives the power of absolutely fixing the stipends of three-fourths of the clergy to a few leading men. Even our Eldership does not save us from this kind of domination, for they are all clerically elected. In the United Presbyterian Church the Elders are elected by Sessions, as their Synod is not representative, and this, as well as the absence of a central fund, saves them from any such danger. In the Established Assembly there are at least between 40 and 50 burgh Elders, who are independent of the clergy, and all the clergy are independent of each other. In the Free Church Assembly not only are three-fourths of the Ministers dependent on a few, but all the Elders are nominees of Presbyteries, in which the majority of the members who attend are invariably Ministers; and some Presbyteries have lately turned out of the Assembly men of the highest respectability, simply on the ground of their differing from the leading managers."

Could any other result have been anticipated in the circumstances? Did not the Free Church start into existence under the despotic rule of a clerical oligarchy, an oligarchy whose incessant agitation for ten years drove the excited multitudes in an hour of passion to perpetrate the schism which rent