way upon society, since society confines the laborer's wealthgetting activities to the sphere of wage-earning, and is the beneficiary of his toil. As a matter of fact, however, society has transferred the obligation to a special agency, namely, the employers or directors of industry. Thus the distributive function of the industrial organism has been specialized, and the indefinite and general obligation attaching thereto has become definite and specific. The employers are the distributors of the social product, and upon them falls the obligation of assigning his just share to the laborer.

True, society has not, either in its political or industrial capacity, explicitly commanded the employer to pay a living wage; but this negligence, whether right or wrong, wise or unwise, does not release the employer. No formal legislative enactment is needed to impose this obligation. It arises out of the very nature of the employer's position in the industrial. organism. Society charges him with the wage-paying function, and he accepts the charge. He is bound, therefore, to exercise it in conformity with the dictates of reason and justice. To deny this is to imply that rights can exist without correlative duties. To assume that nowhere in society is there a concrete, living obligation corresponding to the laborer's right to a decent livelihood, is in effect to declare that, so far as our industrial relations are concerned, we are living not in a condition of order but of anarchy.

TWO WAYS OF CLASSIFYING THE EMPLOYER'S OBLIGATION.

According to the view just outlined, the employer's obligation to pay a living wage has a social character, and belongs to the sphere of distributive justice. It is also commonly regarded as a duty of commutative, or strict justice, inasmuch as it arises out of a contract between individuals. The employer is bound by the law of strict justice to give an exact equivalent for the service that he receives, or, as it is generally expressed, to remunerate labor at its full or just value. This does not mean economic or market value; for wages are practically always equal to the value of labor in this sense. What is meant is that labor ought to be paid for at its ethical value, which is determined by the social estimate of what is fair. Now, the social estimate, it is maintained, always rates labor as worth at

"social estimate" is indefinite and of little use as a moral guide. (See the Catholic University Bulletin, April, 1902.) We do not know whether it adjudges a man's labor in all cases as worth a living wage, and even if we were assured that it does, we might perhaps not be ready to accept its decision as final. We might insist on examining the reasons upon which it is based, and the character of the social body from which it proceeds.

As a matter of fact, the defenders of this view do not consider labor in the abstract. When estimating its just value they take into account the fact that it is the output of a person. (Cf. Vermeersch, Quæstiones de Justitia, pp. 557, seq.) The human dignity of the laborer is introduced into the equation, and the value of his labor is estimated accordingly. Understood in this way, the contention that labor, or rather, the laborer, is worth a living wage is altogether valid. Human labor-force should be dealt with and measured as the attribute of a person, a rational creature who has an indestructible right to live a decent human life. Consequently the employer may not lawfully impose upon him wage conditions which will make the exercise of this right impossible. This principle holds good whether the laborer is engaged in producing marketable utilities, as in the case of the factory hand and the conductor on a street railway; or in rendering his employer direct personal service, as exemplified in the functions of a valet or a coachman. In both instances the man who works full time expends all his labor-power for the benefit of his employer, and is by the very terms of the labor contract deprived of any other means of getting a livelihood except his wages. Consequently, if the employer does not pay a living wage he ignores the human dignity of the laborer and violates one of his most important rights.

Both of the foregoing arguments are based on the dignity of the laborer as a person, his moral equality with all other persons, and his equal right with his fellows to as much of the earth's material goods as is needed to safeguard the sacredness of personality. In one word, they are arguments drawn. from the laborer's individual rights. The conclusion to which they lead, namely, that the employer is bound in justice to pay a family living wage, is likewise obtained when we take the view-point of society. If social order and well-being are to be

that portion of it known as the workingmen will necessarily have to be provided with a wage that will enable them to live decently, to marry, and to support a family in reasonable comfort and security. When these conditions are wanting the welfare, and even the existence, of society is threatened. Hence the employer, who has been entrusted by society with the wage-paying function, is obliged to perform this function in a manner consistent with the social welfare.

THE LABORER'S PRODUCTIVITY AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY.

Those who deny that the employer is bound to pay a living wage maintain that the laborer's productive power, rather than his essential needs, is the true measure of his rights in the matter of remuneration. All productive agents should be rewarded in proportion to the amounts that they produce; and, since the actual wages of labor conform, roughly speaking, to this standard, the laborer who does not receive a living wage is not treated unjustly. So runs their argument. Now, the contention that a man has a right to all the wealth that he produces is valid in the case of goods that he creates exclusively by his own efforts. When, without any assistance from others, a man turns out a product through the use of land, tools, or machinery owned by himself, he has undoubtedly a right to the whole of that product. It is understood, of course, that he does not appropriate so much land as to prevent any of his fellows from exercising their natural right to the use of the earth. For if he do not observe this condition the entire product is not his; a portion of it is due to labor that he has expended on the property of some one else. It must never be forgotten that man does not create goods outright, but merely produces utilities by transforming the raw material of nature. Since the latter is the common heritage of the race, no man may rightfully utilize it to the prejudice of the rights of his fellows. However, the amount of land, and capital likewise, that one man can personally use is so limited that the condition in question will generally be realized. The general proposition that a man has an exclusive right to all that he personally produces may, therefore, be safely affirmed. None of his fellows (abstracting from cases of extreme necessity) can establish a title to it; for it is in no way due to them, nor to any

The product in which the laborer and his employer are interested is not, however, of this character. It is brought into existence by the joint contribution of four causes: the employer, the laborer, land, and capital. Every part of it is due in some measure to each of these factors. Each is in its own order a cause of the whole product; for in the absence of any one of them the product would not exist. On the other On the other hand, no factor is the whole cause of any portion of the product. Consequently, no portion of it can be set apart and attributed exclusively to any one factor. The amount of product due to undertaking ability is not physically distinguishable from that due to labor, land, or capital. What part of the factory-made shoe, for example, has been produced exclusively by the employer? But it is sometimes asserted that we can ascertain the productive importance of each factor, and distribute the product among them accordingly. This also is impossible. There is no scale or test available test available by which the relative importance or productive contribution of the various factors can be even approximately measured. The employer's productive importance—for it is in his interest that the attempt to apply this test is oftenest made-is assumed to be indicated by the share of the product that he actually receives. This inference from income to productivity is evidently a particularly clumsy instance of the logical fallacy known as "the vicious. circle." (Cf. The Social Problem, by John A. Hobson, p. 160.) "What determines the employer's remuneration?" "His productivity." "How can we ascertain the productivity of the employer?" "By referring to his remuneration." Those who take the trouble to get behind formulas and catchwords, and to examine the actual working of industrial forces, know very well that the income of any factor is determined by supply and demand, or more precisely by the scarcity of that factor relatively to the scarcity of all the other factors. In a word, the income of a factor depends upon its "indispensableness," to quote Professor Smart, and not on any proportion to its productive efficiency. (Distribution of Income, pp. 237, 238.) When undertaking ability was less plentiful than at present employers in competitive enterprises received larger rewards. Hence, their former incomes must have been in excess of their productive importance, or their present rewards fall below it.

that portion of it known as the workingmen will necessarily have to be provided with a wage that will enable them to live decently, to marry, and to support a family in reasonable comfort and security. When these conditions are wanting the welfare, and even the existence, of society is threatened. Hence the employer, who has been entrusted by society with the wage-paying function, is obliged to perform this function in a manner consistent with the social welfare.

THE LABORER'S PRODUCTIVITY AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY.

Those who deny that the employer is bound to pay a living wage maintain that the laborer's productive power, rather than his essential needs, is the true measure of his rights in the matter of remuneration. All productive agents should be rewarded in proportion to the amounts that they produce; and, since the actual wages of labor conform, roughly speaking, to this standard, the laborer who does not receive a living wage is not treated unjustly. So runs their argument. Now, the contention that a man has a right to all the wealth that he produces is valid in the case of goods that he creates exclusively by his own efforts. When, without any assistance from others, a man turns out a product through the use of land, tools, or machinery owned by himself, he has undoubtedly a right to the whole of that product. It is understood, of course, that he does not appropriate so much land as to prevent any of his fellows from exercising their natural right to the use of the earth. For if he do not observe this condition the entire product is not his; a portion of it is due to labor that he has expended on the property of some one else. It must never be forgotten that man does not create goods outright, but merely produces utilities by transforming the raw material of nature. Since the latter is the common heritage of the race, no man may rightfully utilize it to the prejudice of the rights of his fellows. However, the amount of land, and capital likewise, that one man can personally use is so limited that the condition in question will generally be realized. The general proposition that a man has an exclusive right to all that he personally produces may, therefore, be safely affirmed. None of his fellows (abstracting from cases of extreme necessity) can establish a title to it; for it is in no way due to them, nor to any