or to whoever intrufted, was liable to abuse. But they denied that to be the cafe in the prefent inftance. There was nothing that diftinguished the removals in queftion, from a fucceffive ftream of precedents, flowing down, from the revolution to the prefent day, through times which were deemed the most favourable to liberty. The two noble lords, they faid, held their offices merely through the favour of the crown, and could therefore have no right to complain when it was withdrawn; they fuffered no injury, for they loft nothing which they could call their own. Was this then fufficient ground for a motion, which went to annihilate one of the first and the most neceffary prerogatives of the crown, that of choofing its own fervants?

A great law lord endeavoured with his ufual ability to fhew, the various inconveniences and mischiefs which muft arife, from its being once established as a principle of acting, that the royal will was fubject to parliamentary controul and examination, upon every exercife, which prudence and reafon might dictate, of thofe powers which the conftitution had vested in the crown, of promoting or removing its own officers. He contended, that it would not only be fubverfive of the royal prerogative, destructive of all public fervice, order, and fubordination, and perfonally degrading to the fovereign, but that it would involve parliament itself in continual and inextricable difficulties. If fuch a precedent was once established, the whole time of the house would be taken up with complaints, appeals, and

addreffes; and they would at length become fo numerous and perplexed, that they never could be able to fee their way through them. He feemed, however, not much better fatisfied with refpect to the right, than to the expedience and propriety, of parliament at all interfering in fuch matters as touched upon the royal prerogative.

The learned lord likewife called for the evidence to fupport the charge. No manner of proof, he faid, had been laid before their lordships, nor had any attempt even been made to prove, that the difmiffion of the noble marquis, or of the noble earl, proceeded from any vote they had given in that houfe; confequently, till fome fact was ftated, or proof made, it could not be decent to approach the throne on the fubject; but would on the contrary, in his opinion, be highly improper, and even difrefpectful.

The lords in oppofition acknowledged in the clearest terms, that the unlimited, unreftrained difcretion of the crown, in a choice of perfons to fill the offices of the ftate, was an inherent, indifputable prerogative, vefted in it for the best and wifeft purpofes; but it was a prerogative or right, the exercife of which, as well as of every other power or right the crown enjoyed, was fubject to the controul and animad. verfion of parliament. It was, like them, exercifed by counfel and advice; and if improperly exercifed, as in other inftances, fubjected the advisers to enquiry; and if it appeared upon that en quiry, that the caufe was fuch as to justify the advice, fub[1] 2

not

jected

val, or to punishment.-This was what was meant by a difcretionary power being vefted in the crown; it was neither more nor lefs. There was an unfound difcretion, as well as a found difcretion; in its proper fenfe, it meant no more than a power or a bility to act, which was after fubject to the controul and difcuffion of parliament. But when ever that power was flretched beyond its due limits, when it was wantonly and intentionally abufed, it immediately changed its nature; it was then no longer difcretionary, it became arbitrary and tyrannical.

The Duke of Richmond, in contradiction to fome of the affertions made, and doctrines now laid down, quoted the debates of that house in the year 1733, and the fpirited proteit then entered, upon the crown's difmiffing Lord Cobham and the Duke of Boiton from their places. This he hoped would ftrike the lords as a pre cedent fully fatisfactory, for the right of parliament to regulate the abufe of difcretion in the crown; and he hoped the circumflance of the late Earl of Bathurst, being at the head of the peers who figned that proteft, would have its due effect on the Lord Prefident of the council, (then prefent) in inducing him to fupport the fentiments of his noble father. The Duke appealed, with respect to the late promotions in the army, to the law lords, and to the bench of bifhops; afking the learned lord on the wool-fack, and the right reverend prelate, at the head of that bench, how they would approve

On this occafion, the Marquis of Rockingham entered as deeply into the abufes relative to the militia, as the military lords did into thofe of the army. He endeavoured to fhew, that the tendency and effect of all the laws which had for feveral years been paffed relative to that body, went directly to draw it daily nearer and nearer, to the model and condition of a standing army. He ftated its original nature, with the motives and defign of its inftitution; and then endeavoured to fhew how it had been warped to purposes entirely different. And, after feveral masterly obfervations on the fubject, the fubject, declared, that under fuch circumstances, if the lieutenants of counties were to be difmiffed for their conduct in parliament, and for differing in political opinions with the minifters for the time being, the only dif ference he could make between a tanding army, and a militia fo conftituted and governed, was, that (for feveral reafons which he fpecified) he would give a prefe rence to the former.

It was remarked, that the fmalleft anfwer was not made by the court lords, to the numerous charges which were made on the other fide, with refpect to the government both of the army and the militia. Excepting it thould be confidered as fuch, that a noble lord in office, who had been lately ambaffador in Paris, fpoke

a few

the civil lift revenue was as much and as fully his majesty's, as any determinable eftate, enjoyed by any perfon prefent, was his immediate property. That revenue had been fettled on his majefty, at his acceffion, for life; which was an intereft no power on earth could deprive him of without manifeft injuftice; confequently, that part of the honourable gentleman's bill, which went to the controul of the civil lift, and to an appropriation of the fuppofed favings to arife from the reform, was an attempt no lefs contrary to precedent than to juftice. It would not cnly, in its confequences, degrade the fovereign, but it would reduce him to the ftate of a precarious penfioner; whofe uncertain ftipend, leffened at will, would be at all times liable to ftill further reduction. And to what purpofe was this violence and injuftice to be offered to leffen the fuppofed influence of the crown. He had heard a great deal of the influence of the crown; but he believed that influence was never lefs known or felt than during the prefent reign; and this he could fpeak from expe

rience.

He declared, that he had neither confulted the noble minifter, nor any other perfon within or without the houfe upon the subject. It was his own opinion, and he was determined to avow it, without any expectation or wifh of fupport, further than what it might be entitled to on its own intrinfic merit. He was apprehenfive that he was rather diforderly, as the order of the day for going into a committee, flood in the way; but it was a fubject on which he wished to take the sense of the houfe; and

he applied to the chair for direction, in what manner to bring it forward.

Although it was contended on the other fide, that the principle of the bill was already fully admitted, as well by the meffage from the throne, which included the royal confent, in what related to its particular interefts, as by its being referred, without oppofition, from the fecond reading, to a committee; yet it was not thought fitting to spend much time on that ground; but to take much stronger, and directly to combat the doctrine itself, without regard to the mode of bringing it forward.

It was maintained, by a great variety of arguments, that the fovereign, in this country, did not poffefs any part of his revenue, as a private or diftin&t property. That the crown held no public right, or public property, but as a truft, for the benefit of the people. It could in truth gain or lofe nothing; becaufe it enjoyed all it poffeffed as a favour, and for the attainment of certain defined or implied purpofes; which purposes were derftood, to be good government, and the well-being of the ftate. The prerogatives of the crown, the highest and moft tranfcendant parts of its power, were created by, and ought of courfe to be exercifed for the benefit of, the people, who created and conferred them. It was therefore to the laft degree abfurd, to reprefent as the private rights or property of an individual, thofe which were granted and held for no other end than the general good of the community; and every right the crown enjoyed, being a delegated right, was confequently fubject to exami[74

nation,