To this last point Hamilton dissented, so far as concerned his own department, which was made especially subject to Congress in some respects, but he thought that he was not obliged to produce all the papers called for. The impression made upon Mr. Jefferson's mind, was, that "he endeavoured to place himself subject to the house, when the executive should propose what he did not like, and subject to the executive, when the house should propose anything disagreeable."

The difficulty, on the present occasion, was removed by Mr. Jefferson's speaking separately with the members of the committee, and persuading them to adopt the course of instructing their chairman to move the house to address the president; which request was complied with, as there were no papers which they desired to withhold.

The government had now determined to redeem our captive citizens at Algiers, and to make peace with that power, by paying an annual tribute. The Senate approved of this course, but they wished the president to make the treaty, and either to take the money it would require from the treasury, or open a loan for it. They were unwilling to consult the representatives on the subject, lest it should establish an inconvenient precedent, and enable the house to share in the treaty making power, which the constitution had confided to the president and senate. They feared, moreover, that if a particular sum were voted by the house, it would not be a secret. The president did not come into their views. But he agreed to enter into a provisional treaty, not to be binding until ratified here. Mr. Jefferson, with his habitual vigilance in behalf of the popular branch, having suggested that the president should withhold his seal from the treaty, after the Senate had advised its ratification, until the two houses voted the money, General Washington inquired whether a treaty stipulating the payment of money, and ratified by him, with the advice of the Senate, would not be obligatory on the representatives. Mr. Jefferson answered that it would, and that it would be the duty of the representatives to provide the money, but they might decline to do what was their duty, and thus he might be involved in embarrassment with a foreign government. It was possible, too,

he added, to conceive a treaty, which they were not bound to provide for.

The president then remarked, that "he did not like throwing too much into democratic hands, for that if they did not do what the constitution called on them to do, the government would be at an end, and must then assume another form. He stopped here; and Mr. Jefferson remarks:-"I kept silence, to see whether he would say any thing more in the same line, or add any qualifying expression to soften what he had said; but he did neither." Whatever might be the species of other form to which General Washington here alluded, it appears from the same testimony -his own declaration at the time-that he did not wish it, as he was unwilling, by increasing the power of the democratic branch, to increase the danger to which he believed the constitution was most exposed.

The course recommended on this occasion seems to be dictated by prudence, and, as he remarks, there appeared to be as much reason for consulting the representatives about a treaty, when their aid was necessary to carry it into operation, as of consulting the senate, because their concurrence was necessary to its ratification; and the executive were then regularly in the practice of doing this.

The celebrated Paul Jones was appointed a commissioner for treating with the Dey of Algiers, on the subject of peace and the ransoming of American captives; and he was informed of the appointment by Mr. Jefferson, on the 1st of June. The captives were thirteen in number, and Jones was limited to the sum of $27,000 for their redemption, including all incidental charges. Among these captives was the well-known Commodore O'Bryan, who was afterwards employed by the government in its negotiations with Algiers. When the ransom of these captives was first talked of, it was supposed it could be effected for about $200 each; but it had now increased to ten times that amount. The government had been anxious to establish the rate of ransom as low as possible, lest these piratical states should be tempted to go in quest of American captives in preference to those of other countries; and thus its regard to the interests of our seamen, generally, compelled it to take a course,

which subjected it to the imputation of cold indifference to that portion of them who were already in captivity. The annual tribute for which the consul was authorized to stipulate, as the price of peace, was limited to $25,000.

This letter, however, never reached its address. It was sent by Mr. Pinckney, recently appointed minister to Great Britain, and he did not arrive in England until the last of July, some days after Jones' death.* He died at Paris on the 18th of July, 1792, in abject poverty, and Mr. Gouverneur Morris, the American minister, whom he sent for in his last moments, made his will. A pompous funeral having been proposed to Mr. Morris by some Americans at Paris, and he having resisted the application, on account of the expense, which he considered he had no right to impose on his government, he was censured at home for this seeming indifference to the memory of one who had rendered eminent public service to the United States.†

As the mint which had been established at the late session of Congress, was considered at that day to be within the province of the state department, Mr. Jefferson took steps to provide the necessary artists and workmen from Europe, through Mr. Pinckney.

*Mr. Jefferson had taken the precaution to request Mr. Pinckney to confide the papers and commission for “Admiral Jones” to Mr. Thomas Barclay, then consul at Morocco, in case Jones should be prevented from acting by death or other cause; and the business assigned to him, was finally transacted by Barclay.

†Mr. Morris thus notices the censure, in a letter to a friend in America: "It is somewhat singular that he who detested the French Revolution and all those concerned in it, should have been followed to the grave by a deputation from the National Assembly; and that I should read in your Gazettes something like a very severe reflection on me for not paying him due respect; I, who, during his life, rendered him all possible service, and possessed his confidence to the last, so that he wished to name me with you for executor."—Life of G. Morris, I. 377.

If, however, the fact be truly stated by Dodley's Annual Register, in its obituary notice of Paul Jones, that "Colonel Blackden was obliged to raise a small sum, by way of subscription, in order to bury him," the censure would not seem to be altogether unmerited. He who had done more than any other individual to sustain the honour of the American flag at sea, and whose services had been deemed, by an unanimous vote of Congress, (Oct. 16, 1787,) "worthy of a gold medal," though he were suffered to live in penury, might at least have been buried at the public

expense.

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CHAPTER XVI.

Mr. Jefferson addresses a long letter to the President. His views of the state of parties. His various arguments why the President should serve a second term. Conversation between them on the subject of this letter. Their respective opinions on the Assumption, Bank, and Excise. Further conversation-the supposed predilections for Monarchy— influence of the Treasury Department. Commissioners from Spain. Discussion in the Cabinet. Disagreement as to Foreign Connexions. Relations with France. Party Dissentions. References to the Secretary of the Treasury—his plan of reducing the Public Debt-proposes to pay the debt to the Bank in advance. Further Assumption of State Debts. Mr. Giles's Resolutions against the Secretary of the Treasury. Proceedings thereon. Views of the two Parties. Conversation with the President on his Levees. Right of the United States to cede Territory, discussed in the Cabinet.

1792-1793.

CONGRESS had adjourned on the 8th of May, and the president having soon after left Philadelphia for Mount Vernon, Mr. Jefferson addressed to him a long letter, in which his consent to a re-election was strongly urged. As this letter, never before published, is a refutation of the charge so often reiterated by his enemies, of comprehending General Washington in his suspicions and criminations of the federalists, is highly honourable both to his frankness and patriotism, and breathes an eloquent earnestness, which only strong feeling could have inspired, it is here given entire.

Dear Sir,

Philadelphia, May 23, 1792.

"I have determined to make the subject of a letter what has

for some time past been a subject of inquietude to my mind, without having found a good occasion of disburthening itself to you in conversation, during the busy scenes which occupied you here. Perhaps, too, you may be able, in your present situation, or on the road, to give it more time and reflection than you could do here at any moment.

"When you first mentioned to me your purpose of retiring from the government, though I felt all the magnitude of the event, I was, in a considerable degree, silent. I knew, that to such a mind as yours, persuasion was idle and impertinent; that, before forming your decision, you had weighed all the reasons for and against the measure; had made up your mind on a full view of them, and that there could be little hope of changing the result. Pursuing my reflections, too, I knew we were some day to try to walk alone, and if the essay should be made while you should be alive and looking on, we should derive confidence from that circumstance, and resource if it failed. The public mind, too, was then calm and content, and, therefore, in a favourable state for making the experiment. Had no change of circumstances supervened, I should not, with any hope of success, have now ventured to propose to you a change of purpose. But the public mind is no longer so confident and serene; and that from causes in which you are no ways personally mixed. Though these causes have been hackneyed in the public papers in detail, it may not be amiss, in order to elucidate the effect they are capable of producing, to take a view of them in the mass; giving to each the form, real or imaginary, under which they have presented it.

"It has been urged then, that a public debt, greater than we can possibly pay before other causes of adding new debt to it will occur, has been artificially created, by adding together the whole amount of the debtor and creditor sides of the accounts, instead of taking only their balances, which could have been paid off in a short time. That this accumulation of debt has taken for ever out of our power those easy sources of revenue, which, applied to the ordinary necessities and exigencies of government, would have answered them habitually, and