Графични страници
PDF файл
ePub

In the absence of a finding otherwise by the Commission a sixty days' limitation for giving notice of a claim against a telegraph company is reasonable.-Gardner v. W. U. Tel. Co., 231 Fed. 405. Responsibility based on rate valid.-Postal Tel. & Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Lumber Co., 251 U. S. 27, 64 L. Ed. 118, 40 Sup. Ct. 69. Where carrier has actual notice of injuries to live stock, written notice need not be given within ten days after unloading.-Southern Pac. Co. v. Stewart, 233 Fed. 956, 147 C. C. A. 630; dismissed by Supreme Court for lack of jurisdiction, Southern Pac. Co. v. Stewart, 245 U. S. 359, 62 L. Ed. 345, 38 Sup. Ct. 130. On rehearing the Supreme Court, Southern Pac. Co. v. Stewart, 248 U. S. 446, 63 L. Ed. 350, 39 Sup. Ct. 139, sustained its jurisdiction and reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals. It is possible to show facts constituting notice in substance. The court here found that such facts had not been shown, quoting the charge of the trial court as follows: "I charge you as a matter of law that if you believe the defendant or its agents or employees did know that five or more of the cattle died while in transit, and also believe that the defendant was negotiating with the plaintiff for a settlement of his claim, and that the defendant knew that the cattle had been injured as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, then the plaintiff was relieved and released from the giving of such notice of loss or injury within ten days as required by the said provisions of said contracts." Discussing the charge, the court said: "Considering the principles and conclusions approved by our opinions in St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U. S. 592, 61 L. Ed. 917, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462, and Erie R. Co. v. Stone, 244 U. S. 332, 61 L. Ed. 1173, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633 (announced since the judgment below), and the cases therein cited, no extended discussion is necessary to show that upon the facts here disclosed the stipulation between the parties as to notice in writing within ten days of any claim for damages was valid. And we also think those opinions make it clear that the circumstances relied upon by the shipper are inadequate to show a waiver by the carrier of written notice as required by the contract. The trial court erred in giving to the jury the instruction quoted above; and it should have granted the carrier's request for a directed verdict."

See, in this connection, Snyder v. King, (Mich.) 165 N. W. 840, 1 A. L. R. 893 and a full note 1 A. L. R. 900, et seq., and Heath v. Sandersville R. Co., (Ga.) 98 S. E. 92; Babbitt v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 285 Ill. 267, 120 N. E. 803.

The rule extends the common-law liability to the initial carrier regardless of whether or not it caused the injury.Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Collins Produce Co., 235 Fed. 857, 149 C. C. A. 169; affirmed, holding that it is unnecessary to show that the injury was "caused by" a connecting line, same-styled case, 249 U. S. 186, 63 L. Ed. 552, 39 Sup. Ct. 189. Carriers may limit liability because of a lesser freight rate. Which, however, was before the passage of either Cummins amendment.-Moore v. Duncan, 237 Fed. 780, 150 C. C. A. 534. Initial carrier liable for a misdelivery.-King v. Barbarin, 249 Fed. 303, 161 C. C. A. 311. Provision for notice of injury to live stock in 10 days after unloading, construed, held valid and unwaivable.-Olson v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 250 Fed. 372, 162 C. C. A. 442. See Sou. Pac. Co. v. Stewart, 233 Fed. 956, 147 C. C. A. 630, holding that actual knowledge makes notice unnecessary, but as held by the Supreme Court on appeal, the knowledge must be definite. The measure of recovery for loss or injury is the value of the goods at the time and place where they should have been delivered.-MeCaull-Dinsmore Co. v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 252 Fed. 664; affirmed, Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 260 Fed. 835, 171 C. C. A. 561, 253 U. S. 97, 64 L. Ed. 801, 40 Sup. Ct. 504.

Notes of Decisions Rendered Since 1920.

Rule allowing interstate carrier to restrict liability relative to baggage, etc., does not apply to local transportation company.-Lawes v. New Orleans Transfer Co. (La.), 123 So. 144. Federal law and decisions construing such law controlling.Coos Bay Amusement Co. v. Am. Ry. Exp. Co. (Oreg.), 277 Pac. 107. Provision that holder of bill of lading not to be deprived of remedy applies to liability, not damage.-Clay v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 231 N. Y. S. 424, 224 App. Div. 508. Shipment to non-adjacent foreign country not within section.Lesser-Goldman Cotton Co. v. M. P. Ry. Co. (Mo.), 12 S. W.

(2d) 485; certiorari denied, 279 U. S. 855, 73 L. Ed. 997, 49 Sup. Ct. 351. Damage for loss of baggage occurring on intermediate line not recoverable from initial line where such line acted as agent only.-Ellsworth v. D., L. & W. R. Co., 236 N. Y. S. 289. Shipper's failure to give notice of injury to live stock before removal as required by contract of shipment held not to defeat recovery for loss due to carrier's negligence. -Hicklin v. C. of Ga. Ry. Co. (Ga.), 149 S. E. 286. Consignee entitled to market value of goods at destination for nondelivery rather than value f. o. b. shipping point.-N., C. & St. L. Ry. v. W. L. Halsey Gro. Co. (Ala.), 121 So. 16.

§ 559. All Carriers Parties to the Transportation Liable.— The statute has been regarded by some courts as fixing a new liability for the initial carrier, but leaving the connecting carriers subject only to the common-law liability. (See Judge Speer's opinion 239 Fed. 590, supra). The Supreme Court of Georgia in Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Yesbik, 146 Ga. 769, supra, held: "Where a bill of lading is issued by a railroad company for an interstate shipment over several connecting lines of railroad, the remedy, under that statute, of the holder of the bill of lading, for damages caused by delay in transporting the goods, is not exclusively against the initial carrier, but extends to all the connecting carriers over the lines of which the goods are transported. The liability is that imposed by the Act, as measured by the original contract of shipment so far as it is valid under the Act."

In Georgia F. & A. Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 15 Ga. App. 142, 82 S. E. 784, the Court of Appeals of Georgia said that "the action is nothing more than that of an action for damages against the delivering carrier.” (P. 147 of opinion.) The case was appealed to the Supreme Court where the facts showed that the shipment was interstate; that the Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. Co., was the initial carrier; that the Central of Ga. Ry. Co. transferred the shipment (flour) from one to another car; that the defendant, the delivering carrier, first delivered, without payment of the draft or surrender of the bill of lading, the flour to the party to be notified under the order bill of lading; that when this delivery was made the flour was wet; that the delivering carrier retook possession of the flour, and the Blish Milling Company, the consignor

and holder of the bill of lading, refused to accept the damaged flour and sued the delivering carrier. When the flour became wet or what particular carrier caused the damage does not appear from the facts stated in the opinion. The railroad contended: "1st. That the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was against the initial carrier, the Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Company, under the Carmack amendment of Section 20 of the Hepburn bill." The Supreme Court said: "The first contention is met by repeated decisions of this court. The connecting carrier is not relieved from liability by the Carmack amendment, but the bill of lading required to be issued by the initial carrier upon an interstate shipment governs the entire transportation, and thus fixes the obligations of all participating carriers to the extent that the terms of the bill of lading are applicable and valid.”—Georgia F. & A. R. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190, 194, 195, 60 L. Ed. 948, 36 Sup. Ct. 541, citing Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, supra, where the court said: "The liability of any carrier in the route over which the articles were routed, for loss or damage, is that imposed by the Act as measured by the original contract of shipment, so far as it is valid under the Act." In citing the Blish case, supra, Judge Hand refers to a long list of cases and says: "A connecting or terminal carrier's liability is subject to the same rules as the initial carrier's."-Lysaght v. Lehigh V. R. Co., 254 Fed. 351, 353. While the language used by Mr. Justice Hughes in the Blish Milling Company case supports the opinion of Mr. Justice Fish of the Supreme Court of Georgia, it would seem that when other than the initial carrier is sued there must be proof, actual or presumptive, that the defendant caused the injury. In the Blish Milling Company case the law presumed that when the delivering carrier received the freight it was in good condition; and, therefore, when it delivered the freight to the consignee in bad condition presumably it caused the damage. This presumption, there being no evidence to, the contrary, was sufficient to support jurisdiction in the Georgia case. Section applies to a terminal carrier holding possession as a warehouseman.-Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Dettlebach, 239 U. S. 588, 60 L. Ed. 453, 36 Sup. Ct. 17; Southern R. Co. v. Prescott, 240 U. S. 632, 60 L. Ed. 836, 36 Sup. Ct. 469. See duty of terminal

carrier to notify consignee.-Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Or. Wash. R. & Nav. Co., 84 Or. 399, 165 Pac. 363, 4 A. L. R. 1275. Damages anywhere in route comprehended by section. -New York P. & N. R. Co. v. Peninsula Produce Ex., 240 U. S. 34, 60 L. Ed. 511, 36 Sup. Ct. 230. Notice of claim to an officer or station agent of delivering carrier sufficient.— Northern P. Ry. Co. v. Wall., 241 U. S. 87, 60 L. Ed. 905, 36 Sup. Ct. 493. Provision requiring a claim to be filed within four months after delivery valid.-Georgia F. & A. R. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190, 60 L. Ed. 948, 36 Sup. Ct. 541. Prior to Cummins amendment limiting value of live stock valid.-Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319, 60 L. Ed. 1022, 36 Sup. Ct. 555. Loss of baggage controlled by section.-N. Y. C. & H. R. Co. v. Beaham, 242 U. S. 148, 61 L. Ed. 210, 37 Sup. Ct. 43. "Lawful holder" defined.-P. R. Co. v. Olivit Bros., 243 U. S. 574, 61 L. Ed. 908, 37 Sup. Ct. 468. Cannot limit liability for unusual delay.

Boston & M. R. Co. v. Piper, 246 U. S. 439, 62 L. Ed. 820, 38 Sup. Ct. 354. Section does not apply to injuries to passengers.-Chicago, R. I. & P. R. v. Maucher, 248 U. S. 359, 63 L. Ed. 294, 39 Sup. Ct. 108; Clark v. Sou. Pac. Ry. Co., 119 N. E. 539. Contra, Gray v. Col. So. Ry. Co., 204 S. W. 347. Ten days' provision for notice not waived under the facts here.-So. Pac. Co. v. Stewart, 248 U. S. 446, 63 L. Ed. 350, 39 Sup. Ct. 139. Five days' provision for notice valid.-B. & O. R. Co. v. Leach, 249 U. S. 217, 63 L. Ed. 570, 39 Sup. Ct. 254; Erie R. Co. v. Stuart, 250 U. S. 465, 63 L. Ed. 1088, 39 Sup. Ct. 519. Under the statute as now written a provision for less than 90 days' notice is invalid. Limitation in bill of lading of time in which to sue not affected by estoppel.-Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Leatherwood, 250 U. S. 478, 63 L. Ed. 1096, 39 Sup. Ct. 517. Consignee liable for freight and railroad cannot be estopped from collecting proper freight charge. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577, 63 L. Ed. 1151, 40 Sup. Ct. 27. This rule, it is believed, had no application where a consignor prepaid the freight and there was no obligation of the consignee to pay any charges. Section 429, supra, now makes it the duty of carriers to collect charges before delivering the freight.

The statute, as amended, makes both the initial and deliver

« ПредишнаНапред »