wherein is the residence of the party upon whose petition or for whose benefit the order was made, and also in the district "in which is located the principal operating office of the carrier, or through which the road of the carrier runs. 1445 This venue is special and applies only to the cases named. Suits under the general jurisdiction of the District Courts must be brought in the district whereof the defendant is an inhabitant or when jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant.446 445 Sec. 521, post. 446 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Illinois, 245 I. S. 493, 62 L. Ed. 425, 38 Sup. Ct. 170; Judicial Code, Sections 24, 51, 207, 208 (U. S. C. A., Title 28, 41, 112, 46); Section 369, ante. 397. Breaking Seals of Railroad Cars Containing Interstate or Foreign Com merce. 398. Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles Prohibited. 399. Child-Labor Law. § 387. Scope of Chapter. The general purpose of this work is to state the law governing the transportation of freight and passengers. It is not a treatise on the general law of the carriers, nor is it a discussion of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States. These questions are incidentally involved, but the main purpose of the work is to treat of the rights of shippers and carriers which arise out of, relate to, or are affected by the acts of Congress. Of these acts, the Act to Regulate Commerce, the amendments thereof and supplements thereto, including the Elkins law, which are now collectively referred to as the Interstate Commerce Act, are the most important. These acts are herein copied and annotated. (See chapter XI.) The so-called Anti-Trust Statutes, being the Act of July 2, 1890, and known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of Oct. 15, 1914, known as the Clayton Act, do affect carriers, and the Clayton Act expressly confers jurisdiction on the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Twenty-Eight Hour Law directly affects the questions discussed in this book and that statute is discussed in Chapter XII, post. A knowledge of the other statutes hereinafter referred to is sometimes necessary to a clear understanding of the questions affecting the rights and duties of carriers engaged in interstate transportation. Some of these statutes are inserted in the appendices. § 388. Quarantine Laws Relating to Transportation.— Health and quarantine laws generally have little relation to rail carriers, although by Sec. 3 of the Act of 1890 it was made a misdemeanor for any common carrier to violate any quarantine laws of the United States.1 By the Act of March 3, 1905, railroad companies and carriers and masters of steam vessels or other vessels or boats are prohibited from receiving for transportation and from transporting in interstate commerce cattle or other live-stock except in conformity to the Act, and it is provided that the Secretary of Agriculture shall make and promulgate rules and regulations governing such transportation. Meat inspection is provided for by the Act of 1907, and the transportation in interstate commerce of "any carcasses or parts thereof, meat or other meat products which have not been inspected, examined and marked 'Inspected and passed' in accordance with terms of (said) this Act, and with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture," is prohibited. In the agricultural appropriation Act of 1908, the Act of 1907 is extended to include "dairy products." The Bureau of Animal Industry, a bureau of the Department of Agriculture, has charge of making, promulgating and enforcing regulations under these statutes, and the Act of 19133 1 Act March 27, 1890, Ch. 51, 26 Stat. 31. See, also, for health and quarantine laws relating to vessels, 3 Fed. Stat. Ann. pp. 214, 228. See also Sec. 6 Act March 3, 1905, Ch. 1496, 33 Stat. 1264, 10 Fed. Stat. Ann. 37, Comp. Stat. 1916, Vol. 8, Sections 9156 et seq. 2 Act March 3, 1905, Ch. 1496, 33 Stat. 1264, 10 Fed. Stat. Ann. 37, Act March 4, 1907, Ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1260. Meat Inspection Act, Act March 1909, p. 46. See Sec. 484, May 23, 1908, Ch. 192 Fed. Stat. Ann. Supp. 1909, p. 92. See also Acts May 29, 1884, 23 Stat. 31; March 3, 1891, March 2, 1895, 1 Fed. Stat. Ann. 448, February 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 791. Regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture have the force of a statute, States v. Peet, 80 Vt. 449, 68 Atl. 661. 3 Act March 4, 1913, 37 Stat., pt. I, C. 831, Comp. Stat. 1916, Vol. 8, Sections 9128 et seq. The Supreme Court held that a carrier receiving the cattle from a connecting carrier at a point outside the quarantine district was not within the provisions of the act of 1905.-United States v. B. & O. S. W. Ry. Co., 222 U. S. 8, 56 L. Ed. 68, 32 Sup. Ct. 6, and this act of 1913 apparently was introduced to meet this decision. An ordinance prohibiting the shipment of uninspected makes all the provisions of the Act of 1905 "apply to any railroad company or other common carrier whose road or line forms any part of a route over which cattle or other live-stock are transported in the course of shipment from any quarantined state or territory or the District of Columbia, or from the quarantined portion of any" such state, territory or district. Regulations have been issued under authority of these statutes which prescribe in detail the rules to which the carriers must conform. The Acts of Congress relating to federal quarantine are compiled with the regulations prescribed by the United States Department of Agriculture in Bureau of Animal Industry general orders. § 389. Sherman Anti-Trust Law. The Sherman AntiTrust Act was at first construed as not applying to carriers. This question was definitely settled in Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. case. In this case the court said: "The language of the act includes every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations. So far as the very terms of the statute go, they apply to any contract of the nature described. A contract therefore that is in restraint of trade or commerce is by the strict language of the act prohibited even though such contract is entered into between competing carriers by railroad and only for the purposes of thereby affecting traffic rates, for the transportation of persons and property. The point urged on the defendant's part is that the statute was not really intended to reach that kind of an agreement relating only to traffic rates entered into by competing common carriers by railroad; that it was intended to reach only those who were engaged in the manufacture or milk in interstate commerce, was held valid. Adams v. City of Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572, 57 L. Ed. 971, 33 Sup. Ct. 610. Same-styled case, 144 Wis. 371, 129 N. W. 518, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1066. To same effect see Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251, 52 L. Ed. 778, 28 Sup. Ct. 485 and Note 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 279; United States v. Penn. 4 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso., 166 U. S. 290, 41 L. Ed. 1007, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, 1 Fed. AntiTrust Dec. 648. sale of articles of commerce, and who by means of trusts, combinations and conspiracies were engaged in affecting the supply or the price or the place of manufacture of such articles. The terms of the act do not bear out such construction. Railroad companies are instruments of commerce, and their business is commerce itself." This ruling was followed in the joint-traffic case.5 8 That a violation of this Act in increasing rates was a proper matter to be considered when complaint was brought against such rates, was determined in the Tift case. The Amendment of June 18, 1910, placing the burden of proof on the carriers to show that rates increased after January 1, 1910, are just and reasonable applies the same burden which the Commission held resulted when rates were increased as an effect of an unlawful combination. However, interstate carriers could not by consolidation or combination create a dominating control and thereby unduly restrict or suppress competition in transportation. In establishing through routes and joint rates, a common carrier may not with the intent and result of eliminating competition select one carrier and exclude others." Where a carrier had established a wharf as a public terminal station for the delivery of coal, it could not lawfully contract granting the exclusive right to a single tug to dock and undock vessels thereat.10 While such a contract might not be illegal under the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act prohibiting undue discrimination, the Anti-Trust Statutes and such provisions have as one common object the requirement that no undue or unjust prefer 5 United States V. Joint Traffic Asso., 171 U. S. 505, 43 L. Ed. 259, 19 Sup. Ct. 25, 1 Fed. Anti-Trust Dec. 869. 6 Tift v. Southern Ry. Co., 138 Fed. 753, 2 Fed. Anti-Trust Dec. 733; Tift v. S. Ry. Co., 10 I. C. C. 548. 7 Sec. 100 and 112, ante; post, 495. 8 United States v. Union P. R. Co., 226 U. S. 61, 57 L. Ed. 124, 33 Sup. Ct. 53; United States v. Reading Co., 226 U. S. 324, 57 L. Ed. 243, 33 Sup. Ct. 90. 9 United States v. Pacific & A. Ry. & Nav. Co., 228 U. S. 87, 57 L. Ed. 742, 33 Sup. Ct. 433. 10 Baker-Whitley Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 188 Fed. 405, 110 C. C. A. 234, reversing same-styled case, 176 Fed. 632, and citing and discussing cases, distinguishing Weems Steamboat Co. v. Peoples Co., 214 U. S. 345, 53 L. Ed. 1024, 29 Sup. Ct. 661, and Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. West Coast Naval Stores Co., 198 U. S. 483, 49 L. Ed. 1135, 25 Sup. Ct. 745. |