of another road.10 For the transportation over its tracks the carrier performing the service is entitled to reasonable compensation.11

The provision of Transportation Act, 1920, under which joint use of terminals may be required supersedes the former law prohibiting the requirement that a carrier should be compelled to give the use of its terminals. Under the Amendment the use of terminals are not given; but may, in analogy to the right of eminent domain, be opened to a joint use upon fair compensation.

§ 239. Industrial Switches and Railways.—The jurisdiction of the Commission to require switch connections includes the power and imposes the duty to regulate such connections. Many industries own private switch-tracks connecting with a carrier; some of the tracks privately owned have developed so far as to become incorporated as railways. That connections may, in proper cases, be required to be made by the carriers with these industrial tracks or industrial railways has been shown in the preceding section. When such connections are made, cars are delivered from the line of the carrier to the industrial track or railway, and sometimes the line carrier delivers incoming cars over and takes outgoing cars from the plant tracks. Obviously, such delivery and receipt of cars is valuable to the industry and costs the carrier something. Carriers have made allowances from their rates to such industries or to their subsidiary railways in the form of rate divisions, per-diem reclaims, remission of car demurrage and furnace allowances, and have performed services without additional charges over the line-haul rate by placing cars at points on the tracks or railways of the industry.

These allowances and remissions were discussed by the

10 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Com., 231 U. S. 457, 58 L. Ed. 310, 34 Sup. Ct. 152; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Com., 236 U. S. 615, 59 L. Ed. 750, 35 Sup. Ct. 422; Penn. Co. v. U. S., 236 U. S. 351, 59 L. Ed. 616, 35 Sup. Ct. 370; Ill.

Cent. R. Co. v. Railroad Com. of La., 236 U. S. 157, 59 L. Ed. 517, 35 Sup. Ct. 275.

11 So. Ry. Co. v. St. Louis Hay & Grain Co., 214 U. S. 297, 53 L. Ed. 1004, 29 Sup. Ct. 678.

Commission in the First Industrial Railways case12 and held to be illegal.

"Spotting cars," in so far as the phrase has a definite meaning, is the service performed by a line-haul carrier of placing or receiving cars for a plant beyond the point of interchange between the rails of the carrier and the tracks of the industry, and, as such practice is so defined, it was held illegal unless a reasonable charge was made for the service.1

13

In prior sections, it has been shown that allowances, sometimes called absorptions, at other times called divisions, are not unlawful.14

§ 240. Switch Connections with Carriers by Water-The Panama Canal Act gives jurisdiction to the Commission over interstate transportation "by rail and water through the Panama Canal or otherwise," and "of the carriers, both by rail and by water, which may or do engage in the same," and gives the Commission power to establish physical connections between the lines of the rail carrier and the dock of the water carrier at which interchange of passengers or property is to be made when such "connection is reasonably practicable,' and "can be made with safety to the public, and the amount of business to be handled is sufficient to justify the outlay.''15

12 Industrial Railways Case, 29 I. C. C. 212.

13 Industrial Railways Case, 29 I. C. C. 212, 234. Spotting was defined in a tariff suspended by the Commission as "service beyond a reasonable convenient point of exchange." In a brief it was defined as "placing a car at a particular spot." See also Alan Wood Iron & Steel Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 22 I. C. C. 540; National Tube Co. v. Lake Tex. R. Co., 56 I. C. C. 272.

14 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Com. Com., 188 Fed. 229 and 929, Opinion Commerce Court No. 2, p. 3, enjoining the order of the Commission in Associated Jobbers of Los Angeles v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 18 I. C. C. 310. Commerce

Court reversed, Interstate Com. Com. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 234 U. S. 294, 58 L. Ed. 1319, 34 Sup. Ct. 814; Secs. 180, 181, ante. Tap Line Cases, 234 U. S. 1, 58 L. Ed. 1185, 34 Sup. Ct. 741; Manufacturers' Railway Co. v. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 32 I. C. C. 578; Industrial Railways Case, 32 I. C. C. 129; Car Ferry Allowance at Cheboygan, 32 I. C. C. 578; Trap or Ferry Car Service Charges, 34 I. C. C. 516; Second Industrial Railways Case, 34 I. C. C. 596; Car Spotting Charges, 34 I. C. C. 609; Manufacturer's R. Co. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457, 62 L. Ed. 831, 38 Sup. Ct. 383. Sections 180 and 181, ante.

15 Act March 24, 1912; Sec. 468, post.

It was argued before the Commission that the words "or otherwise" modified the phrase "by rail and water” and not the phrase "through the Panama Canal." This construction was not adopted and it was held that by reason of the words. "or otherwise" the Commission had jurisdiction to establish through routes and joint rates between rail carriers and water carriers, those operating through the Canal and those operating on other waters. Not to adopt the construction given the statute by the Commission would leave the words "or otherwise" mere surplusage, to do which would violate the fundamental canons of statutory construction.16

The change made by Transportation Act, 1920, in this provision makes more specific than the old law, the dock at which interchange may be required. Paragraph (4) of Section 15, as amended, provided, as the Commission had already held in the Baltimore and Carolina Steamship case (Note 16, supra) that the short-haul limitation of Section 15 did not apply when one of the connecting "carriers is a water line."

§ 241. Through Routes. It is made the duty of the carriers subject to the Act "to establish through routes.''17

The Commission may, after hearing on a complaint, establish through routes and joint rates as the maximum to be charged and prescribe the division of such rates and the terms and conditions under which such through routes shall be operated, when that may be necessary to give effect to any provision of the Act, and the carriers complained of have refused or neglected voluntarily to establish such through routes and joint rates. This jurisdiction exists when one of the carriers is a water line.

The Panama Canal Act, as shown in the preceding section, extended the power of the Commission over transportation by water and also gave the Commission power to establish

16 Augusta & Savannah Steamboat Co. v. Ocean Steamship Co., 26 I. C. C. 380, 385; Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. Central R. Co., of New Jersey, 35 I. C. C. 488; Decatur Navigation Co. v. L. & N. R. Co., 31 I. C. C. 281; Bowling Green Bus. Men's Protective

Asso. v. L. & N. R. Co., 31 I. C. C. 1; Pacific Nav. Co. v. S. P. Co., 31 I. C. C. 472; Port Huron & Duluth S. S. Co. v. P. R. Co., 35 I. C. C. 475; Baltimore & Carolina S. S. Co. v. A. C. L. R. Co., 49 I. C. C. 176, 179. 17 Sec. 1 of Act; Sec. 404, post.

through routes and maximum joint rates between and over such rail and water lines, and to determine all the terms and conditions under which such lines shall be operated in the handling of the traffic embraced.1

18

The Amendment of June 18, 1910, omitted from the statute the words, "provided no reasonable or satisfactory through route exists." Under the old law, the non-existence of a reasonable or satisfactory through route was jurisdictional, and where there was such through route the Commission had no power to order another.19

Under the old law, it was said:

“It may be laid down as a general rule, admitting of no qualification, that a manufacturer or merchant who has traffic to move and is ready to pay a reasonable rate for the service, has a right to have it moved and to have reasonable rates established for the movement regardless of the fact that the revenues of the carrier may be reduced by reason of its competition with other shippers in the same market; and he has the right also to have the benefit of through routes and reasonable joint rates to such distant markets if no reasonable or satisfactory through route already exists.20

A limitation as to the character of the through route was prescribed by the Amendment of 1910 by the provision that no company without its consent should be required to embrace in such route substantially less than the entire length of its railroad and of any intermediate railroads operated in con

18 Act of August. 24, 1912; Sees. 467, 468, post; Augusta & Savannah Steamboat Co. v. Ocean Steamship Co., 26 I. C. C. 380; Truckers Transfer Co. v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co., 27 I. C. C. 275. See also Note 16, ante.

19 Interstate Com. Com. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 216 U. S. 538, 54 L. Ed. 608, 30 Sup. Ct. 417; Enterprise Transportation Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 12 I. C. C. 326; Enterprise Transportation Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 16 I. C. C. 219, 222; Southern Cali

fornia Sugar Co. v. San Pedro, L. A. & R. Co., 19 I. C. C. 6; Cedar Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 17 I. C. C. 479; Spring Hill Coal Co. v. Erie R. Co., 18 I. C. C. 508; Pacific Coast Lumber Mnfg. Assn. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 14 I. C. C. 51, 53.

20 Cardiff Coal Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 13 I. C. C. 460. As sustaining the text see P. R. Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 351, 59 L. Ed. 616, 35 Sup. Ct. 370.

junction and under a common management or control therewith.21

By the Transportation Act, 1920, this limitation does not apply when one of the carriers is a water carrier.22

While the limitation is stated positively, a carrier could not use it to discriminate in violation of other provisions of the Act,23 nor is it a protection to the carrier in charging an unreasonable rate between two given points. It means that a carrier shall not be deprived of a haul which it is capable of providing by a reasonably direct route.24 Other than this limitation under the law as it now exists, the Commission has discretionary power.25

The Commission refused to establish a through route with tugs and barges operated by the owner of practically the whole freight which would use the route if one were established;20 but the mere fact that only one shipper may at the outset use the connection does not prevent the connection from having a public purpose.27

The Commission having no jurisdiction of railroads and steamship lines located, owned and operated entirely in an adjacent foreign country, it cannot establish through routes therewith.28

Agreements between connecting railways and steamship

pealed. For report of the Commission in the same case see: Crane Iron Works v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 17 I. C. C. 514; and Crane R. Co. v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 248.

26 Gulf Coast Navigation Co. v. Kansas City Sou. Ry. Co., 19 I. C. C. 544.

27 Union Lime Co. v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 233 U. S. 211, 58 L. Ed. 924, 34 Sup. Ct. 522; Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. C. of N. J. Ry. Co., 35 I. C. C. 488.

28 Humboldt Steamship Co. V. White Pass & Yukon Route, 25 I. C. C. 136.