considered. It is, however, occasionally observed that particular localities are, to some extent, preferentially served by the action of carriers who resist proposed changes in the classification for the reason that, in their opinion, they will operate to the prejudice of certain patrons. Thus exceptions to the classification are created by a road continuing to carry some articles at one class, while, in the opinion of a majority of the roads using the classification, the articles could well stand a higher rating." § 171. Uniform Classification.-Efforts to obtain uniformity in the classification of commodities have been made since the date of the original Act to Regulate Commerce, and probably even before that date. Beginning at page 453 of Volume 25 of the Interstate Commerce Commission Reports is given a history of these efforts since 1887. In the same case in which that history is given the Commission stated some principles which should be applied to all attempts to reach uniformity. Says the Commission: "The making of a freight classification is a great public function," and further: "No great reform like classification reform, which touches every interest in the country, can ever hope to be carried into effect without causing disturbances, annoyance, and opposition, and some injustice. It is therefore especially important that before a classification committee publishes new rules, descriptions, packing requirements, and ratings, full public hearings shall have previously been given after sufficient notice. It is not necessary to hear everybody. In making a classification that would mean endless repetition and interminable controversy without ever reaching a conclusion. Rather is it important to hear everything. In other words a body of experts in classification should hear and know everything and then form their conclusions.''119 We now have three general classifications published under the same cover: First. The official classification, which, speaking generally, applies north of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers and east of Chicago and the Mississippi River. 119 Re Western Classification, 25 I. C. C. 442, 450, 451, et seq.; Western Trunk Line Rules, 34 I. C. C. 554. See also Sections 84, 85, ante. Second. Southern classification, applying generally to the territory south of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers and east of the Mississippi River. Third. The western classification, applying to that territory west of the Mississippi River not included in the other two classifications. Besides the three general classifications referred to there are minor classifications in some special territories, such as Illinois classification territory, and in some of the states. Progress has been made towards uniformity of classification by the decisions in the Consolidated Classification case120 and the Perishable Freight Investigation.121 This uniformity should be reached separately from any question of the measure of rates. When the carriers seek so to change the classification as to raise rates, the fact that uniformity may also be accomplished will not justify an otherwise unjustified rate.122 § 172. Power of Commission over Classification.-The Commission has the power to prohibit a classification that works a discrimination. This power was exercised by the Commission and a forcible and illustrative opinion written by Mr. Commissioner Knapp in Procter & Gamble v. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co.123 This order of the Commission was enforced.124 The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice White delivering the opinion, concluded the discussion of the question by saying: "Whatever might be the rule by which to determine whether an order of the Commission was too general where the case with which the order dealt involved simply a dis 120 Consolidated Classification Case, all of Vol. 54 I. C. C. 121 Perishable Freight Investigation, 56 I. C. C. 449. 122 National Society of Record Assn. v. A. & R. R. Co., 40 I. C. C. 347, 356; Associated Railway Classification Exceptions 41 I. C. C. 561. Commodity rates may be higher than class rates, although this is unusual. Sulphuric Acid from New Orleans, 42 I. C. C. 200, 202 and cases cited; Warren, Webster & Co. v. P. & Ry. Co., 38 I. C. C. 499. 123 Procter & Gamble v. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co., 9 I. C. C. 440. 124 Cincinnati H. & D. Ry. Co. v. Int. Com. Com., 206 U. S. 142, 51 L. Ed. 995, 27 Sup. Ct. 648. crimination as against an individual, or a discrimination or preference in favor of or against an individual or specific commodity or commodities or localities, or as applied to territory subject to different classifications, we think it is clear that the order made in this case was within the competency of the Commission, in view of the nature and character of the wrong found to have been committed and the redress which that wrong necessitated. Finding, as the Commission did, that the classification, by percentage of common soap in less than carload lots operating throughout official classification territory, brought about a general disturbance of the relations previously existing in that territory, and created discriminations and preferences among manufacturers and shippers of the commodity and between localities in such territory, we think the Commission was clearly within the authority conferred by the Act to Regulate Commerce in directing the carriers to cease and desist from further enforcing the classification operating such results." The subject is one which involves so many facts that only the general principles come within the purview of this book. In a report of nearly two hundred pages the Commission has discussed the subject, cited illustrative decisions, given the history of efforts for uniform classification, and announced applicable principles.125 § 173. Milling in Transit.-The Interstate Commerce Act in force prior to the Amendment of June 29, 1906, was construed as giving the Commission no power to compel carriers to grant the privilege known as milling in transit.126 This privilege is described and its legality discussed by Mr. Commissioner Prouty as follows:127 "Generally in its application the raw material pays the local rate into the point of manufacture; when afterwards the manufactured product goes forward it is transported upon a rate which would be applicable to that product had it 125 Re Western Classification, 25 I. C. C. 442, 609. See also Interior 126 Diamond Mills Co. v. Boston & M. R. Co., 9 I. C. C. 311. 127 Central Yellow Pine Assn. v. Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co., 10 I. C. C. 19, 213, 214. originated in its manufactured state at the point where the raw material was received for transportation, whatever has been paid into the mill being accounted for in this final adjustment. Under this or some equivalent arrangement at the present time grain of all kinds is milled and otherwise treated in transit; flour is blended, cotton is compressed, lumber is dressed and perhaps otherwise manufactured; live stock is stopped off to test the market. "It may be argued with much force that the Act to Regulate Commerce does not sanction arrangements of this kind and the Commission early in its history intimated that such might finally be its conclusion.-Crews v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 1 I. C. C. Rep. 401, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 703. Such practices were, however, in use to a considerable extent at the time of the passage of the act and since then they have become universal. To abrogate these privileges would be to confiscate thousands and probably millions of dollars in value by rendering worthless industrial plants which have been constructed upon the faith of their continuation. Nor is it a forced construction of the statute to hold that when the product finally goes forward to the point of consumption it but completes the journey upon which it entered when the raw material was taken up. There can be no doubt that the application of this principle has cheapened the cost of transportation and probably of manufacture. The commission finally held, In re Unlawful Rates in the Transportation of Cotton, 8 I. C. C. Rep. 121, that cotton might be compressed in transit.' 99 The Commission has said:128 "The stopping of a commodity in transit for the purpose of treatment or reconsignment is in the nature of a special privilege which the carrier may concede, but which the shipper cannot, in the present state of the law, demand as a matter of lawful right. Carriers may not, however, discriminate between markets nor between individuals in the granting of such privileges.' In the Diamond Mills case, supra, the Commission said: "A 128 St. Louis Hay & Grain Co. v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 11 I. C. C. R. 90, 101. complete system of interstate railway regulation would probably give the regulating body authority to determine when privileges of this kind should be accorded, and upon what terms, for they all enter into and are really part of the rate." The Hepburn Amendment has given to the Commission the right and power to regulate these matters. Section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act as it now exists129 provides: "The term 'transportation' shall include all instruments and all and facilities of shipment or carriage services in connection with the receipt, delivery, elevation, and transfer in transit * ** * storage and handling of property transported," and it shall be the duty of every carrier subject to the provisions of this act to provide and furnish such transportation upon reasonable request therefor, and to establish through routes and just and reasonable rates applicable thereto. Under this amended law the Commission has required milling in transit to be extended so as to prevent discrimination.130 In the Western Rate Advance case of 1915,131 it appeared that the grain rates then sought to be advanced were sufficiently high, and that the flour rates which were the proportional or remainder of the through rates were too low. The carriers having offered their proof on the theory that the milling-in-transit privilege should continue, it was pointed out by the Commission that the owner of the grain who paid the high local rate to the mill or the market should not have his rates increased because the remainder of the through rate was too low. § 174. Rebilling or Reshipping.-Rebilling or reshipping is a privilege granted to certain markets and consists of the right to ship a commodity from the point where it is produced to a distributing market where the shipper may unload, sort and clean the commodity, thereafter shipping the same amount of the same kind of commodity to his customers, not at the local rate from the distributing point to the final destination, but at the remainder of the through rate. Com 129 Post, Sec. 401. 130 Southern Illinois Millers' Assn. v. L. & N. R. Co., 23 I. C. C. 672, 678. 131 Western Rate Advance Case 1915, 35 I. C. C. 497; Nashville Flower Transit Rules, 41 I. C. C. 483, 490. |