wise handled as a carload, and no minimum carload weight is legally provided, the carload rate, if it makes less than the 1. c. 1. rate, must be applied on the actual weight. It lies in the power of a carrier to protect its revenue by fixing, in the manner provided by law, minimum weights to be applicable under its published carload rates. If it fails to take this precaution we think it imposes no hardship upon it to give a shipper the benefit of the carload rate on the actual weight of the shipment tendered as a carload, whether it be more or less than an ordinary carload quantity."645 If the rate is for a carload, the greater the load the less the rate on each one hundred pounds, and the less the load the greater the rate a hundred. So "the minimum carload weight is a factor in determining the carload rate."646 § 122. Train-Load Rates.-The carload is a reasonable and practicable unit of quantity that may properly be adopted in determining rates. Perhaps logically the train-load might also be considered, but in the actual movement of commodities the train-load rarely occurs, and to adopt as a unit of quantity the train-load would benefit very few shippers and would discriminate against a large number. Practicable units must be observed.647 So, it has been said that lower rates by the hundred pounds for train-loads than for carloads should not be established.48 Applying the same principle, a rate on one hundred or one hundred thousand cars should not be less by the car than on one car.649 645 1915 Western Advance Rate Case, 35 I. C. C. 497; Chicago Wool Co. v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 40 I. C. C. 101; Southeastern Cotton Goods, 43 I. C. C. 530, 536; Consolidated Classification Case, 54 I. C. C. 8. 646 Sunderland Bros. Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 18 I. C. C. 425, 426. 647 Georgia Fruit Exchange V. Southern Ry. Co., 20 I. C. C. 623, 630; Kansas City Hay Dealers Assn. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 14 I. C. C. 597, 603; Western Rate Advance Case 1915, 35 I. C. C. 497. 648 Planters Compress Co. v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 11 I. C. C. 382; Paine Bros. Co. v. Lehigh V. R. Co., 7 I. C. C. 218; Richards v. 649 Carr V. Northern Pacific R. Co., 9 I. C. C. 1, 14; Woodward Bennett Co. v. S. P. L. A. & S. F. T. Co., 29 I. C. C. 664, 665, and cases cited; wholesale theory disapproved, Diamond Lumber Co. v. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 43 I. C. C. 65, 66; private Wire Contracts, 50 I. C. C. 731. § 123. Relation of Through Rates to the Sum of the Local Rates. In December, 1906, the Commission adopted and issued to all railroads the following ruling: "Reduction of Joint Rate to Equal Sum of Locals (effective December 21, 1906). Where a joint rate is in effect by a given route, which is higher between any points than the sum of the locals between the same points, by the same or any other route, and such joint rate has been in effect thirty days or longer, such higher joint rate may, until further notice from the commission, be changed by reducing the same to the sum of such locals, but not otherwise, upon posting one day in advance a tariff of such reduced rate and mailing a copy thereof to the commission. "Many informal complaints are received in connection with regularly-established through rates which are in excess of the sum of the locals between the same points. The Commission has no authority to change or fix a rate except after full hearing upon formal complaint. It is believed to be proper for the Commission to say that, if called upon to formally pass upon a case of this nature, it would be its policy to consider the through rate, which is higher than the sum of the locals between the same points as prima facie unreasonable, and that the burden of proof would be upon the carrier to defend such higher through rate." The foregoing administrative order of the Commission furnishes a general rule which has been frequently enforced." 650 Laning-Harris Coal & Grain Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 13 I. C. C. 148, 159; Burnham, Hanna, Munger Dry Goods Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 14 I. C. C. 299; Kindel v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 15 I. C. C. 555; Randolph Lumber Co. v. Seaboard A. L. Ry. Co., 13 I. C. C. 601; Milburn Wagon Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 18 I. C. C. 144; Windsor Turned Goods Co. v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 18 I. C. C. 162; Wells-Higman Co. V. Grand Rapids & I. Ry. Co., 19 I. C. C. 487; 650 Webster Grocery Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 19 I. C. C. 493; and ordinarily the through rate should be somewhat less than the combination of locals, Jubitz v. Southern Pac. Co., 27 I. C. C. 44, 45; Washington Milling Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 27 I. C. C. 546, 549; Appalachia Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 25 I. C. C. 193, 194; Commercial Club of Mitchell, S. Dak. v. A. & W. Ry. Co., 46 J. C. C. 1, 7; Herrick Refrigerator & Cold Storage Co. v. C. G. W. R. Co., 46 I. C. C. 421. There have been and may be reasons which make the rule inapplicable.651 Carriers may not avoid the application of the general principle by making different minima on local and through shipments.652 The amended fourth section, making it unlawful "to charge any greater compensation on a through rate than the aggregate of the intermediate rates subject to the provisions" of the Interstate Commerce Act, makes statutory the prior rule frequently applied by the Commission. "Penalty Rates," that is, inbound rates part of a through haul higher if the outbound movement is over a line different from the one enjoying the inbound haul, are unlawful.65 § 124. Proportional Rates.-A proportional rate is but a part of a rate charged for the haul over a portion of the through route. In recognition of the fact that there has been paid or will be paid another or subsequent transportation charge, the proportional rate is usually lower than the local rate for the same haul. That such proportion may be less than the local over the intermediate line is but an application of the principle that usually a through rate is less than the sum of the locals. It is, therefore, obvious that there is nothing illegal of itself in a proportional rate, although such rate, like all other rates, must not be unreasonable and must not result in unjust discrimination or undue preference. The Commission, in defining and stating the principles applicable to proportional rates, said: "A proportional rate is nothing more or less than a separately-established rate, as that phrase is used in section 6 of the amended act, applicable to through transportation. And it has not been understood either by the Commission, or by others so far as we are informed, that a separately-established rate can be other than an open rate available to all. The sep 651 Coffeyville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 12 I. C. C. 498, 499; White Bros. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 17 I. C. C. 288; Winona Carriage Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 18 I. C. C. 334; Southeastern Lumber, 42 I. C. C. 548, 558. 652 Lull Carriage Co. v. K. & S. Ry. Co., 19 I. C. C. 15, 16. 653 Mobile Chamber of Commerce v. M. & O. R. Co., 32 I. C. C. 272; The Tap Line Case, 23 I. C. C. 549, 650; Red River Oil Co. v. T. & P. Ry. Co., 23 I. C. C. 438, 447. arately established or proportional rate is simply one way of making up the through charges between two points; but while we have made no criticism and, as at present advised, see no grounds for any criticism of proportional rates applicable only to through movements from a defined territory or group of points, we have never recognized as valid and, as at present advised, see no grounds upon which we could recognize as valid a proportional rate limited to shipments that come into the proportional rate point over the lines of a particular carrier. Proportional rates limited to through movements from defined territory, or from a group of points, seem to form a proper basis for making up through charges for transportation from those points and that territory. But a proportional rate, the use of which is limited to shipments over a particular line, would appear to be a rate that discriminates against shippers over another line. ''654 When the proportionals are unreasonable, the Commission may order, and has ordered, a reduction therein. Proportional rates should, as a rule, be less than corresponding local rates,655 and such rates have a value when they promote and preserve wholesome competition between producing centers.656 The shipper is not interested in the divisions of rates between the carriers unless the resultant through rate is unreasonable, and proportionals do not measure local rates.657 "Proportional Rates" as defined in the Panama Canal Act, retained in Transportation Act, 1920, are rates "which differ 654 Bascom Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 17 I. C. C. 354, 356, 357. See also Kansas City Transportation Bureau v. Atchison T. & F. Ry. Co., 16 I. C. C. 195, 201; Board of Trade of Kansas City v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 32 I. C. C. 297, 307; Commodity Rates to Pacific Coast Terminals, 32 I. C. C. 611, 632; Hocking Valley R. Co. v. Lackawana Coal & Lumber Cc., 224 Fed. 930; Stevens Grocery Co. v. St. L. I. M. & So. Ry. Co., 42 I. C. C. 396, 398; Iowa v. B. & O. R. Co., 46 I. C. C. 595, 599. 655 Greater Des Moines Committee v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 17 I. C. C. 54, 57; Ottumwa Commercial Assn. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 17 I. C. C. 413, 414. 656 R. R. Com. of Kansas v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 22 I. C. C. 407, 415. 657 Indianapolis Freight Bureau v. Cleveland, C. C. St. L. Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C.. 504, 512; Interior Iowa Cities Case, 28 I. C. C. 64, 73; Serry v. Sou. Pac. Co., 18 I. C. C. 554, 556; Scott Mayer Commission Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 28 I. C. C. 529, 532. from the corresponding local rates to and from the port and which apply only on traffic which has been brought to the port or is carried from the port by a common carrier.''658 Under this statute, the Commission established port-proportional rates less than the local rates, and it would seem, in view of former practices of the Commission, that it was the intention of Congress to require that relationship.65 § 125. Through Rates Must Not Exceed Aggregate of Intermediate Rates.-This Amendment to the fourth section of the original Act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act * to charge any greater compensation as a through rate than the aggregate of the intermediate rates subject to the provisions of this Act." It is further provided "that, upon application," authority may be given "to charge less for longer than for shorter distances," and the "Commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such designated common carriers may be relieved from the operation of this section."660 Does the authority to grant relief apply to the whole section or only to the long-and-short-haul clause thereof? Without the Amendment, the Commission had applied, as a general rule, the principle that joint through rates should not exceed the sum of the locals, and, if the statute does not make universal this rule, it means nothing.662 It would seem that Con 658 Sec. 469, post. 659 Baltimore & S. S. Co. v. A. C. L. R. Co., 49 I. C. C. 176. 660 Post, Sec. 401. 661 Sec. 123, ante; Mayfield & Grady Co. Commercial Club v. B. & O. R. Co., 48 I. C. C. 45, 55, 56. 662 The importance of this provision and the questions that will have to be determined thereunder make it of interest to insert here the House and Senate provisions, that comparison may be had between the section as passed and the provision in the Senate and House bills. Senate Bill: "That section four of the Act entitled 'An Act to regulate commerce,' approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, be amended by striking out the words 'under substantially similar circumstances and conditions,' where the same appear in said section four, and further amend said section four of said Act by striking out all of said section four, beginning with the words 'Provided, however,' and further amend said section four so that when amended it will read as follows: 'Sec. 4. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provision of this Act to charge or re |