Where, under authority of a state, a bridge has been erected over a navigable stream within the state, the owners, having erected such bridge with full knowledge of the paramount authority of Congress, cannot complain when, under authority of the federal government, such bridge is required to be removed as an obstruction to navigation.314 Nor is this rule different when the bridge has been erected under authority of an Act of Congress.315

A state court may not compel the removal of a bridge over a navigable stream, such bridge being used in interstate commerce.316

§ 55. Regulating Charges for Transportation by Water.— The Interstate Commerce Act applies317 "to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad (or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used under a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or ship

314 Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 51 L. Ed. 523, 27 Sup. Ct. 367, followed in Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177, 54 L. Ed. 435, 30 Sup. Ct. 306. See also, The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch, 11 U. S. 382, 3 L. Ed. 378; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 23 U. S. 1, 6 L. Ed. 253; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 36 L. Ed. 294, 12 Sup. Ct. 495; C. W., etc., R. Co. v. Com'rs, 1 Ohio St. 77; Moers v. City of Reading, 21 Pa. St. 188; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491, 498; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 48 L. Ed. 525, 24 Sup. Ct. 349; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 22 U. S. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23; Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269, 41 L. Ed. 996, 17 Sup. Ct. 578; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 45 L. Ed. 126, 21 Sup. Ct. 48; New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Com., 197 U. S. 453, 49 L. Ed. 831, 25 Sup. Ct. 471; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Drainage Com'rs, 200 U. S. 561, 50 L. Ed. 590, 26 Sup. Ct. 341; West Chicago

Street R. Co. v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 506, 50 L. Ed. 845, 26 Sup. Ct. 518; Dugan v. Bridge Co., 27 Pa. St. 303; Cooke v. Boston & L. R. Co., 133 Mass. 185; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Cluggish, 143 Ind. 347; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Smith, 61 Fed. 885; State of Indiana v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 83 Fed. 284, 287; St. L. I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 52 L. Ed. 1061, 28 Sup. Ct. 610; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Duluth, 208 U. S. 583, 52 L. Ed. 630, 28 Sup. Ct. 341.

315 Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194, 55 L. Ed. 699, 31 Sup. Ct. 603. The rule as to bridges would apply to dams, Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet., 27 U. S. 245, 7 L. Ed. 412; Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459, 24 L. Ed. 525.

316 Kansas City S. R. Co. v. K. W. Valley Drainage District, 233 U. S. 75, 58 L. Ed. 837, 34 Sup. Ct. 564.

317 Sec. 401, post, and the power granted by the Panama Canal Act. post, 468.

ment,) " and since the enactment of the Panama Canal Act to interstate transportation by water.

There is a transportation service which is performed by vessels over inland waters wholly within one state. When this transportation service is open to all who apply therefor, that those engaged therein are common carriers is too well settled to justify extensive citation of authorities.318 Being common carriers, the rates on intrastate transportation to be charged by them are subject to the same regulation by the states as rates for transportation by railroads.

The Constitution of the United States extends the judicial power of the courts of the United States "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, '319 and boats plying between points in the state are within this jurisdiction.320 This, however, does not exclude the states from regulating rates on intrastate transportation, although the transportation may be by water.321 There is nothing in the decision in The Daniel

318 Moses V. Bettes, 4 Heisk. (Tenn.) 661, 13 Am. Rep. 1; Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 21 How. 62 U. S. 7, 22, 23, 16 L. Ed. 41; Brown v. Clayton, 12 Ga. 564. In Hale v. New Jersey Navigation Co., 15 Conn. 539, 39 Am. Dec. 398, citing Judge Kent, the opinion classes inland carriers as "carriers by land or water."

319 Art. III, Sec. 2, Constitution United States.

320 The Belfast, 7 Wall., 74 U. S. 624, 19 L. Ed. 266; Aldrich v. Etna Co., 8 Wall., 75 U. S. 491, 19 L. Ed. 473; Tucker on the Constitution, Sec. 370.

321 State legislation regulating or prescribing methods of regulating common carriers show in many states a legislative construction supporting the text. As some states have no navigable streams, their failure to refer to water transportation is only natural. Alabama: carrier includes doing business "over any navigable stream in whole or in any part within the state or partly by rail and partly

by water; but nothing in this article shall be construed as a regulation of or interference with interstate commerce;" Code 1907, Sec. 5648. Arizona laws make no reference to water carriers; Sessions laws 1912, chap. 90. The same is true in Arkansas: Kirby's Digest 1904, Sees. 6002, 6280. California: "canal" companies are mentioned, and the Act includes "every common carrier," and common carrier comprehends owners of "any vessels regularly engaged in the transportation of persons or property for compensation upon the waters of this state or upon the high seas, over regular routes between points in this state;' Stat. 1911, 1st Ex. Sess., Chap. 14. Colorado: Νο mention of water carriers; laws 1910, Sp. Sess., chap. 5. Connecticut: includes all "common carriers" though no specific reference is made to water carriers; Acts 1911, chap. 128. Delaware: has no commission. Florida: includes in the definition of common carriers, “all companies and any per

Ball322 that militates against this rule. In that case, the commerce was interstate and the language of the opinion must be construed with reference to that fact, and Mr. Justice Field, in the course of the opinion, was careful to say that there was an intrastate commerce over which Congress had no control. He said:323

"There is undoubtedly an internal commerce which is subject to the control of the states. The power delegated to Congress is limited to commerce among the several states,' with foreign nations, and with the Indian tribes. This limitation necessarily excludes from federal control all commerce not thus designated, and of course that commerce which is carried on entirely within the limits of a state, and does not extend to or affect other states."

§ 56. Regulating Pilotage, Ports, Harbors and Vessels.Although state laws concerning pilotage are regulations of commerce, such laws fall within that class of powers which may be exercised by the states until Congress shall see fit to act.

The first Act of Congress on the subject left this right in the states and, although there have been other Acts of Congress relating to pilots, there is yet power in the states to make

specific statements are made giving power to regulate water carriers. The full extent of the power to regulate is not attempted to be set forth.

322 The Daniel Ball V. United States, 10 Wall., 77 U. S. 557, 19 L. Ed. 999.

323 The Daniel Ball is cited in the Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352, 399), and the location in the opinion of the citation indicates that the decision was considered by Mr. Justice Hughes as not excluding intrastate commerce. For a further discussion of the case see Sec. 73, post. The question of the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the constitutional provision quoted in the text is not involved in fixing a rate. As to jurisdiction, see

The Belfast, 7 Wall., 74 U. S. 624, 19 L. Ed. 266; The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U. S. 17, 35, 48 L. Ed. 73, 24 Sup. Ct. 8. See as to whether commerce is interstate or intrastate, citing The Daniel Ball, Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 82, 95, 47 L. Ed. 394, 23 Sup. Ct. 266; Pennsylvania R. Co., State of New York ex rel. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21, 27, 48 L. Ed. 325, 24 Sup. Ct. 202; and Wilmington Transp. Co. v. R. R. Com. of Cal., 236 U. S. 151, 59 L. Ed. 508, 35 Sup. Ct. 276. An ordinance fixing a rate of speed for boats in the Chicago river, was held not to interfere with the rights of navigation or with interstate commerce, Canada Atlantic Transit Co. v. City of Chicago, 210, Fed. 7, 125 C. C. A. 587.

regulations concerning pilots in their domestic ports, and many of them have such regulations.

A law of California requiring certain vessels entering and departing from her ports to take on a resident bar pilot was held valid by the Supreme Court for the reason that the law did not conflict with any federal statute or regulation, although the federal power to regulate was stated to be “unquestioned. ''324

A Louisiana statute prohibiting other than a duly-licensed pilot from piloting vessels on the Mississippi river within the borders of the state was held to be a valid law.325

While states may establish harbor lines on navigable waters, such lines have no permanent force as against the will of Congress and, therefore, congressional action supersedes prior state action.326

A law of the state of Alabama requiring the owners of steamboats navigating the waters of the state to file with a state officer certain information relating to the ownership of the boat and residence of the owners was held void, in so far as the law was brought to bear upon a vessel engaged in interstate commerce and licensed and enrolled under the Act of Congress for conducting the coasting trade.327 In this case, Mr. Justice Nelson stated the applicable principle as follows:

324 Anderson v. Pacific C. S. Co., 225 U. S. 187, 56 L. Ed. 1047, 32 Sup. Ct. 526, citing authorities, stating and giving the history of the federal laws on the subject. See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How., 53 U. S. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996. The Queen, 206 Fed. 148, 124 C. C. A. 214, reversing same styled case, 184 Fed. 537.

325 State v. Leech, 119 La. 522, 44 So. 285, 129 Am. St. Rep. 336; Leech v. Louisiana, 214 U. S. 175, 53 L. Ed. 956, 29 Sup. Ct. 552.

326 Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, Secy. of War, 223 U. S. 605, 56 L. Ed. 570, 32 Sup. Ct. 340.

V.

327 Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How., 63 U. S. 227, 16 L. Ed. 243; Foster Davenport, 22 How., 63 U. S. 244, 16 L. Ed. 248. For further statement of the principle controlling the questions discussed in the text and for citation of authorities see, Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352, 403, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 33 Sup. Ct. 729; and holding that tugs used in lightering vessels engaged in interstate merce were themselves instrumentalities of interstate commerce, see United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 208 Fed. 733, 217 Fed. 657.

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