Wherein the requifite Concurrence of moral Agents confifts. Our Species under a threefold Obligation, the first refpecting themselves, the fecond their Fellow-creatures, and the third, their Creator. Of the first of thefe, to wit, The due Care and Regulation of the mental and animal natures.

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HE requifite concurrence of moral agents, of whatever rank or order, or their conformity to the grand defign of the univerfal Governor, which is the ground-work of univerfal harmony, perfection, and happiness throughout the creation, confifts in their acting according to truth, rectitude, and propriety (in their re- · spective stations, whether higher or lower in the fcale of being, whether in ftates of difcipline, or reward) in all cafes or circumstances that regard either themselves, their fellow-beings, or their Creator. Whatever moral agent strictly and univerfally observes this rule, he is of that character, which we and all rational beings call good, is amiable in the fight of the Supreme judge of rectitude, and goodness; and it is as certain, that every fuch being must be finally happy, as that the nature of things is what it is, and that perfect wisdom and goodness muft act rightly in governing the world.

What makes the duty of fuch poor, shortfighted creatures as we are, who are yet but in the infancy of our being, is likewife the grand rule which every angel and archangel in heaven obferves. Nay, it would be blafphemy to think of the Supreme Governor of the universe, as conducting his immenfe and auguft oeconomy otherwise than according to the facred rule, which himself has prefcribed for the conduct of his reasonable creatures, and which is an attribute of his own infinitely perfect nature, I mean, immutable and eternal rectitude.

In what a light does this fhew the dignity of human nature! What may we yet cone to be? Made in the image of God himself! And taught to imitate his example! To what heights may we thus come to be raised? Would to God, we could be brought to confider our own importance! Did we fufficiently reverence ourselves, we fhould act a part worthy of the honours, for which our Creator gave us our being.

The rectitude of that part of our conduct, which regards ourfelves, confifts in the due care of our minds and our bodies, which two parts conftitute our whole nature in the prefent ftate.

Our mental powers are generally confidered under the heads of intelligence, and paffion. The office of the firft, to judge, and diftinguifh between what ought to be pursued, and what avoided; of the latter, to excite to action. Where thefe two capital powers of the mind hold each

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her proper place, where the understanding is faithfully exerted in the search of truth, and the active powers for attaining the real good of the creature, fuch a mind may be properly faid to be duly regulated, and in a good condition.

The proper exertion of the understanding is in enquiry into important truth; and that underftanding, which is furnished with extenfive and clear ideas of things, and enriched with useful and ornamental knowledge, is applied as the Divine wisdom intended every rational mind in the universe should be, if not in one state, yet in another; if not univerfally in a state of difcipline, as that we are now in, yet in a state of perfection, to which we hope hereafter to be raised. And whoever, in the present state, is bleft with the proper advantages for improving his mind with knowledge (as.natural capacity, leisure, and fortune) and neglects to use those advantages, will hereafter be found guilty of having omitted an important part of his duty.

Having in the foregoing book treated pretty copiously of the improvement and conduct of the understanding, there is the less occasion to enlarge upon that fubject in this place. Let us therefore proceed to confider wherein the rectitude of that part of our conduct, which regards the active powers of the mind, confifts.

In general, it is evident, that the will of every individual being in the universe ought to be effectually formed to an abfolute and implicit fubmiffion

fubmiffion to the difpofal of the universal Governor, which is faying, in other words, that every created being in the univerfe ought to study perfect rectitude in all his defires and wishes. He who defires any thing contrary to the Divine nature, and will, or to what is right and good, is guilty of rebellion against the Supreme governor of the universe.

The paffions, as they are commonly, but improperly called, of the human mind, are various, and fome of them of fo mixed and compounded a nature, that they are not eafily ranged under claffes. The following are the principal. Love, or complacence, or defire, whofe object is, whatever appears to us good, amiable, or fit for us, as God, our fellow-creatures, virtue, beauty. Joy, excited by happiness, real or imaginary, in poffeffion, or profpect. Sympathy, or a humane fense of the good or bad condition of our fellowcreatures; self-love; ambition, or defire of glory, true, or false; covetoufnefs; love of life; appetites of eating, drinking, recreation, fleeping, and mutual defires of the fexes; mirth; anger; harred; envy; malice; revenge; fear; jealousy; grief.

It is the whole foul, or whole man, that loves, hates, defires, or fears. Every paffion is a motion of the whole being, toward or from fome object, which appears to him either defirable or difagreeable. And objects appear to us defirable, or difagreeable, either from the real excellence our understanding perceives to be in them, as in vir

tue, beauty, proportion, and their contraries, as vice, deformity, and confufion; or from fome peculiar fitness, or congruity between the objects and our particular make, or caft of mind, which is the pure arbitrary effect of our make; as in the reciprocal love of the fexes, and the antipathy we have at certain creatures.

Now the Divine will, the dignity of our nature, and perfect rectitude, unite in requiring that every one of our paffions, and appetites be properly directed, and exerted in a proper manner and degree; not that they be rooted out and destroyed, according to the romantic notion of the antient Stoic philofophers. It is in many cafes equally unfuitable to the dignity of our nature, that the motions of our minds be too weak and languid, as that they be too strong and vigorous. We be as faulty in not fufficiently loving God and virtue, as in loving the vanities of this world too much.

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Previous to what may be more particularly obferved on the conduct of the natural inclinations or paffions of the mind, it may be proper briefly to mention fome general directions, which will be found of abfolute neceffity toward our undertaking the bufinefs of regulating our paffions with any reasonable profpect of fuccefs.

The first preparatory direction I shall give, is, To habituate ourselves as early, and as conftantly as poffible, to confideration.

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