society is equally entitled to be ranked among the natural and universal principles of our constitution. 124. How very powerfully this principle of action operates, appears from the effects of solitude upon the mind. We feel ourselves in an unnatural state; and, by making companions of the lower animals, or by attaching ourselves to inanimate objects, strive to fill up the void of which we are conscious. 125. The connexion between the Desire of Society and the Desire of Knowledge is very remarkable. The last of these principles is always accompanied with a wish to impart our information to others;-insomuch, that it has been doubted if any man's curiosity would be sufficient to engage him in a course of persevering study, if he were entirely cut off from the prospect of social intercourse.1 In this manner, a beautiful provision is made for a mutual communication, among mankind, of their intellectual attainments. III. THE DESIRE OF ESTEEM. 126. This principle discovers itself, at a very early period, in infants; who, long before they are able to reflect on the advantages resulting from the good opinion of others, and even before they acquire the use of speech, are sensibly mortified by any expression of neglect or contempt. It seems, therefore, to be an original principle in our nature; that is, it does not appear to be resolvable into reason and experience, or into any other principle more general than itself. An additional proof of this is, the very powerful influence it has over the mind;an influence more striking than that of any other active principle whatever. Even the love of life daily gives way to the desire of esteem; and of an esteem, which, as it is 1["Si quis in cœlum ascendisset, naturamque mundi, et pulcritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore; quæ jucundissima fuisset, si aliquem cui narraret, habuisset. Sic natura solitarium nihil amat, semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum annititur: quod in amicissimo . [Cicero, De Amicilia, c. xxiii.---Ed] quoque dulcissimum est."*" Nec me ulla res delectabit, licet eximia sit et salutaris, quam mihi uni sciturus sim. Si cum hac exceptione detur sapientia, ut illam inclusam teneam, nec enunciem, rejiciam. Nullius boni, sine socio, jucunda possessio est."]† [Seneca, Epist. vi.-Ed.] only to affect our memories, cannot be supposed to interest our self-love. In what manner the association of ideas should manufacture, out of the other principles, of our constitution, a new principle stronger than them all, it is difficult to conceive. 127. As our appetites of Hunger and Thirst, though not selfish principles, are yet immediately subservient to the preservation of the individual; so the desire of Esteem, though not a social or benevolent principle, is yet immediately subservient to the good of society. IV. THE DESIRE OF POWER. 128. Whenever we are led to consider ourselves as the authors of any effect, we feel a sensible pride of exultation, in the consciousness of Power; and the pleasure is, in general, proportioned to the greatness of the effect, compared to the smallness of our exertion. 129. The infant, while still on the breast, delights in exerting its little strength upon every object it meets with; and is mortified when any accident convinces it of its own imbecility. The pastimes of the boy are, almost without exception, such as suggest to him the idea of his power:-and the same remark may be extended to the active sports, and the athletic exercises, of youth and of manhood. 130. As we advance in years, and as our animal powers lose their activity and vigour, we gradually aim at extending our influence over others, by the superiority of fortune and of situation, or by the still more flattering superiority of intellectual endowments; by the force of our understanding; by the extent of our information; by the arts of persuasion, or the accomplishments of address. What but the idea of power pleases the orator, in the consciousness of his eloquence; when he silences the reason of others by superior ingenuity; bends to his purposes their desires and passions; and, without the aid of force, or the splendour of rank, becomes the arbiter of the fate of nations? 131. To the same principle we may trace, in part, the plea sure arising from the discovery of general theorems. Every such discovery puts us in possession of innumerable particular truths, or particular facts; and gives us a ready command of a great stock of knowledge to which we had not access before. The desire of power, therefore, comes, in the progress of reason and experience, to act as an auxiliary to our instinctive desire of knowledge. 132. The idea of power is, partly at least, the foundation of our attachment to property. It is not enough for us to have the use of an object;—we desire to have it completely at our own disposal, without being responsible to any person whatever.1 133. Avarice is a particular modification of the desire of power, arising from the various functions of money in a commercial country. Its influence as an active principle is much strengthened by habit and association; [and in consequence of being the immediate spring of action to the great body of the people, it often acquires a mastery over all our other passions, and survives in full vigour the extinction of the rest.]2-2d edit. 134. The love of liberty proceeds, in part, from the same source; from a desire of being able to do whatever is agreeable to our own inclination. Slavery mortifies us, because it limits our power. 135. Even the love of tranquillity and retirement has been resolved by Cicero into the same principle:-" Multi autem et sunt, et fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, Tranquillitatem expetentes, a negotiis publicis se removerint, ad otiumque perfugerint. . . . . His idem propositum fuit, quod regibus, ut ne qua re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur; cujus proprium 1 ["There is an unspeakable pleasure in calling anything one's own; a freehold, though it be but in ice and snow, will make the owner pleased in the possession, and stand in the defence of it." -Addison's Freeholder.]—3d edit. 2 [Among the different subjects of speculation proposed by Bishop Berkeley in The Querist, the two following occur: "Whether the real end and aim of men be not Power? and whether he who could have everything else at his wish or will, would value money? "Whether the public aim in every well-governed state be not, that each member, according to his just pretensions and industry, should have power?] --1st and 3d editt. est, sic vivere, ut velis. Quare, cum hoc commune sit potentiæ cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi, otiosis; alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas habeant; alteri, si contenti sint et suo, et parvo." " 136. The idea of power is also, in some degree, the foundation of the pleasure of Virtue. We love to be at liberty to follow our own inclinations, without being subjected to the control of a superior; but this alone is not sufficient to our happiness. When we are led, by vicious habits, or by the force of passion, to do what reason disapproves, we are sensible of a mortifying subjection to the inferior principles of our nature, and feel our own littleness and weakness. A sense of freedom and independence, elevation of mind, and the pride of virtue, are the natural sentiments of the man who is conscious of being able, at all times, to calm the tumults of passion, and to obey the cool suggestions of duty and honour.1 V. THE DESIRE OF SUPERIORITY. 137. Emulation has been sometimes classed with the Affections; but it seems more properly to fall under the definition of our Desires. It is, indeed, frequently accompanied with illwill towards our rivals; but it is the desire of superiority which is the active principle, and the malevolent affection is only a concomitant circumstance. 138. A malevolent affection is not even a necessary concomitant of the desire of superiority. It is possible, surely, to conceive, (although the case may happen but rarely,) that Emulation may take place between men who are united by the most cordial friendship, and without a single sentiment of illwill disturbing their harmony. *[De Officiis, lib. i. c. xx.] 1[" Quid est libertas? Potestas vivendi ut velis. Quis igitur vivit ut vult, nisi qui recta sequitur, qui gaudet officio, cui vivendi via considerata atque provisa est; qui ne legibus quidem propter metum paret, sed eas sequitur atque colit, quod salutare maximè esse judicat: qui nihil dicit, nihil facit, nihil cogitat denique, nisi libenter ac libere: cujus omnia consilia, resque omnes quas gerit, ab ipso proficiscuntur, eodemque feruntur; nec est ulla res quæ plus apud eum polleat, quam ipsius voluntas atque judicium.”—Cicero, Paradoxa, xlii.]— 1st and 3d editt. 139. When Emulation is accompanied with malevolent affection, it assumes the name of Envy. The distinction between these two principles of action is accurately stated by Dr. Butler. "Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with, or of equality or superiority over others with whom we compare ourselves. . . . . To desire the attainment of this superiority, by the particular means of others being brought down to our own level, or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of Envy. From whence it is easy to see, that the real end which the natural passion, Emulation, and which the unlawful one, Envy, aims at, is exactly the same, (namely, that of equality or superiority;) and, consequently, that to do mischief is not the end of Envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end."*-[" Æmulatio molestia quædam, non quod alteri bona adsint, sed quod non etiam sibi. Emulus se præparat ad bona sibi adipiscenda; invidus studet ut nec proximus hæc habeat.-Juvenes et magnanimi ad æmulationem proclivi.”—Aristotle. † -"Invidia turbulenta molestia, ob res secundas, non illius qui sit indignus, sed illius qui sit æqualis aut similis. Invident homines iis qui ipsis tempore, et loco, et ætate et existimatione propinqui sunt. Idem est alienis malis gaudens ac invidus."Aristotle.-2d edit. 140. Some faint symptoms of Emulation may be remarked among the lower animals: but the effects it produces among them are perfectly insignificant. In our own race, it operates in an infinite variety of directions, and is one of the principal springs of human improvement. 141. As we have artificial appetites, so we have also artificial desires. Whatever conduces to the attainment of any object of natural desire, is itself desired on account of its subserviency to this end; and frequently comes, in process of time, to acquire, in our estimation, an intrinsic value. It is thus that wealth becomes, with many, an ultimate object of pursuit ; although it [Butler's Sermons-Upon Human Nature, 19, note.] † [Rhet., lib. ii. c. 13.] [Ibid., lib. ii. c. 13. Both of Gol ston's translation, as I recollect.] |