distinguishable from our perception of actions as right or wrong: But the distinction has been too little attended to by philosophers. Among the moderns, in particular, some have confined their attention almost solely to our perception of actions as right or wrong; and have thereby rendered their works abstract and uninteresting. Others, by dwelling exclusively on our perception of Moral Beauty and Deformity, have been led into enthusiasm and declamation, and have furnished licentious moralists with a pretext for questioning the immutability of moral distinctions.

206. The emotions of pleasure and of pain arising from the contemplation of moral beauty and deformity, are so much more exquisite than any that are produced by the perception of material forms, that some philosophers have held, that the words Beauty and Sublimity express, in their literal signification, the qualities of mind; and that material objects affect us only by means of the moral ideas they suggest. This was a favourite doctrine of the Socratic school, and has been supported with great ingenuity by several modern writers.

207. Whatever opinion we adopt on this speculative question, there can be no dispute about the fact, that good actions and virtuous characters form the most delightful of all objects to the human mind; and that there are no charms in the external universe so powerful as those which recommend to us the cultivation of the qualities that constitute the perfection and happiness of our nature.

208. It was a leading object of the ancient moralists, to establish such a union between philosophy and the fine arts, as might add to the natural beauty of virtue every attraction. which the imagination could impart. The effect which might be produced in this way may be easily conceived, from the examples we daily see of the influence of association in concealing the meanness and deformity of fashionable vices.

III OF THE PERCEPTION OF MERIT AND DEMERIT.

209. The virtuous actions performed by other men, not only excite in our minds a benevolent affection towards them, or a

disposition to promote their happiness; but impress us with a sense of the merit of the agents. We perceive them to be the proper objects of love and esteem, and that it is morally right that they should receive their reward. We feel ourselves called on to make their worth known to the world, in order to procure them the favour and respect they deserve; and if we allow it to remain secret, we are conscious of injustice, in suppressing the natural language of the heart.

210. On the other hand, when we are witnesses of an act of selfishness, of cruelty, or of oppression-whether we ourselves are the sufferers or not-we are not only inspired with aversion and hatred towards the delinquent, but find it difficult to restrain our indignation from breaking loose against him. By this natural impulse of the mind, a check is imposed on the bad passions of individuals; and a provision is made, even before the establishment of positive laws, for the good order of society.

211. In our own case; when we are conscious of doing well, we feel that we are entitled to the esteem and attachment of our fellow-creatures; and we know, with the evidence of a perception, that we enjoy the approbation of the invisible witness of our conduct. Hence it is that we have not only a sense of merit, but an anticipation of reward, and look forwards to the future with increased confidence and hope.

212. The feelings of remorse which accompany the consciousness of guilt, involve, in like manner, a sense of ill-desert, and an anticipation of future punishment.

213. Although, however, our sense of merit and demerit must convince the philosopher of the connexion which the Deity has established between virtue and happiness, he does not proceed on the supposition, that, on particular occasions, miraculous interpositions are to be made in his favour. That virtue is, even in this world, the most direct road to happiness, he sees to be a fact; but he knows that the Deity governs by general laws; and when he feels himself disappointed in the attainment of his wishes, he acquiesces in his lot, and consoles himself with the prospect of futurity. It is an error of the vulgar to expect,

VOL. VI.

C

that good or bad fortune are always to be connected, in particular instances, with good or bad actions ;-a prejudice which is a source of much disappointment in human life, but of which the prevalence in all ages and countries affords a striking illustration of the natural connexion between the ideas of virtue and of merit.

ARTICLE THIRD.-OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

214. According to some systems, moral obligation is founded entirely on our belief that virtue is enjoined by the command of God. But how, it may be asked, does this belief impose an obligation? Only one of two answers can be given :—either, that there is a moral fitness that we should conform our will to that of the Author and the Governor of the universe; or that a rational self-love should induce us, out of prudence, to study every means of rendering ourselves acceptable to the almighty Arbiter of happiness and misery. On the first supposition, we reason in a circle. We resolve our sense of moral obligation into our sense of religion; and the sense of religion into that of moral obligation.

215. The other system which makes virtue a mere matter of prudence, although not so obviously unsatisfactory, leads to consequences which sufficiently show that it is erroneous. Among others, it leads us to conclude, 1. That the disbelief of a future state absolves from all moral obligation, excepting in so far as we find virtue to be conducive to our present interest; 2. That a being independently and completely happy, cannot have any moral perceptions, or any moral attributes.

216. But farther, the notions of reward and punishment presuppose the notions of right and wrong. They are sanctions of virtue, or additional motives to the practice of it; but they suppose the existence of some previous obligation.

217. In the last place, if moral obligation be constituted by a regard to our situation in another life, how shall the existence of a future state be proved by the light of nature? or how shall we discover what conduct is acceptable to the Deity? The truth is, that the strongest argument for such a state is deduced

from our natural notions of right and wrong, of merit and demerit; and from a comparison between these and the general course of human affairs.

218. It is absurd, therefore, to ask, why we are bound to practise virtue. The very notion of virtue implies the notion of obligation. Every being, who is conscious of the distinction between Right and Wrong, carries about with him a law which he is bound to observe; notwithstanding he may be in total ignorance of a future state. "What renders obnoxious to punishment, is not the foreknowledge of it, but merely the violating a known obligation."-Butler.-[To pèv oplov vóμos ἐστὶ βασιλικός.*]1st edit.

219. From what has been stated, it follows, that the moral faculty, considered as an active power of the mind, differs essentially from all the others hitherto enumerated. The least violation of its authority fills us with remorse. On the contrary, the greater the sacrifices we make, in obedience to its suggestions, the greater are our satisfaction and triumph.

220. The supreme authority of conscience, although beautifully described by many of the ancient moralists, was not sufficiently attended to by modern writers, as a fundamental principle in the science of ethics, till the time of Dr. Butler. Too little stress is laid on it by Lord Shaftesbury; and the omission is the chief defect of his philosophy.

221. If this distinction between the moral faculty and our other active powers be acknowledged, it is of the less consequence what particular theory we adopt concerning the origin of our moral ideas and accordingly Mr. Smith, though he resolves moral approbation ultimately into a feeling of the mind, represents the supremacy of conscience as a principle which is equally essential to all the different systems that have been proposed on the subject. "Upon whatever we suppose our moral faculties to be founded,-whether upon a certain modification of reason,

[Plato, De Lege, ? 9.]

[The nearest approximation to this passage is in the Analogy, part i. ch. vi., entitled, "Of the opinion of Necessity considered as influencing practice;"

but neither in that chapter, nor in any other place of Butler's writings, do I recollect, or at the moment am I able to recover, the articulate quotation.]

upon an original instinct, called a moral sense, or upon some other principle of our nature, it cannot be doubted that they were given us for the direction of our conduct in this life. They carry along with them the most evident badges of this authority, which denote that they were set up within us to be the supreme arbiters of all our actions, to superintend all our senses, passions, and appetites, and to judge how far each of them was either to be indulged or restrained. It is the peculiar office of these faculties to judge, to bestow censure or applause upon all the other principles of our nature."*

SECTION VII.-OF CERTAIN PRINCIPLES WHICH CO-OPERATE WITH OUR MORAL POWERS IN THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE CONDUCT.1

222. In order to secure still more completely the good order of society, and to facilitate the acquisition of virtuous habits, nature has superadded to our moral constitution a variety of auxiliary principles, which sometimes give rise to a conduct. agreeable to the rules of morality, and highly useful to mankind; where the merit of the individual, considered as a moral agent, is extremely inconsiderable. Hence, some of them have been confounded with our moral powers, or even supposed to be of themselves sufficient to account for the phenomena of moral perception, by authors whose views of human nature have not been sufficiently comprehensive. The most important principles of this description are,-1. A regard to Character; 2. Sympathy; 3. The sense of the Ridiculous; and, 4. Taste. The principle of Self-love (which was treated of in a former section [ch. i. § 5]) co-operates powerfully to the same purposes.

I. OF DECENCY, OR A REGARD TO CHARACTER.

223. It was before observed, (126,) that the desire of esteem operates in children before they have a capacity of distinguishing right from wrong; and that the former principle of action continues for a long time to be much more powerful than the

* [Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part VI. sect. iii. Introd.]

1 [See Reynolds' Discourses, pp. 297299.]-1st edit.