and the speculative professions; nor was philosophy understood to be merely a fit subject of declamation and dispute for the period of academical instruction, which the experience of real life was soon to efface from the memory. The teachers of moral truth were men who had been themselves engaged in the important concerns of their country, and who ennobled their precepts by the lustre of their own example; and it was from their schools-"warm," as the poet expresses it, "from the schools of glory," that the youth entered on the pursuits of business, or the career of ambition. "Magnus ex hoc usus, multum constantiæ, plurimum judicii juvenibus statim contingebat, in media luce studentibus et inter ipsa discrimina.” As for us, since the manners of modern Europe have rendered such a plan of education impossible by relegating philosophy to the shade of monastic retirement, what remains but to avail ourselves of the monuments which these illustrious men have left of their genius and of their virtues; and by exhibiting to youth the precepts of ancient wisdom dignified by the splendour of heroic action, to weaken as far as may be those prevailing and fatal prejudices which lead the dissipated and the thoughtless to apprehend, that, in a conscientious regard to moral obligation, there is anything incompatible with an enlightened understanding or a magnanimous spirit! It is fortunate for this purpose that the common system of education in this country, amidst all its defects, by inspiring the tender mind with a warm admiration of classical genius, has a tendency to associate in the imagination the noblest lessons of public and private virtue with all that can captivate the heart or delight the fancy. A judicious selection from the classics directed to this particular object of moral instruction, and cleared of all those erroneous maxims which originate in the peculiar manners and policy of antiquity, or in the superstitious opinions of the heathen world, is still an important desideratum in our literature. It would be improper to bring this subject to a conclusion without mentioning the attempt which Mr. Hume has made to show, that what we call the Beauty of Virtue is the Beauty of Utility.* For a particular examination and refutation of this opinion I shall refer the reader to Mr. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.† Although, however, Mr. Smith differs from Mr. Hume in thinking that virtue pleases because we consider it to be useful, he agrees with him that all those qualities which we consider as amiable or agreeable are really useful either to ourselves or to others. In this respect their conclusions coincide with the doctrines of the Socratic school, and afford additional evidence of the beneficent solicitude with which nature allures us to the practice of our duty. "Do you imagine," says Socrates to Aristippus, "that what is good is not beautiful? Have you not observed that these appearances always coincide? Virtue, for instance, in the same respect as to which we call it good, is ever acknowledged to be beautiful also. In the character we always join the two denominations together. The beauty of human bodies corresponds, in like manner, with that economy of parts which constitutes them good; and in every circumstance of life the same object is constantly accounted both beautiful and good, inasmuch as it answers the purposes for which it was designed."2 SECT. III. -OF THE PERCEPTION OF MERIT AND DEMERIT. The various actions performed by other men not only excite in our minds a benevolent affection towards them, or a disposition to promote their happiness, but impress us with a sense of the merit of the agents. We perceive them to be the proper objects of love and esteem, and that it is morally right that they should receive their reward. We feel ourselves called on to make their worth known to the world, in order to procure * [Essays, Vol. II.—Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ?? ii. v.] † [Part IV. chaps. i. ii.] Which the Athenians did by the words καλοκάγαθος auel καλοκαγαθία. 2 Xenophontis Memorabilia, Lib. III. cap. viii. (The translation is Akenside's.[In note to Pleasures of Imagi nation, Book I. 374.]) them the favour and respect they deserve; and if we allow it to remain secret we are conscious of injustice in suppressing the natural language of the heart. On the other hand, when we are witnesses of an act of selfishness, of cruelty, or of oppression, whether we ourselves are sufferers or not, we are not only inspired with aversion and hatred towards the delinquent, but find it difficult to restrain our indignation from breaking loose against him. By this natural impulse of the mind a check is imposed on the bad passions of individuals, and a provision is made even before the establishment of positive laws for the good order of society. In our own case how delightful are our feelings when we are conscious of doing well? By a species of instinct we know ourselves to be the object of the esteem and attachment of our fellow-creatures, and we feel, with the evidence of a perception, that Heaven smiles on our labours, and that we enjoy the approbation and favour of the invisible witness of our conduct. Hence it is that we not only have a sense of merit, but an anticipation of reward, and look forward to the future with increased confidence and hope. Nor is this confidence weakened, provided we retain our integrity unshaken by the strokes of adverse fortune, but, on the contrary, we feel it increase in proportion to the efforts that we have occasion to make; and even in the moment of danger and of death it exhorts us to persevere, and assures us that all will be finally well with us. Hence the additional heroism of the brave when they draw the sword in a worthy cause. They feel themselves animated with tenfold strength, relying on the succour of an invisible arm, and seeming to trust, while employed in promoting the beneficent purposes of Providence," that guardian angels combat on their side." Although, however, this sense of merit which accompanies the performance of good actions convinces the philosopher of the connexion which the Deity has established between virtue and happiness, he does not proceed on the supposition, that on particular occasions miraculous interpositions are to be made in his favour. That virtue is the most direct road to happiness he sees to be the case even in this world; but he knows that the Deity governs by general laws; and when he feels himself disappointed in the attainment of his wishes, he acquiesces in his lot, and looks forward with hope to futurity. It is an error of the vulgar to expect that good or bad fortune is, even in this world, to be the immediate consequence of good or bad actions,-a prejudice of which we may trace the influence in all ages and nations, but more particularly in times of superstition and ignorance. From this error arose the practices of judicial combat, and of trial by ordeal, both of which formerly prevailed in this part of the world, and of which the latter (as appears from the Asiatic Researches) kept its ground in Hindostan as late as 1784,1 and probably keeps its ground at this day. Absurd as these ideas are, they show strongly how natural to the human mind are the sentiments now under consideration; for this belief of the connexion between virtue and good fortune has plainly taken its rise from the natural connexion between the ideas of virtue and merit, a connexion which; we may rest assured, is agreeable to the general laws by which the universe is governed, but which the slightest reflection may satisfy us cannot always correspond with the order of events in such a world as we inhabit at present. I am not certain but we may trace something of the same kind in the sports of children, who have all a notion that good fortune in their games of chance depends upon perfect fairness towards their adversaries, and that those are certain to lose who attempt to take secretly any undue advantage. 1 "In the code of the Gentoo laws mention is made of the trial by ordeal, which was one of the first laws instituted by Moses among the Jews. (See Numbers, chap. v. from the 12th to the 31st verse.) Fire or water were usually employed; but in India the mode varies, and is often determined by the choice of the parties. I remember a letter from a man of rank, who was accused of corresponding in time of war with the enemy, in which he says, 'Let my accuser be produced; let me see him face to face; let the most venomous snakes be put into a pot; let us put our hands into it together; let it be covered for a certain time; and he who remaineth unhurt shall be innocent.'" "This trial is always accompanied with the solemnities of a religious ceremony."-(Crawford's Sketches of the Hindoos, p. 298, edit. of 1790.) "Pueri ludentes, Rex eris, aiunt, Indeed the moral perceptions (although frequently misapplied in consequence of the weakness of reason and the want of experience) may be as distinctly traced in the mind at that time of life as ever afterwards, when surely it cannot be supposed that they are the result, as some authors have held, of a conviction, founded on actual observation, of the utility of virtue. I shall conclude this subject with again recalling to the attention of the reader a very remarkable fact formerly stated, [p. 222,] that our moral emotions seem to be stronger with respect to the conduct of others than our own. A man who can be guilty, apparently without remorse, of the most flagrant injustice, will yet feel the warmest indignation against a similar act of injustice in another; and the best of men know it to be in many cases a useful rule, before they determine on any particular conduct, to consider how they would judge of the conduct of another in the same circumstances. "Do to others as ye would that they should do unto you." This is owing to the influence of self-partiality and self-deceit. Mr. Smith has been so much struck with the difference of our moral judgments in our own case and in that of another, that he has concluded conscience to be only an application to ourselves of those rules which we have collected, from observing our feelings in cases in which we are not personally concerned.* I shall afterwards state some objections to which this opinion is liable. Were it not for the influence of self-deceit, it could hardly happen that a man should habitually act in direct opposition to his moral principles. We know, however, that this is but too frequently the case. The most perfect conviction of the obligation of virtue, and the strongest moral feelings, will be of little use in regulating our conduct, unless we are at pains to attend constantly to the state of our own character, and to scrutinize with the most suspicious care the motives of our 1 Horatii Epistola, Lib. I. Ep. i. 59. *[Theory of Moral Sentiments; espe cially, Part III. chap. iii., and Part I. sect. i. chaps. 3, 4.] |