is undoubtedly valued at first, merely as the means of attaining other objects. In like manner, men are led to desire dress, equipage, retinue, furniture, on account of the estimation in which they are supposed to be held by the public. Such desires have been called, by Dr. Hutcheson, Secondary Desires.* Their origin is easily explicable, on the principle of Association.

SECTION IV.-OF OUR AFFECTIONS.

142. Under this title are comprehended all those active principles, whose direct and ultimate object is the communication either of enjoyment or of suffering, to any of our fellow-creatures. According to this definition, Resentment, Revenge, Hatred, belong to the class of our affections, as well as Gratitude or Pity. Hence a distinction of the affections into Benevolent and Malevolent.

I. OF THE BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

143. Our Benevolent affections are various; and it would not, perhaps, be easy to enumerate them completely. The Parental and the Filial affections,1-the affections of Kindred,—Love,2Friendship,-Patriotism,-Universal Benevolence,-Gratitude, -Pity to the distressed,-are some of the most important. Besides these, there are peculiar benevolent affections, excited by those moral qualities in other men, which render them either amiable, or respectable, or objects of admiration.

144. In the foregoing enumeration, it is not to be understood that all the benevolent affections particularly specified, are stated as original principles, or ultimate facts in our constitution. On the contrary, there can be little doubt, that several of them may be analyzed into the same general principle, differently modified according to the circumstances in which it operates. This, however, (notwithstanding the stress which has been sometimes laid upon it,) is chiefly a question of arrange

*[See Nature and Conduct of the Passions, sect. i. § 2, p. 8, ed. 3.]

[Taylor's Elements, pp. 365, 374, 384, 388.]-1st and 3d editt. [Hutcheson's

Inquiry concerning Good and Evil, sect. i. art. 10; also sect. v. art. 1.]-2d edit. 2 [Institution of Marriage.]-1st and 3d editt.

ment. Whether we suppose these principles to be all ultimate facts, or some of them to be resolvable into other facts more general, they are equally to be regarded as constituent parts of human nature; and, upon either supposition, we have equal reason to admire the wisdom with which that nature is adapted to the situation in which it is placed. The laws which regulate the acquired perceptions of Sight, are surely as much a part of our frame, as those which regulate any of our original perceptions; and although they require, for their development, a certain degree of experience and observation in the individual, the uniformity of the result shows, that there is nothing arbitrary nor accidental in their origin.

145. The question, indeed, concerning the origin of our different affections, leads to some curious disquisitions; but is of very subordinate importance to those inquiries which relate to their nature, and laws, and uses. In many philosophical systems, however, it seems to have been considered as the most interesting subject of discussion connected with this part of the human constitution.

146. To treat, in detail, of the nature, laws, and uses of our benevolent affections, is obviously inconsistent with the brevity of a treatise, confined by its plan to a statement of definitions and divisions, and of such remarks as are necessary for explaining the arrangement on which it proceeds. The enumeration already mentioned (§ 143) suggests an order according to which this subject may be treated in a course of lectures on Moral Philosophy. What follows is equally applicable to all the various principles which come under the general description.

147. The exercise of all our kind affections is accompanied with an agreeable feeling or emotion. So much, indeed, of our happiness is derived from this source, that those authors whose object is to furnish amusement to the mind, avail themselves of these affections as one of the chief vehicles of pleasure. Hence the principal charm of tragedy, and of every other species of pathetic composition. How far it is of use to separate, in this manner, "the luxury of pity" from the opportunities of active exertion, may perhaps be doubted.

148. The pleasures of kind affection are not confined to the virtuous. They mingle also with our criminal indulgences; and often mislead the young and thoughtless, by the charms they impart to vice and to folly.

149. Even when these affections are disappointed in the attainment of their objects, there is a degree of pleasure mixed with the pain-and sometimes the pleasure greatly predominates.

150. The final cause of the agreeable emotion connected with the exercise of Benevolence, in all its various modes, was evidently to induce us to cultivate, with peculiar care, a class of our active principles so immediately subservient to the happiness of human society.

151. Notwithstanding, however, the pleasure arising from the indulgence of the benevolent affections, these affections have nothing selfish in their origin—as has been fully demonstrated by different writers. This conclusion, although contrary to the systems of many philosophers, both ancient and modern, is not only agreeable to the obvious appearance of the fact, but is strongly confirmed by the analogy of the other active powers already considered.

152. We have found, that the preservation of the individual, and the continuation of the species, are not intrusted to Selflove and Reason alone; but that we are endowed with various appetites, which, without any reflection on our part, impel us to their respective objects. We have also found, with respect to the acquisition of knowledge, (on which the perfection of the individual, and the improvement of the species, essentially depend,) that it is not entrusted solely to Self-love and Benevolence; but that we are prompted to it by the implanted principle of Curiosity. It farther appeared, that, in addition to our sense of duty, another incentive to worthy conduct is provided in the desire of Esteem, which is not only one of our most powerful principles of action, but continues to operate in full force, to the last moment of our being. Now, as men were plainly intended to live in society, and as the social union could not subsist without a mutual interchange of good offices; would

it not be reasonable to expect, agreeably to the analogy of our nature, that so important an end would not be intrusted solely to the slow deductions of Reason, or to the metaphysical refinements of Self-love; but that some provision would be made for it in a particular class of active principles which might operate, like our appetites and desires, independently of our reflection ? Το say this of Parental Affection or of Pity, is saying nothing more in their favour than what was affirmed of Hunger and Thirst; that they prompt us to particular objects, without any reference to our own enjoyment.

II. OF THE MALEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

153. The names which are given to these in common discourse are various; Hatred, Jealousy, Envy, Revenge, Misanthropy; but it may be doubted, if there be any principle of this kind, implanted by nature, in the mind, excepting the principle of Resentment; the others being grafted on this stock, by our erroneous opinions and criminal habits.

154. Resentment has been distinguished into Instinctive and Deliberate. The former operates in man exactly as in the lower animals, [arising necessarily from any feeling of pain excited by external objects; and prompting us to a retaliation on the cause of our suffering, without any exercise whatever of reflection or reason,]* and was plainly intended to guard us against sudden violence, [by rousing the powers both of mind and body to active exertion,]† in cases where reason would come too late to our assistance. This species of resentment subsides, as soon as we are satisfied that no injury was intended.

155. Deliberate Resentment is excited only by intentional injury; and, therefore, implies a sense of justice, or of moral good and evil. [It is plainly peculiar to a rational nature; and perhaps, it is not very distinguishable from Instinctive or Animal Resentment in the ruder state of our own species. It is observed by Robertson, that "the desire of vengeance which takes possession of the heart of savages, resembles the instinctive rage of an animal, rather than the passion of a man, and * 1st and 2d editt. † 1st edit.

that it turns with undiscerning fury, even against inanimate objects." He adds, "that if struck with an arrow in battle, they will tear it from the wound, break and bite it with their teeth, and dash it on the ground."*]—1st edit.

156. The Resentment excited by an injury offered to another person, is properly called Indignation. In both cases, the principle of action seems to be fundamentally the same; and to have for its object, not the communication of suffering to a sensitive being, but the punishment of injustice and cruelty.

157. As all the benevolent affections are accompanied with pleasant emotions, so all the malevolent affections are sources of pain and disquiet. This is true even of Resentment; how justly soever it may be roused by the injurious conduct of others. ["When we consider that, on the one hand, every benevolent affection is pleasant in its nature, is health to the soul, and a cordial to the spirits; that nature has made even the outward expression of benevolent affections in the countenance, pleasant to every beholder, and the chief ingredient of beauty in the human face divine; that, on the other hand, every malevolent affection, not only in its faulty excesses, but in its moderate degrees, is vexation and disquiet to the mind, and even gives deformity to the countenance, it is evident that, by these signals, nature loudly admonishes us to use the former as our daily bread, both for health and pleasure, but to consider the latter as a nauseous medicine, which is never to be taken without necessity; and even then in no greater quantity than the necessity requires.”—Reid.†]—1st edit.

158. In the foregoing review of our active powers, no mention has been made of our passions. The truth is, that this word does not, in strict propriety, belong exclusively to any one class of these principles; but is applicable to all of them, when they are suffered to pass the bounds of moderation. In such cases, a sensible agitation or commotion of the body is produced; *[History of America.]

[On the Active Powers, Essay III. chap. V.- -Works, p. 570.]