436. With respect to pursuits which depend, in the first instance, on our own choice, it is of the last consequence for us to keep constantly in view, how much of the happiness of mankind arises from habit; and, in the formation of our plans, to disregard those prepossessions and prejudices which so often warp the judgment in the conduct of life. "Choose that course of action (says Pythagoras) which is best, and custom will soon render it the most agreeable."*-[" Brevis est institutio vitæ honestæ beatæque, si credas. Natura enim nos ad mentem optimam genuit: adeoque discere meliora volentibus promptum est, ut vere intuenti mirum sit illud magis, malos esse tam multos. Nam ut aqua piscibus, ut sicca terrenis, circumfusus nobis spiritus volucribus convenit: ita certe facilius esse opportebat, secundum naturam, quam contra eam vivere.”—Quintilian, Instit. Lib. XII. c. xi.]—2d edit. 437. The foregoing remarks relate to what may be called the essentials of happiness;-the circumstances which constitute the general state or habit of mind, that is necessary to lay a ground-work for every other enjoyment. 438. This foundation being supposed, the sum of happiness enjoyed by an individual will be proportioned to the degree in which he is able to secure all the various pleasures belonging to our nature. 439. These pleasures may be referred to the following heads :— (1.) The pleasures of Activity and Repose. (2.) The pleasures of Sense. (3.) The pleasures of Imagination. (4.) The pleasures of the Understanding. (5.) The pleasures of the Heart. 440. An examination and comparison of these different classes of our enjoyments is necessary, even on the Stoical principles, to complete the inquiry concerning happiness; in order to ascertain the relative value of the different objects of choice and rejection. * [Plutarch, (De Exilio; Opera, Tom. II. p. 602, ed. Xylandri.)] 441. Such an examination, however, would lead into details inconsistent with the plan, and foreign to the design of these Outlines. To those who choose to prosecute the subject, it opens a field of speculation equally curious and useful, and much less exhausted by moralists than might have been expected from its importance. 442. The practical conclusion resulting from the inquiry is, that the wisest plan of economy, with respect to our pleasures, is not merely compatible with a strict observance of the rules of morality, but is, in a great measure, comprehended in these rules, and, therefore, that the happiness, as well as the perfection of our nature, consists in doing our duty, with as little solicitude about the event, as is consistent with the weakness of humanity. 443. It may be useful once more to remark, (§ 172, (3,) before leaving the subject, that notwithstanding these happy effects of a virtuous life, the principle of Duty and the desire of Happiness are radically distinct from each other. The peace of mind, indeed, which is the immediate reward of good actions, and the sense of merit with which they are accompanied, create, independently of experience, a very strong presumption in favour of the connexion between Happiness and Virtue; but the facts in human life which justify this conclusion, are not obvious to careless spectators; nor would philosophers in every age have agreed so unanimously in adopting it, if they had not been led to the truth by a shorter and more direct process than an examination of the remote consequences of virtuous and of vicious conduct. 444. To this observation it may be added, that if the desire of Happiness were the sole, or even the ruling principle of action, in a good man, it could scarcely fail to frustrate its own object, by filling his mind with anxious conjectures about futurity, and with perplexing calculations of the various chances of good and evil. Whereas he, whose ruling principle of action is a sense of Duty, conducts himself in the business of life with boldness, consistency, and dignity, and finds himself rewarded by that happiness which so often eludes the pursuit of those who exert every faculty of the mind, in order to attain it. SECTION IV. OF THE DIFFERENT THEORIES WHICH HAVE BEEN FORMED CONCERNING THE OBJECT OF MORAL APPROBATION. 445. It was before remarked, (§ 245,) that the different Theories of Virtue which have prevailed in modern times, have arisen chiefly from attempts to trace all the branches of our duty to one principle of action; such as a rational Selflove, Benevolence, Justice, or a disposition to obey the will of God. 446. That none of these Theories is agreeable to fact, may be collected from the reasonings which have been already stated. The harmony, however, which exists among our various good dispositions, and their general coincidence in determining us to the same course of life, bestows on all of them, when skilfully proposed, a certain degree of plausibility. 447. The systematical spirit, from which they have taken their rise, although a fertile source of error, has not been without its use; inasmuch as it has roused the attention of ingenious men to the most important of all studies, that of the end and destination of human life. The facility, at the same time, with which so great a variety of consequences may be all traced from distinct principles, affords a demonstration of that unity and consistency of design, which is no less conspicuous in the moral, than in the material world. SECTION V.-OF THE GENERAL DEFINITION OF VIRTUE. 448. The various duties which have now been considered, all agree with each other in one common quality, that of being obligatory on rational and voluntary agents; and they are all enjoined by the same authority;—the authority of conscience. These duties, therefore, are but different articles of one law, which is properly expressed by the word Virtue; [or still more unequivocally, by the phrase, Moral Law of Nature.]— 2d edit. 449. The same word (as will be more particularly stated in the next section) is employed to express the moral excellence of a character. When so employed, it seems properly to denote a confirmed Habit of mind, as distinguished from good dispositions operating occasionally. It was formerly said, (§ 161,) that the characters of men receive their denominations of Covetous, Voluptuous, Ambitious, &c. from the particular active principle which prevailingly influences the conduct. A man, accordingly, whose ruling or habitual principle of action is a sense of Duty, or a regard to what is Right, may be properly denominated Virtuous. Agreeably to this view of the subject, the ancient Pythagoreans defined Virtue to be, "Eis Toû SéovTOS: *-the oldest definition of Virtue of which we have any account, and the most unexceptionable, perhaps, which is yet to be found in any system of philosophy. 450. These observations lead to an explanation of what has at first sight the appearance of paradox in the ethical doctrines of Aristotle; that where there is Self-denial there is no Virtue.1 That the merit of particular actions is increased by the selfdenial with which they are accompanied, cannot be disputed: but it is only when we are learning the practice of our duties, that this self-denial is exercised, (for the practice of morality, as well as of everything else, is facilitated by repeated acts;) and, therefore, if the word Virtue be employed to express that habit of mind which it is the great object of a good man to confirm, it will follow, that, in proportion as he approaches to it, his efforts of self-denial must diminish; and that all occasion for them would cease, if his end were completely attained. *' Α δ' ἀρετὰ, ἕξις τίς ἐντι τῶ δέοντος, as the Doric has it of the fragment attributed to Theages, (Gale, Opuscu la Mythologica, Physica, et Ethica, p. 690, ed. Amstel. 1688.) The definition merits Mr. Stewart's encomium; but all the Pythagorean fragments, Physical and Ethical, preserved by Sto bæus, &c., are comparatively recent forgeries, fabricated from the works especially of Plato and Aristotle, and these philosophers are not plagiarists of more ancient writers as vulgarly believed.-Ed. 1 Ancient Metaphysics, Vol. III. p. xli. of the Preface. SECTION VI.-OF AN AMBIGUITY IN THE WORDS RIGHT AND WRONG, VIRTUE AND VICE. 451. The epithets Right and Wrong, Virtuous and Vicious, are applied sometimes to external actions, and sometimes to the intentions of the agent. A similar ambiguity may be remarked in the corresponding words in other languages. 452. The distinction made by some moralists between Absolute and Relative Rectitude, was introduced, in order to obviate the confusion of ideas which this ambiguity has a tendency to produce; and it is a distinction of so great importance, as to merit a particular illustration in a system of Ethics. 453. An action may be said to be Absolutely right, when it is in every respect suitable to the circumstances in which the agent is placed: or, in other words, when it is such, as, with perfectly good intentions, under the guidance of an enlightened and well-informed understanding, he would have performed. 454. An action may be said to be Relatively right, when the intentions of the agent are sincerely good;-whether his conduct be suitable to his circumstances or not. 455. According to these definitions, an action may be right, in one sense, and wrong in another; an ambiguity in language, which, how obvious soever, has not always been attended to by the writers on morals. 456. It is the relative rectitude of an action which determines the moral desert of the agent; but it is its absolute rectitude which determines its utility to his worldly interests, and to the welfare of Society. And it is only so far as relative and absolute rectitude coincide, that utility can be affirmed to be a quality of virtue. 457. A strong sense of duty will indeed induce us to avail ourselves of all the talents we possess, and of all the information within our reach, to act agreeably to the rules of absolute rectitude. And if we fail in doing so, our negligence is criminal. But still, in every particular instance, our duty consists in doing what appears to us to be right at the time; and if, while we follow this rule, we should incur any blame, our demerit does |