NOT TE S

ON THE

THREE BOOK S

O F THE

PLEASURES

O F

IMAGINATION.

NOTES ON BOOK I.

66

VER. 151. Say, why was man, &c.] In apologizing for the frequent negligences of the fublimeft authors of Greece, " Those god-like geniuses," fays Longinus, were well affured, that Nature "had not intended man for a low-fpirited or ignoble "being but bringing us into life and the midst of "this wide univerfe, as before a multitude affembled "at fome heroic folemnity, that we might be spectators "of all her magnificence, and candidates high in "emula

G 2

"emulation for the prize of glory; fhe has therefore implanted in our fouls an inextinguishable love of

every thing great and exalted, of every thing which appears divine beyond our comprehenfion. Whence "it comes to pafs, that even the whole world is not an object fufficient for the depth and rapidity of “human imagination, which often fallies forth beyond the limits of all that surrounds us. Let any "man caft his eye through the whole circle of our ex"iftence, and confider how especially it abounds in "excellent and grand objects; he will foon acknow"ledge for what enjoyments and purfuits we were "deftined. Thus by the very propenfity of nature "we are led to admire, not little fprings or fhallow "rivulets, however clear and delicious, but the Nile, "the Rhine, the Danube, and, much more than all, "the Ocean, &c." Dionyf. Longin. de Sublim. § xxiv.

Ver. 202. The empyreal wafe.] "Ne fe peut-il "point qu'il y a un grand espace au dela de la region "des etoiles? Que fe foit le ciel empyrée, cu non, tou

jours cet espace immenfe qui environne toute cette "region, pourra etre rempli de bonheur & de gloire. "Il pourra etre conçu comme l'ocean, cù fe rendent "les fleuves de toutes les creatures bienheureuses, "quand elles feront venues à leur perfection dans le "fyfteme des étoiles." Leibnitz dans la Theodicée, part. i. § 19.

Ver. 204. Whose unfading light, &c.] It was a notion of the great Mr. Huygens, that there may be fixed

ftars

ftars at fuch a diftance from our folar fyftem, as that their light fhould not have had time to reach us, even from the creation of the world to this day.

Ver. 234.

the neglect

Of all familiar profpects, &c.] It is here faid, that in confequence of the love of novelty, objects which at firft were highly delightful to the mind, lose that effect by repeated attention to them. But the inftance of habit is oppofed to this obfervation; for there, objects at firft diftafteful are in time rendered intirely agreeable by repeated attention.

The difficulty in this cafe will be removed, if we confider, that, when objects at firft agreeable, lofe that influence by frequently recurring, the mind is wholly paive, and the perception involuntary; but habit, on the other hand, generally fuppofes choice and activity accompanying it: fo that the pleasure arifes here not from the object, but from the mind's conscious determination of its own activity; and confequently increafes in proportion to the frequency of that determination.

It will still be urged perhaps, that a familiarity with disagreeable objects renders them at length acceptable, even when there is no room for the mind to refolve or ad at all. In this cafe, the appearance must be accounted for, one of these ways.

The pleasure from habit may be merely negative. The object at first gave uneafinefs: this uneasifiness gradually wears off as the object grows familiar: and the mind, finding it at laft intirely removed, rec

kons its fituation really pleafurable, compared with what it had experienced before..

The diflike conceived of the object at first, might be owing to prejudice or want of attention. Confequently the mind, being neceffitated to review it often, may at length perceive its own miftake, and be reconciled to what it had looked on with averfion. In which cafe, a fort of inftinctive juftice naturally leads it to make amends for the injury, by running toward the other extreme of fondnefs and attachment.

Or laftly, though the object itself fhould always continue difagreeable, yet circumftances of pleasure or good fortune may occur along with it. Thus an affociation may arife in the mind, and the object never be remembered without thofe pleafing circumstances attending it; by which means the difagreeable impreffion which it at firft occafioned will in time be quite obliterated.

Ver. 240.

this defire.

Of objects new and strange -] Thefe two ideas are often confounded; though it is evident. the mere novelty of an object makes it agreeable, even. where the mind is not affected with the leaft degree of wonder: whereas wonder indeed always implies novelty, being never excited by common or well-known appearances. But the pleasure in both cafes is explicable from the fame final caufe, the acquifition of knowledge and inlargement of our views of nature: on this account, it is natural to treat of them together.

6.6

Ver. 374.

Truth and good are one,

And beauty dwells in them, &c.] "Do

you imagine," fays Socrates to Aristippus, "that "what is good is not beautiful? Have you not, ob"ferved that these appearances always coincide? “Virtue, for instance, in the same respect as to which "we call it good, is ever acknowledged to be beau"tiful alfo.. In, the characters of men we always* "join the two denominations together. The beauty of "human bodies correfponds, in like manner, with "that œconomy of parts which conftitutes them good; "and in every circumftance of life, the fame object "is conftantly accounted both beautiful and good, "inafmuch as it anfwers the purposes for which it "was defigned." Xenophont. Memorab. Socrat. 1. iii. c. 8.

This excellent obfervation has been illuftrated and extended by the noble reftorer of ancient philofophy; fee the Characteristicks, vol. ii. p. 339 and 422, and vol. iii. p. 18E. And another ingenious author has particularly fhewn, that it holds in the general laws of nature, in the works of art, and the conduct of the fciences. Inquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue, Treat. i. § 8. As to the connection. between beauty and truth, there are two opinions concerning it. Some philofophers affert an independent and invariable law in nature, in confequence of which "all rational beings muft alike perceive beauty in

* This the Athenians did in a particular manner;,

By the word καλοκαταθὸς, καλοκαταθία.