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CHAPTER to be specially called for that purpose by the Legislatures of the respective states; and that hence this question of 1787. authority was of little consequence, and ought not to deter the Convention from proposing a plan fully adequate to existing difficulties.

Other questions, intimately connected with the preceding, related to the ratio of representation and the rule of voting in the national Legislature, whether it should be by states or by the individual members. The small states desired to retain that equal vote which, under the Confederation, they already possessed—a point, indeed, which the members from Delaware had express instructions not to yield. The larger states, on the other hand, were firmly resolved to secure to themselves, under the new arrangement, a weight proportionate to their superior wealth and numbers.

During the discussion of Randolph's resolutions in Committee of the Whole, deep differences of opinion became manifest upon these points. The plan, however, of a national government, based upon proportionate representation, was supported by a majority of the states present. The party of the smaller states, or what may be called the State Rights party, included the delegates from Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, and a majority of those from Maryland and New York. The party of the larger states, or National party, included not only the delegates from Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, but also those from the two Carolinas and Georgia, states which anticipated a very rapid increase of population. Indeed, they flattered themselves with the idea of having, within no very distant period, a greater number of people than all the rest of the Union together. North Carolina, it should be recollected, included the present state of Tennessee, and Georgia the present states of Alabama and

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Mississippi-vast tracts, of which the settlement had CHAPTER hardly begun. The states thus stood six for the national view to five for the state rights view. Under this as- 1787. pect, the absence of Rhode Island and New Hampshire was a very fortunate circumstance. Had they been present to side with the small states, the adoption of any truly national plan of government would have been rendered very difficult, if not impossible.

This party division of large and small states, involving the question of a national, self-acting central government, or of a mere confederation, lay at the bottom of all the earlier discussions in the Convention; but on collateral questions, the delegates, as we shall see, were more or less influenced by other considerations.

The election by the people of the first branch of the national Legislature was opposed by Sherman, who thought the less the people had to do immediately about the government the better. He was very warmly supported by Gerry, to whose confidence in the people the late rebellion of Shays had given a severe shock. "All the evils we experience," said Gerry, "flow from excess of democracy, The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. In Massachusetts they are daily misled into the most baleful measures and opinions. He had been too republican heretofore, but had been taught by experience the danger of a leveling spirit." The South Carolina delegates esteemed a choice by the people impracticable in a scattered population. Wilson, Madison, and Mason argued very ably that no republican government could stand without popular confidence, which confidence could only be secured by giving to the people the election of one branch of the Legislature. Gerry's colleagues went against him, and the election by the people was carried; New Jersey and South Carolina. against it, Connecticut and Delaware divided.

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On the question of the time for which the members of this first branch should be elected, there seemed to be a 1787. change of sides. Sherman moved one year, and Gerry strenuously supported it. Madison proposed three years, and that term was agreed to; Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the two Carolinas against it.

The term of seven years for the members of the second branch of the national Legislature was earnestly urged by Madison and Randolph. "The democratic licentiousness of the state Legislatures prove," said Randolph, "the necessity of a firm Senate." Sherman thought the term of seven years too long. If the members did well, they would be re-elected; if not, the sooner they were got rid of the better. Seven years was agreed to; Connecticut against it, Massachusetts and New York divided.

How the members of this second branch should be chosen was a point still more warmly discussed. Wilson was zealous for their election by the people, but only Pennsylvania supported him. Read proposed their appointment by the executive out of candidates to be nominated by the state Legislatures, but this motion was not seconded. Dickinson, supported by the smaller states, insisted upon the election of the members of the second branch by the state Legislatures, and that point, after considerable opposition, was at length conceded. But the national party steadily refused to yield what the smaller states still more earnestly demanded, an equality of representation in this second branch. It was carried, six states to five, that the same ratio of representation should prevail in both branches.

By what should that ratio be determined? Sherman suggested the number of free inhabitants. Rutledge and Butler, of South Carolina, insisting that money was power, proposed that representation should be in proportion

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to rates of contribution. But if the revenue, or a part CHAPTER of it, were raised by duties on imports, how were rates of contribution to be determined? Wilson suggested 1787. the ratio recommended by Congress as an amendment to the Articles of Confederation on the subject of rates of contribution, and already assented to by eleven states -the number of free citizens and three fifths of all other persons. This was opposed by Gerry, on the ground that persons, and not property, ought to be the basis of representation; but it passed, only New Jersey and Delaware voting against it.

The constitution of the Legislature being disposed of, attention was turned to the executive. Should it consist of one person or of several ? Some hesitation appeared at expressing an opinion on this point, the members looking round at each other before venturing to avow themselves. At length Wilson moved that it be composed of a single person. This motion was zealously supported by C. Pinckney, Rutledge, and Gerry. Randolph opposed it violently. He denounced unity in the executive office as "the foetus of monarchy." It was carried, however; New York, Delaware, and Maryland in the negative.

Wilson then proposed, not without expressing some apprehensions that his opinion on that point might be thought chimerical, the election of the national executive directly by the people. Sherman proposed an election by the Legislature, and an executive completely dependent upon it. Mason inclined to favor an election by the people, but thought it impracticable. Wilson then proposed a college of electors, to be chosen by the people, the states to be divided into districts for that purpose. Gerry inclined to this plan, but feared it would alarm the partisans of state rights. Only Maryland and Pennsylvania

CHAPTER Voted for it. Gerry proposed an election by the execuXLVIL tives of the states; but this proposition obtained no votes. 1787. No change could be agreed upon; and the election by the national Legislature stood as a part of the plan. Sherman, Wilson, and others, were in favor of three years, with re-eligibility, as the term of office. Mason suggested seven years, and ineligibility afterward, as the best means of preventing intrigues between the Legislature and the executive, likely to result in the election of unqualified persons. This motion was carried; Connecticut, the two Carolinas, and Georgia against it; Massachusetts divided.

Franklin was opposed to giving the executive any salary beyond his expenses, and, in general, to any high salaries, as adding the temptation of avarice to that of ambition, and tending to throw the administration of the government into the hands of the violent, bold, and selfish, to the exclusion of the wise, moderate, and disinterested. He read a speech to that effect, to which the Convention listened with marked attention; but his views were regarded as visionary and impracticable.

The constitution of the judiciary next came up. Wilson proposed to give the appointment of the judges to the executive; but this was opposed by Rutledge and Franklin. Objecting to their choice by the Legislature as leading to intrigue and the selection of unfit persons, Madison suggested their appointment by the second branch of the Legislature, which prevailed unanimously.

The Council of Revision, as proposed in Randolph's resolutions-borrowed from the Constitution of New York -was not agreed to. On Gerry's suggestion, a modified veto-imitated from the Constitution of Massachusetts was substituted; a vote of three fourths in both branches being necessary to pass laws objected to by the