people see how many prerogatives of the prince, as we said before, are after long enjoying called in question. So that, by this means, their inconstancy seems to be grounded upon loyalty to the King, and they, perchance, with honest, but deceived hearts, grow weary of the great council of the land.

Another reason may be, that the prince himself averse from such a parliament, for the reasons aforesaid, can find power enough to retard their proceedings, and keep off the cure of state so long, till the people, tired with expectation of it, have by degrees forgot the sharpness of those diseases, which before required it.

By this means at last, accidentally a miracle hath been wrought after a long parliament, which is, that the people have taken part with the great delinquents against the parliament, for no other reason, than because those delinquents had done them more wrong, than the parliament could suddenly redress. And so the multitude of those great delinquents crimes hath turned to their own advantage.

But in such reforming parliaments, upon whom so much business lies, not only the inconstancy of the people hath been seen in history, but the unstedfastness of the representative body itself, and the distractions of that assembly, whilst they forsake each other under so great a burthen, have let that burthen fall dishonourably to the ground. The most unhappy instance, in this case, was that parliament of Richard the Second begun at Westminster, and adjourned to Shrewsbury, in the nineteenth year of his reign; a parliament that discharged their trust, the worst of any that I read of, where there was as much need of constancy and magnanimity, as ever was, to redress those great distempers, which were then grown upon the state; and as much mischief ensued by their default, both upon prince which people, and might have been well prevented, and his happiness wrought together with their own (in the judgment of best writers) if they had timely and constantly joined together, in maintaining the true rights of parliament, and resisting the illegal desires of their seduced King. But, being fatally distracted, the major part of lords and bishops wrought upon by the King, and the house of commons too far prevailed with, by Bushy the speaker, and his instruments, they utterly deserted the commonwealth, and, looking only upon the King's present desire, assented to such things, as made the prerogative a thing boundless; that he himself, as the story reports, was heard glorying to say, that there was no free and absolute Monarch in Europe, but himself. Upon which, the same bad counsel, which had before brought him out of love with parliaments, brought him to as great an abuse of that power, which he had now gotten over a parliament. And then followed the blank charters, and other horrid extortions, besides the suffering of some lords, whom the people most loved; and shortly after, by a sad consequence, his own ruin. Nor do we read, that any of those lords, who under colour of loyalty and love (as they called it) to his person, had trodden down the power and privilege of a parliament, under his feet, had afterwards so much loyalty to him, as to defend his crown and person, against the force of an usurper, who, without any resistance or contradiction, unjustly ascended the royal throne; the sad occasion of that miserable and crucl civil war, which,

VOL. V.

in the following ages, so long afflicted the kingdom of England. This, was the worst example of any parliament; but in other times, though bad too, they have proved better physick than any other earthly ways or means could be; yet their greatest vertue and excellency is seen, when they have been used as a diet, by honourable and just princes, such as this nation hath been often blessed with; and such who have thought it no more disparagement or depression of their dignity, to be ruled by the sway of that great council, than a wise guider of a ship would think it, to follow his compass; or any mathematician to be directed by his necessary rules and instruments.

CERTAIN ORDERS

MEET TO BE OBSERVED UPON ANY FOREIGN INVASION,
For those Shires that lie upon the Sea Coasts.

WITH A DIRECTION TO THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.

London, printed by R. C. for Michael Sparke, senior, and are to be sold at the Sign of the Blue Bible, in Green-Arbour, 1642. Quarto, containing fourteen pages.

THAT

HAT in every shire be appointed one nobleman to take the chief charge for the ordering and governing of the same, and he to appoint a leader of the horsemen, and another of the footmen, and, under them, captains and officers of all sorts; which captains may be of the better sort inhabiting the country, if their courage and skill be answerable for it.

The chief leaders, both of horsemen and footmen, must be men of that experience, discretion, temperance, and judgment, as well in ordering and disposing of great numbers, as also in taking advantages of grounds, times, occasions, and matters offered. And it were to be wished they were such in all points, as the whole realm might be able to furnish every front shire but with two of that conduct and valour; that there might be also a meeting and drawing together of some convenient numbers, both of horsemen and footmen, to be trained and exercised into all manner of sorts and forms, as well frivolous as necessary, to the intent to make them the more perfect how to give and receive a charge. For I think, if you shall ask the opinion but of three captains, How horsemen ought to charge, and how they should receive a charge? And so likewise of footmen and their retreats, your three captains will be of two opinions at least; and yet the first thing, we offer unto the

enemy, is rashly to join battle, without any foresight of the inconvenience thereof: A thing so generally received of all our nation, for the best way, as who should seem to impugn the same is in danger to be made ridiculous, and his reasons to be holden for heresy, and not fit to be heard or read; and yet, how rude, ignorant, and untowardly we should and would present ourselves thereunto, make but some models of convenient numbers assembled, and you shall see the same.

In private quarrels for trifling causes, every man desireth to be exercised and skilful in that weapon, wherewith he would encounter his enemy; but, in this general conflict, wherein we fight for the safety of our country, religion, goods, wives, and children, we should hazard all in that order and form, wherein we are altogether ignorant and unexperimented.

But, because I have found it, by experience and reason, a very desperate and dangerous kind of trial, I would not wish any prince to venture his kingdom that way, unless he be weary of the same, it being the only thing for an invader to seek, and a defender to shun; for the one doth hazard but his people, and hath a lot to win a kingdom; the other, in losing of the battle, hath lost his crown.

A battle is the last refuge, and not to be yielded unto by the defendant, until such time as he and his people are made desperate.

In which kind of trial, seldom or never shall you see the invader to quail; no, though his numbers have been much less than the other.

There is a kind of heat and fury in the encounter and joining of battles; the which whose side can longest retain, on that part goeth victory; contrariwise, which side conceiveth the first fear, whether it be upon just cause, or not, that side goeth to wreck; yea, and oftentimes it falleth so out, before the pikes be touched.

Thus much to the uncertainty of battle; wherein albeit I would wish our nation to be well exercised and trained, it being a thing of great moment, yet to be used in our own country, as the sheet-anchor and last refuge of all.

A Caveat for the avoiding of that dangerous course in running down to the Sea side, at the firing of the Beacons.

THAT there be in every shire places appointed, whereunto the country may resort upon the firing of the beacons; which places of assembly should not be less distant, than five or six miles from the seaside at the least, for the footmen to gather themselves together, to the intent you may the better sort your men, put them in some order, and consult what is meetest to be done; which you shall hardly be able to do, if your place of assembly be within the view, or near unto the enemy, who will by all means seek to attempt you in your disorderly assemblies. Moreover, if fear once take your men, or they be amazed, if you* had as skilful leaders as the earth doth bear, they would not be able to dispose or reduce them into such order and form as they would; nei

ther will the enemy give you time to deliberate what is best to be done, but you must either disorderly fight, or more disorderly run away. And, above all things, I especially advise to shun that old and barbarous custom of running confusedly to the sea-side, thinking thereby to prevent the landing of the enemy, or at least to annoy them greatly; which you shall never do; for, be it upon any invasion, you may be sure, that there is no prince will undertake so great an enterprise, but he will be sure to have such a number of boats, gallies, and other small vessels of draught, as he will be able to land at one time two or three thousand men; which boats shall be so well appointed with bases and other shot, as that they will be sure to make way for their quiet landing. And, for my own part, I much doubt, whether you shall have in two or three days, after the firing of the beacons, such a sufficient number as, with wisdom and discretion, were fit to deal or venture a battle with so many men as they will land in an hour, for any thing that ever I could yet sce in the country's readiness at the firing of the beacons.

If the enemy doth intend but to land, and burn some houses or villages near to the sea-coast, for the prevention thereof, as much as may be, it were good to appoint only those, that dwell within two or three miles of the sea-side, to repair thither to make resistance; and, for their succour, you may appoint the horsemen to draw down to the plains next adjoining to the same, who may also keep them at a bay from straggling far into the country.

But, if the attempt be made by a prince purposed and appointed to invade, if you give them battle at the first landing, you offer them even the thing they most desire; and it is a thousand to one a conquest the first day.

My reasons are these: First, You give battle, but, I pray, with what people? even with countrymen altogether unexperimented in martial actions, whose leaders are like to themselves; and another thing, as dangerous as all this, You fight at home, where your people know the next way to save themselves by flight, in recovering of towns, woods, and by-ways.

Contrariwise, with whom do you encounter but with a company of picked and trained soldiers, whose leaders and captains are, no doubt, men both politick and valiant, who are made so much the more despe rate and bold, by not leaving to themselves any other hope to save their lives, but by marching over your bellies. And besides, it is to be imagined, that, having spread some faction before, amongst yourselves, as there is no country free from seditious and treacherous malecontents, they are animated to pursue the victory more sharply. Again, if you once receive an overthrow, what fear and terror you have brought yourselves into, how hardly you shall bring a second battle, and how dangerous to fight with men dismayed, those that are of experience can judge. Likewise what pride and jollity you have put your enemies in, to march forward, having no forts, nor fenced towns, to give them any stop in this fear, or for your own people to take breath, and make head. again; but that your enemies and factious companies of your own nation may join together, and be furnished with victuals, horse, and carriage at their will and pleasure, without which no prince can prevail in

any invasion; for, if you drive him to bring these things with him (as, if matters be well foreseen, and a good plot laid, you may easily do) a world of shipping will scarce suffice for the transportation thereof, besides an infinite mass and charge, that must be provided before-hand; yea, and what waste and loss thereof will fall out, though wind, wea ther, and shipping were had to pass without disturbance, experience thereof remaineth yet fresh in memory.

Again, if scarcity of victuals and unsavouriness thereof once grow, the pestilence and other sickness (which assail the best victualled and ordered army that ever was) will then be doubled and trebled, in such sort, that it will, in a short time, fight and get the victory for you.

And here, by the way, I would put you in remembrance, that there be continual lets and disturbances by your navy of the quiet passing of their victuals which should come unto them; whereof you shall oftentimes take advantage also by storms and contrary winds.

Wherefore I hold it for the best and surest way to suffer the enemy, coming to invade, to land quietly at his pleasure; which he will otherwise do, whether you will or not: Only fronting him in the plains with your horsemen; and by all means and diligence to draw the victuals, cattle, carriages, and corn behind your back; and that which you cannot, to waste and spoil, that the enemy take no advantage thereof, keeping such streights and passages with your footmen, as may be kept, and which, with small numbers of your horsemen, you may safely do, until great power do come to back you. And, though they win some streight, which they cannot do without great loss, yet, by keeping of back-receipts in streights, you shall always (if you be so driven) retire without any great loss or danger: And always remember to leave a ward in every place meet to be guarded, though it be but of twenty or thirty persons, which will be an occasion for the enemy to stop the winning of them before they can pass; because else those few numbers will always annoy their victuals and ammunition, that daily and hourly must have free and quiet passage to them. Now, if they tarry the winning or yielding of them up, though it be but a day or two kept, you get thereby time to yourselves to grow stronger, and your enemy. loseth opportunity, and waxeth weaker.

For we see, and find by experience, that huge armies, lying in the fields but fifteen or sixteen weeks, are brought to that weakness, and their first courage so abated by sickness and pestilence, which are handmaids unto such great assemblies, especially where any want of those things is that belong to the sustentation of man's body, that they may, with smaller numbers and less danger, be dealt withal, than at the first landing. Moreover, your people shall, in that time, attain to some knowledge, by daily exercise and use of their weapons; and the terror of shot will be more familiar unto them. For it is not numbers that do prevail, but trained men, resolute minds, and good order. For, if a prince would only select and choose out such men to wear armour, and employ the rest, I mean the baser sort, to the spade and shovel, there is no doubt but he shall sooner attain unto victory by this means, than with rude multitudes, in whom there is nothing but confusion and disorder.