804 Free will proved by our judgments on others. LIX. 2. HOMIL. objections again, asking, And why did God make him such? God did not make him such, far from it, since then neither would He have punished him. For if we in those matters in which we are the cause, do not find fault with our servant, much more will not the God of all. "But whence did this come to pass?" one may say. Of himself and his own remissness. "What means, of himself?" Ask thyself. For if it be not of themselves the bad are bad, do not punish thy servant nor reprove thy wife for what errors she may commit, neither beat thy son, nor blame thy friend, nor hate thine enemy that doth despite to thee: for all these deserve to be pitied, not to be punished, unless they offend of themselves. "But I am not able to practise self-restraint," one may say. And yet, when thou perceivest the cause not to be with them, but of another necessity, thou canst practise self-restraint. When at least a servant being taken with sickness doth not the things enjoined him, so far from blaming thou dost rather excuse him. Thus thou art a witness, that the one thing is of one's self, the other not of one's self. So that here too, if thou knewest that he was wicked from being born such, so far from blaming, thou wouldest rather have shewn him indulgence. For surely, when thou makest him allowance for his illness, it could not be that thou wouldest have refused to make allowance for God's act of creation, if indeed he had been made such from the very first. And in another way too it is easy to stop the mouths of such men, for great is the abounding power of the truth. For wherefore dost thou never find fault with thy servant, because he is not of a beautiful countenance, that he is not of fine stature in his body, that he is not able to fly? Because these things are natural. So then from blame against his nature he is acquitted, and no man gainsays it. When therefore thou blamest, thou shewest that the fault is not of nature but of his choice. For if in those things, which we do not blame, we bear witness that the whole is of nature, it is evident that where we reprove, we declare that the offence is of the choice. Do not then bring forward, I beseech thee, perverse reasonings, neither sophistries and webs slighter than the spider's, but answer me this again; Did God make all men? Evil not from God or nature, nor self-existent. 805 How then are not all MATT. XVIII. It is surely plain to every man. equal in respect of virtue and vice? whence are the good, 7. and gentle, and meek? whence are the worthless and evil? For if these things do not require any purpose, but are of nature, how are the one this, the others that? For if by nature all were bad, it were not possible for any one to be good; but if good by nature, then no one bad. For if there were one nature of all men, they must needs in this respect be all one, whether they were to be this, or whether they were to be that. But if we should say that by nature the one are good, the other bad, which would not be reasonable, (as we have shewn); these things must be unchangeable, for the things of nature are unchangeable. Nay mark. All mortals are also liable to suffering; and no one is free from suffering, though he strive without end. But now we see of good many becoming worthless, and of worthless good, the one through remissness, the other by earnestness; which thing most of all indicates that these things do not come of nature. For the things of nature are neither changed, nor do they need diligence for their acquisition. For like as for seeing and hearing we do not need labour, so neither should we need toils in virtue, if it had been apportioned by nature. "But wherefore did He at all make worthless men, when He might have made all men good? Whence then are the evil things?" saith he. Ask thyself; for it is my part to shew they are not of nature, nor from God. "Come they then of themselves?" he saith. By no means. "But are they unoriginated?" Speak reverently, O man, and start back from this madness, honouring with one honour God and the evil things, and that honour the highest. For if they be unoriginate they are mighty, and cannot so much as be plucked up, nor pass into annihilation. For that what is unoriginate is imperishable, is surely manifest to all. [3.] And whence also are there so many good, when evil hath such great power? how are they that have an origin stronger than that which is unoriginate? "But God destroys these things," he saith. When? And how LIX. 3. 806 Origin of evil not to be sought beyond our will. HOMIL. Will He destroy, what are of equal honour, and of equal strength, and of the same age, as one might say, with Himself? Oh malice of the devil! how great an evil hath he invented! With what blasphemy hath he persuaded men to surround God! with what cloke of godliness hath he devised another profane account? For desiring to shew, that not of Him was the evil, they brought in another evil doctrine, saying, that these things are unoriginate. "Whence then are evils ?" one may say. From willing and not willing. "But the very thing of our willing and not willing, whence is it?" From ourselves. But thou dost the same in asking, as if when thou hadst asked, whence is seeing and not seeing? then when I said, from closing the eyes or not closing the eyes, thou wert to ask again; the very closing the eyes or not, whence is it? then having heard that it was of ourselves, and our will, thou wert to seek again another cause. For evil is nothing else than disobedience to God. "Whence then," one may say, " did man find this?” “Why, was it a task to find this? I pray thee." "Nay, neither do I say this, that this thing is difficult; but whence became he desirous to disobey." "From remissness. For having power for either, he inclined rather to this." But if thou art perplexed yet and dizzy at hearing this, I will ask thee nothing difficult nor involved, but a simple and plain question. Hast thou become some time bad? and hast thou become some time also good? What I mean, is like this. Didst thou prevail some time over passion, and wast thou taken again by passion? Hast thou been overtaken by drunkenness, and hast thou prevailed over drunkenness? Wast thou once moved to wrath, and again not moved to wrath? Didst thou overlook a poor man, and not overlook him? Didst thou commit whoredom once? and didst thou become chaste again? Whence then are all these things? tell me, whence? Nay if thou thyself do not tell, I will say. Because at one time thou didst restrain thyself and strive, but after that thou becamest remiss and careless. For to those that are desperate, and are continually in wickedness, and are in a state of senselessness, and are mad, Were evil necessary, we could blame no one. 807 XVIII. and who are not willing so much as to hear what will amend MATT. them, I will not even discourse of self restraint; but to them 7. that have been sometimes in the one, and sometimes in the other, I will gladly speak. Didst thou once take by violence the things that belonged not to thee; and after this, subdued by pity, didst impart even of thine unto him that was in need? Whence then this change? Is it not quite plain it is from the mind, and the choice of will? It is quite plain, and there is no one who would not say this. Wherefore I entreat you to be in earnest, and to cleave to virtue, and ye will have no need of these questions. For our evils are mere names, if we be willing. Inquire not then whence are evils, neither perplex thyself; but having found that they are from remissness only, flee the evil deeds. And if any one should say, that these things come not from us; whenever thou seest him angry with his servants, and provoked with his wife, and blaming a child, and condemning them who injure him, say to him, how then saidst thou, that evils come not from us? For if they be not from us, wherefore dost thou find fault? Say again; is it of thyself thou revilest, and insultest? For if it be not of thyself, let no man be angry with thee; but if it be of thyself, of thyself and of thy remissness are thy evil deeds. But what? thinkest thou there are some good men? For if indeed no man is good, whence hast thou this word? whence are praises? But if there are good men, it is quite plain that they will also reprove the bad. Yet if no one is voluntarily wicked, nor of himself, the good will be found to be unjustly reproving the bad, and they themselves too will be in this way bad again. For what can be worse than to subject the guiltless to accusations? But if they continue in our estimation good men, though reproving, and this especially is a proof of their goodness, even to the very fools it is hereby plain, that no one is ever by necessity bad. But if after all this thou wouldest still enquire, whence are evils? I would say, from remissness, from idleness, from keeping company with the bad, from contempt of virtue; hence are both the evils themselves, and the fact that some enquire, whence are the evils. Since of them surely who do right no one enquires about these things, of them that are 4. Field. 808 Offences foretold that we may beware of them. HOMIL. purposed to live equitably and temperately; but they, who dare LIX. to commit wicked acts, and wish to devise some foolish comfort' 1 apa- to themselves by these discussions, do weave spiders' webs. μυθίαν, But let us tear these in pieces not by our words only, but by our deeds too. For neither are these things of necessity. For if they were of necessity, He would not have said, Woe to the man, by whom the offence cometh. For those only doth he bewail, who are wicked by their choice. v. 7. And if He saith by whom,' marvel not. For not as though another were bringing in it by him, doth He say this, but viewing him as himself causing the whole. For the Scripture is wont to say, "by whom," for "of whom;" as when 3 Gen. it saith, I have gotten a man by God3, putting not the second ixx. cause, but the first; and again, Is not the interpretation of 4 Gen. them by God', and, God is faithful, by whom ye are called 40,8. unto the fellowship of His Son3. 4, 1. 51 Cor. 1, 9. [4.] And that thou mayest learn that it is not of necessity, hear also what follows. For after bewailing them, He saith, v. 8. 9. If thy hand, or thy foot offend thee, cut them off, and cast them from thee: for it is better for thee to enter into life halt or maimed, rather than having two hands or feet to be cast into the fire. And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out; it is better for thee to enter into life with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into the furnace of fire; not saying these things of limbs; far from it; but of friends, of relations, whom we regard in the rank of necessary members. This He had both said further back, and now He saith it. For nothing is so hurtful as bad company. For what things compulsion cannot, friendship can often effect, both for hurt, and for profit. Wherefore with much earnestness He commands us to cut off them that hurt us, intimating these that bring the offences. Seest thou how He hath put away the mischief that would result from the offences? By foretelling that there surely will be offences, so that they might find no one in a state of carelessness, but that looking for them men might be watchful. By shewing the evils to be great, (for He would not have said without purpose, Woe to the world because of the offences, but to shew that great is the mischief therefrom,) by lamenting again in stronger terms over him that |