Under the head of Memory, in a subsequent part of this work, an abstract will be found of a case of divided personality, occurring through disease, reported by Dr. Dyce, of Aberdeen, to Dr. Henry Dewar, and by him published in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. A similar case is stated in The Medical Repository, communicated by Dr. Mitchell to the Rev. Dr. Nott, dated January, 1816. "When I was employed," says he, "early in December, 1815, with several other gentlemen, in doing the duty of a visiter to the United States Military Academy, at West Point, a very extraordinary case of double consciousness in a woman was related to me by one of the professors. Major Ellicott, who so worthily occupies the mathematical chair in that seminary, vouched for the correctness of the following narrative, the subject of which is related to him by blood, and an inhabitant of one of the western counties of Pennsylvania :—Miss R- - possessed, naturally, a very good constitution, and arrived at adult age without having it impaired by disease. She possessed an excellent capacity, and enjoyed fair opportunities to acquire knowledge. Besides the domestic arts and social attainments, she had improved her mind by reading and conversation, and was well versed in penmanship. Her memory was capacious, and stored with a copious stock of ideas. Unexpectedly, and without any forewarning, she fell into a profound sleep, which continued several hours beyond the ordinary term. On waking, she was discovered to have lost every trait of acquired knowledge. Her memory was tabula rasa-all vestiges, both of words and things, were obliterated and gone. It was found necessary for her to learn everything again. She even acquired, by new efforts, the art of spelling, reading, writing, and calculating, and gradually became acquainted with the persons and objects around, like a being for the first time brought into the world. In these exercises she made considerable proficiency. But, after a few months, another fit of somnolency invaded her. On rousing from it, she found herself restored to the state she was in before the first paroxysm; but was wholly ignorant of every event and occurrence that had befallen her afterward. The former condition of her existence she now calls the Old State, and the latter the New State; and she is as unconscious of her double character as two distinct persons are of their respective natures. For example, in her old state she possesses all her original knowledge; in her new state only what she acquired since. If a gentleman or lady be introduced to her in the old state, and vice versa, (and so of all other matters,) to know them satisfactorily she must learn them in both states. In the old state she possesses fine powers of penmanship, while in the new she writes a poor awkward hand, having not had time or means to become expert. During four years and upward, she has undergone periodical transitions from one of these states to the other. alterations are always consequent upon a long and sound sleep. Both the lady and her family are now capable of conducting the affair without embarrassment. By simply knowing whether she is in the old or new state, they regulate the intercourse, and govern themselves accordingly. A history of her curious case is drawing up by the Rev. Timothy Aldin, of Meadville." I often saw a clergyman of the church of Scotland, who, having become insane, believed himself Napoleon Bonaparte, and, under this conviction, felt the most poignant remorse for having commanded the massacre at Jaffa, and occasioned the death of so many brave men in war. Such cases as the foregoing have led some persons to the inference, that the feeling of personal identity is a primitive mental affection, connected with a particular organ, and hence liable separately to disease. This view corresponds with the apprehension of mankind in general; for popular language is framed on the principle of the I of consciousness being distinct from the other mental affections. We speak of evil thoughts

The

intruding themselves into our mind; and of our having strong desires which we forbear to indulge. In such expressions the our and we seem to mean the principle of personal identity; and the evil thoughts and desires appear to be regarded as affections of that principle, originating in sources distinct from it, and different from one another.

The more general opinion of philosophers is, that the mind is a simple and indivisible substance, and that the several faculties are merely different states of it. Such is the light in which the subject is viewed by Dr. Gall. "In my opinion," says he, "there exists but one single principle, which sees, feels, tastes, hears, touches, thinks, and wills. But in order that this principle may become capable of perceiving light and sound-of feeling, tasting, and touching-and of manifesting the different kinds of thought and propensity-it requires the aid of various material instruments, without which the exercise of all these faculties would be impossible."* This view is espoused also by my excellent friend, the Rev. Dr. David Welsh, Professor of Church History in the University of Edinburgh, who successfully shows that it is consistent with the phrenological doctrine of a plurality of organs. "The leading doctrine of Phrenology," says he," is, that different portions or organs of the brain are connected with the primitive feelings of the mind. The truth of this position can obviously be ascertained only by observation. But taking it for granted that it is true, it may be asked how it can be reconciled with the great principle to which so frequent reference has been made, that the powers, thoughts, and feelings of the mind are not different from the mind, but merely the mind itself existing in different states ?

"It requires but little reflection to be satisfied that the introduction of cerebral organs does not in any degree affect Dr. Brown's leading principle. The cerebral organs are not the mind-nor is any state of these organs the mind. The mind we believe to be a simple and indivisible substance. And the only difference that the doctrines of Phrenology introduce in regard to Dr. Brown's principle is, that, instead of the feelings and thoughts being merely the relations of the simple substance mind to its own former states or to external objects, they are the relations of the simple substance mind to certain portions of the encephalon.

"In looking upon any object-as snow-we have the notion of a certain colour. Now, the notion is not in the snow, but in the mind. That is, the notion of colour is the mind existing in a certain relation to an external object. But it is allowed on all hands, that there is an intervening step between the snow and the mind: there is an affection of the optic nerve. The notion of colour, then, is the mind existing in a certain relation to the optic nerve. It will be conceded that this does not alter the question as to the simplicity of the mind. And if this is conceded, it is abundantly obvious that another step in the process might be conceived without taking away from the simplicity of the immaterial part, and that, instead of an affection of the optic nerve being the immediate antecedent of the notion of colour, it might be a particular portion of the encephalon. As the notion of colour, upon this supposition, is a relation of the mind to the organ of colour, it follows that, if that organ were changed in any respect, the state of the mind would also be changed. Thus, if it were larger, or of a finer structure, or more active, the perception of colour would be more delicate, or quick, or pleasing. The same remarks might be extended to all the organs. Where the organ of Causality is large, as in the case of Dr. Brown himself, then there will be a tendency to reason; which tendency is a state of the mind in relation to a material organ, which state would have been different had the organ been different. "A multitude of organs may all be affecting the mind at the same *Sur les Fonctions du Cerveau, i.,, 243,

instant, and in that case a variety of feelings will be experienced. But still the mind is simple, and it is only its relations to these different organs that are complex.

"When we say, then, that when we have any power, as, for example, of reasoning, we are not to suppose that the power is different from the mind. There is a material organ which is separate from the mind, but the perception of relation is a state wholly mental. One state of the organ may give the perception of relation, another the desire to perceive or discover it; but the perception and desire are both attributes, not of matter, but of mind. The effect of the organ being large or small, active or inactive, in different individuals, or upon the same individual at different times, is the subject to which I alluded in the chapter on Cause and Effect, as that which Dr. Brown had not considered."*

Dr. Caldwell, again, argues strongly in favour of the singleness of the power of the mind. "We do not believe," says he, "that, in a separate or insulated capacity, the mind either does or can possess a number of distinct faculties, but that it is as single in its power as it is in its substance. It is a quickening and operative principle, essential to all the mental faculties, but does not by any means possess them itself. It is no more made up of parts, in relation to power, than in relation to substance. In both respects it is one and indivisible.

"To advocate a proposition the opposite of this is, to contend that the mind, like the body, is compound. To be single in essence and multiplex in power, implies a contradiction. Conformably to the present arrangement of creation, we consider such a case impossible In support of a belief the reverse of this, no evidence presents itself, either primitive or analogical. On the contrary, all attainable evidence is against it.

"We can conceive of but one possible way in which the human mind, single in its essence, can be tributary to the existence of a multiplicity of faculties. That is, by being united to a system of organs, instead of a single one, and serving as the spring of action to the whole. In this case the multiplicity of the organs, each different in structure from the other, although acting from the same principle and impulse, will secure, in the result, the requisite variety. For every organ must necessarily act in a manner corresponding with its specific structure.

For

"We cannot, therefore, withhold an expression of our deliberate belief, that the doctrine of the perfect unity of the human mind, both in substance and power, constitutes, most certainly, that foundation of the science of Phrenology that nothing can shake, and which the progress of time and improvements in knowledge will only render more stable and secure. if it be true that the mind, as a unit, possesses but unity of power, it follows, of necessity, that the multiplicity of power manifested in the functions of the mental faculties must arise from a multiplex system of cerebral organs, acting in conjunction with the mind."+

It is not necessary, in studying Phrenology, to decide which of these views is the correct interpretation of nature; because the effects of the organs on the mind are the same, whichever of them be adopted. If the mind consists of an aggregate of powers, then each acts by means of a particular organ, and is manifested with a degree of energy varying with its size. Viewed as one simple substance, capable of existing in a variety of states, it enters into each state by means of a separate organ: when the organs are spontaneouly active, they induce their relative states; without their influence, these cannot take place when they are large,

Welsh's Life of Dr. Thomas Brown, p. 521.

Preliminary Discourse in answer to Lord Jeffrey's Criticism on PhreHology in the 88th No. of the Edinburgh Review, prefixed to Dr. Caldwell's Elements of Phrenology, 2d edit., p. 16.

WHAT IS MIND BY ITSELF ?-DIVISION OF THE FACULTIES. 105

the states are excited vigorously; when they are small, these exist feebly. The reader may therefore adopt whichever theory appears to himself preferable. Without meaning to deny that the latter view appears to me the more plausible, I shall, in the following pages, treat of the faculties as distinct mental powers, connected with separate organs; because, by doing so, I shall be able to bring out the doctrine more simply and luminously, than by considering them as merely particular states of the general power-the Mind: and this language, moreover, is correct even on what seems to be the true hypothesis; because, according to this view, when the organ of Causality, for example, is largely possessed, the individual is capable of reasoning logically and acutely-of which mental act he is incapable when that organ is greatly deficient. The word faculty or power, therefore, is used to express the quality possesed in the one case, and not in the other, and which is legitimately designated and universally recognised by either of these terms.

"It has occurred to me," continues Dr. Welsh," that another difficulty of a metaphysical nature may suggest itself in regard to the principles of Phrenology. It may be asked, What is the soul when deprived of the cerebral organs? But the system of Dr. Brown affords us no more light upon this point than the system of Dr. Gall. Indeed, a passage which I have quoted from his Lectures shows that he considered that those who engaged in such inquiries were ignorant of the limits of our faculties. It is only experience that can teach us in what state the soul exists when separated from the body. And in this sense the precept of the poet holds equally in a scientific and in a religious point of view,

"Wait the great teacher Death, and God adore.""

DIVISION OF THE FACULTIES.

DR. SPURZHEIM divides the faculties into two orders, FEELINGS and INTELLECT, or affective and intellectual faculties. The feelings are subdivided by him into two genera, denominated PROPENSITIES and SENTIMENTS. He applies the name propensities to indicate internal impulses, which invite only to certain actions; and sentiments to designate other feelings, not limited to inclination alone, but which have an emotion of a peculiar kind superadded. Acquisitiveness, for example, is a mere impulse to acquire; Veneration gives a tendency to worship, accompanied by a particular emotion, which latter quality is the reason of its being denominated a sentiment.

The second order of faculties makes us acquainted with objects which exist, and their qualities and relations; they are called INTELLECTUAL. These are subdivided by Dr. Spurzheim into four genera. The first includes the external senses and voluntary motion; the second those internal powers which perceive existence, or make man and animals acquainted with external objects and their physical qualities; and the third the powers which perceive the relations of external objects. These three genera are named perceptive faculties. The fourth genus comprises the faculties which act on all the other powers-which compare, judge, and discriminate these are named reflective faculties.

excep

The names of the faculties employed in this work are, with few tions, those suggested by Dr. Spurzheim. To designate propensity, he adds to a root or fundamental word the termination ive, as indicating the quality of producing; the termination ness denotes the abstract state, as Destructiveness. The termination ous characterizes a sentiment, as cautious, conscientious. To these is added ness, to express the abstract quality, as Cautiousness, Conscientiousness. The names of the intel

lectual faculties are easily understood, and do not here require any particular explanation.

Considerable difficulty attends the arrangement of the faculties and organs. In the first and second editions of this work they were arranged and numbered according to the order adopted in Dr. Spurzheim's Physiognomical System, published in 1815. The principle of that arrangement was, as far as possible, philosophical. The organs common to man and the lower animals were treated of first, beginning with the lowest, and ascending. Next come the organs of the sentiments peculiar to man; and, lastly, the organs of intellect. Since 1815, the great divisions of this classification have been retained, but repeated alterations have been made by Dr. Spurzheim in the arrangement of the details. It appears impossible to arrive at a correct classification until all the organs, and also the primitive faculty or ultimate function of each, shall be definitely ascertained, which is not at present the case. Till this end shall be accomplished, every interim arrangement will be in danger of being overturned by subsequent discoveries. In the meantime, however, for the sake of uniformity, I shall adopt the arrangement followed by Dr. Spurzheim in the third edition of his Phrenology, published in 1825.* During his visit to Edinburgh, in 1828, he demonstrated the anatomy of the brain, and traced out the connexion between the organs in a manner so clear and satisfactory, that the basis of his arrangement appeared founded in nature. Dr. Gall seems not to have adopted any philosophical principle of classi fication; but it is proper that his names and order should be known. I shall, therefore, add a table of these to the present work.†

In the case of many of the organs, observations have been made to such an extent, that the functions are held to be ascertained; and in regard to others, where the observations have been fewer, the functions are stated as probable. There is no difference of opinion among phrenologists in regard to the kind of manifestations which accompany the organs set down as established; their differences touch only the result of the metaphysical analysis of the feelings and intellectual powers, and the order of their arrangement.

I shall notice briefly the history of the discovery of each organ, and state a few cases in illustration of its function: but the reader is respectfully informed, that I do not pretend to bring forward the evidence on which Phrenology is founded. I beg leave to refer those readers who are fond of perusing cases, to Dr. Gall's work, in six volumes, entitled Sur les Fonctions du Cerveau, &c.; to Dr. Spurzheim's work, Phrenology; to the Transactions of the Phrenological Society; to The Phrenological Journal and Miscellany; and to the Journal de la Société Phrenologique de Paris. Those persons who desire philosophical conviction are requested to resort directly to nature, which is always within their reach; for WELL-GROUNDED CONVICTION CAN BE OBTAINED ONLY BY PERSONAL

OBSERVATION.

NATURAL LANGUAGE OF THE FACULTIES

DRS. GALL and Spurzheim have investigated the laws which determine the natural language of the individual faculties, and their exposition of them is highly interesting and instructive. The leading principle is, that the motions are always in the direction of the seat of the organs. Self-Esteem, for instance, produces an attitude in which the head and * See Objections to Dr. Spurzheim's classification of the faculties, in the Appendix, No. II. † Appendix, No. III. See Gall, Sur les Fonctions du Cerveau, v., 440, and Spurzheim's Physi gnomical System, London, 1815, p. 398.