bear this Appellation) under a Jurisdiction imposed upon them by the Conqueror; Colonies are formed of national People v. g. British in the British Colonies, transported to form a Settlement in a foreign or remote Country. nals. The first Settlers of our Colonies, were formed from various Sorts of People. 1. Laudably ambitious Adventurers. 2. The Malecontents, the Unfortunate, the Necessitous from Home. 3. Transported CrimiThe present Proportion of these Ingredients in the several Plantations varies much, for Reasons which shall be mentioned in the particular Sections of Colonies, and does depend much upon the Condition of the first Settlers: Some were peopled by Rebel Tories, some by Rebel Whigs (that Principle which at one Time is called Royalty, at another Time is called Rebellion) some by Church of England-Men, some by Congregationalists or Independants, some by Quakers, some by Papists (Maryland and Monserrat) the most unfit People to incorporate with our Constitution. Colonies have an incidental good Effect, they drain from the MotherCountry the Disaffected and the Vicious (in this same Manner, subsequent Colonies purge the more ancient Colonies); Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, drained from Massachusetts-Bay, the Antinomians, Quakers, and other wild Sectaries. Perhaps in after Times (as it is at Times with the Lord Lieutenants and other high Officers in Ireland) some Malecontents of Figure, capable of being troublesome to the Administration at Home, may be sent in some great Offices to the Plantations. In our Colonies we have four Sorts of People. 1. Masters that is Planters and Merchants. 2. White Servants. 3. Indian Servants. 4. Slaves for Life, mostly Negroes. White Servants are of two Sorts, viz. Poor People from Great-Britain, and Ireland mostly, these are bound or sold, as some express it, for a certain Number of Years, to reimburse the transporting Charges, with some additional Profit; the others are Criminals judicially transported, and their Time of Exile and Servitude sold by certain Undertakers and their Agents. In our American Settlements, generally the Designations are, Province, where the King appoints a Governor; Colony, where the Freemen elect their own Governor : This customary Acceptation is not universal; Virginia is called a Colony, perhaps because formerly a Colony, and the most ancient. We have some Settlements with a Governor only; others with Gov ernor and Council, such are Newfoundland, Nova-Scotia, Hudson's-Bay, and Georgia, without any House or Negative deputed by the Planters, according to the Essence of a British Constitution: These, may be said, not colonized. There are various Sorts of Royal Grants of Colonies. 1. To one or more personal Proprietors, their Heirs and Assigns; such are Maryland and Pennsylvania; both Property and Government. 2. The Property to personal Proprietors; the Government and Jurisdiction in the Crown; this is the State of Carolinas and Jersies. 3. Property and Government in the Crown, viz. Virginia, New York, and New-Hampshire commonly called Piscataqua. 4. Property in the People and their Representatives; the Government in the Crown; as is Massachusetts-Bay. 5. Property and Government in the Governor and Company, called the Freemen of the Colony, such are Connecticut and Rhode-Island. This last seems to be the most effectual Method of the first settling and peopling of a Colony; Mankind are naturally desirous of Parity and Leveling, without any fixed Superiority, but when a Society is come to Maturity, a more distinct fixed Subordination is found to be requisite. Connecticut, Rhode-Island, and some of the Proprietary Governments, are of Opinion, that they are not obliged to attend to, or follow any Instructions or Orders from their Mother-Country or Court of GreatBritain; they do not send their Laws home to the Plantation-Offices to be presented to the King in Council for Approbation or Disallowance : They assume the Command of the Militia, which by the British Constitution is a Prerogative of the Crown: Some Time ago, they refused not only a Preventive Custom-House Office, but likewise a Court of ViceAdmiralty's Officers appointed from Home; but these Points they have given up, especially considering that the Royal Charter grants them only the Privilege of trying Causes, Intra corpus Comitatus, but not a-float or Super altum mare. William] D[ouglass], A Summary, Historical and Political, of the first Planting of the British Settlements in North-America (Boston, 1747), 1, 201-208 passim. 51. A French Publicist's View of the British BY MONSIEUR CHARLES DE SECONDAT DE MONTESQUIEU (ANONYMOUS TRANSLATION, 1777) Montesquieu was a French philosopher and publicist, who had lived in England and who greatly admired the English government as he understood it. His book was much read in the colonies; and he had more influence than any other writer in the development in America of balanced governments of three departments. — Bibliography: Channing and Hart, Guide, § 134. IN N every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law. By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other, simply, the executive power of the state. The political liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another. When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. There would be an end of every thing, were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals. . . The judiciary power ought not to be given to a standing senate; it should be exercised by persons taken from the body of the people, at certain times of the year, and consistently with a form and manner prescribed by law, in order to erect a tribunal that should last only so long as necessity requires. By this method, the judicial power, so terrible to mankind, not being annexed to any particular state or profession, becomes, as it were, invisible. People have not then the judges continually present to their view; they fear the office, but not the magistrate. In accusations of a deep and criminal nature, it is proper the person accused should have the privilege of choosing, in some measure, his judges, in concurrence with the law; or, at least, he should have a right to except against so great a number, that the remaining part may be deemed his own choice. The other two powers may be given rather to magistrates or permanent bodies, because they are not exercised on any private subject; one being no more than the general will of the state, and the other the execution of that general will. But, though the tribunals ought not to be fixt, the judgements ought; and to such a degree, as to be ever conformable to the letter of the law. Were they to be the private opinion of the judge, people would then live in society without exactly knowing the nature of their obligations. The judges ought likewise to be of the same rank as the accused, or, in other words, his peers; to the end, that he may not imagine he is fallen into the hands of persons inclined to treat him with rigour. . . . As, in a country of liberty, every man who is supposed a free agent ought to be his own governor, the legislative power should reside in the whole body of the people. But, since this is impossible in large states, and in small ones is subject to many inconveniences, it is fit the people should transact by their representatives what they cannot transact by themselves. The inhabitants of a particular town are much better acquainted with its wants and interests than with those of other places; and are better judges of the capacity of their neighbours than of that of the rest of their countrymen. The members, therefore, of the legislature should not be chosen from the general body of the nation; but it is proper, that, in every considerable place, a representative should be elected by the inhabitants. The great advantage of representatives is, their capacity of discussing L public affairs. For this, the people collectively are extremely unfit, which is one of the chief inconveniences of a democracy. ... Neither ought the representative body to be chosen for the executive part of government, for which it is not so fit; but for the enacting of laws, or to see whether the laws in being are duly executed; a thing suited to their abilities, and which none indeed but themselves can properly perform. In such a state, there are always persons distinguished by their birth, riches, or honours: but, were they to be confounded with the common people, and to have only the weight of a single vote, like the rest, the common liberty would be their slavery, and they would have no interest in supporting it, as most of the popular resolutions would be against them. The share they have, therefore, in the legislature ought to be proportioned to their other advantages in the state; which happens only when they form a body that has a right to check the licentiousness of the people, as the people have a right to oppose any encroachment of theirs. The legislative power is, therefore, committed to the body of the nobles, and to that which represents the people; each having their assemblies and deliberations apart, each their separate views and interests.. But, as an hereditary power might be tempted to pursue its own particular interests, and forget those of the people, it is proper, that, where a singular advantage may be gained by corrupting the nobility, as in the laws relating to the supplies, they should have no other share in the legislation than the power of rejecting, and not that of resolving. . . . The executive power ought to be in the hands of a monarch, because this branch of government, having need of dispatch, is better administered by one than by many: on the other hand, whatever depends on the legislative power, is oftentimes better regulated by many than by a single person. But, if there were no monarch, and the executive power- should be committed to a certain number of persons, selected from the legislative body, there would be an end of liberty, by reason the two powers would be united; as the same persons would sometimes possess, and would be always able to possess, a share in both. Were the legislative body to be a considerable time without meeting, this would likewise put an end to liberty. For, of two things, one would naturally follow: either that there would be no longer any legislative |