POWER AND ACTIVITY-IS THE MIND SIMPLE ? 101 is trampled under foot-to call forth the energies of a people, and direct them against a tyrant at home, or an alliance of tyrants abroad-to stamp the impress of a single mind upon a nation-to infuse strength into thoughts, and depth into feelings, which shall command the homage of enlightened men in every age-in short, to be a Bruce, Bonaparte, Luther, Knox, Demosthenes, Shakspeare, Milton, or Cromwell-a large brain is indispensably requisite: but to display skill, enterprise, and fidelity in the various professions of civil life-to cultivate, with success, the less arduous branches of philosophy-to excel in acuteness, taste, and felicity of expression-to acquire extensive erudition and refined manners-a brain of a moderate size is perhaps more suitable than one that is very large; for wherever the energy is intense, it is rare that delicacy, refinement, and taste are present in an equal degree. Individuals possessing moderate-sized brains easily find their proper sphere, and enjoy in it scope for all their energy. In ordinary circumstances they distinguish themselves; but they sink when difficulties accumulate around them. Persons with large brains, on the other hand, do not readily attain their appropriate place: common occurrences do not rouse or call them forth; and, while unknown, they are not trusted with great undertakings. Often, therefore, such men pine and die in obscurity. When, however, they attain their proper element, they are conscious of greatness, and glory in the expansion of their powers. Their mental energies rise in proportion to the obstacles to be surmounted, and blaze forth in all the magnificence of self-sustaining energetic genius, on occasions when feebler minds would sink in despair.* The term faculty is used to denote a particular power of feeling, thinking, or perceiving, connected with a particular part of the brain. Phrenologists consider man by himself, and also compare him with other creatures. When the lower animals manifest the same propensities and intellectual operations as those displayed by man, the faculties which produce them are held to be common to both. A faculty is admitted as primitive, 1. Which exists in one kind of animal, and not in another; 2. Which varies in the two sexes of the same species; 3. Which is not proportionate to the other faculties of the same individual; 4. Which does not manifest itself simultaneously with the other faculties; that is, which appears or disappears earlier or later in life than other faculties; 5. Which may act or rest singly; 6. Which is propagated in a distinct manner from parents to children; and, 7. Which may singly preserve its proper state of health or disease.t As phrenological observation establishes the existence of a plurality of mental faculties, each connected with a particular part of the brain, the question occurs, Is the mind simple, or is it an aggregate of separate powers? It is extremely difficult to give a satisfactory answer to this inquiry. Looking at the facts presented to us by observation, the most obvious inference seems to be, that the mind consists of an aggregate of powers, and that one of them supplies the feeling of Personal Identity, or the. I of consciousness, to which, as their substratum, all the other feelings and capacities bear reference. This view of personal identity is strongly supported by some of the phenomena of madness; for patients are sometimes insane in this feeling, and in no other faculty of the mind. Such individuals lose all consciousness of their past and proper personality, and imagine themselves different persons altogether; while, with the exception of this erroneous impression, they feel and think correctly. * See remarks on the character of Cromwell, in The Phrenological Journal, iii., 482. Spurzheim's Phrenology, p. 126. 66 Under the head of Memory, in a subsequent part of this work, an abstract will be found of a case of divided personality, occurring through disease, reported by Dr. Dyce, of Aberdeen, to Dr. Henry Dewar, and by him published in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. A similar case is stated in The Medical Repository, communicated by Dr. Mitchell to the Rev. Dr. Nott, dated January, 1816. When I was employed," says he, "early in December, 1815, with several other gentlemen, in doing the duty of a visiter to the United States Military Academy, at West Point, a very extraordinary case of double consciousness in a woman was related to me by one of the professors. Major Ellicott, who so worthily occupies the mathematical chair in that seminary, vouched for the correctness of the following narrative, the subject of which is related to him by blood, and an inhabitant of one of the western counties of Pennsylvania :-Miss R- possessed, naturally, a very good constitution, and arrived at adult age without having it impaired by disease. She possessed an excellent capacity, and enjoyed fair opportunities to acquire knowledge. Besides the domestic arts and social attainments, she had improved her mind by reading and conversation, and was well versed in penmanship. Her memory was capacious, and stored with a copious stock of ideas. Unexpectedly, and without any forewarning, she fell into a profound sleep, which continued several hours beyond the ordinary term. On waking, she was discovered to have lost every trait of acquired knowledge. Her memory was tabula rasa-all vestiges, both of words and things, were obliterated and gone. It was found necessary for her to learn everything again. She even acquired, by new efforts, the art of spelling, reading, writing, and calculating, and gradually became acquainted with the persons and objects around, like a being for the first time brought into the world. In these exercises she made considerable proficiency. But, after a few months, another fit of somnolency invaded her. On rousing from it, she found herself restored to the state she was in before the first paroxysm; but was wholly ignorant of every event and occurrence that had befallen her afterward. The former condition of her existence she now calls the Old State, and the latter the New State; and she is as unconscious of her double character as two distinct persons are of their respective natures. For example, in her old state she possesses all her original knowledge; in her new state only what she acquired since. If a gentleman or lady be introduced to her in the old state, and vice versa, (and so of all other matters,) to know them satisfactorily she must learn them in both states. In the old state she possesses fine powers of penmanship, while in the new she writes a poor awkward hand, having not had time or means to become expert. During four years and upward, she has undergone periodical transitions from one of these states to the other. alterations are always consequent upon a long and sound sleep. Both the lady and her family are now capable of conducting the affair without embarrassment. By simply knowing whether she is in the old or new state, they regulate the intercourse, and govern themselves accordingly. A history of her curious case is drawing up by the Rev. Timothy Aldin, of Meadville." I often saw a clergyman of the church of Scotland, who, having become insane, believed himself Napoleon Bonaparte, and, under this conviction, felt the most poignant remorse for having commanded the massacre at Jaffa, and occasioned the death of so many brave men in war. Such cases as the foregoing have led some persons to the inference, that the feeling of personal identity is a primitive mental affection, connected with a particular organ, and hence liable separately to disease. This view corresponds with the apprehension of mankind in general; for popular language is framed on the principle of the I of consciousness being distinct from the other mental affections. We speak of evil thoughts The intruding themselves into our mind; and of our having strong desires which we forbear to indulge. In such expressions the our and we seem to mean the principle of personal identity; and the evil thoughts and desires appear to be regarded as affections of that principle, originating in sources distinct from it, and different from one another. The more general opinion of philosophers is, that the mind is a simple and indivisible substance, and that the several faculties are merely different states of it. Such is the light in which the subject is viewed by Dr. Gall. "In my opinion," says he, "there exists but one single principle, which sees, feels, tastes, hears, touches, thinks, and wills. But in order that this principle may become capable of perceiving light and sound-of feeling, tasting, and touching-and of manifesting the different kinds of thought and propensity-it requires the aid of various material instruments, without which the exercise of all these faculties would be impossible."* This view is espoused also by my excellent friend, the Rev. Dr. David Welsh, Professor of Church History in the University of Edinburgh, who successfully shows that it is consistent with the phrenological doctrine of a plurality of organs. "The leading doctrine of Phrenology," says he, "is, that different portions or organs of the brain are connected with the primitive feelings of the mind. The truth of this position can obviously be ascertained only by observation. But taking it for granted that it is true, it may be asked how it can be reconciled with the great principle to which so frequent reference has been made, that the powers, thoughts, and feelings of the mind are not different from the mind, but merely the mind itself existing in different states? "It requires but little reflection to be satisfied that the introduction of cerebral organs does not in any degree affect Dr. Brown's leading princi ple. The cerebral organs are not the mind-nor is any state of these organs the mind. The mind we believe to be a simple and indivisible substance. And the only difference that the doctrines of Phrenology introduce in regard to Dr. Brown's principle is, that, instead of the feelings and thoughts being merely the relations of the simple substance mind to its own former states or to external objects, they are the relations of the simple substance mind to certain portions of the encephalon. "In looking upon any object-as snow-we have the notion of a certain colour. Now, the notion is not in the snow, but in the mind. That is, the notion of colour is the mind existing in a certain relation to an external object. But it is allowed on all hands, that there is an intervening step between the snow and the mind: there is an affection of the optic nerve. The notion of colour, then, is the mind existing in a certain relation to the optic nerve. It will be conceded that this does not alter the question as to the simplicity of the mind. And if this is conceded, it is abundantly obvious that another step in the process might be conceived without taking away from the simplicity of the immaterial part, and that, instead of an affection of the optic nerve being the immediate antecedent of the notion of colour, it might be a particular portion of the encephalon. As the notion of colour, upon this supposition, is a relation of the mind to the organ of colour, it follows that, if that organ were changed in any respect, the state of the mind would also be changed. Thus, if it were larger, or of a finer structure, or more active, the perception of colour would be more delicate, or quick, or pleasing. The same remarks might be extended to all the organs. Where the organ of Causality is large, as in the case of Dr. Brown himself, then there will be a tendency to reason; which tendency is a state of the mind in relation to a material organ, which state would have been different had the organ been different. "A multitude of organs may all be affecting the mind at the same *Sur les Fonctions du Cerveau, i., 243. instant, and in that case a variety of feelings will be experienced. But still the mind is simple, and it is only its relations to these different organs that are complex. "When we say, then, that when we have any power, as, for example, of reasoning, we are not to suppose that the power is different from the mind. There is a material organ which is separate from the mind, but the perception of relation is a state wholly mental. One state of the organ may give the perception of relation, another the desire to perceive or discover it; but the perception and desire are both attributes, not of matter, but of mind. The effect of the organ being large or small, active or inactive, in different individuals, or upon the same individual at different times, is the subject to which I alluded in the chapter on Cause and Effect, as that which Dr. Brown had not considered."* Dr. Caldwell, again, argues strongly in favour of the singleness of the power of the mind. "We do not believe," says he, "that, in a separate or insulated capacity, the mind either does or can possess a number of distinct faculties, but that it is as single in its power as it is in its substance. It is a quickening and operative principle, essential to all the mental faculties, but does not by any means possess them itself. It is no more made up of parts, in relation to power, than in relation to substance. In both respects it is one and indivisible. "To advocate a proposition the opposite of this is, to contend that the mind, like the body, is compound. To be single in essence and multiplex in power, implies a contradiction. Conformably to the present arrangement of creation, we consider such a case impossible. In support of a belief the reverse of this, no evidence presents itself, either primitive or analogical. On the contrary, all attainable evidence is against it. "We can conceive of but one possible way in which the human mind, single in its essence, can be tributary to the existence of a multiplicity of faculties. That is, by being united to a system of organs, instead of a single one, and serving as the spring of action to the whole. In this case the multiplicity of the organs, each different in structure from the other, although acting from the same principle and impulse, will secure, in the result, the requisite variety. For every organ must necessarily act in a manner corresponding with its specific structure. For "We cannot, therefore, withhold an expression of our deliberate belief, that the doctrine of the perfect unity of the human mind, both in substance and power, constitutes, most certainly, that foundation of the science of Phrenology that nothing can shake, and which the progress of time and improvements in knowledge will only render more stable and secure. if it be true that the mind, as a unit, possesses but unity of power, it follows, of necessity, that the multiplicity of power manifested in the functions of the mental faculties must arise from a multiplex system of cerebral organs, acting in conjunction with the mind."t It is not necessary, in studying Phrenology, to decide which of these views is the correct interpretation of nature; because the effects of the Organs on the mind are the same, whichever of them be adopted. If the mind consists of an aggregate of powers, then each acts by means of a particular organ, and is manifested with a degree of energy varying with its size. Viewed as one simple substance, capable of existing in a variety of states, it enters into each state by means of a separate organ: when the organs are spontaneouly active, they induce their relative states; without their influence, these cannot take place when they are large, Welsh's Life of Dr. Thomas Brown, p. 521. Preliminary Discourse in answer to Lord Jeffrey's Criticism on Phre. nology in the 88th No. of the Edinburgh Review, prefixed to Dr. Caldwell's Elements of Phrenology, 2d edit., p. 16. WHAT IS MIND BY ITSELF ?-DIVISION OF THE FACULTIES. 105 the states are excited vigorously; when they are small, these exist feebly. The reader may therefore adopt whichever theory appears to himself preferable. Without meaning to deny that the latter view appears to me the more plausible, I shall, in the following pages, treat of the faculties as distinct mental powers, connected with separate organs; because, by doing so, I shall be able to bring out the doctrine more simply and luminously, than by considering them as merely particular states of the general power-the Mind: and this language, moreover, is correct even on what seems to be the true hypothesis; because, according to this view, when the organ of Causality, for example, is largely possessed, the individual is capable of reasoning logically and acutely-of which mental act he is incapable when that organ is greatly deficient. The word faculty or power, therefore, is used to express the quality possesed in the one case, and not in the other, and which is legitimately designated and universally recognised by either of these terms. "It has occurred to me," continues Dr. Welsh, "that another difficulty of a metaphysical nature may suggest itself in regard to the principles of Phrenology. It may be asked, What is the soul when deprived of the cerebral organs? But the system of Dr. Brown affords us no more light upon this point than the system of Dr. Gall. Indeed, a passage which I have quoted from his Lectures shows that he considered that those who engaged in such inquiries were ignorant of the limits of our faculties. It is only experience that can teach us in what state the soul exists when separated from the body. And in this sense the precept of the poet holds equally in a scientific and in a religious point of view, "Wait the great teacher Death, and God adore.'" DIVISION OF THE FACULTIES. DR. SPURZHEIM divides the faculties into two orders, FEELINGS and INTELLECT, or affective and intellectual faculties. The feelings are subdivided by him into two genera, denominated PROPENSITIES and SENTIMENTS. He applies the name propensities to indicate internal impulses, which invite only to certain actions; and sentiments to designate other feelings, not limited to inclination alone, but which have an emotion of a peculiar kind superadded. Acquisitiveness, for example, is a mere impulse to acquire; Veneration gives a tendency to worship, accompanied by a particular emotion, which latter quality is the reason of its being denominated a sentiment. The second order of faculties makes us acquainted with objects which exist, and their qualities and relations; they are called INTELLECTUAL. These are subdivided by Dr. Spurzheim into four genera. The first includes the external senses and voluntary motion; the second those internal powers which perceive existence, or make man and animals acquainted with external objects and their physical qualities; and the third the powers which perceive the relations of external objects. These three genera are named perceptive faculties. The fourth genus comprises the faculties which act on all the other powers-which compare, judge, and discriminate these are named reflective faculties. The names of the faculties employed in this work are, with few exceptions, those suggested by Dr. Spurzheim. To designate propensity, he adds to a root or fundamental word the termination ive, as indicating the quality of producing; the termination ness denotes the abstract state, as Destructiveness. The termination ous characterizes a sentiment, as cautious, conscientious. To these is added ness, to express the abstract quality, as Cautiousness, Conscientiousness. The names of the intel |