extended its meaning as to signify that faculty of the mind by which knowledge or truth is perceived. The first property of wit, as an exertion of the intellectual faculty, is that it be spontaneous, and as it were instinctive: laboured or forced wit is no wit. Reflection

and experience supply us with wisdom; study and
labour supply us with learning; but wit seizes with
an eagle eye that which escapes the notice of the deep
thinker, and elicits truths which are in vain sought
for with any severe effort: Wit lies more in the as-
semblage of ideas, and putting those together with
quickness and varie-ADDISON. Humour is a
pecies of wit which flows out of the humour of a
erson;

For sure by wit is chiefly meant
Applying well what we invent:
What humour is not, all the tribe
Of logick-mongers can describe:
Here nature only acts her part,

Unhelp'd by practice, books, or art.-Swirt. Wit, as distinguished from humour, may consist of a single brilliant thought;

In a true piece of wit all things must be,
Yet all things there agree.-COWLEY.

'Tis with our judgements as our watches, none
Go just alike, yet each believes his own;
In poets as true genius is rare,

True taste as seldom is the critick's share.-POPE. without having genius; but it would not be possible to It is obvious, therefore, that we may have a taste have genius for a thing without having a taste for it: for nothing caa so effectually give a taste for any ac complishment, as the capacity to learn it, and the sus ceptibility of all its beauties, which circumstances ar inseparable from genius.

INGENUITY, WIT.

Both these terms imply acuteness of understanding, and differ mostly in the mode of displaying themselves. Ingeny, in Latin ingenuitas, signities literary freedom of birth, in distinction from slavery, with which condition have been naturally associated nobleness of character and richness in mental endowments, in which latter sense it is allied to wit. Ingenuity con prebends invention; wit comprehends knowledge. Ingenuity displays itself in the mode of conducting an argument; Men were formerly won over to opinions, But humour runs in a vein; it is not a striking, but an by the candour, sense, and ingenuity of those who had equable and pleasing flow of wit; There is a kind played in aptness of expression and illustration; When the right on their side.'--ADDISON. Wit is mostly disof nature, a certain regularity of thought, which must I broke loose from that great body of writers, who have discover the writer (of humour) to be a man of sense employed their wit and parts in propagating vice and at the same time that he appears altogether given up irreligion, I did not question but I should be treated as to caprice-ADDISON. Of this description of wit Mr. Addison has given us the most admirable specimens in in matters either of art or science; one is witty only an odd kind of fellow.'-ADDISON. One is ingenious his writings, who knew best how to explain what wit and humour were, and to illustrate them by his practice. in matters of sentiment: things may, therefore, be inHumour may likewise display itself in actions as well genious, but not witty; witty, but not ingenious, or both as words, whereby it is more strikingly distinguished witty and ingenions. A mechanical invention, or any from it, which displays itself only in the happy ex-ingenious, not a witty solution of a difficulty; a flashi ordinary contrivance, is ingenious but not witty an pression of happy thoughts; I cannot help remarking of wit, not a flash of ingenuity; a witty humour, a that sickness, which often destroys both wit and wis- witty conversation; not an ingenious humour or condom, yet seldom has power to remove that talent which versation: on the other hand, a conceit is ingenious, we call humour. Mr. Wycherley showed his in his last compliment paid to his young wife (whom he made contains point, and strikes on the understanding of as it is the fruit of one's own mind; it is witty, as it promise, on his dying bed, that she would not marry an old man again).'-POPE.

Satire, from satyr, probably from sat and ira abounding in anger, and irony, from the Greek cipova simulation and dissimulation, are personai and censo rious sorts of wit; the first of which openly points at the object, and the second in a covert manner takes its aim; The ordinary subjects of satire are such as excite the greatest indignation in the best tempers.'ADDISON. In writings of humour, figures are sometimes used of so delicate a nature, that it shall often happen that some people will see things in a direct contrary sense to what the author, and the majority of the readers understand them: to such the most innocent irony may appear irreligion.'--CAMBRIDGE. Bur lesque is rather a species of humour than direct wit, which consists in an assemblage of ideas extravagantly discordant; 'One kind of burlesque represents mean persons in the accoutrements of heroes.'ADDISON. The satire and irony are the most ill-natured kinds of wit; burlesque stands in the lowest rank.

TASTE, GENIUS.

others.

SENSE, JUDGEMENT.

perceive, siguities in general the faculty of feeling cor-
Sense, from the Latin sensus and sentio to feel or
poreally, or perceiving mentally; in the first case it is
allied to feeling (v. Feeling), in the second it is synony-
mous with judgement, which is a special operation of
understanding which renders an account of things
the mind. The sense is that primitive portion of the
through the medium of the senses;

Then is the soul a nature, which contains
The power of sense within a greater power.

DAVIES.

selects or rejects from this account. The sense is, so And the judgement, that portion of the reason which to speak, the reporter which collects the details, and exposes the facts; the judgement is the judge that passes sentence upon them. According to the strict import of the terms, the judgement depends upon the sense, and varies with it in degree. He who has no sense, has no judgement; and he who loses sense, loses judgement: since sense supplies the knowledge of things, and judgement pronounces upon them, it is evident that there must be sense before there can be judgement.

Taste, in all probability from the Latin tactum and tango to touch, seems to designate the capacity to derive pleasure from an object by simply coming in contact with it; This metaphor would not have been so general had there not been a conformity between the mental taste and that sensitive taste which gives a reOn the other hand, sense, when taken to denote the mental faculty of perceiving, may be so distinguished lish of every flavour.'-ADDISON. Genius designates from judgement, that there may be sense without judgethe power we have for accomplishing any object; ment, and judgement without sense; sense is the Taste consists in the power of judging, genius in the faculty of perceiving in general; it is applied to abpower of executing.'-BLAIR. He who derives parti-stract science as well as general knowledge: judgement cular pleasure from musick may be said to have a taste is the faculty of determining either in matters of pracfor musick; he who makes very great proficiency in the tice or theory. It is the lot of many, therefore, to have theory and practice of musick may be said to have a sense in matters of theory, who have no judgment in genius for it. Taste is in some degree an acquired matters of practice, while others, on the contrary, faculty, or at least is dependant on cultivation, as also who have nothing above common sense, will have a on our other faculties, for its perfection; The cause soundness of judgement that is not to be surpassed of a wrong taste is a defect of judgement.'-BURKE. Genius, from the Latin gigno to generate, is a perfectly natural gift which rises to perfection by its own native strength; the former belongs to the critick, and the latter to the poet;

sense, and yet not a solid judgement: as they are Nay, further, it is possible for a man to have good both natural faculties, men are gifted with them as

* Vide Riband: "Sens, jugement"

variously as with every other faculty. By good sense |
a man is enabled to discern, as it were intuitively, that
which requires another of less sense to ponder over
and study;

There's something previous ev'n to taste: 'tis sense,
Good sense; which only is the gift of heav'n,
And, though no science, fairly worth the seven;
A light within yourself you must perceive,
Jones and Le Notre have it not to give.--POPE.

towards discrimination; he who can discern the springs of human action, or penetrate the views of men, will be most fitted for discriminating between the characters of different men; Perhaps there is no character through all Shakspeare drawn with more spirit and just discrimination than Shylock's.'HENLEY.

Although judgement derives much assistance from the three former operations, it is a totally distinct it acts on external objects by seeing them: the latter power: the former only discover the things that are; is creative; it produces by deduction from that which ex-passes inwardly. The former are speculative; they confined to present objects; they serve to discover are directed to that which is to be known, and are truth or falsehood, perfections and defects, motives and pretexts: the latter is practical; it is directed to that which is to be done, and extends its views to the future; it marks the relations and connexions of things: it foresees their consequences and effects; 'I love him, I confess, extremely; but my affection does by no means prejudice my judgement.")-MELMOTH (Letters of Pliny).

By a solid judgement a man is enabled to avoid those errours in conduct, which one of a weak judgement is always falling into; In all instances, where our perience of the past has been extensive and uniform, our judgement concerning the future amounts to moral certainty.-BEATTIE. There is, however, this distinction between sense and judgment, that the deficiencies of the former may be supplied by diligence and attention; but a defect in the latter is to be supplied by no efforts of one's own. A man may improve his Sense in proportion as he has the means of information; but a weakness of judgement, is an irreme

diable evil.

When employed as epithets, the term sensible and judicious serve still more clearly to distinguish the two primitives. A writer or a speaker is said to be sensible; I have been tired with accounts from sensible men, furnished with matters of fact, which have hap pened within their own knowledge.'-ADDISON. A friend, or an adviser, to be judicious; Your observations are so judicious, I wish you had not been so sparing of them.'--SIR W. JONES. The sense displays itself in the conversation, or the communication of one's ideas; the judgment in the propriety of one's actions. A sensible man may be an entertaining companion; but a judicious man, in any post of command, is an inestimable treasure. Sensible remarks are always calculated to please and interest sensible people; judicious measures have a sterling value in themselves, that is appreciated according to the importance of the object. Hence, it is obvious, that to be sensible is a desirable thing; but to be judicious is an indispensable requisite.

pene.

Of discernment, we say that it is clear; it serves to remove all obscurity and confusion: of penetration, falsehood draws before truth, and prevents us from we say that it is acute; it pierces every veil which being deceived: of discrimination, we say that it is nice; it renders our ideas accurate, and serves to presay that it is solid or sound; it renders the conduct vent us from confounding objects: of judgement, we prudent, and prevents us from committing mistakes,

or involving one's self in embarrassments.

of either persons or things, we exercise discernment; When the question is to estimate the real qualities Cool age advances venerably wise,

Turns on all hands its deep discerning eyes.-POPE. When it is required to lay open that which art or cunning has concealed, we must exercise penetration; of modern algebra and fluxions, is not worth the "A penetration into the abstruse difficulties and depths labour of those who design either of the three learned professions.'-WATTS. When the question is to determine the proportions and degrees of qualities in persons or things, we must use discrimination; A satire should expose nothing but what is corrigible, and make a due discrimination between those who are, and those who are not, proper objects of it.'-ADDISON, When called upon to take any step, or act any part, we must employ the judgement; 'Judgement, a cool and slow faculty, attends not a man in the rapture of poeti

DISCERNMENT, PENETRATION, DISCRIMINATION, JUDGEMENT. Discernment expresses the judgement or power of discerning, which, from the Latin discerno, or dis and cerao, signifies to look at apart, so as to form a true estimate of things; penetration denotes the act or power of penetrating, from penetrate, in Latin tratus, participle of penetro and penitus, within, signi-cal composition.'-DENNIS. Discernment is more or fying to see into the interiour; discrimination denotes the act or power of discriminating, from discriminate, in Latin discriminatus, participle of discrimino, to make a difference; judgement denotes the power of judging, from judge, in Latin judico, compounded of jus and dico, signifying to pronounce right.

The first three of these terms do not express different powers, but different modes of the same power; hamely, the power of seeing intellectually, or exerting the intellectual sight.

less indispensable for every man in private or public station; he who has the most promiscuous dealings with men, has the greatest need of it: penetration is of peculiar importance for princes and statesmen: dis crimination is of great utility for commanders, and all who have the power of distributing rewards and punishments: judgement is an absolute requisite for all to whom the execution or management of concerns is intrusted.

REASONABLE, RATIONAL,

Are both derived from the same Latin word ratio, reason, which, from ratus and reor, to think, signifies the thinking faculty.

Discernment is not so powerful a mode of intellec tual vision as penetration; the former is a common faculty, the laiter is a higher degree of the same faculty; it is the power of seeing quickly, and seeing in spite of all that intercepts the sight, and keeps the object out of view: a man of common discernment discerns characters which are not concealed by any par-signifies having reason in it: the former is more comReasonable signifies accordant with reason; rational ticular disguise; Great part of the country was aban• doned to the spoils of the soldiers, who, not troubling only applied in the sense of right reason, propriety, themselves to discern between a subject and a rebel, or fairness; the latter is employed in the original sense while their liberty lasted, made indifferently profit of of the word reason: hence we term a man reasonable both.-HAYWARD. A man of penetration is not to be who acts according to the principles of right reason; deceived by any artifice, however thoroughly cloaked and a being rational, who is possessed of the rational or secured, even from suspicion; He is as slow to or reasoning faculty, in distinction from the brutes. It decide as he is quick to apprehend, calmly and delibe- is to be lamented that there are much fewer reasonable rately weighing every opposite reason that is offered, than there are rational creatures. The same distinction and tracing it with a most judicious penetration. exists between them when applied to things; A law MELMOTH (Letters of Pliny). may be reasonable in itself, although a man does not Discernment and penetration serve for the discovery allow it, or does not know the reason of the lawgivers of individual things by their outward marks; discrimi-SWIFT. The evidence which is afforded for a future nation is employed in the discovery of ditierences state is sufficient for a rational ground of conduct.'between two or more objects; the former consists of simple observation, the latter combines also comparison: discernment and penetration are great aids

BLAIR.

• Vide Abbe Girard. "Discernement, jugement "

MENTAL, INTELLECTUAL. There is the same difference between mental and intellectual as between mind and intellect: the mind comprehends the thinking faculty in general with all its operations; the intellect includes only that part of it which consists in understanding and judgement: mental is therefore opposed to corporeal; intellectual is opposed to sensual or physical: mental exertions are not to be expected from all; intellectual enjoyments fall to the lot of comparatively few.

Objects, pleasures, pains, operations, gifts, &c. are denominated mental; To collect and reposite the various forms of things is far the most pleasing part of mental occupation.'-JOHNSON. Subjects, conversation, pursuits, and the like, are entitled intellectual;

Man's more divine, the master of all these,
Lord of the wide world, and wide wat'ry seas,
Endued with intellectual sense and soul.

SHAKSPEARE.

It is not always easy to distinguish our mental pleasures from those corporeal pleasures which we enjoy in common with the brutes; the latter are however greatly heightened by the former in whatever degree they are blended: in a society of well-informed persons the conversation will turn principally on intellectual subjects.

MEMORY, REMEMBRANCE, RECOLLECTION,
REMINISCENCE.

The power of memory, and the simple exercise of that power in the act of remembering, are possessed in common, though in different degrees, by man and brute; but recollection and reminiscence are exercises of the memory that are connected with the higher faculties of man, his judgement and understanding. To remember is to call to mind that which has once been presented to the mind; but to recollect is to remember afresh, to remember what has been remembered before. Remembrance busies itself with objects that are at hand; recollection carries us back to distant periods: simple remembrance is engaged in things less easily to be recalled, and more or less faithfully to that have but just left the mind, which are more or be represented; but recollection tries to retrace the faint images of things that have been so long unthought of as to be almost obliterated from the mery. In this manner we are said to remember in one half hour what was told us in the preceding half hour, or to remember what passes from one day to another; but we recollect the incidents of childhood; we recollect what happened in our native place after many years' absence from it. The remembrance is that homely every-day exercise of the memory which renders it of essential service in the acquirement of knowledge, or in the performance of one's duties; Memory may be assisted by method, and the decays of knowledge repaired by stated times of recollection.'-JOHNSON. The recollection is that exalted exercise of the memory which affords us the purest of enjoyments, and serves the noblest of purposes; the recollection of all the minute incidents of childhood is a more sincere pleasure than any which the present moment can afford.

Memory, in Latin memoria or memor, Greek pvhuwv and uváopat, comes, in all probability, from uevos, the mind, because memory is the principal faculty of the mind; remembrance, from the verb remember, con- Reminiscence, if it deserve any notice as a word of tracted from re and memoro, to bring back to the mind, English use, is altogether an abstract exercise of the is a verbal substantive, denoting the exercise of that memory, which is employed on purely intellectual ideas faculty; recollection, from recollect, compounded of re in distinction from those which are awakened by senand collect, signifies collecting again, i. e. carefully,sible objects; the mathematician makes use of remiand from different quarters by an effort of the memory; reminiscence, in Latin reminiscentia, from reminiscor and memor, is the bringing back to the mind what was there before.

Memory is the power of recalling images once made on the mind; remembrance, recollection, and reminis cence, are operations or exertions of this power, which vary in their mode.

The memory is a power which exerts itself either independently of the will, or in conformity with the will; but all the other terms express the acts of conscious agents, and consequently are more or less connected with the will. In dreams the memory exerts itself, but we should not say that we have then any remembrance or recollection of objects.

BON.

niscence in deducing unknown truths from those which he already knows; Reminiscence is the retrieving a thing at present forgot, or confusedly remembered, by setting the mind to hunt over all its notions.'-SOUTH.

Reminiscence among the disciples of Socrates was the remembrance of things purely intellectual, or of that natural knowledge which the souls had had before their union with the body; while the memory was exercised upon sensible things, or that knowledge which was acquired through the medium of the senses; therefore the Latins said that reminiscentia belonged exclusively to man, because it was purely intellectual, but that memory was common to all animals, because it was merely the depot of the senses; but this distinc tion, from what has been before observed, is only pre served as it respects the meaning of reminiscence.

Remembrance is the exercise of memory in a conscious agent; it is the calling a thing back to the mind Memory is a generic term, as has been already which has been there before, but has passed away; shown: it includes the common idea of reviving former Forgetfulness is necessary to remembrance.'-JoHN-impressions, but does not qualify the nature of the ideas revived: the term is however extended in its application to signify not merely a power, but also a seat or resting place, as is likewise remembrance and recollection; but still with this difference, that the memory is spacious, and contains every thing; the remembrance and recollection are partial, and compre hend only passing events: we treasure up knowledge in our memory; the occurrences of the preceding year are still fresh in our remembrance or recollection.

This may be the effect of repetition or habit, as in the case of a child who remembers his lesson after having learned it several times; or of a horse who remembers the road which he has been continually passing; or it may be the effect of association and circumstances, by which images are casually brought back to the mind, as happens to intelligent beings continually as they exercise their thinking faculties;

Remember thee!

Ah, thou poor ghost, while memory holds a seat
In this distracted globe.-SHAKSPEARE.

In these cases remembrance is an involuntary act; for things return to the mind before one is aware of it, as in the case of one who hears a particular name, and remembers that he has to call on a person of the same name; or of one who, on seeing a particular tree, remembers all the circumstances of his youth which were connected with a similar tree.

Remembrance is however likewise a voluntary act, and the consequence of a direct determination, as in the case of a child who strives to remember what it has been told by its parent; or of a friend who remembers the hour of meeting another friend in consequence of the interest which it has excited in his mind: nay indeed experience teaches us that scarcely any thing in ordinary cases is more under the subservience of the will than the memory; for it is now become almost a maxim to say, that one may remember whatever one wishes.

FORGETFULNESS, OBLIVION.

Forgetfulness characterizes the person, or that which is personal; oblivion the state of the thing: the former refers to him who forgets; I have read in ancient authors invitations to lay aside care and anxiety, and give a loose to that pleasing forgetfulness wherein men put off their characters of business.'-STEELE. The latter to that which is forgotten; O'er all the rest, an undistinguished crew, Her wing of deepest shade oblivion drew.-FALCONER We blame a person for his forgetfulness; but we some times bury things in oblivion

FANCY, IMAGINATION.

Fancy, considered as a power, simply brings the ob ject to the mind, or makes it appear, from the Latin phantasia, and the Greek pavraoin and pairw, to

appear; but imagination, from image, in Latin imago, | be indifferently employed in general discourse for
or imitago, or imitatio, is a power which presents the thought; but the former term does not on this account
images or likenesses of things. The fancy, therefore, lose its characteristic meaning.
only employs itself about things without regarding
their nature; but the imagination aims at tracing a
resemblance, and getting a true copy;

And as imagination bodies forth

The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen Turns them to shape.-SHAKSPEARE. The fancy consequently forms combinations, either real or unreal, as chance may direct; but the imagina ia is seldomer led astray. The fancy is busy in freans, or when the mind is in a disordered state; There was a certain lady of thin airy shape, who was very active in this solemnity: her name was Fancy. ADDISON. But the imagination is supposed to act when the intellectual powers are in full play. The fancy is employed on light and trivial objects, which are present to the senses; the imagination soars above all worldly objects, and carries us from the world of matter into the world of spirits, from time present to the time to come. A milliner or mantua-maker may employ her fancy in the decorations of a cap or gown; Philosophy! I say, and call it He;

The imagination is not only the fruit of thought, but of peculiar thought: the thought may be another's; the imagination is one's own: the thought occurs and recurs; it comes and it goes; it is retained or rejected at the pleasure of the thinking being: the imagination is framed by special desire; it is cherished with the partiality of a parent for its offspring. The thoughts are busied with the surrounding objects; the imaginations are employed on distant and strange objects; hence the thoughts are denominated sober, chaste, and the like; the imaginations, wild and extravagant. The thoughts engage the mind as circumstances give rise to them; they are always supposed to have a foundation in some thing: the imaginations, on the other hand, are often the mere fruit of a disordered brain; they are always regarded as unsubstantial, if not unreal; they fre quently owe their origin to the suggestions of the appetites and passions; whence they are termed the imagi nations of the heart: Different climates produce in men, by a different mixture of the humours, a different and unequal course of imaginations and passions.'

-TEMPLE.

IDEAL, IMAGINARY.

For whatsoe'er the painter's fancy be, It a male virtue seems to me.-COWLEY. But the poet's imagination depicts every thing grand, every thing bold, and every thing remote; Whatever be his subject, Milton never fails to fill the imagina-mitive idea (v. Idea): the idea is the representation of tion.'-JOHNSON.

Although Mr. Addison has thought proper, for his convenience, to use the words fancy and imagination promiscuously when writing on this subject, yet the distinction, as above pointed out, has been observed both in familiar discourse and in writing. We say that we fancy, not that we imagine, that we see or hear something; the pleasures of the imagination, not of the fancy.

IDEA, THOUGHT, IMAGINATION. Idea, in Latin idea, Greek udén, signifies the form of image of an object, from idéw to see, that is, the thing seen in the mind. Thought literally signifies the thing thought, and imagination the thing imagined.

The idea is the simple representation of an object; the thought is the reflection; and the imagination is the combination of ideas: we have ideas of the sun, the moon, and all material objects; we have thoughts on moral subjects; we have imaginations drawn from the ideas already existing in the mind. The ideas are formed; they are the rude materials with which the thinking faculty exerts itself: the thoughts arise in the mind by means of association, or recur in the mind by the power of the memory; they are the materials with which the thinking faculty employs itself: the imaginations are created by the mind's reaction on itself; they are the materials with which the understanding seeks to enrich itself.

The word idea is not only the most general in sense, but the most universal in application; thought and imagination are particular terms used only in connexion with the agent thinking or imagining. All these words have therefore a distinct ethice, in which they cannot properly be confounded with each other. Idea is used in all cases for the mental representation, abstractedly from the agent that represents them: hence ideas are either clear or distinct; ideas are attached to words; ideas are analyzed, confounded, and the like; in which cases the word thought could not be substi tuted; Every one finds that many of the ideas which he desired to retain have slipped away irretrievably." -Joussos. The thought belongs only to thinking and rational beings: the brutes may be said to have ideas, but not thoughts: hence thoughts are either mean, fine, grovelling, or sublime, according to the nature of the mind in which they exist:

The warring passions, and tumultuous thoughts That rage within thee!-RowE. Hence we say with more propriety, to indulge a thought, than to indulge an idea; to express one's thoughts, rather than one's ideas, on any subject: although the latter term idea, on account of its comprehensive use, may without violation of any express rule

Ideal does not strictly adhere to the sense of its pri

a real object in the mind; but ideal signifies belonging to the idea independent of the reality or the external object. Imaginary preserves the signification of its primitive imagination (v. Fancy, also v. Idea), as denoting what is created by the mind itself.

The ideal is not directly opposed to, but abstracted from, the reality; There is not, perhaps, in all the stores of ideal anguish, a thought more painful than the consciousness of having propagated corruption.' -JOHNSON. The imaginary, on the other hand, is di rectly opposed to the reality; it is the unreal thing formed by the imagination; Superiour beings know well the vanity of those imaginary perfections that swell the heart of man.'-ADDISON. Ideal happiness is the happiness which is formed in the mind, without having any direct and actual prototype in nature; but it may, nevertheless, be something possible to be real ized; it may be above nature, but not in direct contradiction to it: the imaginary is that which is opposite to some positive existing reality; the pleasure which a lunatic derives from the conceit of being a king is alto gether imaginary.

INHERENT, INBRED, INBORN, INNATE.

The inherent, from hereo to stick, denotes a perma nent quality or property, as opposed to that which is adventitious and transitory. Inbred denotes that pro perty which is derived principally from habit or by a gradual process, as opposed to the one acquired by actual efforts. Inborn denotes that which is purely natural, in opposition to the artificial. Inherent is in its sense the most general; for what is inbred and inborn is naturally inherent; but all is not inbred and inborn which is inherent. Inanimate objects have inherent properties; but the inbred and inborn exist ouly in that which receives life; solidity is an inherent, but not an inbred or inborn property of matter: a love of truth is an inborn property of the human mind: it is consequently inherent, in as much as nothing can totally destroy it;

When my new mind had no infusion known,
Thou gav'st so deep a tincture of thine own,
That ever since I vainly try

To wash away th' inherent dye.-COWLEY.
birth; hence, likewise, the properties of animals are
That which is inbred is bred or nurtured in us from our
inbred in them, in as much as they are derived through
the medium of the breed of which the parent partakes,
that which is inborn is simply born in us: a property
may be inborn, but not inbred; it cannot, however, be
inbred and not inborn. Habits which are ingrafted
into the natural disposition are properly inbred; whence
the vulgar proverb that what is bred in the bone will
never be out of the flesh;' to denote the influence

which parents have on the characters of their children, | Apprehending is a momentary or sudden act; both physically and morally;

But he, my inbred enemy,

I nam'd them as they pass'd, and understood
Their nature, with such knowledge God indued
My sudden apprehension.—MILTON

Conceiving, which is a process of nature, is often slow inde-ceived the duke's death, but what was the motive of and gradual, as to conceive a design; This man conthat felonious conception is in the clouds.'-WOLTON.

Forth issu'd, brandishing his fatal dart,
Made to destroy; I fled, and cry'd out death!
MILTON.
Propensities, on the other hand, which are totally
pendent of education or external circumstances, are
properly inborn, as an inborn love of freedom;
Despair, and secret shame, and conscious thought
Of inborn worth, his lab'ring soul oppress'd.
DRYDEN.

Inborn and innate, from the Latin natus born, are precisely the same in meaning, yet they differ somewhat in application. Poetry and the grave style have adopted inborn; philosophy has adopted innate: genius is inborn in some men; nobleness is inborn in others: there is an inborn talent in some men to command, and an inborn fitness in others to obey. Mr. Locke and his followers are pleased to say, there is no such thing as innate ideas; and if they only mean that there are no sensible impressions on the soul, until it is acted upon by external objects, they may be right: but if they mean to say that there are no inborn characters or powers in the soul, which predispose it for the reception of certain impressions, they contradict the experience of the learned and the unlearned in all ages, who believe, and that from close observation on themselves and others, that man has, from his birth, not only the general cha- | racter, which belongs to him in common with his species, but also those peculiar characteristicks which distinguish individuals from their earliest infancy: all these characters or characteristicks are, therefore, not supposed to be produced, but elicited, by circumstances; and the ideas, which are but the sensible forms that the soul assumes in its connexion with the body, are, on that account, in vulgar language termed innate;

Grant these inventions of the crafty priest,
Yet such inventions never could subsist,
Unless some glimmerings of a future state
Were with the mind coeval and innate.

JENYNS.

TO CONCEIVE, APPREHEND, SUPPOSE,
IMAGINE.

To conceive, from the Latin concipio, or con and capio to put together, is to put an image together in the mind, or to form an idea; to apprehend, from appre hendo to lay hold of, is to seize with the understanding; to suppose, in French supposer, Latin supposui, perfect of suppono, or sub and pono to put one thing in the place of another, is to have one thing in one's mind in lieu of another; to imagine, in French imaginer; Latin imagino, from imago an image, signifies to reflect as an image or phantom in the mind.

What is conceived, is conclusive or at least determinate; 'A state of innocence and happiness is so remote from all that we have ever seen, that although we can easily conceive it is possible, yet our specula What is apprehended may be dubious or indetermi tions upon it must be general and confused.'-JOHNSON. nate: hence the term apprehend is taken in the sense Nothing is a misery,

of fear;

Unless our weakness apprehend it so.

standing; suppose and imagine of the imagination;
Conceive and apprehend are exercises of the under
but the former commonly rests on some ground of
reality, the latter may be the mere offspring of the
brain. Suppose is used in opposition to positive know-
ledge; no person supposes that, of which he is posi-
tively informed; It can scarce be supposed that the
mind is more vigorous when we sleep, than when we
for that which, in all probability, does not exist; we
are awake.'-HAWKESWORth. Imagine is employed
shall not imagine what is evident and undeniable;
The Earl of Rivers did not imagine there could exist,
in a human form, a mother that would ruin her own
Savage).
son without enriching herself.'-JOHNSON (Life of

TO CONCEIVE, UNDERSTAND, COM

PREHEND.

These terms indicate the intellectual operations of forming ideas, that is, ideas of the complex kind in distinction from the simple ideas formed by the act of perception. To conceive, is to put together in the mind; to understand, is to stand under, or near to the mind; to comprehend, from the Latin com or cum and prehendo to take, signifies to seize or embrace in the mind.

when we conceive we may have but one idea, when Conception is the simplest operation of the three; we understand or comprehend we have all the ideas not understand or comprehend without conceiving; which the subject is eapable of presenting. We canbut we may often conceive that which we neither inderstand nor comprehend; Whatever they cannot immediately conceive they consider as too high to be reached, or too extensive to be comprehended.'—

JOHNSON:

is not essential to the belief of a thing's existence. Sc long as we have reasons sufficient to conceive a thing as possible or probable, it is not necessary either to underlief. The mysteries of our holy religion are objects of stand or comprehend them in order to authorize our beconception, but not of comprehension;

Conceive, in the strict sense of the word, is the but the conception of it gives it an existence, at least That which we cannot conceive is to us nothing; generick, the others the specifick terms: since in appre-in our minds; but understanding or comprehending hending, imagining, and supposing, we always conceive or form an idea, but not vice versa; the difference consists in the mode and object of the action: we conceive of things as proper or improper, and just or unjust, right or wrong, good or bad, this is an act of the judgement; Conceive of things clearly and distinctly in their own natures; conceive of things completely in all their own parts; conceive of things comprehensively in all their properties and relations; conceive of things extensively in all their kinds; conceive of things orderly, or in a proper method.'—WATTS. We apprehend the meaning of another; this is by the power of simple perception;

Yet this I apprehend not, why to those Among whom God will deign to dwell on earth So many and so various laws are given.-MILTON. Apprehension is considered by logicians as the first power or operation of the mind being employed on the simplest objects; Simple apprehension denotes no more than the soul's naked intellection of an object, without either composition or deduction.'-GLANVILLE. Conceiving is applied to objects of any magnitude which are not above the stretch of human power; O, what avails me now that honour high To have conceived of God,or that salute

Our finite knowledge cannot comprehend

We conceive that a thing may be done without under The principles of an abounded sway.-SHIRLEY. standing how it is done; we conceive that a thing may exist without comprehending the nature of its existWe conceive clearly, understand fully, comprehend minutely.

ence.

Conception is a species of invention; it is the fruit of the mind's operation within itself; If, by a more noble and more adequate conception that be considered though not obvious, is, upon its first production, acas wit which is at once natural and new, that which, knowledged to be just; if it be that, which he that never found it, wonders how he missed; to wit of this kind the metaphysical poets have seldom risen.'— JOHNSON. Understanding and comprehension are employed solely on external objects; we understand and comprehend that which actually exists before us, and presents itself to our observation; 'Swift pays no court

Hail highly favour'd, among women blest.-MI: TON. to the passions; he excites neither surprise nor adnu