The sensational idealism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume

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George Washington University, 1904 - 26 страници
 

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Страница 90 - Thou seemest human and divine, The highest, holiest manhood, Thou: Our wills are ours, we know not how; Our wills are ours, to make them Thine.
Страница 21 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself 'at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Страница 86 - Let knowledge grow from more to more, But more of reverence in us dwell; That mind and soul, according well, May make one music as before, But vaster.
Страница 20 - Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second.
Страница 85 - For the creation was subjected to vanity, not of its own will, but by reason of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.
Страница 89 - Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? or who shall stand in his holy place? He that hath clean hands, and a pure heart; who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, nor sworn deceitfully.
Страница 19 - All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.
Страница 21 - If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same through the whole course of our lives, since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant - and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such...
Страница 23 - I am sensible that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings could have induced me to receive it.
Страница 24 - In short there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them: viz., that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences.

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