upon a private order, which he might fign in his closet? moft fatal confequences: If the maxims of thefe gentlemen be juft, there is an end of our liberty! an end of our parliaments! If the ports of Ireland could be opened and we are no more a nation! for our ex- for the exportation of corn, by fuch a pricutive power is the fame with that of Eng-vate order, it is poffible that order might land, and, of courfe, our legiflative power muft alfo be theme:For my part, I cannot conceive from what premifles they draw this conclufion: For, if the Englith Thould ever pretend to make laws for us, because the King of Great Britain is the executive power of Ireland, we have juft as good a right to make laws for them, because our King of Ireland is the executive power of Great Britain :-Depend upon it, that when they form any ferious defign of making laws for us, they will fupport their oppreffion by much more forcible arguments. I come now to confider the fifth political axiom; in which it is afferted, That, whenever the power of fufpending a law islodged in any body of men, they become, ipfo fallo, the executive power of the ftate.- -This propofition is too ridiculous to be feriously answered :If the parliament had vested in you, gentlemen, a power of fufpending the execution of this act, (and, from the many opportunities you have of comparing the quantity of corn in the kingdom, with the demands of the inhabitants, I know no body of men more capable of executing it with propriety) would you from that moment have erected yourfelves into the executive power of the kingdom?Had the parliament lodged that power in the Lord-Mayor of London, would he, from thence, become the executive power of Ireland?The abfurdity of this fuppofition ftrikes every body at first fight: And can an argument, which appears fo ridiculous, when applied to any other body of men, become ferious and weighty, when applied to the council of Great Britain? But I have already proved, and, I think, beyond all poffibility of doubt, that this act gives no power whatfoever to the English council: And, as that is certainly the cafe, I appeal to every man of fenfe and difcretion, whether it be not more proper, moft refpectful to this country, more defirable in every refpect, that the fufpenfion of this law fhould depend upon the order of his Majefty, publickly made in the midft of his council, than be obtained in a clandeftine manner, by the influence of a favourite, bribed thereto by fome interested perfons.You have, many of you, in the course of your bufinefs, fuffered by embargoes, laid on from fuch private motives;--but there is no fuch danger to be apprehended, when the order for fufpending this act is to be made by his Majefty before the principal perfons of his British fubjects, who are at once the witneffes of his conduct, and the judges of the propriety of it. We have the ftrongest reafon to believe, that no fuch order will be ever made, unlefs the neceffities of the English fhall require it; and, if they should stand in need of our affittance, God forbid that we fhould be fo ungrateful as to refuse it to a people, who, in the time of the greatest scarcity, when they have prohibited the exportation of their grain to all other parts of the world, have never failed to make an exception in favour of this kingdom. We may alfo be affured, that his Majefty will not open our ports for the exportation of grain; without prohibiting, at the fame time, the exportation of corn from Great Britain: By which means, we fhall fupply the people of England only; whereas, if this law had been rejected, our corn would be carried, thro' England, to every other part of Europe, and we thould give plenty to our enemies, while we are ftarving at home. Before I conclude this fubject, I must be candid enough to own that this act does introduce an innovation, and one of a very material nature:-This is the first time that an embargo has ever been laid on, in this kingdom, by the authority of the Irish parliament:-This is the first time that his Majefty ever delegated to his Irith fubjects the exercife of that undoubted branch of his prerogative: He has indeed prefumed to referve to himself a liberty of reaffuming his authority, when the fafety of his English fubjects mall require it.-By what arguments people perfuade themfelves that this refervation is an innovation dangerous to our conftitution, and an infult on the nation, I cannot comprehend: But, of this I am con fident, fident, that the rejecting the bill in queftion, for that reafon only, would have been the most wanton, unprovoked, unwarrantable infult on Majefty, that ever was offered to a good Prince by any houfe of parliament. • I thall trouble you with no further obfervations on this fubject, and hope, for your own fakes chiefly, that what I have faid may prove a fufficient ANTIDOTE against this feditious ADDRESS. The Analyfis of a new Quack-medicine, called an Antidote, &c. The Author of the following piece, after treating his opponent with much ridicule, both as to the fubject of his Antidote, and his manner of prescribing it, proceeds; point it was brought to establish. The fufpenfion in that cafe being by proclamation and under the great feal of Ireland: that is, with an appropriated appendage of his fupreme power over this kingdom, and exprefsly by virtue of that supreme power without any foreign council of appendage. But now we have another. precedent from the glorious times of George II. which would completely an fwer the purpofe-only for two fmall" objections. The firft is that it is no precedent at all of any fufpenfion of a law. But an inftance of a power vested in his M-y to exempt thofe abfentees from the penalty of four fhillings in the pound, whom he fhall judge proper. Here is one the author ftates it, and it is a very ma material difference-And the other is (as terial one) that the prefent fufpenfion is, and affitted, as K-g of Great Britain; as an act, part, or confequence of his fa vereignty over that kingdom, whereas the exempting claufe of George II. is, by an order under his fign manual, that is, by the king, acting in perfon, as K. of Ireland, without the intervention of any asfembly whatever, which is the peculiar appendage of another and distinct sovereignty. AN alteration, faith the antidote, bas by his My fitting, acting, attended, bill antrite, bas tranfmitted to Great Britain. -That furely was no innovation! (p.52) For tho' it may not be fo properly called an innovation, because a vicious practice of this kind may have been tolerated in more inftances than it ought (for it ought not to have been tolerated in one, as appears from the rectitude of the practice being now inferred merely from the fufferance of it)-though I fay it may therefore not be fo properly called a novelty at leastyet this writer must be told that the bill's being altered in E- -d, was a fufficient objection in itself-that any alteration of our bills in E- -d, is contrary to PoyNING's law (as it is not impoffible but that the public may at fome time have the pleasure to hear demonftrated)-that every law fo altered is by the 11th of Eliz. void and of no effect, and this laft altered law among the reft, thank God!-And that the minority refted their oppofition to this bill merely upon its own demerits, folely from strictness and accuracy of argumentation, and in order to avoid complicating the question, or multiplying objections from different quarters, where one was fully fufficient. And when the reader attends to the true ftate and purport of the new infertion, he will poffibly be tempted to ftare with fome furprize at the precedent brought by this writer to justify it. That of the reign of Philip and Mary (fee p. 47.) is given up, as directly repugnant to the By the HEADS of the Bill, faith he, as they paffed the H- of C-, a power was vefied in the chief governors and council [of THIS kingdom] of fufpending the execution of this law, [by public and open PROCLAMATION] and by a claufe added in Great Britain, this power of fufpenfion was likewife extended to his Majefly in council.The author feems willing to forget that the words of the claufe are, in the privy council of Great Britain-and this, not by public proclamation, but by order, which from its nature may be private and partial. He can heft inform us, what it was that tempted him, to falfify or curtail thefe important expreffions. This bill, faith he [thus altered] vefs in his majefty a power of fufpending the execution of it (p. 52.) Who knows not that the bill, as it was origi nally framed, vefted this power in his majefty? But how? as king of Ireland acting by his delegates, and in them, exercifing his independent fovereignty, and fupreme executive power over this his loyal kingdom?-Why fhould not the the merchants have been told at once? or were they like their brethren fo great dolts that they could not discern at once, without being told, that the alteration vetted a power in his my acting in, and with the participation of a council, which is the proper and peculiar appendage of his executive adminiftration, as fovereign of Great Britain, acting in his official capacity as fovereign of Great Britain, (and therefore by fair and clear implication) acting by virtue of this fovereignty, (a power I fay) of fufpending the execution of a law made in this, his other kingdom, where we are bound to believe, that he enjoys, and acts by virtue of another diftinet fovereignty, independent, and unconnected with any council, affembly, or conftitution in any other kingdom upon earth?—This is the real ftate of the queftion; but a state of it, not quite fo convenient for our author's purpofe,— -as we may judge from his ftopping at the word, council" and omitting," of Great "Britain." The first propofition which the author of the antidote has impofed upon the minority, is, "That the king and council are the executive power of Great Bri"tain;" (p. 53.) a pofition which it is falfe that the minority fuftained. They faid uniformly, and truly, I believe, that his majesty, is king, and executive power, of Great Britain; and that the privy council of Great Britain, is the executive council of Great Britain; not of Ireland: that it is the proper and diftinguifhing appendage to his majesty, as king and executive power of Great Britain; and marks, denotes, and characterizes him in that capacity. This I venture to affert was the pofition of the minority. The affertion of the minority I have mentioned; and they feemed to think that no man in his fenfes could fuppofe that his majefty acting in the privy council of Great Britain could be mistaken for the king, or executive power of any other country, than of Great Britain. They, allowed, and they gloried in it, that one and fame perfon, is king and executive power of both kingdoms. But they maintained that though he is fingle in perfon, he is double in office; that he is one, and the fame, as a man: but that he conAtitutes two distinct magiftrates; that we are not to infer official, from perfonal identity; and that his natural unity, does not prevent his political dividuality. This they maintained, and therefore they maintained that his proper and diftinguishing appendage, as the executive power of one kingdom, ought not to have been applied to him, as the executive power of the other: and that the very identity of perfon, which the author of the antidote feems to object to their opposition, is the best juftification of it; because, from that identity of perfon, a confufion of office, if not carefully prevented, must necefiarily arise. The fecond propofition afcribed by the author of the antidote to the minority, is, "That the Lord Lieutenant and council are the executive power of this kingdom,” (p. 53.) If he means by this, that the lord lieutenant and council are the executive power of this kingdom, exclusively of his majesty, and otherwise than by delegation from him, then it is falle that the minority ever afferted this pofition. If he mean any thing elfe, he either means what can be nothing to his argument, or he means nothing at all. And here I must observe that in the first propofition he mentions, "The king and council," but omits to mention" of Great Britain ;" and that in this fecond propofition he mentions "Lord Lieutenant and council," but omits to mention" of Ireland," (because these additional words would fuggeft a material difference, and mark that evident diftinction which was made by the opponents to the b-ll, but which the candid writer of the antidote wishes to conceal. As to the matter of this fecond propofition, the minority afferted that his majefty, as king of Ireland, is the executive power of this country; or, by delegation his fubftitutes; with the privy council of Ireland, which in many cafes act as a part of the executive, in conjunction with the chief governor, or governors. They afferted that that the privy council of Ireland is the proper and conftitutional council for the executive power of Ireland; and they might ask, if in the Br-th P. it were propofed, to give a power of fufpending a Br- fh law to his Majefty in, or by and with the advice of his privy council of Ireland, whether it would not be inftantly rejected, as a dangerous folecifin; though many things might be admitted by a nation fuperior in ftrength, and of uncontroverted title, which an in ferior, ferior, and a threatened nation, could not admit with fafety? The third propofition which the author of the Antidote gives to the minority, is, "That the executive powers in the two kingdoms are different." (p. 53) If he means, that the minority afferted that they were diftinct in office, though united in one perfon; it is true: But if he ftates this, which he feems to do, as a confequence deduced by the minority from his two preceding propofitions, he, for fo much, departs from truth. And this fhews the futility of the fyllogifm, as it were, which follows in the 2d page of the Antidote after this: (p. 53.) and in which is included the whole of this author's argument. There he denies the two propofitions he before falfely afcribed to the minority, and in confequence thereof, concludes that this third propofition, viz. that the executive powers of the two countries are different or distinct, is falfe likewife. Thus he affumes that the minority maintained two false propofitions which they never thought of; and that they inferred a third from thofe two, which they never did infer from them; and that this third propofition must therefore be falfe. A fpecies of logic, new indeed, but perhaps, it is as much as the fubject will admit. For what artifice can even perplex a point, fo clear in principle as this; that the fame perfon may at the fame time, be invested with two diftinct magiftracies: and that certain modes of acting, certain circumstances, certain appendages,* adjuncts and affiftants, may be proper to him in one capacity; and improper and incongruous in the other? The fourth propofition afcribed to the miniftry, is; That whenever it shall happen, that the two kingdoms have the fame executive power, the confequence must be that they will have the fame legislative alfo. (p. 53.) Now it never was afferted by the minority that the latter must be; or that it was an inevitable and a neceffary confequence of the former, as the Antidote has unfairly infinuated. If fuch were the neceffary confequence, the guilt of those who should abet such an innovation would be unparalelled. What then was afferted by the minority? That the crowns of the two countries only, were united; but that the kingdoms were di * See the Proteft of the Lords. Jan. 1766. stinct. That from his Majesty's being the executive power of each, as being the king of both, nothing could poffibly be inferred further than the union of the crowns: But that, if by an act of our legiflature, we allowed that the privy-coun cil of Great-Britain (who have no relation. to us; who belong to another country; who are a body contradiftinguished, configned, and appropriated, to a different kingdom) were proper appendages, or affiflants to the executive power of this kingdom; that it might be conftrued to indicate fomething more than an union of crowns: and that from any thing like a national union, an union of states, or an union of legislative, as well as of execu, tive councils, might poffibly be inferred. That inferences in favour of the most momentous claims, had been made upon lefs plaufible grounds; and that a weak nation ought to be as circumfpect with re gard to its rights, as an unfriended virginwith respect to her reputation. The fifth propofition afcribed to the unfortunate minority, is, That the power of fufpending a law, can be lodged only in the executive power of the state; and that whenever the power of fufpending a law, is vefted in any body of men, they become ipfo facto, the executive power." (p. 53.)--Now it was faid by the minority, that the power of fufpending any law, ought, of right, and in strictness of propriety, to be lodged in the legiflature which made the law: that the fame authority which had created, might destroy; and that the operation of fuperior power might not be controled by inferior. Left however the legislature fhould not happen to be fitting when it might be proper to fufpend the law, it was observed, that the legislature, for convenience, delegated this power to the executive authority of the country to which the law belonged: but that it cannot be conftitutionally transferred to the executive power of any other country; and particularly that it cannot be conftitutionally, or prudently depofited in the executive power of a country, with which there are any controverfies with refpect to legislative authority; becaufe, it is in fact, for fo much, a tranffer, or delegation of the legislative power. If, according to the ftrange fuppofition of the author, the power of suspension had been given to the Lord Mayor of London, (p. 54.) (in the common council of London H don let us add); it would not, I grant, have made the Lord Mayor of London the King or the executive power of Ireland; nor could there be any inference there fore, that the common council of London were acknowledged by our own legiflature to be a proper, and conftitutional council, adjunct, appendage or affiftant to the executive power of Ireland; or, which is still worse, that they were a proper depofitary for a part of the legiflative authority of Ireland, for fuch certainly is the power of fufpenfion: neither could any further constitutional inferences, therefore, have flowed from fuch an appointment; as there might from the prefent, in the fears of the minority, and, it feems, of the public. The one cafe, and the other, indeed, are fo widely different, that it is abfurd to compare them. But furely, though it might not be fo dangerous, no man could doubt of the impropriety and abfurdity of fuch an appointment, and that a claufe depofiting fuch a power in fuch hands, ought to be rejected without hesitation, though it had been the original clause, and not an illegal and unconftitutional alteration. How much more ought this to have been rejected, when inferences of fo critical and dangerous a nature, in point of conftitution, were poffibly deducible from it! The argument in favour of the alteration (fuppofing any alteration fufferable) was dangerous; that it had been and might be used again for purposes one could not wish to promote. That his Majesty is the executive power himself; and that it is of no confequence in what place, with what affiftants, in what manner, or by what inftruments he exercises it. (p. 53.) . Hence they infer, that the altered B-Il ought to have been excepted; and why? truly because the alteration does not appear to be prejudicial. And are we then to admit novelties in our conftitution, as we would give a play-thing to a child, merely because we may not immediately fee harm in them? Whoever reads hittory and politicks, will acknowledge how little men ought to depend upon their fagacity in forefeeing every poffible confequence of any innovation; and therefore, every wife and honeft man, ought to oppofe any innovation, the great benefit, or abfolute neceffity of which is not apparent: and even then, he ought to furvey it on every fide, left it might have greater ill confe quences in future, than good ones in prefent; and after all this, if he did adopt it, he ought to adopt it with fear and in trembling; and to account himself fortunate, as well as wife, if he never should have caufe to repent it. I will add, that an innovation in point of constitution is a precedent for ever, and nothing of this fort ought ever to be admitted upon a temporary view: wherefore it would have been better to have truited for the prevention of exportation, to the refolutions of P-t, paffed at the beginning of the feffion; and to the alarm they had spread over the country, an alarm at least equal to the likelihood of fcarcity;-rather than have admitted a precedent which mult laft for ever, to obviate the evil of one feafon. What novelties indeed, what monsters might not the principle upon which this innovation is defended, introduce into the conftitution? It is the mere act of the crown, it is faid, and therefore, it is no matter in what place it is done, or with what affiftants. The royal affent is the mere act of the crown, (p. 53.) and therefore, according to this principle, it might as well be given in his Majesty's bedchamber, or privy council-chamber, as from the throne in the presence of the lords and commons of Great Britain: or, to bring it more clofely to ourselves, his Majesty might cease to give his affent to our laws in this country, by his reprefentative, from the throne in the prefence of the lords and commons of Ireland; and might, by a new ftroke of political fafhion, give his affent to our laws in the parliament of Great Britain, and not in our own parliament. And then I fuppofe it would be afked, what did it fignify? Was it not the fame thing? Was it not the mere and fole act of the crown? and was it not a matter of indifference, whether the lords and commons of one, or of the other country were present? Whether it was done in the parliament of G—1 B-n or of Ireland ? A thousand inftances of the fame kind might be mentioned, to fhew the danger and abfurdity of this principle, and too many examples of fuch inferences having been made heretofore, to the eternal dishonour of the makers of them, and still more of the receivers. I muft, however, obferve, that many arguments were made ufe of by the mi nority, |