being brought to a close and decifive engagement. The delay of waiting for reinforcement and inftructions, in the first instance, and contrary winds afterward, detained the fleet in Torbay, notwithstanding the urgency of the occafion, until the 14th of September. In the mean time, a great alarm was spread in Ireland as well as England, with respect to this unexpected movement, and to the apprehended defigns of the enemy. The great outward-bound fleet for America and the Wett-Indies, was not only fuppofed to be in imminent danger in the open harbour of Corke, but that city itfelf, which is totally unfortified, and which was at that time ftored with immenfe quantities of provifion, was confidered a not being lefs fo. The regular forces in that kingdom were 2ccordingly ordered to the fouthward, for the protection of that city and coalt; and the patriotic volunteers, who had gained fo much honour in fupporting and reclaiming the liberties of their country, now fhewed no lefs patriotifm in their immediate offer to government, of initantly tak ing the field, and of ma.ching wherever their services should be neceffary to its defence. As foon as the commanders of the combined fleets had received intelligence of Admiral Darby's position in Torbay, and of the inferiority of his force in point of number, a council of war was hed, on the question of attacking hun while in that fituation. It feems they were under orders to fight, if the occafion offered; but the instructions were thought not to reach to the prefent cafe, which would have been an attack on the English squadron, in a bay (though that was open) upon their own coafts. And, under this change of circumftance, which their inftructions had not provided for, it was fuppoled that they were thereby left at large, to the ee exercite of their own judgment and dil Cretion. The Count de Guichen is faid to have contended ftrongly for an immediate attack. He argued, that the English fleet would now be caught, as it were, in a net; that fuch an opportunity of complete advantage over that nation might never again offer; that if, by good fortune, and the valour of the combined nations, along with the powerful aid of fire-fhips (in a fituation where they were capable of producing the greateft polfible effect) that fleet was happily deftroyed, which they had every reafon to expect, the power of Great Britain on the feas would be at an end, and the war decided at a blow. Don Vincent Doz, the third of the Spanish commanders, ftrongly supported this opinion; he afferted that the deftroying of Darby's fleet was fo very practicable, that it would be highly difficult to jufti'fy or excufe their not making the attempt; and to give the greater effect to his fentiments, he boldly offered to command the van fquadron, and to lead on the attack in his own fhip. On the other hand, M. de Beauffet, a French officer of repute, held a totally contrary opini He faid, that all the advantage which the allies derived from their fuperiority of force and number, would be given up and entirely loft, by an attack upon Admiral Darby's fleet in its prefent situation; that the whole of the combined Beets could not bear down upon him in a line of m The to battle a-breaft; that of courfe, they must fore the line of battle a-head, and go down upon t enemy fingly, by which they would run t greatest rifque of being thattered and torn pieces before they could get into their ftation by the fixed aim, and the angular fire in every direction, of fuch a number of great and well provided fhips, drawn up to the greatest advan tage, and lying moored and steady in the water” He therefore concluded, that as the attempt on Torbay would, in his opinion, be a measure unwarrantable in the defign, and exceedingly hazardous in the execution, fo, he likewile thought, that the allied fleets fhould direct their whole attention to that great and attainable object, of intercepting the English home-wardbound Weft-India fleets. This was a measure which, as they were now masters of the fea, could fcarcely fail of fuccefs; and it would prove a blow fo fatal to England, as the could not recover during the war. Don Louis de Cordova, with all the Spanish flag-officers, except Doz, coincided entirely in opinion with M. de Beauffet; fo that M. de Guichen being either brought over to, or overruled by the majority, the idea of attacking Admiral Darby in Torbay was entirely renounced. It seems very probable, that a recollection of the repeated defeat which D'Estaing met with in his attack upon Admiral Barrington's fmall fquadron at St. Lucia, had no fmall influence upon the determination of this council of war. It has fince appeared that the combined fleets were in fuch exceeding bad condition, that had there been any force then at home in England, which could, with any degree of propriety in respect to number, at all face them, their ruin must have been inevitable. They were originally (the Spaniards in particular) very badly manned; and befides a great mortality, which had prevailed during the whole voyage and cruize, and a prodigious number of fick in both fleets, a confiderable majority of the fhips were in fuch a ftate, that they fcarcely feemed capable of live ing at fea in any thing of a strong gale. But though the French feet was in fufficiently bad condition, the Spanish was, in all respects, much worfe. The former difcovered upon this occaon, that their new vaft fhips of 110 guns each, (a conftruction which they had run much into of late) were exceedingly unmanageable, dangerous, and, in their prefent ftate, could be of very little ufe at fea. The hard weather which came on in the beginning of September, accordingly frustrated all their views; and abandoning all hope of intercepting the British convoys, they were glad to get into port as foon as poffible. M. de Guichen returned to Breft with his divifion, on the 11th of September, and was near lofing one of his greatest hips in the entrance of the harbour. Whether it proceeded from the particular etiquette of the French with refpect to that great naval arfenal, or from whatever other caufe, the Spaniards were obliged to proceed directly home, though feveral of their fhips feemed fcarcely capable of reaching their own coafts. But the condition and circumstances of the combined fleets were little capable of fatisfying the people of France, with reipe to the conduct of thefe R2. command commanders, who had oppofed and over-ruled ral Zoutman, and Commodore Kingsbergen, the opinion of Don Vincent Doz in the council of failed from the Texel, with a great convoy unwar. The coffee-houfe politicians of Paris had der their protection. Their force confifted of taught the people of that capital to believe, that eight fhips of the line, from 54 to 74 guns, of the English fleet could not efcape being either ten frigates, and five floops. Several of the fri deftroyed or taken in Torbay; and fo flattering gates were very large, and carried an unusual an illufion being eagerly fwallowed, they could weight of metal. The Argo carried 44 guns, now hardly brook the difappointment, and were and five more carried 36 guns each. They were particularly violent in their cenfure and invective. joined by the Charles-Town, an American friThe Count de Guichen did not escape his full gate of an extraordinary construction, the being fhare of thefe, being particularly blamed for as long and large as a fhip of the line, with fefuffering any difcuffion to arife, upon the questi veral hundred men on board, and thirty-fix. 42 on of obedience to his general inftructions for pounders upon one deck, a weight of metal, in fighting; and the prejudice was fo ftrong, that fuch a compafs and fituation, which, it was the rank and popularity of the Count d'Artois, thought, few Engle fhips could long withstand. (the king's brother) who led him arm in arm She took this opportunity of failing with the into his own box at the playhoufe, was fcarcely Dutch fleet, in order to go north about, on her fufficient to fave him from infult. way home. The arrival of the West-India trade was fo much later than had been expected, that Admiral Darby kept the fea until the month of November, and it was probably his attention to that important object, which prevented his falling in with a rich Spanish flota, that in the intermediate time returned from America, and brought a large fupply of treasure to Spain, which was, then not a little wanted. It feemed almost remarkable, that neither the combined fleets nor the British, had taken a fingle prize during the long term they had been relpectively at fea. The war had hitherto languished, in Europe as well as every where elfe, on the fide of Holland. Their fleets were not only in very bad condition, but they attonithed the world by the dilcovery of a weakness little thought of, confifting in a deficiency of feamen, and a total want of naval ftores; in both of which they had ever been held to abound beyond any other nation, England only excepted. The vicinity and fituation of their ports, along with that ftate of preparation which they were ftill capable of making, proved, however, a great check upon the naval operations of Great Britain through the course of the year, and prevented fome of thofe vigorous exertions which might have been otherwife made against her former enemies. It was neceffary to keep a fquadron in the Downs, as well to watch their motions in general, as to prevent their intercourfe with the 1outhern parts of Europe. And it was still more effentially neceffary to have fuch a force in the North Seas, as would be capable of ruining their immenfe commerce on that fide, and of effectually protecting our own; including the farther great object, of preventing the poffibility of reftoring their marine, by cutting off their only fources of every kind of naval fupply. This very important fervice was committed to the conduct of Admiral Hyde Parker, a veteran commander of established repute, who failed from Portsmouth, in the beginning of June, with four fhips of the line, and one of fifty guns, for the North Sea. In the mean time, Holland ftrained every nerve for the equipment of fuch a force, as might, at least, be able to convoy their outward bound trade to the Baltc, and to protect it on its return, if not to intercept ours, and to become entirely masters of the North Sear. It was not, however, until Home days after the middle of July, that Admi Admiral Parker was on his return with a great convoy from Elfineur. He had been joined by feveral frigates fince he left Portsmouth, and by the Dolphin of 44; and, in this moft critical and dangerous conjuncture, was very timely and fortunately reinforced by the junction of Commodore Keith Stuart, in the Berwick of 74 guns, who had been for fome time on the coaft of Scotland. The fquadron now confifted of fix fhips of the line, of which the Princest Amelia carried 80 guns, the Fortitude (which was the Admiral's own fhip) and the Berwick, 74 each, the Bienfaisant 64, the old Buffalo 60, and the Prefton 5d guns; but the fuperiority of the enemv, obliged the Admiral to take the Dolphin, of 4+ guns, into his line. Of this force, the two venty-fours were by much the best ships. The incels Amelia, though a three-decker, was fo very old and weak, that her metal had been reduced to the rate of a 50 gun fhip, her lowerdeck guns being only 24 pounders, and the Buffalo, befides being old, was of fo bad a conftruction, that he had fome years before been difcharged from the fervice, and employed as a ftore-ship in America. The hoftile fleets came in fight of each other on the Dogger-Bank, very early in the morning of the 5th of Auguft, 178r. Though one of the Dutch line-of-battle fhips had, through fome accident, returned to port, yet, as the Argo of 44 guns was fubftituted in her place, their lice ftill confifted of eight two-decked fhips. Admiral Parker perceiving the number and strength of the enemy's frigates, detached the convoy, with orders to keep their wind, fending his own frigates along with them for their protection, and as foon as this difpofition was made, he threw out a general fignal to the fquadron to chafe the enemy. The Dutch were by no means dilpofed to fhun the conflict; they likewife détached their convoy to fome distance, when they drew up with great coolness in order of battle, and waited the fhock with the utmost compofure. This action, though upon a fmall fcale, was conducted and fought in fuch a manner, that it recals fresh to the mind thofe dreadful fea-fights between England and Holland which the laft century witneffed; and which feem to indicate, that thofe nations contend with the greatest animofity, whofe intereft it is not to contend at all. None of that manoeuvring was now practifed on on either fide, through which the French in the prefent war, have eluded the complete decifion of fo many naval actions. The parties were equally determined to fight it out to the laft; a gloomy filence, expreffive of the most fixed determination, prevailed; and not a single gun was fired, until the hoftile fleets were within little more than piftol thot diftance. Admiral Parker, in the Fortitude, then ranging a-breaft of Mr. Zoutman's ship, the Admiral Ruyter, the action was commenced with the utmolt fury and vio. lence on both fides. The cannonade continued without intermiffion for three hours and forty minutes. Some of our fhips fired 2,500 fhot each. The effect of the ancient naval emulation was eminently displayed in the obstinacy of the battle. was much regretted. His fon, a boy of seven years old, was by his fide when he was killed and his fortitude, as well upon that occafion, as through the whole action, aftonished the boldest feaman in the ship. Captain Græme, who fought the Dolphin with the greatest valour, loft an arm, and his hip's company fuffered confiderably. Mr. Harrington, one of the Admiral's Lieute nants, an officer of forty years fervice, and of the most distinguished merit, was mortally wounded. Though this gentleman poffeffed an affluent fortune, and that his promotion had by no means correfponded with his merit, yet he nobly difdained to withdraw his profeffional abilities from the fervice and defence of his country, in this trying feafon. Other brave officers fell in this action; and the proportion of the woundThe Dutch fhips were much fuperior in weighted to the number 'engaged was very confideraof metal to the English of the fame rates. This ble. Admiral Parker's letter giving an account difference, however, was but little confidered; of the action, was diftinguished by its concifebut their heavy frigates, as well as the Charles- nefs and bluntnefs, by its modeity with respect to Town, having intermixed with their line, took his own fide, and by the full honour which it pays a very effective part in the action, and did much to the valour of the enemy. mifchief by raking our fhips, and firing at their rigging, while closely and desperately engaged with a fuperior enemy. Such returns were, however, at length made, that they paid dearly for their temerity; and the Charles-Town, among others, fuffered fo feverely, that it was fuppofed the had gone down, either in, or foon after the action. At the expiration of the term we have ftated the fhips were fo ruined or both fides, that they lay like logs upon the water, and were incapable of answering fo much command, as would keep them within the distance neceffary for mutual annoyance; while the combatants were un willingly feparated by the mere action of the water. The English thips were chiefly wounded in their mats and rigging, which rendered them incapable of pursuing and profiting of their victory; but as they fired entirely at the hulls of the enemy, and by their fuperior alertnels and expedition difcharged, a much greater quantity of hot, the greater part of the Dutch fhips were fo woefully torn, that it was with the ut moft difficulty they were kept above water, until they reached, feparately, and in the utmost diftrefs, (notwithitanding the aid of their numerous frigates) fuch of their own neareft ports as they could firit fetch. But the Hollandia, of 68 guns, and one of their best ships, went down in the night of the engagement; and the danger was fo fudden and extreme, that the crew were reduced to the melancholy neceffity of abandoning their wounded in quitting the fhip. Her topmafts, though he was funk in twenty-two fathoms, being still above water, and her pendent flying, the was difcovered in the morning by one of the English frigates, who ftruck, and brought off her colours as a trophy. The action was very bloody. Even on the fide of the English, who were by much the leaft fufferers, in that refpect, 104 men were killed, and 339 wounded, in the feven fhips. Of thefe 20 were killed, and 67 wounded, in the Fortitude only. The lofs in the Berwick, Princefs Amelia, and Buffalo, was not much lefs. The death of the gailant Captain Macartney, (who left a widow and large family unprovided for) The On the other hand, the Dutch gazettes tarnifhed the honour which their countrymen had defervedly obtained in battle, by the exaggerat ed accounts which they contained, and the gafconades with which they were stuffed. truth, however, as is uiually the cafe, in delpite of authorized mifreprefentation, by degrees appeared. The confequences fufficiently told their defeat. Exclusive of the total lofs of the Hollandia, two, at leaft, of their capital fhips were fo totally ruined in the engagement, as to be declared incapable of farther fervice. Their lofs of men, which was reprefented as being more trifling, than appeared confiftent with their own accounts, of the nature of the action, and of the damage done to their ships, appears, by authenticated private intelligence, to have exceeded 1100 men, in killed, wounded, and funk. Their convoy, as well as the ships of war, returned home, fcattered, and in great diforder and confufion; every idea of profecuting the voyage to the Baltic, was of neceffity given up; all means of procuring naval ftores cut off; and that immenfe carrying trade between the northern and fouthern nations of Europe, which along with their fisheries, had been the great fource of the Dutch power and wealth, was, along with them, for this year, annihilated. 'As this was the firft naval action of any value or confequence, in which Holland had been engaged for much the greater part of a century, the States General were beyond meature liberal in the praife, rewards and honours, which they beftowed upon their officers. Admiral Zoutman, and Commodore Kingibergen, were immediately promoted, and molt, if not all of the first and fecond Captains, as well as feveral of the Lieutenants, were either rifen in rank and command, or flattered with fome peculiar mark of distinction. The gallant Count Bentinck, who bravely fought the Batavia, and who though mortally wounded, and informed that his fhip was in dan ger of finking, would not liften to a proposal for quitting his ftation, was foothed in his last moments by every mark of ho , and teftimony of regard, which his country and his Prince could beflow. In the few days that he lived at ter ter being put a-hore, be was created Rear AdIniral of Holland and Weft Friefland, and appointed Adjutant General to the Prince Statbolder; and his funeral was not more honourable to the brave dead, than to the grateful living. ge In England, though the conduct and valour difplayed in this action, met with great and neral approbation, yet the imputed neglect in government or the admiralty, of furnishing Admiral Parker with a force equal to the accomplishment of the great objects which he had in view, excited no lefs general diffatisfaction. This was not likely to be leffened by the prevalent opinion, that his want of fupport proceeded merely from the fuppofed circumftance of his not being a favourite; a fituation indeed, however ufeful or flattering, to which his difpofition and habits were by no means likely to lead him. It was faid, in fupport of the popular opinion, that the admiralty could not be ignorant of the laperior force which had been fo long fitting out at the Texel, and whofe object was every where known; that there were at the very time, as many thips lying idle in port, or waiting for or ders in the Downs, as would have enabled Admiral Parker to bring the whole Dutch fleet and convoy into England. That fo fignal and fatal a ftroke, must have been decifive of the war with iolland; and by compelling that republic to a feparate peace, would have freed us from one of ur numerous foes. But, that in confequence of the rumous conduct which had been oblerved, inftead of the poftibility of taking the Dutch convoy, the prefervation of our own, upon t which to much depended, was left to left folely upon the fuperiority of our teamen, and the extraordina sy bravery and conduct of our officers. The Admirai fublequent conduct, as well as fome intimation given in his letter to the admiralty, ferved ftrongly to confirm the public opinion; and fufficient ly indicated, that he was no lefs diffatisfied at the want of support, than they were at its not Leing given. Thole who imagine themselves capable of diving into the mysteries of courts, might poffibly attribute, in fome degree, to this public fatisfaction and complaint, the extraordinary faveur shewn to the Admiral, by a royal visit, upon his arrival, with his fcattered fquadron, at the Nore. It not, however, to be doubted, that the royal vifit was intended to be distinguished by fome fignal and permanent marks o: favour and honour to the Admiral. But the rough and veteran commander, who was equally incapable of difguife and flattery, as he fcorned to conceal his diffatisfaction, had too much pride and turdinefs in his nature to be feothed out of it; and it was foon understood, that no intended promotion or honour would be accepted. The King went on board the Fortitude, where he had a levee of all the officers of the fquadron, who were received with the most gracious attention; and the Admiral had the honour of dining with bis Majesty and the Prince of Wales, on board the royal yacht. It was faid upon that occafion, (the firft Lord of the admiralty, and a number of naval officers, being preten?) that the Admiral took an opportunity of hinting both his diffatisfaction and intention of retiring by the following words to his fovereign,-" That he wifhed him younger of "ficers, and better fhips!-he was grown too "old for the fervice;" and that though he received the most flattering compliments, and the greatest acknowledgments of his diftinguished fervices to his country, these were not capable of producing any change in his determinationIt was related likewife as an anecdote at the time, that young Macartney being presented on board the Fortitude, and a royal intention of providing for him, for the fake of his brave father, being declared, the admiral apologized for informing his Majelly, that he had already adopted him as his fon. The Admiral refigned his command immedi ately after; and it was, notwithstanding, probably intended as a mark of favour and regard to him, that his fon, Sir Hyde Parker, who, for his gallantry in North America and the Weft Indies, had fome time before the honour of being knighted, was now appointed to the command of a quadron of frigates, which were employed in blocking up the Dutch ports during the remainder of the feafon. The utmott expedition had been used at Breft, after the return of M. de Guichen from his cruize, in refitting and preparing the French fleet for fea, notwithstanding the lateness of the fealon. The objects in view were of fufficient confequence to excite this diligence. It was necellary to reinforce the Count de Graffe with both troops and fhips of war in the Welt Indies, and it was determined to fend a confiderable reinforcement of both to fupport M. de Orves, and De Suffrein, in the Eaft. But fhips and troops were not fufficient for either service. It was well forefeen that M. de Graffe, after the hard fervice on the coafts of North America in the preceding campaign, must stand in need of an im menfe fupply of naval and military stores of eve ry fort, both for the land and the fea fervice, and that his flation in the West India islands would extend the want to, almoft, every article of provifion and necesary of life. The demand for naval and military stores in the Eaft Indies was no lets urgent. A numerous convoy of transports, forefhips, and provifion veffels, were accordingly prepared and provided with the fame diligence as the fleet. And as it was likewife neceffary to guard against the designs of the English, the preparation was extended to fuch a number of men of war, as was thought equal to the protec tion of the whole, until they had got out of reach. This part of the fervice, as well as the conduct of the whole while he continued in company, wa committed to the Count de Guichen; and the command of the fquadron and fleet deftined for the Weft Indies, to M. de Vau dreuil. The former was accompanied by Monfieur de la Motte Picquet, and De Beauffet; and when he feparated from the convoy, was to join the Spanish fleet at Cadiz, in order to defeat any attempt that might be made from England, tor the relief of the island of Minorca. Monfieur de Vaudreuil carried out a confiderable body of land forces, with a full confidence on the fide both of France and Spain, of now carrying into complete execution, the fo often laid project of reducing the inland of Jamaica. Intelligence |