ferred to the owner of the licensed premises notwithstanding that creditors of the licensee offer an applicant who is willing to pay a considerable sum for the same.-Summa's License, 43. 157. In such case the court may require the transferee to pay to the parties legally entitled thereto so muclr of the license fee as is proportioned to the unexpired part of the terin.-1b. 158. The power of courts of quarter sessions to transfer licenses, even without the consent of the licensee, is discretionary; its lawful exercise is not reviewable by the Supreme Court, and a writ of certiorari to the judgment of the lower court does not supersede the transfer.-16. 159. The creditors of a licensee have no interest or right in his license, as creditors, that can effect its transfer to another.-Ib. 160. L., the holder of a hotel license became insolvent and removed from the premises. The owners of the hotel, who were also L.'s creditors, made application for a transfer of the license to a new tenant. L. refused to consent to said transfer. HELD, that the license will be transferred upon payment to L. of so much of the cost of the license as had not been used by him, even without his consent.-Leibeknecht's License, 197. 161. The license granted to David Leibeknecht was a personal privilege to keep the hotel or house described therein, upon the premises of the petitioners. His insolvency and removal from the same terminated his rights under said license. He could no longer, elsewhere, exercise any right under the same.-16. 162. The house of the petitioners, used for the purpose of a hotel and summer resort, requires the license for the purpose of a successful transaction of the business for which it is fitted up and kept. To prevent loss and inconvenience and a depreciation in value of the property by reason of a deprivation of license, it is just and equitable that the license for said hotel should be transferred to the present occupant of said house, according to the prayer of the petitioners.-Ib. LIEN. CREATION OF. 164. Whether the lien was created with sufficient clearness to render liable an innocent purchaser without notice, doubted.--Ib. LIMITATION. DEATH OF DEBTOR. 165. That the death of a debtor does not suspend the operation of the statute of limitations is as true in the Orphans' Court as in an action in the Common Pleas.-Schooley's Estate, 146. 166. A claim was presented in the Orphans' Court in 1886, on a distribution of a fund, and terminated in a decree against the allowance of a claim. In 1893 a petition was presented for rehearing or review of the former decree. HELD that the action was not pending in the Orphans' Court and did not suspend the operation of the statute of limitations.-Ib. HUSBAND AND WIFE. 167. The statute of limitations does not begin to run against a husband's claim against his wife until her death.-Gracie's Estate, 36. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP. DISSOLUTION OF. 168. A limited partnership was formed by E. W. and the latter's wife, to continue until April 1, 1892, of which E. was chairman and W. was secretary and treasurer. At the expiration of the term the association was not wound up nor was its existence extended by the execution and recording of new articles or amendments to the old, but the business went on under the old firm name and management, the original members retaining the original interest. On the death of E., on July 10, 1893, W. continued the management and rendered a statement to E.'s administrators (plaintiffs) showing a balance of assets over liabilities of $7,625.84. Subsequently he confessed judgments in the firm name to the amount of over $5.400 on which executions were issued and a levy made. Plaintiffs filed a bill praying that the Sheriff be enjoined from selling on said executions, that the same be stayed and set aside, and that a receiver be appointed; whereupon an order was made staying the executions and appointing a receiver. On a motion to dismiss the bill and rescind the appointment, HELD, that the motion must be refused.-Eichelbergers' Administrators v. Woll 169. The limited partnership association was dissolved on April 1st, 1892, by limitation of time, for the only legal method of prolonging its existence, viz.: by executing and recording new articles or amendment of the old, was not resorted to.-Ib. 163. A and B, by a written agreement, exchanged two pieces of real estate each of which was encumbered by a mortgage made by the re-man et al., 85. spective vendors. The mortgage upon the property conveyed by A covered only a part of the lot. In the written agreement the conveyance by A was said to be in consideration of $7500 ($3500 of which is to remain secured upon the premises as now mortgaged," etc.) The deed From A to B described it as 'subject to the principal and interest of a certain mortgage now a lien upon said premises.' B made default in the payment of interest and A. to protect his bond, bought the property at the Sheriff's sale for a price less than the mortgage debt. In an action of equitable ejectment to recover from B the unincumbered part of the land conveyed to him by A. HELD, that as between the parties, the mortgage debt was in the nature of unpaid purchase money for which a lien was created by the deed and that A was entitled to recover from B either the unincumbered land or the balance of the debt for which he was liable on his bond. -Edwards v. Clark, 22. 170. The business having been continued by a parol agreement among the partners the partnership from April 1st, 1892, to the death of Eichelberger must necessarily have been (at least so far as relates to all transactions in that period) a common law, or unlimited partnership, which was dissolved by the death of Eichelberger on July 10th, 1893.—Ib. 171. Notwithstanding the fact that the business had been carried on for some time after the dissolution of the limited partnership association, as above stated, the proper legal and exclusive method of winding up the business, was that prescribed by section 9 of the Act of June 2, 1874, as amended by the Act of May 10, 1889 to wit, the election, by the members of three liquidating trustees, whose duty it would have been to settle the affairs of the association, pay its debts in the order prescribed by the Act, and divide the remainder of the assets among the members, all under the direction of the Court of Common Pleas.-Ib. 172. It is perfectly plain that W. had no legal power or authority to bind the association | by the confession of those judgments, and that so far as relates to the association, the judgments entered on the warrants of attorney executed by him were void.-Ib. 173. They were clearly in violation of the Acts of Assembly which prescribe the only method by which the affairs of a limited partnership association after dissolution can be wound up, totally subversive of its provisions. -Ib. 174. It is very doubtful whether a partner in such an association can bind it by the confession of judgment even during its existence as an association. It is entirely certain that no partner can do so after the association has been dissolved and whether the partnership be limited or unlimited.-1b. 175. Woltman's act in confessing these judgments and procuring or permitting the partnership property to be levied and exposed to sale, especially as by his own statement the assets so largely exceeded all liabilities, was in gross violation of his duty to his late partner, as well as beyond his powers and illegal; and justified and required these plaintiffs to invoke this equitable remedy to secure the proper and legal application of the assets to the payment of debts, and the distribution of the balance.—Ib. 176. The Court has no authority to appoint liquidating trustees to wind up a limited partnership. That can only be done by the members of the association, and it is too late to attempt to do so after the control of the property has been taken from them, and placed in the hands of an officer of the Court.-7b. 177. The notes held by E., given after the dissolution of the limited partnership, the deceased partner, are not void because they are not signed by two of the managers, for they are the notes not of the limited partnership, but of a common law partnership:—Ib. MARRIED WOMAN. BOND OF. 178. A bond made by a married woman is absolutely void, and, in the absence of an entirely new consideration, cannot be ratified so as to make it a valid obligation of the woman, after the determination of her coverture by the death of her husband.-Nesbitt v. Turner, 18. 179. Mere acknowledgment of the genuineness of the signature does not amount to ratification.-Ib. GIFT TO HUSBAND. 180. A married woman, having a separate bank account. drew money at various times from her account and deposited it to the credit of herself and husband, "either to drew" After the first advance her husband by a codicil to his will, acknowledged that the transaction was a loan. HELD, that the presumption is that the subsequent advances, made after the date of the codicil, were also loans and not gifts.-McGarvey's Estate, 165. 181. The burden is on the husband's heirs to prove that such advances are gifts.-1b. JUDGMENT AGAINST. 182. A judgment was obtained before a Justice of the Peace against H. (a married woman) and A. (her husband), aud transcript fled in the Common Pleas. The record failed to state that H. was a married woman. On a motion to strike off the judgment, HELD. that the motion must be overruled.-Spahr v. Hess, 73. 183. A judgment against a married woman before the passage of the Act of 1887, presumed to be void, is now presumably valid, and it is no longer necessary to the validity of such a judgment, to set out on the record the facts which, before the passage of the act, were essential to the validity of the judgment.-16. 184. B., a married woman, purchased real estate from E. giving as consideration her judgment note. At the same time she signed another judgment note for $500, in favor of E., which latter note was she claims, for a debt due by her husband to E. This note was executed by B. without any knowledge of its character, although there is no evidence to show that she is an illiterate woman, or asked to have the note read to her. After the death of E., and B.'s husband, E.'s administratrix entered said judgment for $500 whereupon B. presented her petition to have the same stricken off. HELD, that the petition must be granted.—Eppleman v. Bott, 185. 185. In the absence of any evidence of misrepresentation or fraud in procuring her signature, the judgment can not be opened on the ground that she was ignorant of the nature and character of the note.-/b. 186. With the exception of being unable to convey or mortgage her real estate without the consent of her husband, and his joinder therein and inability to become accommodation endorser, guarantor or surety for the debt of another, a married woman stands upon an equality with other persons capable of contracting as regards her rights, powers, obligations and liabilities, in relation to contracts.—Ib. 187. To say that a married woman is liable on a note given for the debt of her husband under circumstances such as are shown in this case, would be to abrogate the proviso of the Act of 1887, and destroy the only protection remaining for the property and estates of marof their husbands and their rapacious creditors. ried women from the overshadowing influence after the death of her husband, the promise 188. To establish a ratification of such a note must be clear and distinct, and the recovery must be on the new promise.-1b. PROPERTY OF, 32-7. 189. A pensioner, drawing his pension money, and applying it to the purchase of real estate, taking the title in the name of his wife, makes such real estate liable to seizure and sale for the payment of his debts.-Burtch v. Burtch 190. 190. In a suit against a sheriff's estate for trespass committed by him in his lifetime, in selling plaintiff's property as that of her husband, the latter was permitted to testify in support of a lease offered in evidence by plaintiff, and constituting her title to a large part of the facts which before the Act June of 3, 1887 P. L. property sold by the sherifl. HELD, on a mo- 332, were necessary to give the judgment valition for a new trial, to have been error.-Quick- dity.-Reifsnyder v. Missimer et ux., 8. el v. Finley, 169. 191. Neither the plaintiff nor her husband, was competent to testify to any fact occurring in the lifetime of the original defendant. Hei interest, adverse to the decedent, places her within the exclusion of clause E of section 5 of the Act of 1887, and where a wife is excluded on the ground of interest her husband is excluded by identity of interest growing out of the closeness of the personal relation.-Ib. 192. Neither is it material that the execution creditor indemnified the defendant. The estate of the latter is still primarily liable and is defending this suit; in fact must do so in order to make the indemnity available. It is obvious that defendant's estate has an interest in the suit to which that of plaintiff is adverse, and it is that fact, and not the quantum of the interest that excludes the adversely interested witness from testifying.—Ib. 193. Plaintiff's husband, the subscribing witness to the lease, having an adverse interest to that of the decedent, by reason of identity of! interest with that of his wife, proof of his hand writing could not be admitted.-Ib. MECHANICS' LIEN. ACT OF JUNE 8, 1891. 201. The Act of June 8, 1891, P. L. 225 in so far as the same undertakes to make the contractor the agent of the owner and to confer on him authority to bind the building for labor and materials furnished upon his order, notwithstanding the fact that the parties to the contract have agreed that the contractor shall not have the powers of an agent, and that no lien shall be entered against the building, and that the sub-contractor or material man knew of the agreement, is unconstitutional.-Lee v. Lewis et al., 95. CLAIM. 202. The statement of claim under the Act of June 17, 1887, P. L. 409, must be verified by affidavit or the lien will be stricken off. Such 194. The Act of Assembly was not intended to, and has not been construed to be, and is not to be regarded or used as a means of protecting, under the guise of ownership by the wife, per- NEGLIGENCE. sonal property actually belonging to the husband, from the husband's creditors. Ib. 195. The mere possession of property or money by a married woman living with her husband, without anything else, is no evidence of ownership by her.-16. 196. She must show in every contest with her husband's creditors, by clear and satisfactory proof, her ownership; and that she acquired the property she claimed to own in some manner authorized by the law, and that her husband's credit and her husband's money did not go into it.-16. 197. Among the powers of a married woman or rights which she acquired under the Act of 1887, is the right to rent property, and to enter into the possession of it, and farm it.-16. 198. If the leases that were made by her were made for the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding creditors of William, Andrew and Daniel Quickel, and if she knew that that was the intention, then, so far as the crops upon the farms at the time she leased them, which were intended to be transferred to her by those leases, are concerned, she acquired no title.-Ib. FIRE, 68. OF EMPLOYER. 203. When a master voluntarily subjects his servants to dangers, such as in good faith he ought to provide against, he is liable for any accident arising therefrom.-Reese v. Hershey, 83. 204. Plaintiff's son, aged seventeen years, lost his left hand while operating a rolling machine in defendant's caramel factory. The boy was hired to operate and had for seven weeks operated this machine, protected by a guard the invention of the defendant; about three hours before the accident, the defendant took off the guard from this machine, as it was troublesome the candy being unusually sticky He testified that he cautioned the boy against the danger of the machine. The boy denied all recollection of this, but admitted that he knew that the machine was dangerous without the guard. The court refused a non-suit and the jury found for the plaintiff. HELD, that the case was properly submitted to the jury and a new trial should be refused.—Ib.* 199. If she entered into a separate business 205. If a master stands by and sees a servant in good faith, conducted it without any pecun- doing, or about to do, a negligent act, or failiary assistance or credit from her husband made the purchase which it has been testified to she ing to exercise ordinary care in the performance made out of the products of that business or out of money or credit not that of her husband's, then as to all things purchased and acquired, if it be in that way, she has a right to that property, even as against the creditors of her husband.-Ib. SUIT AGAINST. 200. In a suit against a married woman before a Justice of the Peace it is no longer necessary to set out in the record of the proceedings the of a duty, in consequence of which a fellow servant may be injured, and does nothing to restrain him, he may fairly be presumed to have the consequences, although he may not have given his assent, and be justly held liable for given express orders.-Cannon v. Mears et al., 192. 206. But in order to imply assent from his mere presence and to impute negligence to him it must be shown that he knew, or ought to *See Reese v Hershey, 8 YORK LEGAL RECORD, 56 where this case was reversed by the Supreme Court. have known, the facts which made the act neg- you could infer any such thing as that; for ligent.-1b. OF ROAD SUPERVISORS. 207. Deceased was being driven in a closed carriage across a bridge in a public highway in defendant township. The bridge was sixteen feet wide, about ten feet long, and three feet above the water, with no guard rails or barriers at the sides. While on the bridge another vehicle, in attempting to pass decedent's conveyance from the rear, colided therewith, and the horses shying, the latter vehicle was thrown over the side of the bridge into the stream, resulting in the death of the deceased the next morning. The jury having found the defendant township was negligent in not maintaining guard rails at the sides of the bridge, and rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, HELD, that a new trial will be refused.-Worley v. Dover Township, 160. 208. A request to charge the jury that even if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant township was negligent in not main. taining guard rails or other barriers at the bridge where the injury was received, then because said injury was received through the concurrence of said negligence with an extraordinary and outside cause not likely to be foreseen by ordinary forecast, to wit: the violent striking of the vehicle containing the deceased by another vehicle, driven in the same direction by Frank Stambaugh, their verdict must be for the defendant, was properly refused.—Ib. 209. If in the ordinary use of the street one had been crowded over the bank by the volume of travel, the sudden shying of his horse, or the accumulation of ice in the roadway the absence of the barrier might justify a recovery, if the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence.-lb. 210. The accident which resulted in plaintiff's decedent's death, occurred in the usual and ordinary use of the highway, from an ordinary usual cause, which should have been guarded against. Where the facts are not in dispute the question of proximate cause is for the court not for the jury.-Ib. 211. The supervisors of a township must afford an easy, convenient and safe passage to persons traveling on the township roads by day or by night and where there is special peril involved, they must provide such protection as will make it safe for travel even with horses that are easily frightened.-Ib.. NEW TRIAL. SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR. 212. On the trial of the case, defendants offered to prove that the notes in suit were given on the strength of a contemporaneous parol agreement on the part of the payee not to negotiate them, but to hold them until the money was realized out of the territory sold. This offer was rejected. HELD, to be sufficient ground for a new trial.-Hoke v. Martin, No. 2, 133. 213. Plaintiff, payee in a promissory note, signed by defendant, brought suit thereon. Defendant alleged want of consideration and a fraudulent use of the notes by plaintiff's husband. The Court charged the jury: "There is no legal evidence in the case at all from which whatever may have taken place between S. B. Gleason and the defendant, David W. Crider, there is no knowledge of it brought home to this plaintiff; and if she be the holder of these notes, accepted by her in payment of the debt of her husband to her, she is entitled to recover the amount of these notes with interest from the defendant, David W. Crider.” HELD, to have been error, and sufficient cause for a new trial. Gleason v. Crider, No. 2, 158. 214. If the paper be taken as collateral security, merely, for the antecedent debt, the defendant may aver any ground of defence which would have been competent between antecedent parties.-16. 215. The question whether or not the note was made as claimed and whether it was transferred in payment of a pre-existing debt or as collateral security therefor, are to be submitted to the jury.-Ib. NOT SUFFICIENT, 47, 50-8. NOTE, 213. DESTROYED, 72. FORGERY, 13. FOR PATENT, 8. 9, 217, 218. FRAUD, 14. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 177. MARRIED WOMEN, 184-8. MINOR, 128. WAGES, 261. NOTICE, 240. CONSTRUCTION OF, 41-2. PAROL AGREEMENT. EFFECT ON WRITTEN INSTRUMENT. 216. A written instrument obtained on the faith of a contemporaneous parol agreement, cannot be enforced in violation of such agreement. The attempt to use it subjects the wrievidence of what occurred at its execution.ting to modification or contradiction by parol Hoke v. Martin, No. 2, 133. PARTITION, 79. PARTNERSHIP, LIMITED, 168-77. PATENT RIGHT. NOTE FOR, 89. 217. The note having been given for a patent right, and such being stated on the face of it, the case stands precisely as though it were a suit between original parties.-Hoke v. Martin No. 2, 133. 218. There is nothing in the idea that the Act of 12 April, 1872, is unconstitutional.-/b. PAYMENT. PRESUMPTION OF, 2, 4. PER CAPITA, 73. JURISDICTION. INDEX OF CASES REPORTED. 219. Defendant was a Maryland corporation doing business in that State; having no office and transacting no business in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff procured service upon an officer of the defendant company residing in this State. After the return of the service, and before statement filed or any other steps taken, defendant entered an appearance de bene esse and pleaded to the jurisdiction, and persisted in such plea at every stage of the case. Upon demurrer to this plea, HELD, that judgment must be for the defendant.-McConkey v. Peach Bottom Slate Co., 129. 220. It seems plain in principle and authority that of such a corporation, not doing business in Pennsylvania (as the demurrer admits) the Courts of Pennsylvania have no jurisdiction.Ib. 221. The mere fact of the defendant having made a single contract in this State is not such a transaction of business in the State as would be sufficient to draw this foreign corporation within the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania Courts. -Ib. 222. As want of jurisdiction of the person can be waived by consent, and must be insisted on as early as possible, and persisted in at every stage of the case, it is difficult to see how any court of justice could hold that filing pleas in bar coincidently with a plea to the jurisdiction, and with an express reservation of the benefit of the plea, could be a waiver of it, or a ground for striking it off.-/b. 223. The course pursued by the defendant in objecting at the earliest stage of the case to the want of jurisdiction over it was judicious and in fact necessary.—Ib. 224 A plea in abatement is the proper method of taking advantage of want of jurisdiction of the person, and by such plea the truth of the sheriff's return may be contradicted and the sufficiency of the service be inquired into.-lb. PLEDGE, 32-7. PRESUMPTION, 165, 205. OF PAYMENT, 2, 4. QUARTER SESSIONS, 45, 91. PROTHONOTARY, 71. RAILROADS. CROSSING. 225. Plaintiff company procured an injunction to restrain defendant company from erecting grade crossings over its tracks alleging that they would prove dangerous to the traveling public. Defendant replied that other crossings were impracticable, and that the danger was not as great as alleged. On a motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction, HELD, that the motion will be refused, and the injunction continued in force until the final hearing.-Baltimore and Harrisburg Railroad Co. v. Hanover and McSherrystown S. R. Co., 1. 226. The Act of June 19, 1871, relative to railroad crossings, is applicable to street railways.-Ib. 227. It imposes on the Courts, in determining such a case as this, a threefold duty; 1st, to ascertain the mode of crossing which will 223 least injure the company whose road is to be crossed; 2nd, to compel by its decree the adoption of that mode; 3rd, to prevent by its process a crossing at grade if any other be reasonably practicable.-1b. 228. Such a decree can only be intelligently made at the final hearing upon the report of an examiner and Master, where all the facts are before the Court.-Ib. 229. The Act of June 19, 1871, P. L. 1360, relating to grade crossings, has no application to a crossing established and in actual use; it applies to the case of a new road which intends to cross an existing road At least such established crossing will not be disturbed by a preliminary injunction.-Norristown June. Railroad Co. v. Citizens' Passenger Railway Co., 29. ELECTRIC, 259. INSOLVENT. 230. A writ of fi. fa. issued from a United States Circuit Court in Pennsylvania stands upon the Act of April 7, 1870. Taylor v. Baltimore and Lehigh Railroad Co., 174. 231. Its execution is dependent upon that statute and there can be no stronger warrant for tion defendant, now in the hands of the reits execution upon the property of the corporaceiver for this court, than a fi. fa. issued out of a court of this Commonwealth, upon the same property.—Ib. 232. The estate and efiects of the defendant corporation are in the custody of the court, and therefore the fi. fa. cannot be executed after the appointment of a receiver, without the consent of the court.-Ib. 233. The court having taken charge of the property of the corporation, it is required to preserve as far as possible the equities of all parties in interest, including, of course, the creditors in this proceeding.-Ib. 234. When a Court, upon a petition and without objection granted leave to a U. S. Marshall to execute a writ of fi. fa. upon the property of a corporation of which it had appointed a receiver, snch leave will be revoked upon petition of intervening creditors, showing that their claims would be jeopardized and their liens endangered by such execution.—Ib. 235. The court will authorize a receiver of a railroad company to issue certificates for the purchase of a locomotive, where it is satisfied that such purchase is imperatively demanded for the safe and convenient operation of the road.-Ib. 236. It is the right and duty of the Court to while it is under the control of the Court. It keep the road in safe and successful operation, must be kept a going concern for the benefit of the bondholders, creditors and all parties inter ested.-Ib. 237. The public good requires that railroads should be operated even at the expense of some detriment to private interests.-1b. RECOGNIZANCE, 48–9. RAPE, 61. RATIFICATION, 179, 188. NECESSITY. |