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ferred to the owo er of the licensed premises not 164. Whetlier the lien was created with suf-
withstanding that creditors of the licensee offer ficient clearness to render liable an innocent
an applicant who is willing to pay a consider- purchaser without notice, doubted.--1b.
able sum for the same.-Summa's License, 43.

157. In such case the court may require thic LIMITATION.
transferee to pay to the parties legally entitled
thereto so mucli of the license fee as is propor-

tioned to the unexpired part of the term.--16. 165. That the death of a debtor does not sus-

158. The power of courts of quarter sessions pend the operation of the statute of limitations
to transfer licenses, even without the consent of is as true in the Orphans' Court as in an action
the licensee, is discretionary; its lawful exercise in the Common Pleas.---Schooley's Estate, 146.
is not reviewable by the Supreme Court, and a 166. A claim was presented in the Orphans'
writ of certiorari to the judgment of the lower Court in 1886, on a distribution of a fund, and
couri does not supersede the transfer.-16. terminated in a decree against the allowance of

159. The creditors of a licensee have no in- a claim. 111 1893 a petition was presented for
terest or right in his license, as creditors, that rehearing or review of the former decree. HELD
can effect its transfer to another.-16.

that the action was not pending i. the Orphans'
160. L., the holder of a hotel license became Court and did not suspend the operation of the

statute of limitations.-16.
insolvent and removed from the premises. The
owners of the hotel, who were also L.'s credi-
tors, made application for a transfer of the li-
cense to a new tenant. L. refused to consent 167. The statute of limitations does not be-
to said transfer. HELD, that the license will begin to run against a husband's claim against his
transferred upon payment to L. of so much of wife until her death.--Gracie's Estate, 36.
the cost of the license as had not been used by

hini, even without his consent.-Leibcknecht's
License, 1972

161. The license granted to David Leibe 168. A limited partnership was formed by E.
knecht was a personal privilege to keep the W. and the latter's wife, to continue until April
hotel or house described therein, upon the pre- 1, 1892, of which E. was chairman and W. was
mises of the petitioners. His insolvency and secretary and treasurer. At the expiration of
removal froni the same terminated his rights the terui the association was not wound up nor
under said license. He could no longer, else- was its existence extended by the execution and
where, exercise any right under the same.--Ib. recording of new articles or amendments to the

162. The house of the petitioners, used for old, but the business went on under the old firm
the purpose of a hotel and summer resort, re- name and management, the original members
quires the license for the purpose of a successful retaining the original interest. On the death
transaction of the business for which it is fitted of E., on July 10, 1893, W. continued the man-
up and kept. To prevent loss and inconveni- agement and rendered a statement to E.'s ad-
ence and a depreciation in value of the property ministrators (plaintiffs) showing a balance of
by reason of a deprivation of license, it is just assets over liabilities of $7,623.84. Subsequent-
and equitable that the license for said hotel ly he confessed judgments in the firm name to
should be transferred to the present occupant the amount of over $5.400 on which executions
of said house, according to the prayer of thc pe- were issued and a levy made. Plaintiffs filed a

bill praying that the Sheriff be enjoined from

selling on said executions, that the same be

stayed and set aside, and that a receiver be ap-
pointed; whereupon an order was made staying
ihe executions and appointing a receiver. 011

a motion to dismiss the bill and rescind the ap-
163. A and B, by a written agreement, cx- pointment, HELD, that the motion must be re-
changed two rieces of real estate cach of which tused.-Eichelbergers' Administrators v. Wolt-
was encumbered by a mortgage made by the re man et al., 85.
spective vendors. Tlie mortgage upon the pro- 169. The limited partnership association
perty conveyed by A covered only a part of the was dissolved on April ist, 1892, by limitation
lot. In the written agreement the conveyance of time, for the only legal method of prolong-
by A was said to be in consideration of $7500 ing its existence, viz.: by executing and record-
($3500 of which is to remain secured upon the ing new articles or amendment of the old, was
premises as now mortgaged.”' ctc.) The deed not resorted to.-16.
from A to B described it as 'subject to the prin 170. The business having been continued by
cipal and interest of a certain mortgage now a a parol agreement among the partners the part-
lien upon said premises.' B made default in nership from April ist, 1892, to the death of
the payment of interest and A, to protect his Eichelberger must necessarily have been (at
bond, hought the property at the Sheriff's sale least so far as relates to all transactions in that
for a price less than the mortgage deht. In an period) a common law, or unlimited partner-
action of equitable ejectment to recover from B ship, which was dissolved by the death of Eich-
the unincumbered part of the land conveyed to elberger on July joth, 1893.-16.
him by A. HELD, that as between the parties, 171. Notwithstanding the fact that the busi-
the mortgage debt was in the nature of unpaid ness had been carried on for some time after the
purchase money for which a lien was created by dissolution of the limited partnership, associa-
the deed and that A was entitled to recover from tion, as above stated, the proper legal and ex-
B either the unincumbered land or the balance clusive method of winding up the business, was
of the debt for which he was liable on his bond. that prescribed by section 9 of the Act of June
- Edrwards 2. Clark, 22.

2, 1874, as amended by the Act of May 10, 1889


ment note.

to wit, the election, by the members of three' 181. The burden is on the husband's heirs to
liquidating trustees, whose duty it would liave prove that such advances are gifts.-16.
been to settle the affairs of the association, pay
its debts in the order prescribed by the Act, JUDGMENT AGAINST.
and divide the remainder of the assets among
the members, all under the direction of the 182. A judgment was obtained before a Jus-
Court of Common Pleas.-Ib.

tice of the Peace against H. (a married woman)
172. It is perfectly plain that W. had 110' and A. (lier husband), aud transcript tiled in
legal power or authority to bind the association the Common Pleas. The record failed to state
by the confession of those judgments, and ulat that H. was a married woman. On a motion to
so far as relates to the association, the judg- strike off the judgment, HELD. that the motion
ments entered on the warrants of attorney exe must be overruled.-Spahr v. Hess, 73.
cuted by him were void.-16.

183. A judgment against a married woman
173. They were clearly in violation of the before the passage of the Act of 1887, presumed
Acts of Assembly which prescribe the only to be void, is now presumably valid, and it is no
method by which the affairs of a limited pari- longer necessary to the validity of such a judg-
nership association after dissolution can be ment, to set out on the record the facts which,
wound up, totally subversive of its provisions. before the passage of the act, were essential to

the validity of the judgment.--16.
174. It is very doubtful whether a partner in 184. B., a married woman, purchased real
such an association can bind it by the confes- estate from E. giving as consideration her judg.
sion of judgment even during its existence as an

At the same time she signed an-
association. It is entirely certain that no part- other judgment note for $500, in favor of E.,
ner can do so after the association las been dis- wbich latier note was she claims, for a debt due
solved and whether the partnership be limited by her husband to E. This note was executed
or unlimited.-16.

by B. without any knowledge of its character,
175. Woltman's act in confessing these judg- although there is no evidence to show that she
mients and procuring or permitting the partner- is an illiterate woman, or asked to have the
ship property to be levied and exposed to sale, note read to her. After the death of E., and
especially as by his own statement the assets so B.'s husband, E.'s administratrix entered said
largely exceeded all liabilities, was in gross vio- judgment for $500 wliereupon B. presented her
lation of his duty to his late partner, as well as petition to have the same stricken off. HELD,
beyond his powers and illegal; and jnstified and that the petition must be granted.- Epple man
required these plaintiffs to invoke this equitable v. Bott, 185.
remedy to secure the proper and legal applica 185. In the absence of any evidence of mis-
tion of the assets to the payment of debts, and representation or fraud in procuring lier signa-
the distribution of the balance.-16.

ture, the judgment can not be opened on the
176. The Court has no authority to appoint ground that she was ignorant of the nature and
liquidating trustees to wind up a limited part- character of the note.-16.
nership. That can ouly be done by the mem 186. With the exception of being unable to
bers of the association, and it is too late to at- convey or mortgage her real estate without the
tempt to do so after the control of the property consent of her husband, and his joinder therein
has been taken from them, and placed in the and inability to become acconimodation en-
hands of an officer of the Court.-16.

dorser, guarantor or surely for the debt of an-
177. The notes held by E., given after the other, a married woman stands upon an equali-
dissolution of the limited partnership, the de- ty with otiier persons capable of contracting as
ceased partner, are not void because they are regards her riglits, powers, obligations and lia-
not signed by two of the managers, for they are bilities, in relation to contracts.- 1b.
the notes not of the limited partnership, but of 187. To say that a married woman is liable
a common law partnership ----16.

on a note given for the debt of her husband

uuder circunstances such as are shown in this
case, would be to abrogate the proviso of the

Act of 1887, and destroy the only protection

A bond made by a married woman is remaining for the property and estates of mar-
absolutely void, and, in the absence of an en- of their husbands and their rapacious creditors.

ried women from the overshadowing influence
tirely new consideration, cannot be ratified so
as to make it a valid obligation of the woman,

after the determination of her coverture by the after the death of her husband, the promise

188. To establish a ratification of such a note
death of her husband.-Nesbitt v. Turner, 18,

179. Mere acknowledgment of the genuine must be clear and distinct, and the recovery
ness of the signature does not amout ito ratifi. must be on the new promise.-18.




189. A pensioner, drawing his pension
180. A married woman, having a separate money, and applying it to the purchase of real
hank account. drew money at various times cstate, taking the title in the name of his wife,
from her account and deposited it to the credit makes such real estate liable to seizure and sale
of herself and husband, “either to drew After

for the payment of his debts.Burtch v'. Burtih
the first advance her husband by a codicil to his

will, acknowledged that the transaction was a

190. In a suit against a sheriff's estate for
loan. HELD, that tlie presumption is tha! the trespass committed by him in his lifetime, in
subsequent advances, made after the date of the selling plaintiff's property as that of her hus-
codicii, were also loans and not gifts,- McGar- band, the latter was permitted to testify in sup-
zey's Estate, 165.

port of a lease offered in evidence by plaintiit,



and constituting her title to a large part of the facts which before the Act June of 3, 1887 P. L.
property sold by the sheriti. HELD), ou a mo- 332, were necessary to give the judgmeut vali-
tion for a new trial, to have been error.-Quick- dity:--Reissnyder v. Missimer et ux., 8.
el v. Finley, 169.
191. Neither the plaintiff nor her husband,

was competent to testify to any tact occurring
in the lifetime of the original defendant. Hei

ACT OF JUNE 8, 1891.
interest, adverse to the decedent, places her 201. The Act of Jurie 8, 1891, P. L. 225 in so
within the exclusion of clause E of section 5 ot far as the same undertakes to make the con-
the Act of 1887, and where a wife is excluded on tractor the agent of the owner and to confer on
the ground of interest her husband is excluded him authority to bind the building for labor and
by identity of interest growing out of the close. ' materials furnished upon his order, notwith-
ness of the personal relation.-16.

standing the fact that the parties to the contract
192. Neither is it material that the execu!ion have agreed that the contractor shall not have
creditor indemnified the defendant. The estate the powers of an agent, and that 110 lien shall
of the latter is still primarily liable and is de- be entered against the building, and that the
fending this suit; in fact must do so in order to sub-contractor or material wan knew of the
make the indennily available. It is obvious agreement, is unconstitutional.-Lee v. Lewis
that defendant's estate has an interest in the et al., 95.
suit to which that of plaintiff is adverse, and it
is that fact, and not the quantum of the interest
that excludes tlie adversely interested witness
from testifying.-16.

202. The statement of claimi under the Act
193. Plaintiff's husband, the subscribing wit- of June 17, 1887, P. L: 409, must be verified by
ness to the lease, having an adverse interest to claim must be filed within thirty days from the

affidavit or the lien will be stricken off. Such
that of the decedent, by reason ļof identity of
interest with that of his wife, proof of his hand time the last work was done by the claimant.
writing could not be admitted.-16.

Egolf & Son v. Casselberry et al., 124.
194. The Act of Assembly was not intended MORTGAGE, 162.
to, and has not been construcd to be, and is not
to be regarded or used as a means of protecting,

under the guise of ownership by the wife, per- ;

sonal property actually belonging to the hus-
band, from the liusband's creditors.-- 1b.

FIRE, 68,
195. The mere possession of property or
money by a married woman living with lerhus-
band, without anything else, is no cvidence of

203. When a master voluntarily subjects his
ownership by her.-16.
196. She must show in every contest with ought to provide against, he is liable for any

servants to dangers, such as in good faith he
her husband's creditors, by clear and satisfac- accident arising therefrom.- Reese v. Hershey,
tory proof, her ownership, and that she acquir- 83.
ed the property she claimed to own in some 204. Plaintiff's son, aged seventeen years,
manner authorized by the law, and that her hus- ' lost his left hand while operating a rolling ma-
band's credit and her husband's money did not chine in defendant's caramel factory. The boy
go into it.-16.

was hired to operate and had for seven weeks
197. Among the powers of a married woman operated this machine, protected by a guard the
or rights which she acquired under the Act of invention of the defendant; about three hours
1887, is the right to rent property, and to enter before the accident, the defendant took off the
into the possession of it, and farm it.-16. guard from this machine, as it was troublesome

198. If the leases that were made by her were the candy being unusually sticky He testified
made for the purpose of hindering, delaying or that he cautioned the boy against the danger of
defrauding creditors of William, Andrew and the machine. The boy denied all recollection
Daniel Quickel, and if she knew that that was of this, but admitted that he knew that the ma-
the intention, then, so far as the crops upon the chine was dangerous without the guard. The
farms at the time she leased them, which were court refused a non-suit and the jury found for
intended to be transferred to her by those leas- the plaintiff. Held), that the case was proper-
es, are concerned, she acquired no title.-16.

ly submitted to the jury and a new trial should

be refused.-16.*
199. If she entered into a separate business
in good faith, conducted it without any pecull doing, or about to do, a negligent act: or fail-

205. If a master stands by and sees a servant
iary assistance or credit from her husband made
the purchase which it has been testified to she ing to exercise ordinary care in the performance
made out of the prodncts of that business or out of a duty, in consequence of which a fellow ser-
of money or credit not that of her husband's, vant may be injured, and does nothing to re-
then as to all things purchased and acquired, ii strain him, he inay fairly be presumed to have
it be in that way, she has a right to that prop- the consequences, although he may not have

given his assent, and be justly held liable for
erty, even as against the creditors of her hus-

given express orders. --Cannon v. Nlears et al.,

206. But in order to imply assent from his

mere presence and to impute negligence to hini
20 In a suit against a married woman

it must be shown that he knew, or ought to

a Justice of the Peace it is no longer necessary *See Reese Hershey, 8 YORK LEGAL RECORD, 56
to set out in the record of the proceedings the i where this case was reversed by the Supreme Court.



have known, the facts which made the act neg- you could infer any such thing as that ; for

whatever may have taken place between S. B.
Gleason and the defendani, David W. Crider,
there is no knowledge of it brought home to

this plaintiff ; and it she be the holder of these
207. Deceased was being driven in a closed notes, accepted by lier in payment of the debt
carriage across a bridge in a public bigliway in of lier husband to her, she is entitled to recover
defendant township. The bridge was sixteen the amount of these notes with interest from the
feet wide, about ten feet long, and three feet defendant, David W. Crider." HEID, to have
above the water, with no guard rails or barriers been error, and sufficient cause for a new trial.
at the sides. While on the bridge another -Gleason v. Crider, No. 2, 158.
vehicle, in attempting to pass decedent's con 214. If the paper be taken as collateral se-
veyance from the rear, colided therewith, and curity, merely, for the antecedent debt, the de-
the horses shying, the latter vehicle was thrown fendant may aver any ground of defence which
over the side of the bridge into the stream, i would have been competent between anteced-
resulting in the death of the deceased the next elit parties.-16.
morning. The jury having found the defend 215. The question whether or not the note
ant township was negligent in not maintaining was made as claimed and whether it was trans-
guard rails at the sides of the bridge, and renu- ferred in payment of a pre-existing debt or as
cred a verdict for the plaintiff, HELD, that a ! collateral security therefor, are to be submitted
new trial will be refused.-Worley '. Dover to the jury:-16.
Township, 160.

208. A request to charge the jury that eveni
if the jury believe from the evidence that the NOTE, 213.
defendant township was negligent in not main.!
taining guard rails or other barriers at the bridge

where the injury was received, then because FORGERY, 13.
said injury was received through the concur-
rence of said negligence with an extraordinary

FOR PATENT, 8, 9, 217, 218.
and outside cause not likely to be toreseen by FRAUI), 14.
ordinary forecast, to wit: the violent striking of
the vehicle containing the deceased by another

vehicle, driven in the same direction by Frank MARRIED WOMEN, 184-8.
Stambaugh, their verdict must be for the de-

MINOR, 128.
fendant, was properly refused.-16.

209. If in the ordinary use of the street one WAGES, 261.
had been crowded over the bank by the volume

NOTICE, 240.
of travel, the sudden shying of his horse, or the
accumulation of ice in the roadway the absence ORDINANCE.
of the barrier might justify a recovery, if the

plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negli-

210. The accident which resulted in plain- PAROL AGREEMENT.
tiff's decedent's death, occurred in the usual
and ordinary use of the highway, from an ordi EFFECT ON WRITTEN INSTRUMENT.
nary usual cause, which should have been guard-
ed against. Where the facts are not in dispute faith of a contemporaneous parol agreement,

216. A written instrument obtained on the
the question of proximate cause is for the court

cannot be enforced in violation of such agree-
not for the jury.-16.

211. The supervisors of a township must af- !eut. The attempt to use it subjects the wri-
ford an easy, convenient and safe passage to ting to modification or contradiction by parol
persons traveling on the township roads by day evidence of what occurred at its execution. -

Hoke v. Martin, No. 2, 133.
or by night : and where there is special peril
involved, they must provide such protection as PARTITION, 79.
will make it safe for travel even with horses that

are easily frightened.-16. .



217. The note having been given for a patent

right, and such being stated on the face of it,
212. On the trial of the case, defendants the case stands precisely as though it were a
offered to prove that the notes in suit were giv- suit between original parties.-Hoke v. Martin
en on the strength of a contemporaneous parol No. 2, 133.
agreement on the part of the payee not to ne.218. There is nothing in the idea that the
gotiate them, but to hold them until the money Act of 12 April, 1872, is unconstitutional.-16.
was realized out of the territory sold. This of-

fer was rejected. HELI), to be sufficient ground
for a new trial.-Hoke v. Martin, No. 2, 133. PRESUMPTION OF, 2, 4.

213. Plaintiff, payee in a promissory note, PENSION, 190
signed by defendant, brought suit thereon. De-
fendant alleged want of consideration and a PER CAPITA, 73.
fraudulent use of the notes by plaintiff's hus-

band. The Court charged the jury: "There is
110 legal evidence in the case at all from which PLEADING.


Co., 129.



least injure the company whose road is to be
219. Defendant was a Maryland corporation tion of that mode ; 3rd, to prevent by its pro-

crossed; and, to compel by its decree the adop-
doing business in that State ; having 110 ottice cess a crossing at grade if any other be reason-
and iransacting 110 business in Pennsylvania. ably practicable.- 1b.
l'laintitf procured service upon an officer of the 228. Such a decree can only be intelligently
defendant company residing in this State. ' made at the final hearing upon the report of au
After the return of the service, and before state- exaininer and Master, where all the facts are
went hled or any other steps taken, defendant before the Court.-16.
entered an appearance de bene esse and pleaded 229. The Act of June 19, 1871, P. L. 1360,
to the jurisdiction, and persisted in such plca at relating to grade crossings, has no application
every stage of the case. L'pon demurrer to this to a crossing established and in actual use; it
plea. Held, that judgment must be for the applies to the case of a new road which intends
defendant.--- McConkey v. Peach Bottoin Slate to cross an existing road At least such estab-

lislied crossing will not be disturbed by a pre-
220. It seems plain in principle and authori- liminary injunction.- Vorristown Juni. Rail-
ty that of such a corporation, not doing business road Co. v. Citizens' Passenger Railway Co.,
in Pennsylvania (as the demurrer admits) the

Courts of Pennsylvania have no jurisdiction. --

221. This mere fact of the defendant having
made a single contract in this State is not such
a transaction of business in the State as would
be sufficient to draw this foreign corporation :

230. A writ of fi. fa. issued from a United
within the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania Courts. States Circuit Court in Pennsylvania stands up-

on the Act of April 7, 1870. Taylor 7. Balli-
222. As want of jurisdiction of the person

more and Lehigh Railroad Co., 174.

231. Its execution is dependent upon that
can be waived by consent, and must be insisted
on as early as possible, and persisted in at every

statute and there can be no stronger warrant for
stage of the case, it is difficult to see how any tion defendant, now in the hands of the re-

its execution upon the property of the corpora-
court of justice could hold that filing, pleas in ceiver for this court, than a fi. fa. issued out of
bar coincidently with a plea to the jurisdiction,
and with an express reservation of the benefit a court of this Commonwealth, upon the same
of the plea, could be a waiver of it, or a ground

property :--16.

232. The estate aud cficcts of the defendant
for striking it off.-16.

223. The course pursued by the defendant in corporation are in the custody of the court, and
oljecting at the carliest stage of the case to the therefore the fi. fa. cannot be executed after the
want of jurisdiction over it was judicious and in appointment of a recejver, without the consent
fact necessary.-16.

of the court.- 1b.
224 A pica in abatenient is the proper me-

233. The court having taken charge of the
thod of taking advantage of want of jurisdiction prorerty of the corporation, it is required to
of the person, and by such plea the truth of the preserve as far as possible the equities of all
sheriff's return may be contradicted and the parties in interest, including, of course, the
sufficiency of the service be inquired into.--Ib. creditors in this proceeding.16.

234. When a Court, upon a petition and
PLEDGE, 32-7.

without objection granted leave to a U. S. Mar-
shall to execute a writ of fi. fa.

PRESUMPTION, 165, 205.

erty of a corporation of which it had appointed

. a receiver, snch leave will be revoked upon pe-

tition of intervening creditors, showing that

their claims would be jeopardized and their liens

endangered by such execution.-16.

235. The court will authorize a receiver of

a railroad company to issue certificates for the

purchase of a locomotive, where it is satisfied
that such purchase is imperatively demanded

for the safe and convenient operation of the
225. Plaintiff company procured an injunc-

tion to restrain defendant company from erect-

236. It is the right and duty of the Court to
ing grade crossings over its tracks alleging that while it is under the control of the Court. It

keep the road in safe and successful operation,
they would prove dangerous to the traveling must be kept a going concern for the benefit of
public Defendant replied that other crossings the bondholders, creditors and all parties inter-
were impracticable, and that the danger was

not as great as alleged. On a motion to dissolve
the preliminary injunction, HELI), that the

237. The public good requires that railroads
inotion will be refused, and the injunction con detriment to private interests.- İb.

should be operated even at the expense of some
tinued in force uritil the final hearing.--Balti-
more and Harrisburg Railroad Co. i'. Hanov- RECOGNIZANÇE, 48-9.
er and McSherrystown S. R. Co., I.

226. Tlie Act of June 19, 1871, relative to RAPE, 61.
railroad crossings, is applicable to street rail-
ways. -- 1b.

227. It imposes on the Courts, in determin-
ing such a case as this, a threefold duty ; ist.

to ascertain the mode of crossing which will

upon the



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