for life to one who is still living, and the principal thereof, after
her death, payable to the chancellor. Ming's Case,
See EXECUTORS, 7; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1.
A preliminary notice is not requisite to a tender of money on a past-
due obligation. Sharp v. Wyckoff,
See APPEAL, 1; PRACTICE, 4.
1. General, indefinite verbal statements by a trustee are insuffi-
cient to fasten the trust funds upon his individual real estate.
Cuming v. Robins,
2. The income of a testamentary trust fund was given to a testator's
wife for her life or widowhood, for the maintenance of herself
and children, with a provision, among others, that if the children
should be of age at the time of their mother's death or remar-
riage, the principal of the fund should be equally divided among
them. They are now all of age, and their mother survives,
unmarried.-Held, that, upon the application of the mother and
children, the moneys derived from the condemnation of part of
the lands covered by the trust for the purposes of a railroad
company, could be devoted to erecting a building on another
part of the lands covered by the trust, the present buildings
whereon are very dilapidated. Matthews v. Dellicker,
3. A husband conveyed lands to his wife, to hold in trust (evidenced
by deed) for his benefit during his lifetime, and thereafter to sell.
the lands and divide the proceeds among his widow, should she
survive him, and their children or grandchildren.-Held, that
the husband and wife could not substitute for the trust as to
those lands another trust, so as to affect the interests of the chil-
dren and grandchildren. Gulick v. Gulick,
Trusts and Trustees-Continued.
complainant expended $2,000 in finishing buildings which were
unfinished at the testator's death. The cost of the factory,
including that expenditure and the cost of the land, was $21,000.
The defendant has complied with all the conditions of the trust
relative to the taxes, repairs and insurance. He expended, prior
to December 31st, 1881, $3,660 in new buildings and machinery
and repairs. All the buildings were insured in the complain-
ant's name as trustee. In 1881 one of the buildings, with the
machinery therein, was destroyed, and portions of others of the
buildings injured, by fire, and the proceeds of the insurance,
about $6,000, were paid by the companies to the trustee, and
were by him paid to defendant, who expended that and also
about $18,000 of his own money in new buildings and machinery,
built partly on the trust land and (as to one building) partly on
his own adjoining land. The value of the buildings &c. on the
trust property has been doubled by the defendant, and new
buildings &c., including cost of land, worth $48,000, erected on
his own property adjoining, and used by him in connection with
the original factory, all of which have been insured by defend-
ant in complainant's name. In 1884 the paint-shop was again
burnt, and almost all the other buildings so damaged that manu-
facturing was suspended until after they had been repaired. The
loss was adjusted at $29,000, and complainant has received
thereof $21,000, and paid $11,000 to defendant, who has begun to
rebuild, and in doing so has placed one of the buildings, in part,
on his own land; but even if such part should be severed from
the part on the trust lands, the latter would not be essentially
impaired. The defendant's reasons for such location are to
increase his facilities for business and to reduce the chances of
loss by fire.-Held, that the defendant is bound to keep the
premises insured to an amount equal to the original valnation of
the trust buildings &c., and the value of the complainant's
improvements, such insurance to be in the name of the trustee;
that in making restorations, the plant on the trust property
should be kept complete in itself, so that severance of the build-
ings thereon from those on the adjoining land would not destroy
the usefulness of the former as an oil-cloth factory; that any
improvements put upon the premises by the defendant are to be
regarded as trade fixtures, and subject to removal by him or to
allowance for their value; that as but an inconsiderable portion
of one building is being erected on defendant's own land, the
insurance-money may be applied thereto; that should the de-
fendant fail to insure or repair the premises, or to pay the taxes
thereon, the complainant ought to do so, and retain the cost
from the defendant's income in his hands; and, finally, that as
an infant is interested, the matter must be referred to a master to
Trusts and Trustees-Continued.
ascertain and report the facts, although complainant and defend-
ant substantially agree as to them. Wiley v. Morris,
See Costs, 1; EXECUTORS, 20; FRAUD, 3; FRAUDULENT CONVEY-
ANCE; PARTIES, 4; POWERS; TAXES.
1. The testimony in the case was held to establish, clearly, the capa-
city of the testator to make a will. Black v. Foljambe,
2. That a wife requests her husband to appoint her one of the execu-
tors of his will, is not evidence of fraud or undue influence; nor
the fact that the wife's sisters, one of whom testator was visiting,
procured the attendance of the lawyer of one of them to assist
testator's lawyer in drawing the disputed will. Id.,
See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3; WILLS, 1.
Parties who, in their pleadings and proofs, have insisted that they were
*not accountable to complainant for the rental value of land of
which the ancestor died seized, because they were in possession as
equitable owners, cannot, at the hearing, shift their ground, and
claim that they were tenants of the ancestor's widow, who might
have been entitled to hold the land until her dower was assigned,
but who has disclaimed such a right. Larison v. Polhemus,
1. A natural watercourse may be created by the flow of surface water.
Kelly v. Dunning,
2. A land-owner has no right to cause the natural discharge of sur-
face water, from his land on that of his neighbor, to be changed,
to the injury of the latter, by conducting it through new channels,
in unusual quantities, to the land of his neighbor. Id.,
See CORPORATION, 2; NUISANCE; RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
See DEDICATION; EASEMENT; EMINENT DOMAIN.
1. A bachelor, seventy-two years old, while in a moribund condition,
signed a paper purporting to be his will, and giving all of his
property to his housekeeper, who had lived with him for many
years. The paper had been prepared by her four years before,
and she testified that he had put off executing it, although mean-
while frequently requested by her to do so. On the day when ne
signed it, she sent for the witnesses, and told the attending physi-
cian that if the testator was not going to live, she wanted to have a
paper signed. None of the testator's brothers and sisters was
present, or informed of the making of the will, although one
brother lived in the adjoining house. To one of the witnesses,
in reply to a remark that they had come to witness his will and
supposed he knew all about it, he replied that he did not know
anything about it. The evidence as to his intentions in disposing
of his property was conflicting.-Held, that the paper should be
refused probate, on the ground of want of capacity and undue
influence. Byard v. Conover,
2. In February, 1876, a will was executed by a widow, who was then
about eighty-two years old, and blind. In November, 1878, an
inquisition of lunacy found that she was then of unsound mind,
and had been so for three years preceding. Her testamentary
capacity, at the time when her will was made, was, nevertheless,
shown and established by the testimony of witnesses, and the
orphans court decree ordering her will to be admitted to probate
was affirmed. Brady v. McBride,
See DEVISE; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 4; UNDUE INFLUENCE.
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