Guardian and Ward-Continued.
should be credited with a certain investment. In a litigation, after his death and insolvency, between the ward and the sure- ties upon his respective bonds-Held, that each fund should be credited with one-half of the amount of the investment. Smith v. Gummere,
1. A decedent left no property, except a lot with an unfinished house thereon, which his widow occupied for about three months after his death, and then leased, and received the rent. In a suit by the children for partition thereof-Held, that she was entitled to re-imbursement of moneys paid by her for taxes thereon, and also for repairs of damage to the house by a tempest, but not for the premiums on insurance policies taken in her own name, and that she must account for the rents. Houston v. Houston,
2. The legislation of this state, enlarging the capacity of a married woman to acquire and dispose of property, does not give her capacity to make a legal contract with her husband. Farmer v. Farmer,
3. A wife may bestow her property, by gift, on her husband, or she may make a contract with him which will be upheld in equity, but the courts always examine such transactions with an anxious watchfulness and dread of undue influence. Id.,
4. Under the laws of France, by a marriage without a contract as to property, a community of property between the husband and wife is established as an incident of the marriage. During coverture the husband has the control and management of the community property, and he may dispose of his share of the common property by his will; but the wife's share-that is, the one-half of the community property--the husband cannot dispose of, and she will be entitled to it on his death. Harral v. Harral,
5. A son advanced money to his mother for her support during her life, under an agreement that he should be repaid at her death out of her estate. The son procured from his wife the money advanced, agreeing that she should have the account against his mother. Equity will enforce the claim in behalf of the wife. Titus v. Hoagland,
6. The parol assignment to the wife being unknown to the mother, a counter-claim which she had against her son at her death will be set off against this claim of the wife. Id.,
See ATTORNEY; DIVORCE; DOMICILE, 3, 4; DOWER; EVIDENCE, 3, 7; FRAUD, 1; LIMITATION OF ACTIONS; TRUST, 3; UNDUE IN- FLUENCE, 2.
See FRAUD, 3; GUARDIAN; PARENT AND CHILD; TRUSTS, 4. Injunction.
A statute of 1876 authorized the appointment of deputy county clerks, but provided that they should receive no salaries from their respective counties. A statute of 1882 directed that in all counties where the county clerks were then paid by annual salary, the deputy clerk should receive an annual salary of $2,000, payable quarterly. A bill was filed by some tax-payers and citizens of Camden county, alleging that the statute of 1882 was unconstitu- tional, and thereupon an injunction was issued, restraining the county collector from paying, and the defendant from receiving, as deputy county clerk, any salary thereunder. Pending the suit, the board of freeholders passed a resolution appropriating $160 per month to the defendant for his services in the county clerk's office from the time the bill was filed and injunction issued.-Held, that, although the board of freeholders were not parties to this suit, the payment of the money by the county collector, and its reception by the defendant, were palpable vio- lations of the injunction. Gibbs v. Morgan,
See ACCIDENT, 2; CORPORATION, 1, 2; EASEMENT; SPECIFIC PER- FORMANCE, 4.
A policy of insurance issued in the name of the agent of the owner of the vessel insured, instead of in the name of the principal, through the mistake of the insurance company's agent in pre- paring the application for the policy, without any representation or mistake of the owner or applicant for such insurance, may be rectified after the loss of the vessel, the act of the company's agent in such case being that of the company and not of the insured, notwithstanding the fact that he signed the application with his own name "for applicant." Hill v. Millville Mutual Marine and Fire Insurance Co.,
See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1; MORTGAGE, 5; TRUSTS, 4. Interest.
An oral agreement to reduce the rate of interest on a mortgage from seven to six per cent., and to pay it semi-annually instead of annually, made after the mortgage became due, is valid. Sharp v. Wyckoff,
See DEVISE, 2; GUARDIAN, 2.
Where the facts are undisputed, and the cause is to be decided upon mere questions of law, it is not error for the court to direct the jury what verdict to find. American Dock Co. v. Trustees, See EASEMENT; PRACTICE, 5.
By the terms of a foreclosure sale the purchaser was required to pay ten per cent. of the purchase-money at the close of the sale, and if he should not complete his purchase, the premises would be offered for sale again, and the defaulting purchaser should not be benefited by any advance in price at such second sale, but liable for all loss and expense occasioned thereby. A purchaser of the premises for $9,900 paid the ten per cent., but did not pay the balance of the purchase-money, and the premises bought by him were resold by the sheriff, and brought $10,500.-Held, that he was entitled to the ten per cent. deposited by him. Chancellor v. Gummere,
1. Where a sale of lands under a municipal assessment is absolutely void, because made after the time limited by law for the continu- ance of the lien of the assessment on the premises, this court has no authority, on a bill quia timet, to order the complainant to pay the assessment; neither can it correct it, nor declare it a lien on the premises, under the statute providing that such assessments shall not be set aside for irregularities or defects in form &c. Field v. West Orange,
2. The complainant made a contract with the receiver of a railroad (the defendant's predecessor) to remove the coal, ashes and cin- ders from a specified ash-pit on the railroad, and to have there- for the coal, ashes and cinders so removed. He alleges that the former receiver refused to allow him to perform the contract, and that he thereby sustained great damage.-Held, on demurrer, that this court would entertain jurisdiction of the suit, on the ground that the contract having been made with a former re- ceiver, the present receiver (the defendant) cannot be sued thereon at law, and the claim is against the trust funds of the railroad company, which are still under the control of this court. Kerr v. Little,
3. Where an executor has, by retainer, satisfied his own claim against the estate, the orphans court, in passing his account, has juris- diction to inquire into the validity of the claim, and the legality of his action in retaining therefor. Kinman v. Wight,
partnership affairs was proceeding in the court of chancery in a suit pending between the surviving partner and the executrix of the deceased partner, who had, by his will, acquired his interest. Under such circumstances, the parties entered into a written con- tract for the sale of all the real estate to the executrix, who was to pay for it by procuring releases of some mortgages which encum- bered it, and by also depositing in court $30,000, to be disposed of in the settlement. The executrix failed to perform her part of the contract, and the mortgages having been foreclosed, a sale under a decree of foreclosure divested the interest of the parties and rendered specific performance of the contract impossible. The surviving partner filed a supplemental bill by leave of court, praying that the losses sustained by the partnership estate by the breach of the contract, should be ascertained and decreed to be paid or accounted for by the executrix.-Held,
(1) Whether the relief asked is, under such circumstances, within the jurisdiction of a court of equity, not decided.
(2) If the court has jurisdiction, the relief should be granted under the same rules which are applicable to the granting of re- lief by way of specific performance, and if he who seeks relief was unable to perform the contract on his part, or his conduct in the transaction was wanting in fairness and equity, the relief should be denied.
(3) In this case the contract could not have been performed by the surviving partner, according to its terms, and his conduct respecting it was so inequitable as to justify the refusal of the relief he sought. Ludlum v. Buckingham,
See CONSTITUTION, 4; CONTEMPT; DOWER, 3; EXECUTORS, 2, 17; LANDLORD AND TENANT.
A landlord, by a mere oral agreement, rented a hotel to a tenant, in 1867, with a stipulation that if he should enlarge the hotel the tenant would pay him a specified additional rent, and that the tenant should also have the privilege of purchasing the premises at cost. The tenant entered and occupied the demised lands, and the landlord and tenant both made valuable additions thereto. The landlord died in 1876, and the tenant in 1879. Pending litigation in another state over the landlord's will, the defendant was appointed by this court a receiver of the premises; and a few months prior to the tenant's death, he (the tenant) made an assignment to the complainant for the benefit of his creditors. On a bill alleging these facts, and that the estate of the landlord is indebted to complainant for board &c. furnished the landlord and his family, and that the accounts between the parties are
Landlord and Tenant-Continued.
complicated, and the items numerous-Held, (1) that this court would entertain jurisdiction of the matter; (2) that the statute of limitations, under the circumstances, was not a defence on the part of the landlord or his representatives; (3) that the cost of improvements to the premises, made by the tenant, could not be included in this accounting. Woolley v. Osborne,
Quere. As to the application of the statute of limitations to a debt due from a husband to his wife. Gray v. Gray,
"Qui tacet consentire videtur, qui potest et debet vetare, jubet si non
"Quod non apparet non est,"
« ПредишнаНапред » |