shown that the wife was decoyed there, by the procurement of
her husband, and for the purpose of making a case against her.
Id.,
3. A husband who seduces his wife before marriage, and, after mar-
riage, sees her in a situation of temptation, and does nothing to
rescue her, and she yields, will be understood as having con-
sented to her adultery. Id.,
1. A person sui juris may change his domicile as often as he pleases.
To effect such a change, naturalization in the country he adopts
as his domicile is not necessary. Harral v. Harral,
2. To effect a change of domicile there must be a voluntary change
of residence; the residence at the place chosen for the domicile
must be actual; to the factum of residence there must be added
animus manendi; and that place is the domicile of a person in
which he has voluntarily fixed his habitation, not for a mere
temporary or special purpose, but with a present intention of
making it his home, unless or until something uncertain or un-
expected shall happen to induce him to adopt some other place
as his permanent home. Id.,
3. By the laws of France, the marriage of a foreigner in France with-
out any contract as to property, followed by the establishment of
a conjugal domicile in that country, will subject the property of
the married persons to the community law, and a government
authorization under article XIII of the Code is not necessary to
the establishment of such a domicile. Id.,
4. H., whose birthplace was in Connecticut, went to Europe in 1869,
for the purpose of acquiring the German language, and com-
pleting his professional studies. In 1872 he went to Paris,
where he remained; and, in February, 1877, married a French
woman in Paris, without any contract as to property. Immedi-
ately after the marriage he rented a house at Suresnes, a village
near Paris, for two years, and took up his residence there with
his wife. In May, 1878, he was brought to this country, and
sent to a hospital for the insane, at Philadelphia, where he died
in 1881.-Held, that by his marriage in France, and the estab
lishment of his conjugal domicile there, his personal property
became subject to the community law, and that his widow, on
his death, was entitled to the one-half part thereof, notwith-
standing that by his will, made before the marriage, he had be-
queathed the whole of it to others. Id.,
that she was not his wife, and therefore it should be decreed that
she was entitled to no dower, and must give up possession of the
property in which he and she lived together at his death, and of
which she continued to hold and claim possession as his widow.
Besson v. Gribble,
2. After directing that his debts be paid, and making a specific de-
vise, a testator gave the "balance and residue" of his estate to
his wife, declaring that that gift to her was in lieu of her dower.
In the settlement of the estate, and the payment of testator's
debts, all his personal estate was exhausted, and all his lands,
other than those specifically devised, sold, by order of the or-
phans court.-Held, that his widow was not deprived of her right
of dower in those other lands by her failure to file her dissent to
the devise to her within the time limited by the statute. Osmun
v. Porter,
3. A widow who has dower by the judgment of a court which cannot
award her damages or compensation for mesne profits, may main-
tain a suit in equity for their recovery. Shields v. Hunt,
4 A widow whose dower has not been assigned, and who remains on
the homestead farm of her husband, is entitled to the crops grown
thereon after her husband's death. Merchant's Case,
An alley lying between two houses had been used for over forty years
by the adjoining owners, for access to the rear of their houses,
and to the lots behind and belonging thereto. Both houses were
destroyed by fire.-Held, that the easement in the alley was not
thereby lost, and that whether complainant had forfeited her
right thereto by placing the foundation of her house in the alley,
in rebuilding (the evidence thereof being conflicting), should be
determined by an issue at law before she could enjoin the de-
fendant from appropriating the part of the alley next to his lot
in rebuilding. Chew v. Cook,
A master was directed to ascertain and report the value of certain
lands taken by a railroad company for its right of way, and the
consequent damage to the owner's adjacent lands, as of the time
when the company took the land.-Held, that the land covered
by a public road, which was laid out through the land taken by
the company, after the company had taken it, should not be ex-
cepted. New York and Greenwood Lake R. R. Co. v. Stanley,
itor's bill to set aside, as fraudulent, two conveyances of lands by
the brother to the defendant. The evidence showed satisfac-
torily that the lands in question, in fact, belonged to the defend-
ant, although the legal title thereto had been in the name of his
brother.-Held, that, as the cause of the action at law had been
a tort, there was, against the defendant, no ground of estoppel
such as sometimes exists where the cause of action is founded on
a contract, and the credit has been given under the belief that
the debtor was the true owner of the property, of which he had
the legal title only, but not the equitable title. Lillis v. Gal-
lagher,
2. The assignment of a mortgage was made in December, 1879. The
mortgage was afterwards foreclosed, the premises bought by com-
plainant's agent, and conveyed to the defendant in July, 1881.
The complainant, who was then in Paris, was notified thereof in
October, 1881, and returned to this state in April, 1882. He
lived continuously thereafter, until April, 1883, with his agent,
who informed him fully as to this transaction. He filed his bill
in June, 1883.--Held, that his delay constituted a ratification and
an estoppel as against defendant. Chetwood v. Berrian,
3. A mortgage for about $1,500 was given to the defendant to secure
a bond containing a warrant of attorney to confess judgment
thereon. After it became due, and was, with the interest,
unpaid, the defendant entered a judgment by confession on the
bond, in the supreme court, and issued an execution thereon.
The complainant, the mortgagor's brother, in order to aid him,
conveyed with him to the defendant, pursuant to an agreement
between the complainant and defendant, certain cedar swamps
owned by him and his brother, and the consideration thereof was
credited on the bond. He also, under the agreement, obtained
from his brother a deed for the undivided one-half of another
tract of land, likewise owned by them in common, and known as
the Tin Shop Lot, on the brother's interest in which the judg-
ment was a lien, and then gave the defendant a mortgage thereon
for $150, which complainant afterwards paid on account of the
$1,500 mortgage. Subsequently, the defendant foreclosed his
$1,500 mortgage, and after the sale there remained a deficiency.
--Held, that under the circumstances the defendant should be
enjoined (on the ground of equitable estoppel and waiver) from
collecting this deficiency out of the Tin Shop Lot, which defend-
ant now claims the right to do by virtue of his lien, under his
execution on the confessed judgment, on complainant's brother's
interest in the Tin Shop Lot before its conveyance to complain-
ant. Lewis v. Champion,
estate, and another received payment from the estate for services
to the testator, estops the former from excepting to the executor's
account because of such payment. Kinman v. Wight,
5. The holder of a decree against an insolvent railway corporation
who, as director of a new corporation, with full knowledge, con-
sents to the subsequent acceptance of a deed from a receiver to
it, free from all encumbrances, under the statute, and votes to
execute a mortgage for the security of bond-holders, which shall
be a first lien-Held, not entitled, on petition, to execution and
sale of land of the company, with priority. Freehold and New
York Railway Co. v. Hodgson,
See AGENCY; ARBITRATION; FRAUD, 3.
1. On a bill by the alleged vendee against an administrator cum testa-
mento annexo, for the specific performance of a contract for the
sale of lands alleged to have been made by the executor, who
had a testamentary power of sale, the vendee is incompetent to
prove the contract. Palmateer v. Tilton,
2. The complainant was, by a decree of this court, declared to be of
unsound mind, and he appears in this suit (to foreclose a mortgage
held by him) by guardians of his person and estate duly
appointed. The defendant set up usury as a defence, and at the
examination offered himself as a witness to prove it.-Held, that
complainant (and not his guardians "suing in a representative
capacity") was the real party to the suit, and being under a
"legal disability," within the meaning of the statute, the defend-
ant was incompetent as a witness, and the examiner should,
under the 218th Rule, have rejected him. Demarest v. Vanden-
berg,
3. An executrix (the wife) was held incompetent to prove the gift
of a chattel by her husband to her, which she claimed as her own.
It did not appear that any objection was made to her testimony.
There was a minor interested who was not represented in the
case.-Held, that her testimony should be disregarded, although
the record did not show that objection to her competency was
made at the time she offered herself as a witness. Sherman v.
Lanier,
thereon authorized by the act, and that on such payment the title
to the land should vest in the company in fee, and that a deed
therefor might be made by the riparian commissioners, governor
and attorney-general, in the name and under the great seal of the
state.-Held, that on the trial of an action of ejectment, a deed
under the great seal of the state, purporting to convey land of the
state in pursuance of the statute, was, of itself, competent evi-
dence, without proof that the previous steps leading to the vest-
ing of the title had been taken when the deed was made.
American Dock Co. v. Trustees for the Support of Public Schools,
5. Also, that evidence offered by the defendants in the action to show
that the lands conveyed by the deed did not come within the loca-
tion of the road or of the depots, stations or other works of the
company, was properly excluded. Id.,
6. The administrator of a married woman paid a bill presented by a
physician against the estate, and her husband excepted to its
allowance in the settlement of the administrator's account.-Held,
that the physician was incompetent to testify to a promise by the
decedent to pay the bill. Baker v. Galpin,
7. On a bill filed by a wife for moneys received for her by her hus-
band, she cannot be a witness to prove the admissions of her
husband. Gray v. Gray,
See AGENCY; ATTORNEY; FRAUD, 1; MORTGAGE, 5; PRACTICE, 3.
Executors and Administrators.
1. A testatrix obtained a decree in a foreclosure suit, and the exеси-
tion thereon was, by direction of her solicitor, returned unexe-
cuted. After her death an alias execution was issued in her
name, and, at the sheriff's sale, one of her executors bought the
premises, taking the title in his own name for convenience, and
in trust for the estate.-Held, that a deed executed by himself and
his wife, and his co-executor, would transfer a good title to the
premises. Banta v. Board of Trustees of School District No. 3,
2. After the account of two administrators, allowing commissions in
a gross sum to both, had been passed, one of them, alleging that
his co-administrator had possessed himself of all of the commis-
sions, filed a petition in the orphans court to compel his co-
administrator to pay him one-half thereof.-Held, that the or-
phans court had no jurisdiction to grant the order. Mount v.
Slack,
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