Denied, McCartin v. Perry, Trenton Board of Health v. Hutchinson, 12 Stew. Eq. 218. Affirmed, Hutchinson v. Trenton Board of Health,
Constitution - Continued.
holders of that county persist in paying the deputy clerk the salary under the act, out of the county treasury, and that, too, in monthly payments. Gibbs v. Morgan,
2. A statute provided that, in any county in which the fees &c. allowed county clerks for services should be collected and paid over for the use of the county, it should be lawful to have an as- sistant clerk, who should be paid by the county collector; that each of the clerks of said counties, whenever the population thereof exceeded sixty thousand, should appoint an assistant clerk, who should possess and exercise all the powers of the county clerk during the latter's absence, and that he should be paid an annual salary of $2,000.-Held, that the act was uncon- stitutional, as being special legislation regulating the internal affairs of a county. Ernst v. Morgan,
3. The West Line grant was not in violation of the constitutional prerogative of congress to regulate commerce with foreign na- tions and among the several states. American Dock Co. v. Trus- tees,
4. Where both parties claim under a grant from the state, the ques- tion whether congress has jurisdiction is neither material nor pertinent. Id.,
The officers and managers of a savings bank petitioned the chancellor for an order directing them, among other things, to invest all moneys deposited in the bank, after a designated date, in certain specified securities. Loans of part of these deposits were after- wards made by the president, without the knowledge or subse- quent approval of the other managers or finance committee, on the promissory notes of the borrowers, secured by collaterals other than those specified in the order. Other loans of part of these deposits were similarly made by the president, under an agreement with the borrowers, that the latter should retain a sufficient amount of "good securities" to cover these loans. The "good securities" never were, in fact, those stated in the order, and the borrowers for several years, and as long as the loan con- tinued, had the custody of the box containing the "good securi- ties" in their own vault, and the exclusive access thereto, and removed and changed the securities at pleasure.-Held, that this court had jurisdiction over the managers, and power to make the order; that the loans by the president were "investments," and a violation of the order, rendering him punishable for a con- tempt, even if the bank sustained no pecuniary loss therefrom; that the conduct of the other managers was not a contempt, although some of them knew, after the loans had been made, of
the kind of securities taken by the president, and had thus been negligent in the discharge of their duties. Una v. Dodd,
See APPEAL, 2; INJUNCTION; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 5.
It appearing that two sons had worked their father's farms, under an agreement that they should do so until they had accumulated for him a fund of $12,000, and then they should have the farms free of rent during his life, and that the specified sum had been gathered about a year before the father's death, and thereafter the sons had enjoyed the use of the farms free until their father died-Held, that the sons had no reason to complain, on appeal, that the chancellor had made too small an allowance to them for services rendered under that contract. Larison v. Polhemus, 303
See FRAUD, 1, 4; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2, 3; INTEREST; JURIS- DICTION, 2; SOLICITOR; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
1. Where the trustees of a corporation gave a bond, secured by a mort- gage on the corporate property, which, in strict legal effect, bound them individually, a court of equity will enjoin an action at law against them thereon, if it appears that there was no in- tention on their part to become personally liable. Maps v. Cooper,
2. The complainants were incorporated, under a general statute, to supply Atlantic City, the defendant, with water. They after- wards contracted with the city for that purpose, and thereby accepted the provisions of certain ordinances regulating the mode of supplying the water, both for public and private pur- poses. They received in return exemption from municipal taxa- tion, and also the exclusive privilege of furnishing water to the city and its inhabitants. They constructed their works at a large expense, and supplied the water, as required by their contract, satisfactorily.-Held, that, whether or not the city's grant of the exclusive privilege of furnishing water was ultra vires, and void as creating a monopoly, the city had exhausted its power as to providing a water supply; that the complainants' franchise was exclusive, and that consequently, this court would, by injunction, protect them against any invasion of their rights by persons laying water-pipes &c., under municipal authority, to com- pete with them unlawfully. Atlantic City Water Works v. Atlantic City,
3. A railroad company may buy land in fee and hold it, and if the company becomes insolvent the property will be assets for the payment of its debts. American Dock Co. v. Trustees,
1. The circumstances in this case prove a resulting trust in the de- fendants' deceased brother, whose heirs-at-law the defendants are. As there is no evidence that the answering defendant knew of the existence of the trust, he is entitled to his costs. Third Na- tional Bank of New York v. Cary,
2. Two defendants in a partition suit put in separate and merely for- mal answers.-Held, that the fact that the answers were merely formal, and put in by the same solicitor, did not disentitle those defendants to the costs thereof. Garwood v. Hartley,
See EXECUTORS, 4, 18, 19; PARTNERSHIP.
Land dedicated for a highway does not, ipso facto, become a highway, and will not become so until the proper municipal authority has accepted it. Booraem v. North Hudson County Railway Co.,
Deed. See EVIDENCE, 4; EXECUTORS, 1; PARTIES, 2.
1. A testator provided as follows: "I give and bequeath to my dear, beloved wife, Rachel, about nine acres that is by south of Edo P. Mercellus's land called the new lane, and also all my movable personal property to be left to discharge my debts, and so much of my real property to discharge the remainder of my debts, if any wanting, and the remainder of my property, of what nature soever, during her widowhood. I give and bequeath to my daughter Caty the one equal fifth part of the remainder, and the rest to my two sons John and George, equal, share and share alike." The will was proved December 28th, 1822. In 1823, the widow married Adrian Van Houten, who died in 1825. She con- tinued in the possession of the nine acres until her death, in 1863, and her executors, to whom she gave a testamentary power of sale, continued to possess the premises until the filing of this bill.-Held, that, aside from the widow's and her executors' pos- session of the premises for about sixty years, the will gave her a fee simple in the nine-acre lot. Van Houten v. Post,
Devise and Legacy-Continued.
each child is entitled to payment of its portion of the $500, on attaining majority, but not to interest thereon from the time of testator's death, because, as grandfather, he did not stand in loco parentis; (3) that the legal construction of the word "heirs," in this clause, is not controlled or affected by another clause in the will, making a bequest to the "children" of testator's daughter. Davis v. Davis,
3. A testamentary trust of lands was to pay to the testator's wife and five children, in equal shares, the net rents thereof, and, after the death or remarriage of his wife, to the children, and in case of the death of any of the children leaving lawful issue, that child's share to be paid to such issue. The testator's wife died in his lifetime, and the five children all survived him. One daughter, Laura, married and died, leaving two children and four grand- children, the children of her deceased son who died in her life- time.-Held, that each one of Laura's surviving children took one-third of her interest under the trust and the four grandchil- dren of Laura's deceased son took the remaining third. Ballen- tine v. De Camp,
4. Legatees mentioned in a will by the nicknames by which testator always called them, and identified, were held entitled to their re- spective legacies. Beatty v. Trustees,
5. A provision that in case of the death of a certain legatee before majority, the legacy was "to revert back to" testator's "other lawful heirs," construed to mean that, in that event, the legacy should go to his children or their representatives. Id.,
A non-resident testatrix gave all her estate to her husband for life, "and in the event of his decease, and not till then, to be divided between my step-children," John, William, Julia and James, "or their heirs." William died in the testatrix's lifetime, intes- tate, and having never been married. The property of the tes- tatrix was all personal. By the statute of distributions of Wil- liam's domicil, his father was entitled to his personal estate.- Held, that at testatrix's death, William's father became absolutely entitled to the estate in remainder given to William, notwith- standing the fact that he was, by the will, also entitled to a life estate therein. Hard v. Turnure,
1. A visit by a married woman to a brothel, will, unless satisfactorily explained, justify the presumption that she went there for a criminal purpose. Cane v. Cane,
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