Merchant's Case. marketing it. Also that they should be charged with the value of sixty-one lambs not inventoried, sold by Mrs. Hughson in August and October, 1880, the produce of sheep belonging to the intestate; and also with the value of wool from the sheep which belonged to the intestate, clipped and sold after his death. Also that they should be charged with the proceeds from April, 1880, of the sale (on a milk route) of milk from the cows belonging to the intestate, and served to customers by means of wagons and horses of the estate. It appears by the testimony that the agreement with Tucker was made after the intestate's death by Mrs. Hughson, who acted in the matter in behalf of the widow, with whom she lived in the homestead. The widow's dower was never assigned. By the statute she was entitled to remain in and hold and enjoy the mansion-house of her husband and the messuage or plantation thereto belonging until her dower should be assigned to her, without being liable to pay any rent therefor. Rev. p. 320 § 2. She was, therefore, entitled to the crops. Mrs. Hughson sold, in the summer and fall of 1880, sixty-one lambs, the produce of sheep of the intestate, and received therefor $244. The administrators urge that, in charging themselves with the amount of the inventory, they have charged themselves with all that they should answer for with respect to those lambs. The inventory contains an item of sixty-one sheep, appraised at $6 each. No lambs are inventoried. The appraisers say that the appraised value of the sheep included that of the lambs; that they valued the sheep at $4 each, and the lambs at $2 each, but inventoried the former only, and appraised them at the value of both. It is proved that the sheep were worth $6 apiece. It appears that fifty-six of them were bid in at the sale for Mrs. Hughson, at $5.50 apiece. The administrators should be charged with the value of the lambs. The wool sheared from the sheep belonged to the estate, and the administrators should account for it. As to the milk, they should account for the net profits made from the sale of the milk, but not for the gross amount of money received from the sales. The net profit for the time during Merchant's Case. which the business was carried on, with the property of the estate, after the taking out of the letters of administration up to the time of the sale of the personal property, may be fairly put at the sum of $450, and with that amount the administrators should be charged. The result is that the administrators should not be charged with the crops, but should be charged with the money received for the lambs, $244, and the money received for the wool, $80, and the net profits of the milk business, $450. The decree will be reversed, with costs, and the record remitted to the orphans court. CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CHANCERY, MARCH TERM, 1885. JOHN GRAY, administrator, appellant, υ. ELIZABETH GRAY, respondent. 1. On a bill filed by a wife for moneys received for her by her husband, she cannot be a witness to prove the admissions of her husband. 2. Quere. As to the application of the statute of limitations to a debt due from the husband to the wife. On appeal from a decree of the chancellor. Mr. Alfred Mills, for appellant. Mr. J. H. Neighbour, for respondent. 39 511 52 425 Gray v. Gray. The opinion of the court was delivered by BEASLEY, C. J. This bill was exhibited by a widow against the administrator of her husband to recover certain sums of money which belonged to her as her separate estate, by force of the act relating to married women, and which he had received on her behoof during coverture. One of the exceptions to the proceedings in the court below was leveled at the admission of the testimony of the widow, relating to sundry conversations between herself and her husband, in which he acknowledged the receipt of the moneys in question, accompanying such admissions with promises to repay them when requested. Their conversations were plainly inadmissible, as they were expressly prohibited by the act that qualifies as witnesses the parties to the suit, to a limited extent, when either plaintiff or defendant is such in a representative capacity. But the case of the respondent is not seriously impaired by the rejection of this testimony, for the facts necessary to support her claim are amply proved by the residue of the evidence. It is shown, beyond rational dispute, that the moneys claimed were the property of the wife, and were received by her husband for her during coverture, with the understanding that he would hold them for her benefit and as her quasi trustee. It is not to be questioned that under such circumstances, in the absence of qualifying conditions, the estate of the husband must account in NOTE. Before the Married Women's Acts, the statute of limitations did not run against the claim of a wife against her husband for money loaned by her to him, until his death, Towers v. Hagner, 3 Whart. 48. See Duke v. Fulmer, 5 Rich. Eq. 121; Livesay v. Helms, 14 Gratt. 441. So, where her money was loaned, in 1845, to her husband and his partner, who made an assignment for the benefit of their creditors in 1857, Kuto's Appeal, 40 Pa. St. 90. Since the Married Women's Acts, the statute has been held not to run against such a claim, Sewell v. McVay, 30 La. Ann. 673; Upham v. Wyman, 7 Allen 499; Boardman's Appeal, 40 Conn. 169; Lahr's Appeal, 90 Pa. St. 510; Wilson v. Wilson, 36 Cal. 447; Marsteller v. Marsteller, 93 Pa. St. 350; but see Sobel v. Slinghuff, 52 Md. 132; Boughton v. Flint, 74 N. Y. 476; Muns v. |