Wiley v. Morris.

estate. The testator gave him the use of the property for the purposes of trade. He anticipated that he might require improvements, and gave him permission to put them there. When put there they are to be regarded as trade fixtures put upon demised premises by a tenant, would be, and Mr. Morris will have the same right of removal thereof that such tenant would have. If, at the end of his occupation, they remain there, he will, in equity, be entitled to compensation for them to the extent to which they may enhance the value of the property.

The bill alleges that he proposes to build the paint shop, which is a large and important building, partly on the trust land and partly on his own adjoining land, and that to so build it would greatly impair the value of the part which will be on the trust land, inasmuch as it could not be severed from the other part without thereby materially detracting from its usefulness. The answer, on the contrary, states, and the diagram annexed thereto shows, that the paint shop has already been built entirely on the trust land, and that all of the buildings except the grinding-room building are built entirely on the trust land, and that the part of that building which is built or to be built on Mr. Morris's land has cost, if finished, or will cost when completed, only $514.69, and can, if or when built, be readily separated from the part which is on the trust land, and that such separation would be without injury to either part. It appears by the answer that Mr. Morris has already expended, in the restoration of the trust property, $21,367.33. There can be no reasonable objection, under the circumstances, to paying the cost of the grinding-room building out of the insurance money, although part of it is not on the trust land.

In any restoration of the property, the plant on the trust land should be kept complete in itself for the purposes for which it was designed, so that a severance of the buildings not on the land from those upon it would not destroy the usefulness of the latter as an oil-cloth factory plant. It is stated in the answer that the buildings now on the trust land are themselves a complete plant for the manufacture of oil-cloth, and that the plant on the trust

Wiley v. Morris.

land is of greater capacity and value than it was when received by Mr. Morris.

The trustee should pay over to Mr. Morris the balance of the insurance-money in his hands, or which may be received by him, from the fire of April last. The answer states that the reason why Mr. Morris insured the whole property in the name of the trustee was that he was ignorant of his rights in the matter, and supposed that he could not insure in his own name; but he avers that he always thought that the insurance money would be his, and under his control.

The following, then, are the answers to the questions propounded:

Mr. Morris is not bound to keep the buildings &c. on the trust property insured to an amount exceeding their value at the testator's death as increased by the expenditure of the trustee in finishing buildings.

The insurance which he is bound to keep up is for the benefit of the trust estate, and should be in the name of the trustee.

Should Mr. Morris fail to insure according to his obligation to the trust estate, or should he fail to pay the taxes or make the requisite repairs, the trustee should do those things and pay for them out of the income in his hands coming to Mr. Morris.

As to the improvements put by him upon the property, Mr. Morris has the rights of a tenant putting trade fixtures upon the demised premises, and he will, on sale of the property, be entitled in equity to compensation for any existing, permanent improvements put on the trust land by him at his own expense, to the extent to which they may enhance the value of the property at the sale.

The trustee may allow the insurance money in hand or to be received for the loss from the fire of April last, to be applied to paying the cost of the new grinding-room building. He should pay over the balance of that insurance money to Mr. Morris.

Although the bill and the answer of Mr. Morris do not differ in any essential point of fact, yet as there is no proof in the case to bind the infant defendant, there must be a reference to ascer

Hassell v. Van Houten.

tain the amount for which, on the principles expressed in this opinion, Mr. Morris should insure in the name of the trustee ; also, whether the plant on the trust land is complete and as valuable as it was when Mr. Morris received the property from the estate, and whether, if the building or buildings which Mr. Morris proposes to build partly on his own land and partly on that of the trust estate, be so built, the part or parts built on his land can be separated from the other without material damage to the latter, and any other fact which should be established by proof, in order to make a valid decree as against the infant.

ABRAM M. HASSELL

υ.

FRANCES L. VAN HOUTEN et al.

Under the statute authorizing the assignment of counsel to indigent suitors, the complainant was assigned to assist the defendant in a suit to recover from a life insurance company the amount of a policy on her husband's life. The complainant thereupon made an agreement with her to prosecute the claim; and, if successful, to receive one-half of the amount recovered, and if not successful, to receive nothing. He did prosecute the suit, paid the costs incurred, and recovered the amount of the policy, $1,000, besides $339.27 interest thereon. -Held, that he was entitled to one-half of this whole amount.

Bill for relief. On final hearing on pleadings and proofs.

Mr. J. Coult, for complainant.

Mr. S. H. Baldwin, for defendant Mrs. Van Houten.

THE CHANCELLOR.

This suit is brought to recover one-half of a fund, represented by a bank check, given by the Masonic Mutual Life Insurance Company, of Newark, in payment of the debt and interest due

Hassell v. Van Houten.

on the decree of this court in Van Houten v. Pine, 11 Stew. Eq. 72. For the taxed costs and interest thereon the company gave its check to the complainant in this suit, Abram M. Hassell, Esq., who was solicitor for the complainant (Mrs. Frances L. Van Houten) in that one, and for the debt and interest gave her its check payable to her order. That check was certified to be good by the bank on which it was drawn. Mr. Hassell took possession of it to secure him for the amount of his fee for collecting the money, according to an agreement between him and Mrs. Van Houten on that head, made before the suit was begun. She refused to endorse the check, or to authorize him in any way to receive the money for it, or to pay him the fee, according to the agreement. This suit is brought against her and Messrs. Pine and Ingalls, in their official capacities (one is president and the other secretary and treasurer of the company, which is unincorporated), and the bank, for relief in the premises, to establish Mr. Hassell's lien for the fee on the check and the fund which it represents, and to compel Mrs. Van Houten to endorse the check, or authorize him or some one else to endorse it for her, so that he may draw the money, and after taking out his fee, pay the balance to her. The bill also prays that the company may be

Hassell v. Van Houten.

required to give to him a new check for, or pay to him the amount of the fee and pay her the balance. A general demurrer to the bill by Messrs. Pine and Ingalls has been allowed, on the ground that the bill presents no claim for relief against the insurance company (infra p. 113). Since this suit was begun the money has, by agreement of parties, been drawn upon the check, and after paying $250 to the complainant on account of his demand, and the like sum to the solicitor of Mrs. Van Houten, the balance has been paid into court to the credit of the cause.

The complainant alleges that Mrs. Van Houten agreed with him, before the suit to recover the insurance money was brought, that, if he would undertake to collect the claim upon the policy, which was for $1,000, on the life of her deceased husband, she would pay him for his fee for the service one-half of the amount recovered, whether obtained by suit or compromise. If he failed to collect or settle the claim, he was to have nothing. She denies that she agreed to pay him any specified sum for his services, but in her answer admits that before the suit was begun she offered to pay him $500, but says he declined to accept that sum and declined also to enter into any agreement for payment of his fee out of the money to be recovered, on the ground that the existence of such agreement, if known, might prejudice her in

In Wright v. Burroughes, 3 C. B. 344, a pauper plaintiff having, behind the back of his attorney, and under circumstances showing an intention to deprive him of his costs, agreed with the defendants, in an action for unliquidated damages, to execute a release, and the defendant having pleaded the release the court, at the attorney's instance, set aside the plea, Tindal, C. J., saying: "It is the spes spolii alone that induces the attorney to undertake the conduct of a pauper cause." See Quinnan v. Clapp, 10 Abb. N. C. 394.

In Holmes v. Penney, 9 Erch. 584, the plaintiff brought an action for work and labor, as an attorney. At the trial it appeared, in June, 1851, the defendant retained the plaintiff as his solicitor in a chancery suit, in which he was a defendant; that he stated to the plaintiff that he was a poor man, but that he would be entitled to some property upon his father's death. The plaintiff agreed to do the work "upon the ordinary terms," and consented not to press the defendant, but to wait until he should come into the possession of his property. On July 29th, the defendant obtained an order to proceed in the chancery suit in forma pauperis, and the plaintiff was appointed his solicitor therein, and the defendant had counsel also appointed to him. On October 31st, defendant's father died, of which the plaintiff became aware, but took no