It is an universal and fundamental political principle, that the power to protect, can safely be confided only to those interested in protecting, or their responsible agents-a maxim not less true in private than in public affairs. The danger in our system is, that the general government, which represents the interests of the whole, may encroach on the states, which represent the peculiar and local interests, or that the latter may encroach on the former.

would be to retard, and not finally to resist, the will of a dominant majority.

But it is useless to multiply arguments. Were it possible that reason could settle a question where the passions and interests of men are concerned, this point would have been long since settled for ever, by the state of Virginia. The report of her legislature, to which I have already referred, has really, in my opinion, placed it beyond controversy. Speaking in reference to this subject, it says," It has been objected" (to In examining this point, we ought not the right of a state to interpose for the to forget that the government, through all protection of her reserved rights), "that of its departments, judicial as well as the judicial authority is to be regarded as others, is administered by delegated and the sole expositor of the Constitution; on responsible agents; and that the power this subject it might be observed first that which really controls ultimately all the there may be instances of usurped powers movements, is not in the agents, but those which the forms of the Constitution could who elect or appoint them. To under- never draw within the control of the judistand then its real character, and what cial department; secondly, that if the dewould be the action of the system in any cision of the judiciary be raised above the supposable case, we must raise our view sovereign parties to the Constitution, the from the mere agents, to this high con- decisions of the other departments, not trolling power which finally impels every carried by the forms of the Constitution movement of the machine. By doing so, before the judiciary, must be equally auwe shall find all under the control of the thoritative and final with the decision of will of a majority, compounded of the that department. But the proper answer majority of the states, taken as corporate to the objection is, that the resolution of bodies, and the majority of the people of the General Assembly relates to those the states estimated in federal numbers. great and extraordinary cases, in which all These united constitute the real and final of the forms of the Constitution may prove power, which impels and directs the move-ineffectual against infraction dangerous to ments of the general government. The the essential rights of the parties to it. majority of the states elect the majority of The resolution supposes that dangerous the Senate; of the people of the states, that powers not delegated, may not only be of the House of Representatives; the two usurped and executed by the other deunited, the President; and the President partments, but that the judicial departand a majority of the Senate appoint the ment may also exercise or sanction danjudges, a majority of whom and a major-gerous powers beyond the grant of the ity of the Senate and the House with the Constitution, and consequently that the President, really exercise all of the pow-ultimate right of the parties to the Constiers of the government with the exception of the cases where the Constitution requires a greater number than a majority. The judges are, in fact, as truly the judicial representatives of this united majority, as the majority of Congress itself, or the President, is its legislative or executive representative; and to confide the power to the judiciary to determine finally and conclusively what powers are delegated and what reserved, would be in reality to confide it to the majority, whose agents they are, and by whom they can be controlled in various ways; and, of course, to subject (against the fundamental principle of our system, and all sound political reasoning) the reserved powers of the states, with all of the local and peculiar interests they were intended to protect, to the will of the very majority against which the protection was intended. Nor will the tenure by which the judges hold their office, however valuable the provision in many other respects, materially vary the case. Its highest possible effect

tution to judge whether the compact has been dangerously violated, must extend to violations by one delegated authority, as well as by another-by the judiciary, as well as by the executive or legislative."

Against these conclusive arguments, as they seem to me, it is objected, that if one of the parties has the right to judge of infractions of the Constitution, so has the other, and that consequently in cases of contested powers between a state and the general government, each would have a right to maintain its opinion, as is the case when sovereign powers differ in the construction of treaties or compacts, and that of course it would come to be a mere question of force. The error is in the assumption that the general government is a party to the constitutional compact. The states, as has been shown, formed the compact, acting as sovereign and independent communities. The general government is but its creature; and though in reality a government with all the rights and authority which belong to any other government,

within the orb of its powers, it is, never-pact of every defect and uncertainty, by theless, a goverment emanating from a an amendment of the instrument itself. It compact between sovereigns, and partak- is impossible for human wisdom, in a sysing, in its nature and object, of the character of a joint commission, appointed to superintend and administer the interests in which all are jointly concerned, but having, beyond its proper sphere, no more power than if it did not exist. To deny this would be to deny the most incontestable facts, and the clearest conclusions; while to acknowledge its truth, is to destroy utterly the objection that the appeal would be to force, in the case supposed. For if each party has a right to judge, then under our system of government, the final cognisance of a question of contested power would be in the states, and not in the general government. It would be the duty of the latter, as in all similar cases of a contest between one or more of the principals and a joint commission or agency, to refer the contest to the principals themselves, Such are the plain dictates of reason and analogy both. On no sound principle can the agents have a right to final cognisance, as against the principals, much less to use force against them, to maintain their construction of their powers. Such a right would be monstrous; and has never, heretofore, been claimed in similar cases.

tem like ours, to devise another mode which shall be safe and effectual, and at the same time consistent with what are the relations and acknowledged powers of the two great departments of our government. It gives a beauty and security peculiar to our system, which, if duly appreciated, will transmit its blessings to the remotest generations; but, if not, our splendid anticipations of the future will prove but an empty dream. Stripped of all its covering, and the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government: a constitutional or absolute one; a government resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the states, or on the unrestrained will of a majority; a form of government, as in all other unlimited ones, in which injustice and violence, and force, must finally prevail. Let it never be forgotten, that where the majority rules, the minority is the subject; and that if we should absurdly attribute to the former the exclusive right of construing the Constitution, there would be in fact between the sovereign and subject, under such a government, no constitution; or at least nothing deserving the name, or serving the legitimate object of so sacred an instrument.

That the doctrine is applicable to the case of a contested power between the states and the general government, we How the states are to exercise this high have the authority not only of reason and power of interposition which constitutes so analogy, but of the distinguished statesman essential a portion of their reserved rights already referred to. Mr. Jefferson, at a that it cannot be delegated without an enlate period of his life, after long experience tire surrender of their sovereignty, and and mature reflection, says, "With respect converting our system from a federal into to our state and federal governments, I do a consolidated government, is a question not think their relations are correctly un- that the states only are competent to dederstood by foreigners. They suppose the termine. The arguments which prove former subordinate to the latter. This is that they possess the power, equally prove not the case. They are co-ordinate de- that they are, in the language of Jefferson, partments of one simple and integral "the rightful judges of the mode and whole. But you may ask if the two de- measure of redress." But the spirit of partments should claim each the same forbearance, as well as the nature of the subject of power, where is the umpire to right itself, forbids a recourse to it, except decide between them? In cases of little in cases of dangerous infractions of the urgency or importance, the prudence of Constitution; and then only in the last both parties will keep them aloof from the resort, when all reasonable hope of relief questionable ground; but if it can neither from the ordinary action of the governbe avoided nor compromised, a convention ment has failed; when, if the right to inof the states must be called to ascribe the terpose did not exist, the alternative would doubtful power to that department which be submission and oppression on the one they may think best."-It is thus that our side, or resistance by force on the other. Constitution, by authorizing amendments, That our system should afford, in such exand by prescribing the authority and mode treme cases, an intermediate point between of making them, has by a simple contriv- these dire alternatives, by which the govance, with its characteristic wisdom, pro- ernment may be brought to a pause, and vided a power which, in the last resort, thereby an interval obtained to comprosupersedes effectually the necessity and mise differences, or, if impracticable, be even the pretext for force; a power to compelled to submit the question to a conwhich none can fairly object; with which stitutional adjustment, through an appeal the interests of all are safe; which can to the states themselves, is an evidence of definitely close all controversies in the its high wisdom; an element not, as is only effectual mode, by freeing the com- supposed by some, of weakness, but of

strength; not of anarchy or revolution, | people great truths, intimately connected

but of peace and safety. Its general recognition would of itself, in a great measure, if not altogether, supersede the necessity of its exercise, by impressing on the movements of the government that moderation and justice so essential to harmony and peace, in a country of such vast extent and diversity of interests as ours; and would, if controversy should come, turn the resentment of the aggrieved from the system to those who had abused its powers (a point all important), and cause them to seek redress, not in revolution or overthrow, but in reformation. It is, in fact, properly understood, a substitute where the alternative would be force, tending to prevent, and if that fails, to correct peaceably the aberrations to which all political systems are liable, and which, if permitted to accumulate, without correction, must finally end in a general catastrophe.

Speech of Henry Clay

with the lasting welfare of my country. I should, indeed, sink overwhelmed and subdued beneath the appalling magnitude of the task which lies before me, if I did not feel myself sustained and fortified by a thorough consciousness of the justness of the cause which I have espoused, and by a persuasion I hope not presumptuous, that it has the approbation of that Providence who has so often smiled upon these United States.

Eight years ago it was my painful duty to present to the other House of Congress, an unexaggerated picture of the general distress pervading the whole land. We must all yet remember some of its frightful features. We all know that the people were then oppressed and borne down by an enormous load of debt; that the value of property was at the lowest point of depression; that ruinous sales and sacrifices were everywhere made of real estate; that stop laws, and relief laws, and paper money were adopted to save the people from impending destruction; that a deficit in the

In Defence of the American System* in which is given the public revenue existed, which compelled

Previous History of Tariff Contests in the Senate

of the United States, February 2d,
3d and 6th, 1832.

[Mr. CLAY, having retired from Congress soon after the of the Tariff of 1824, did not return to it till 1831-2, when the opponents of this system had acquired the ascendency, and were bent on its destruction. An act reducing the duties on many of the protected articles, was devised and passed. The bill being under considera tion in the Senate, Mr. CLAY addressed that body as follows:]

establishment of the American System, by the passage

government to seize upon, and divert from its legitimate object the appropriations to the sinking fund, to redeem the national debt; and that our commerce and navigation were threatened with a complete paralysis. In short, sir, if I were to select any term of seven years since the adoption of the present constitution which exhibited a scene of the most wide-spread dismay and desolation, it would be exactly that term of seven years which immediately preceded the establishment of the tariff of 1824.

In one sentiment, Mr. President, expressed by the honorable gentleman from South Carolina, (General Hayne,) though perhaps not in the sense intended by him, I have now to perform the more pleasing I entirely concur. I agree with him, that task of exhibiting an imperfect sketch of the decision on the system of policy em- the existing state of the unparalleled prosbraced in this debate, involves the future perity of the country. On a general surdestiny of this growing country. One way vey, we behold cultivation extended, the I verily believe, it would lead to deep and arts flourishing, the face of the country general distress, general bankruptcy and improved, our people fully and profitably national ruin, without benefit to any part employed, and the public countenance exof the Union: the other, the existing pros-hibiting tranquillity, contentment and happerity will be preserved and augmented, piness. And if we descend into particuand the nation will continue rapidly to lars, we have the agreeable contemplation advance in wealth, power, and greatness, of a people out of debt, land rising slowly without prejudice to any section of the in value, but in a secure and salutary confederacy. degree; a ready though not extravagant Thus viewing the question, I stand here market for all the surplus productions of as the humble but zealous advocate, not of our industry; innumerable flocks and the interests of one State, or seven States herds browsing and gamboling on ten only, but of the whole Union. And never thousand hills and plains, covered with before have I felt more intensely, the over- rich and verdant grasses; our cities expowering weight of that share of respon-panded, and whole villages springing up, sibility which belongs to me in these de- as it were, by enchantment; our exports liberations. Never before have I had more occasion than I now have to lament my want of those intellectual powers, the possession of which might enable me to unfold to this Senate, and to illustrate to this *In this extended abstracts are given and data refer

ences omitted not applicable to these times.

and imports increased and increasing; our tonnage, foreign and coastwise, swelling and fully occupied; the rivers of our interior animated by the perpetual thunder and lightning of countless steam-boats; the currency sound and abundant; the public debt of two wars nearly redeemed; and, to

It extends to all lower Louisiana, the Delta of which might as well be submerged again in the Gulf of Mexico, from which it has been a gradual conquest, as now to be deprived of the protecting duty upon its great staple.

It affects the cotton planter himself, and the tobacco planter, both of whom enjoy protection.

perity, the necessity of encouraging our domestic manufactures. Then came the edicts of Napoleon, and the British orders in council; and our embargo, non-intercourse, non-importation, and war, followed in rapid succession. These national measures, amounting to a total suspension, for the period of their duration, of our foreign commerce, afforded the most efficacious Such are some of the items of this vast encouragement to American manufactures; system of protection, which it is now pro- and accordingly they everywhere sprung posed to abandon. We might well pause up. While these measures of restriction, and contemplate, if human imagination and this state of war continued, the manucould conceive the extent of mischief and facturers were stimulated in their enterruin from its total overthrow, before we prise by every assurance of support, by proceed to the work of destruction. Its public sentiment, and by legislative reduration is worthy also of serious con- solves. It was about that period (1808) sideration. Not to go behind the consti- that South Carolina bore her high testitution, its date is coeval with that instru- mony to the wisdom of the policy, in an ment. It began on the ever memorable act of her legislature, the preamble of fourth day of July-the fourth day of July, which, now before me, reads:

The legislature, not being competent to afford the most efficacious aid, by imposing duties on foreign rival articles, proceeded to incorporate a company.

1789. The second act which stands re- 'Whereas, the establishment and encourcorded in the statute book, bearing the il-agement of domestic manufactures, is conlustrious signature of George Washington, ducive to the interests of a State, by adding laid the corner-stone of the whole system. new incentives to industry, and as being That there might be no mistake about the the means of disposing to advantage the matter, it was then solemnly proclaimed surplus productions of the agriculturist : to the American people and to the world, and whereas, in the present unexampled that it was necessary for "the encourage- state of the world, their establishment in ment and protection of manufactures," that our country is not only expedient, but duties should be laid. It is in vain to politic in rendering us independent of urge the small amount of the measure of foreign nations." the protection then extended. The great principle was then established by the fathers of the constitution, with the father of his country at their head. And it cannot now be questioned, that, if the government had not then been new and the subject untried, a greater measure of protection would have been applied, if it had been supposed necessary. Shortly after, the master minds of Jefferson and Hamilton were brought to act on this interesting subject. Taking views of it appertaining to the departments of foreign affairs and of the treasury, which they respectively filled, they presented, severally, reports which yet remain monuments of their profound wisdom, and came to the same conclusion of protection to American industry. Mr. Jefferson argued that foreign restrictions, foreign prohibitions, and foreign high duties, ought to be met at home by American restrictions, American prohibitions, and American high duties. Mr. Hamilton, surveying the entire ground, and looking at the inherent nature of the subject, treated it with an ability, which, if ever equalled, has not been surpassed, and earnestly recommended protection.

Peace, under the treaty of Ghent, returned in 1815, but there did not return with it the golden days which preceded the edicts levelled at our commerce by Great Britain and France. It found all Europe tranquilly resuming the arts and business of civil life. It found Europe no longer the consumer of our surplus, and the employer of our navigation, but excluding, or heavily burthening, almost all the productions of our agriculture, and our rivals in manufactures, in navigation, and in commerce. It found our country, in short, in a situation totally different from all the past-new and untried. It became necessary to adapt our laws, and especially our laws of impost, to the new circumstances in which we found ourselves. Accordingly, that eminent and lamented citizen, then at the head of the treasury, (Mr. Dallas,) was required, by a resolution of the House of Representatives, under date the twenty-third day of February, 1815, to prepare and report to the succeeding ses The wars of the French revolution com- sion of Congress, a system of revenue conmenced about this period, and streams of formable with the actual condition of the gold poured into the United States through country. He had the circle of a whole a thousand channels, opened or enlarged year to perform the work, consulted merby the successful commerce which our chants, manufacturers, and other practical neutrality enabled us to prosecute. We men, and opened an extensive corresponforgot or overlooked, in the general pros-dence. The report which he made at the