performing, among other duties, that of also prohibitions on the states. Some auelecting a governor. Is the government of the state on that account not a popular government? This government, sir, is the independent offspring of the popular will. It is not the creature of state legislatures; nay, more, if the whole truth must be told, the people brought it into existence, established it, and have hitherto supported it, for the very purpose, amongst others, of imposing certain salutary restraints on state sovereignties. The states cannot now make war; they cannot contract alliances; they cannot make, each for itself, separate reg-standing." ulations of commerce; they cannot lay imposts; they cannot coin money. If this constitution, sir, be the creature of state legislatures, it must be admitted that it has obtained a strange control over the volition of its creators.

thority must therefore necessarily exist, having the ultimate jurisdiction to fix and ascertain the interpretation of these grants, restrictions and prohibitions. The constitution has itself pointed out, ordained, and established that authority. How has it accomplished this great and essential end? By declaring, sir, that "the constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pur suance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwith

This, sir, was the first great step. By this, the supremacy of the constitution and laws of the United States is declared. The people so will it. No state law is to be valid which comes in conflict with the constitution or any law of the United States. The people then, sir, erected this govern- But who shall decide this question of interment. They gave it a constitution, and in ference? To whom lies the last appeal? that constitution they have enumerated the This, sir, the constitution itself decides also, powers which they bestow on it. They by declaring "that the judicial power shall have made it a limited government. They extend to all cases arising under the constihave defined its authority. They have re- tution and laws of the United States." strained it to the exercise of such powers These two provisions, sir, cover the whole as are granted; and all others, they declare, ground. They are, in truth, the keystone are reserved to the states or the people. of the arch. With these it is a governBut, sir, they have not stopped here. If ment; without them it is a confederacy. they had, they would have accomplished In pursuance of these clear and express but half their work. No definition can be provisions, Congress established, at its very so clear as to avoid possibility of doubt; no first session, in the judicial act, a mode for limitation so precise as to exclude all un- carrying them into full effect, and for certainty. Who, then, shall construe this bringing all questions of constitutional grant of the people? Who shall interpret power to the final decision of the Supreme their will, where it may be supposed they Court. It then, sir, became a government. have left it doubtful? With whom do they It then had the means of self-protection; leave this ultimate right of deciding on the and but for this, it would, in all probapowers of the government? Sir, they have bility, have been now among things which settled all this in the fullest manner. They are passed. Having constituted the govhave left it with the government itself, in ernment, and declared its powers, the peoits appropriate branches. Sir, the very ple have further said, that since somebody chief end, the main design for which the must decide on the extent of these powers, whole constitution was framed and adopt- the government shall itself decide-subject ed, was to establish a government that always like other popular governments, to should not be obliged to act through state its responsibility to the people. And now, agency, or depend on state opinion and sir, I repeat, how is it that a state legisladiscretion. The people had had quite ture acquires any right to interfere? Who, enough of that kind of government under or what, gives them the right to say to the the confederacy. Under that system, the people, "We, who are your agents and serlegal action the application of law to vants for one purpose, will undertake to individuals belonged exclusively to the decide, that your other agents and servants, states. Congress could only recommend-appointed by you for another purpose, have their acts were not of binding force till the states had adopted and sanctioned them. Are we in that condition still? Are we yet at the mercy of state discretion and state construction? Sir, if we are, then vain will be our attempt to maintain the constitution under which we sit.

But, sir, the people have wisely provided, in the constitution itself, a proper, suitable mode and tribunal for settling questions of constitutional law. There are, in the constitution, grants of powers to Congress, and restrictions on those powers. There are

transcended the authority you gave them"? The reply would be, I think, not impertinent, "Who made you a judge over another's servants. To their own masters they stand or fall."

Sir, I deny this power of state legislatures altogether. It cannot stand the test of examination. Gentlemen may say, that, in an extreme case, a state government might protect the people from intolerable oppression. Sir, in such a case the people might protect themselves, without the aid of the state governments. Such a case

warrants revolution. It must make, when it comes, a law for itself. A nullifying act of a state legislature cannot alter the case, nor make resistance any more lawful. In maintaining these sentiments, sir, I am but asserting the rights of the people. I state what they have declared, and insist on their right to declare it. They have chosen to repose this power in the general government, and I think it my duty to support it, like other constitutional powers.

with his posse, will come to the collector's aid; and here the contest begins. The militia of the state will be called out to sustain the nullifying act. They will march, sir, under a very gallant leader; for I believe the honorable member him. self commands the militia of that part of the state. He will raise the NULLIFYING ACT on his standard, and spread it out as his banner. It will have a preamble, bearing that the tariff laws are palpable, deliberate, and dangerous violations of the constitution. He will proceed, with his banner flying, to the custom house in Charleston,

And now, Mr. President, let me run the honorable gentleman's doctrine a little into its practical application. Let us look at his probable modus operandi. If a thing can be done, an ingenious man can tell how it is to be done. Now, I wish to be informed how this state interference is to be put in practice. We will take the ex isting case of the tariff law. South Carolina is said to have made up her opinion upon it. If we do not repeal it, (as we For myself, sir, I doubt the jurisdiction probably shall not,) she will then apply to of South Carolina, or any other state, to the case the remedy of her doctrine. She prescribe my constitutional duty, or to will, we must suppose, pass a law of her settle, between me and the people, the va- legislature, declaring the several acts of lidity of laws of Congress for which I have Congress, usually called the tariff laws, voted. I decline her umpirage. I have null and void, so far as they respect South not sworn to support the constitution ac- Carolina, or the citizens thereof. So far, cording to her construction of its clauses. all is a paper transaction, and easy enough. I have not stipulated, by my oath of office But the collector at Charleston is collector otherwise, to come under any responsi-ing the duties imposed by these tariff laws bility, except to the people and those whom-he, therefore, must be stopped. The they have appointed to pass upon the ques-collector will seize the goods if the tariff tion, whether the laws, supported by my duties are not paid. The state authorities votes, conform to the constitution of the will undertake their rescue: the marshal, country. And, sir, if we look to the general nature of the case, could any thing have been more preposterous than to have made a government for the whole Union, and yet left its powers subject, not to one interpretation, but to thirteen or twentyfour interpretations? Instead of one tribunal, established by all, responsible to all, with power to decide for all, shall constitutional questions be left to four and twenty popular bodies, each at liberty to decide for itself, and none bound to respect the decisions of others; and each at liberty, oo, to give a new construction, on every new election of its own members? Would any thing, with such a principle in it, or rather with such a destitution of all prinSonorous metal blowing martial sounds." ciple, be fit to be called a government? No, sir. It should not be denominated a Arrived at the custom house, he will tell constitution. It should be called, rather, the collector that he must collect no more a collection of topics for everlasting con- duties under any of the tariff laws. This troversy; heads of debate for a disputatious he will be somewhat puzzled to say, by the people. It would not be a government. It way, with a grave countenance, considerwould not be adequate to any practical ing what hand South Carolina herself had good, nor fit for any country to live under. in that of 1816. But, sir, the collector To avoid all possibility of being misunder- would, probably, not desist at his bidding. stood, allow me to repeat again, in the full- Here would ensue a pause; for they say, est manner, that I claim no powers for the that a certain stillness precedes the temgovernment by forced or unfair construc- pest. Before this military array should tion. I admit that it is a government of fall on custom house, collector, clerks, and strictly limited powers, of enumerated, all, it is very probable some of those comspecified, and particularized powers; and posing it would request of their gallant that whatsoever is not granted is withheld. commander-in-chief to be informed a little But, notwithstanding all this, and however upon the point of law; for they have the grant of powers may be expressed, its doubtless a just respect for his opinion as imits and extent may yet, in some cases, a lawyer, as well as for his bravery as a admit of doubt; and the general govern- soldier. They know he has read Blackment would be good for nothing, it would stone and the constitution, as well as Tube incapable of long existence, if some renne and Vauban. They would ask him, mode had not been provided in which therefore, something concerning their those doubts, as they should arise, might rights in this matter. They would inquire be peaceably, but not authoritatively solved. | whether it was not somewhat dangerous to

"all the while

extent of its own powers, whether that right of judging be in Congress or the Supreme Court, it equally subverts state sovereignty. This the gentleman sees, or thinks he sees, although he cannot per ceive how the right of judging in this matter, if left to the exercise of state legisla tures, has any tendency to subvert the government of the Union. The gentleman's opinion may be that the right ought not to have been lodged with the general government; he may like better such a constitution as we should have under the right of state interference; but I ask him to meet me on the plain matter of fact-I ask him to meet me on the constitution itself-I ask him if the power is not there— clearly and visibly found there.

resist a law of the United States. What would be the nature of their offence, they would wish to learn, if they, by military force and array, resisted the execution in Carolina of a law of the United States, and it should turn out, after all, that the law was constitutional. He would answer, of course, treason. No lawyer could give any other answer. John Fries, he would tell them, had learned that some years ago. How, then, they would ask, do you propose to defend us? We are not afraid of bullets, but treason has a way of taking people off that we do not much relish. How do you propose to defend us? "Look at my floating banner," he would reply; "see there the nullifying law !" Is it your opinion, gallant commander, they would then say, that if we should be indicted for treason, that But, sir, what is this danger, and what same floating banner of yours would make the grounds of it? Let it be remembered, a good plea in bar? "South Carolina is a that the constitution of the United States Sovereign state," he would reply. That is is not unalterable. It is to continue in its true; but would the judge adinit our plea? present form no longer than the people "These tariff laws," he would repeat, 66 are who established it shall choose to continue unconstitutional, palpably, deliberately, it. If they shall become convinced that dangerously." That all may be so; but if they have made an injudicious or inexpethe tribunals should not happen to be of that opinion, shall we swing for it? We are ready to die for our country, but it is rather an awkward business, this dying without touching the ground. After all, this is a sort of hemp-tax, worse than any part of the tariff.

dient partition and distribution of power between the state governments and the general government, they can alter that distribution at will.

If anything be found in the national constitution, either by original provision or subsequent interpretation, which ought Mr. President, the honorable gentleman not to be in it, the people know how to get would be in a dilemma like that of another rid of it. If any construction be established, great general. He would have a knot be- unacceptable to them, so as to become, fore him which he could not untie. He practically, a part of the constitution, they must cut it with his sword. He must say will amend it at their own sovereign pleato his followers, Defend yourselves with sure. But while the people choose to mainyour bayonets; and this is war-civil war. tain it as it is, while they are satisfied with Direct collision, therefore, between force it, and refuse to change it, who has given, and force, is the unavoidable result of that or who can give, to the state legislatures a remedy for the revision of unconstitutional right to alter it, either by interference, laws which the gentleman contends for. construction, or otherwise? Gentlemen It must happen in the very first case to do not seem to recollect that the people which it is applied. Is not this the plain have any power to do anything for themresult? To resist, by force, the execution selves; they imagine there is no safety for of a law, generally, is treason. Can the them any longer than they are under the courts of the United States take notice of close guardianship of the state legislatures. the indulgence of a state to commit trea- Sir, the people have not trusted their son? The common saying, that a state safety, in regard to the general constitucannot commit treason herself, is nothing tion, to these hands they have required to the purpose. Can it authorize others to other security, and taken other bonds. do it? If John Fries had produced an act They have chosen to trust themselves, first of Pennsylvania, annulling the law of Con- to the plain words of the instrument, and gress, would it have helped his case? Talk to such construction as the government itabout it as we will, these doctrines go the self, in doubtful cases, should put on its length of revolution. They are incompa- own powers, under their oaths of office, tible with any peaceable administration of and subject to their responsibility to them; the government. They lead directly to just as the people of a state trust their own disunion and civil commotion; and there-state governments with a similar power. fore it is, that at the commencement, when they are first found to be maintained by respectable men, and in a tangible form, that I enter my public protest against them all. The honorable gentleman argues, that if this government be the sole judge of the

Secondly, they have reposed their trust in the efficacy of frequent elections, and in their own power to remove their own servants and agents, whenever they see cause. Thirdly, they have reposed trust in the judicial power, which, in order that it might

If sir, the people, in these respects, had done otherwise than they have done, their constitution could neither have been pre-been to us all a copious fountain of naserved, nor would it have been worth preserving. And if its plain provision shall now be disregarded, and these new doctrines interpolated in it, it will become as feeble and helpless a being as enemies, whether early or more recent, could possibly desire. It will exist in every state, but as a poor dependant on state permission. It must borrow leave to be, and will be, no longer than state pleasure, or state discretion, sees fit to grant the indulgence, and to prolong its poor existence.

John C. Calhoun on the Rights of the terpose for arresting the progress of the

States.

Delivered July 26, 1831.

The question of the relation which the states and general government bear to each other, is not one of recent origin. From the commencement of our system, it has divided public sentiment. Even in the convention, while the Constitution was struggling into existence, there were two parties, as to what this relation should be, whose different sentiments constituted no small impediment in forming that instrument. After the general government went into operation, experience soon proved that the question had not terminated with the labors of the convention. The great struggle that preceded the political revolution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power, turned essentially on it; and the doctrines and arguments on both sides were embodied and ably sustained; on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions and the report to the Virginia legislature; and on the other, in the replies of the legislature of Massachusetts and some of the other states. These resolutions and this report, with the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the same time (particularly in the case of Cobbett, delivered by Chief Justice McKean, and concurred in by the whole bench), contain what I believe to be the true doctrine on this important subject. I refer to them in order to avoid the necessity of presenting my views, with the reasons in support of them in detail.

evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them." This right of interposition thus solemnly asserted by the state of Virginia, be it called what it may-state right, veto, nullification, or by any other name I conceive to be the fundamental principle of our system, resting on facts, historically as certain as our revolution itself, and deductions as simple and demonstrative as that of any political or moral truth whatever; and I firmly believe that on its recognition depends the stability and safety of our political institutions.

I

I am not ignorant that those opposed to the doctrine have always, now and formerly, regarded it in a very different light, as anarchical and revolutionary. Could Í believe such in fact to be its tendency, to me it would be no recommendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our political institutions, and the union of these states. never breathed an opposite sentiment; but, on the contrary, I have ever considered them the great instruments of preserving our liberty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves and our posterity; and next to these, I have ever held them most dear. Nearly half my life has passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public reputation I have acquired, is indissolubly identified with it. To be too national has, indeed, been considered, by many, even of my friends, to be my greatest political As my object is simply to state my fault. With these strong feelings of atopinions, I might pause with this refer- tachment, I have examined, with the ut ence to documents that so fully and ably most care, the bearing of the doctrine in state all the points immediately connected question; and so far from anarchical or rewith this deeply important subject; but as volutionary, I solemnly believe it to be the there are many who may not have the op- only solid foundation of our system, and of portunity or leisure to refer to them, and, the Union itself, and that the opposite as it is possible, however clear they may doctrine, which denies to the states the be, that different persons may place differ-right of protecting their reserved powers, ent interpretations on their meaning, I will, in order that my sentiments may be fully known, and to avoid all ambiguity, proceed to state, summarily, the doctrines which I conceive they embrace.

The great and leading principle is, that the general government emanated from the people of the several states, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people forming one aggregate political community; that the Constitution of the United States is in fact a compact, to which each state is a party, in the character already described; and that the several states, or parties, have a right to judge of its infractions, and in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the language of the Virginia resolutions; "to in

and which would vest in the general government (it matters not through what department) the right of determining exclusively and finally the powers delegated to it, is incompatible with the sovereignty of the states, and of the Constitution itself, considered as the basis of a Federal Union. As strong as this language is, it is not stronger than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who said, to give to the general government the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to make "its discretion and not the Constitution the measure of its powers;" and that "in all cases of compact between parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the operation, as of the mode and measure of redress." Language cannot be more explicit; nor can higher authority be adduced.

That different opinions are entertained