advance beyond preliminaries. Inasmuch as they were undertaken without sincerity, they ended quite naturally without result. Meanwhile, May 19, Gustavus Adolphus took his farewell of the Estates, and soon afterwards left Sweden forever. He entered upon the undertaking without allies, which was a bold venture, whether we conclude that he was persuaded to engage in it by thoroughly political motives alone, or, more justly, by these in union with a strong and earnest desire to further the interests of Protestantism.

ARTICLE II.-ULRICI'S LOGIC.

Compendium der Logik von Dr. H. ULRICI, o ö Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Halle. Zweite neu bearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage. Leipzig, Weigel, 1872.

PROFESSOR ULRICI is well known as the author of various works, prominent among which are his System der Logik, Gott und der Mensch, Gott und die Natur. We have chosen his Compendium for notice, because it contains the germ of the author's peculiar philosophy, and that, too, in its latest and clearest form. Before proceeding to the discussion, however, some preliminary statement is necessary.

Three theories are possible concerning the relation of thought and thing: 1st, the thought is created by the thing; 2nd, the thing is created by the thought; 3d, thought and thing stand over against each other as equally valid and necessary factors of knowledge. The first two theories, or materialism and idealism, are alike destructive of philosophy. The consistent materialist can only view the logical laws and forms as the accidental product of forces, existing by chance, and uniting by chance in this or that accidental combination. Under such a view the logical laws and forms lose all authority, and all that is built up by their aid vanishes into an abyss of doubt and delusion. Pure idealism is no less fatal; for the consistent idealist cannot stop short of denying the existence of all but himself and his notions. Not alone the material world, but men also must fade into ideas; and the thorough-going idealist must believe himself alone in the universe-a position which not even a madman would dream of maintaining. If, however, one should, for argument's sake, assume such a position, he would do worse than expose himself to the charge of insanity -he would turn thought into chaos. The law of causation stands sponsor for the external world, and to deny one is to deny both. But to deny this law is to introduce anarchy into thought, and once more all is at sea. Out of this bog the third

view, or realism, offers to help philosophy by assuming that subject and object are equally real and necessary factors of knowledge. But, unfortunately, its mediation between these contending views has generally consisted in dogmatically appropriating the principles of both parties, without any attempt to reconcile them; and the inner contradiction of its teachings has been concealed by judiciously refraining from their logical development. In general, it may be said that the peace which realism has secured between materialism and idealism is such a peace as a fog might effect between hostile fleets. The hostility is there. It slumbers only because no one has vision keen enough to perceive it. Dogmatic realism has served as just such a fog-bank, in which the contradictory principles of idealism and materialism have slumbered, unconscious of their mutual hostility. By and by the sceptic comes with his confounding criticism. The mind is represented as holding with equal assurance both sides of a contradiction; and philosophy reaches one of its periodical crises. Idealism and materialism are both fatal to philosophy, and realism, unless it can vindicate the reality and necessity of both subject and object as equally valid factors of knowledge, is not a philosophy, but a dogmatic acceptance of whatever principles practical needs may force upon us. The question which realism has to answer is: What are the relations of thought and thing? and upon the answer depends the possibility of philosophy.

Of all the crises through which philosophic thought has passed, none will compare in importance with that produced by the scepticism of Hume. Realism at that time was little more than sensationalism; and the answer it gave to the question concerning the relation of thought and thing was that the thought is entirely subordinated to the thing. It would hear nothing of a priori factors of knowledge, but sought to lead all that we knew back to sensation. This is the unit from which all else is built up. The mind is passive in knowledge; it receives but contributes nothing. It is merely a register upon which our manifold sensations record themselves; and the socalled laws of thought are but abstractions from them. To this philosophy Hume applied a very short but convincing criticism. Is sensation the source of all knowledge? then it

follows inevitably that what is not in sensation is unreal; and all so-called knowledge which cannot justify itself in the court. of the senses, must be treated as blank illusion. Hence the belief in causation and the logical forms, in morality, the soul, and God, must be abandoned as the results of unthinking habit. Plainly, these beliefs are supersensual; and sensation is the norm of knowledge. Out of doors they all must go, and science and religion must perish together. The argument was simple and convincing. The self-destructive nature of the experience-philosophy was clearly seen. In the clear demonstration of this fact lies Hume's great and inestimable service to philosophy.

The direction which speculation must take was evident. The denial of a priori factors of knowledge led to this sceptical result. To avoid it was impossible. To argue against the conclusion while admitting the premises was as hopeless as argu ment against the multiplication-table. Until philosophy could demonstrate, not the need, but the reality of a priori factors of knowledge, it must abandon all its claims. Only witless, reckless dogmatism could ignore the challenge. clearly stated; could it be as clearly solved?

The problem was

An attempt at solution could not be avoided. Haunted by a belief in the reality of knowledge, the mind will never rest content with scepticism. It matters not that the stone ever comes bounding back, Sisyphus must upheave it once more. There was nothing to do then but to return to first principles, and re-investigate the relation of thought and thing. The result was the Kantian criticism. Before we begin to philosophize, said Kant, let us inquire whether our faculties are competent to philosophy. Let reason itself be called into court, and an inventory of its powers be taken. Let us inquire after the origin and development of our knowledge. It may be that the contradictions of philosophy lie in the imperfection of its instrument. At all events, the first thing to do is to investigate the knowing faculty itself; for if this be untrustworthy, all is at sea. The results of his criticism was his well known doctrine of mental forms. According to this doctrine, the raw material of knowledge is derived from experience; the form which it assumes is determined by the mind itself. The skele

ton of knowledge is given in the nature of intelligence; the outline is filled up by experience. Apart from these forms, sensation itself is impossible; for sensation postulates the intuitions of space and time. Much more is the higher thought-knowledge impossible without the existence of forms of knowledge. Sensation, as such, is chaotic and meaningless. Of itself one sensation has no relation to another. They are connected in relation and judgment only by the mind within. This chaos of sensation can only become the unity of knowledge as law and order are imposed upon it by an inner activity. But this law and order are contributed by the mind, and are hence a priori factors of knowledge. This, then, is Kant's doctrine of mental forms. Knowledge necessarily contains two factors-form and content. Form without content is void; content without form is chaos. We can know things only under certain forms which lie in the nature of the mind itself. Knowing consists in subsuming the chaos of sensation under these forms; and not until it is so subsumed does it become a definite object of knowledge. Such was Kant's conception; and whatever may be thought of its value, one thing is certain : he demonstrated the helplessness of the experience-philosophy. At every step of mental development he showed the presence and working of a priori factors. Ignorant, reckless empiricism might ignore it; but all except the willfully or hopelessly blind could not fail to see that the experience-philosophy cannot advance one step without the use of the very a priori principles which it is supposed to displace. The clear proof of this fact is Kant's great service to philosophy, and also his undying glory.

Unfortunately, Kant stated his doctrine in such a way as to countenance the gravest errors. The philosophers who came after him proved far more capable of falling into his errors than of appreciating his truths. The critical stand-point was quickly deserted; and the dreadful treadmill-round of a onesided idealism was begun over again. Since then German philosophy has been floundering in a dreadful bog. There has been any amount of speculation, but no principles. No one has troubled himself to inquire after the foundations of philosophy; but every one has snatched up whatever one-sided princi