they lay dormant. Not a man was raised, not a single ship was put into commission. From the 12th of September, when they heard of the first blow being actually struck, we are to date the beginning of their preparations for defence. Let us now inquire, my lords, what expedition they have used, what vigour they have exerted. We have heard wonders of the diligence employed in impressing, of the large bounties offered, and the number of ships put into commission. These have been, for some time past, the constant topicks of ministerial boast and triumph. Without regarding the description, let us look to the substance. I tell your lordships that, with all this vigour and expedition, they have not, in a period of considerably more than two months, raised ten thousand seamen. I mention that number, meaning to speak largely, though in my own breast, I am convinced that the number does not exceed eight thousand. But it is said they have ordered forty ships of the line into commission. My lords, upon this subject I can speak with knowledge. I have been conversant in these matters, and draw information from the greatest and most respectable naval authority that ever existed in this country, I mean the late lord Anson. The merits of that great man are not so universally known, nor his memory so warmly respected as he deserved. To his wisdom, to his experience, and care (and I speak it with pleasure) the nation owes the glorious naval successes of the last war. The state of facts laid before parliament in the year 1756, so entirely convinced me of the injustice done to his character, that in spite of the popular clamours raised against him, in direct opposition to the complaints of the merchants, and of the whole city (whose favour I am supposed to court upon all occasions) I replaced him at the head of the admiralty; and I thank God that I had resolution enough to do so. Instructed by this great seaman, I do affirm, that forty ships of the line, with their necessary attendant frigates, to be properly manned, require forty thousand seamen. If your lordships

my

are surprised at this assertion, you will be more so, when I assure you, that in the last war, this country maintained 85,000 seamen, and employed them all. Now, my lords, the peace establishment of your navy, supposing it complete, and effective (which by the by ought to be known) is sixteen thousand men. Add to these the number newly raised, and you have about twenty-five thousand men to man your fleet. I shall come presently to the application of this force, such as it is, and compare it with the services, which I know are indispensable. But first, my lords, let us have done with the boasted vigour of the ministry. Let us hear no more of their activity. If your lordships will recall to your minds the state of this country when Mahon was taken, and compare what was done by government at that time, with the efforts now made in very similar circumstances, you will be able to determine what praise is due to the vigorous operations of the present ministry. Upon the first intelligence of the invasion of Minorca, a great fleet was equipped and sent out; and near double the number of seamen collected in half the time taken to fit out the present force, which pitiful as it is, is not yet, if the occasion was ever so pressing, in a condition to go to sea. Consult the returns which were laid before parliament in the year 1756. I was one of those who urged a parliamentary inquiry into the conduct of the ministry. That ministry, my lords, in the midst of universal censure and reproach, had honour and virtue enough to promote the inquiry themselves. They scorned to evade it by the mean expedient of putting a previous question. Upon the strictest inquiry it appeared, that the diligence they had used in sending a squadron to the Mediterranean, and in their other naval preparations, was beyond all example.

My lords, the subject on which I am speaking seems to call upon me, and I willingly take this occasion to declare my opinion upon a question, on which much wicked pains have been employed to disturb the minds of the people, and to distress government. My opinion may not be very popular;

neither am I running the race of popularity. I anı myself clearly convinced, and I believe every man who knows any thing of the English navy will acknowledge, that without impressing, it is impossible to equip a respectable fleet within the time in which such armaments are usually wanted If this fact be admitted, and if the necessity of arming upon a sudden emergency should appear incontrovertible, what shall we think of those men, who in the moment of danger would stop the great defence of their country. Upon whatever principle they may act, the act itself is more than faction-it is labouring to cut off the right hand of the community. I wholly condemn their conduct, and am ready to support any motion that may be made, for bringing those aldermen, who have endeavoured to stop the execution of the admiralty warrants, to the bar of this house. My lords, I do not rest my opinion merely upon necessity. I am satisfied that the power of impressing is founded upon uninterrupted usage. It is the consuetudo regni, and part of the common law prerogative of the crown. When I condemn the proceedings of some persons upon this occasion, let me do justice to a man whose character and conduct have been most infamously traduced; I mean the late lord mayor, Mr. Treacothick. In the midst of reproach and clamour, he had firmness enough to persevere in doing his duty. I do not know in office a more upright magistrate; nor, in private life, a worthier

man.

Permit me now, my lords, to state to your lordships the extent and variety of the service which must be provided for, and to compare them with our apparent resources. A due attention to, and provision for these services, is prudence in time of peace; in war it is necessity. Preventive policy, my lords, which obviates or avoids the injury, is far preferable to that vindictive policy, which aims at reparation, or has no object but revenge. The precaution that meets the disorder is cheap and easy; the remedy which follows it, bloody and expensive.

The first great and acknowledged object of national defence in this country, is to maintain such a superiour naval force at home, that even the united fleets of France and Spain may never be masters of the Channel. If that should ever happen, what is there to hinder their landing in Ireland, or even upon our own coast? They have often made the attempt. In King William's time it succeeded. King James embarked on board a French fleet, and landed with a French army in Ireland. In the mean time the French were masters of the Channel, and continued so until their fleet was destroyed by admiral Russel. As to the probable consequences of a foreign army landing in Great Britain or Ireland, I shall offer your lordships my opinion when I speak of the actual condition of our standing army.

The second naval object with an English minister, should be to maintain at all times a powerful western squadron. In the profoundest peace it should be respectable; in war it should be formidable. Without it, the colonies, the commerce, the navigation of Great Britain, lie at the mercy of the house of Bourbon. While I had the honour of acting with lord Anson, that able officer never ceased to inculcate upon the minds of his majesty's servants the necessity of constantly maintaining a strong western squadron; and I must vouch for him, that while he was at the head of the marine it was never neglected.

The third object indispensable, as I conceive, in the distribution of our navy, is to maintain such a force in the bay of Gibraltar as may be sufficient to cover that garrison, to watch the motions of the Spaniards, and to keep open the communication with Minorca. The ministry will not betray such want of information as to dispute the truth of any of these propositions. But how will your lordships be astonished, when I inform you in what manner they have provided for these great, these essential objects? As to the first, I mean the defence of the Channel, I take upon myself to affirm to your lordships, that, at this hour (and I beg that the date may be taken down and

observed) we cannot send out eleven ships of the line so manned and equipped that any officer of rank and credit in the service shall accept of the command and stake his reputation upon it. We have one ship of the line at Jamaica, one at the Leeward islands, and one at Gibraltar; yet at this very moment, for ought the ministry know, both Jamaica and Gibraltar may be attacked; and if they are attacked (which God forbid) they must fall. Nothing can prevent it but the appearance of a superiour squadron. It is true that, some two months ago, four ships of the line were ordered from Portsmouth, and one from Plymouth, to carry a relief from Ireland to Gibraltar. These ships, my lords, a week ago, were still in port. If, upon their arrival at Gibraltar, they should find the bay possessed by a superiour squadron, the relief cannot be landed; and if it could be landed of what force do your lordships think it consists ? Two regiments, of four hundred men each, at a time like this, are sent to secure a place of such importance as Gibraltar! a place which it is universally agreed cannot hold out against a vigorous attack from the sea, if once the enemy should be so far masters of the bay as to make a good landing even with a moderate force. The indispensable service of the lines requires at least four thousand men. The present garrison consists of about two thousand three hundred; so that if the relief should be fortunate enough to get on shore, they will want eight hundred men of their necessary complement.

Let us now, my lords, turn our eyes homewards. When the defence of Great Britain or Ireland is in question, it is no longer a point of honour; it is not the security of foreign commerce, or foreign possessions; we are to contend for the very being of the state. I have good authority to assure your lordships that the Spaniards have now a fleet at Ferrol, completely manned and ready to sail, which we are in no condition to meet. We could not this day send out eleven ships of the line properly equipped,