go on without uttering a protest. Hence the future existence of Turkey depended on a possible agreement between Russia, England, and Austria. If a firm alliance were founded between those countries, neither France nor Prussia, whether separate or united, could prevent the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. Russia, through her geographical position, is the natural and eternal enemy of the Porte. This immense country can only dispose of its produce through the Baltic and the Black Sea, but on both these routes nature has erected a gate through which Russia must have a free passage-the Sound in the Baltic, the Bosphorus in the Black Sea. The latter, however, forms the harbour and roadstead of Constantinople. Russia must command the Bosphorus, and yet cannot do this without imposing laws on the capital. Hence she must employ every scheme to gain possession of Constantinople, for the occupation of that city would afford the Czar more certainty and safety, and would be cheaper than holding the Sultan in constant subjection. The so-called Oriental project has been repeatedly deferred at St. Petersburg, but never entirely given up. The will of Peter the Great speaks all too clearly. Turkey in Asia, like Russia, borders on Persia. The latter state possesses all the physical elements of a powerful empire, and has repeatedly proved such to be the case. Now it is torn by internal dissensions. Russians and British regulate its policy. It wants unity and political strength. If these could be restored to it, Persia would become the natural enemy of the Porte, and a valuable ally for Austria. The Turkish Empire is, itself, much weakened. It must continually carry on intestine wars. It has always to contend against revolt on the eastern frontiers, in Greece, Syria, or Arabia. The repetition of such outbreaks gives the rebels by degrees the requisite experience. Before long, one of these rebels will either make himself independent of the Porte, and carry off a large extent of territory, or seize on the capital, and thence subjugate the whole country. The first of these possibilities is undoubtedly the better for the adjoining states to Turkey, for it weakens the Osmanli Empire. How true Radetzky's views were is seen in the fact that Turkey lost both Greece and Egypt, and had it not been for the interference of the other powers Mehemet Ali would have hurled Abd-ul-Medjid from the throne. The misfortune is that his remarks about Turkey are as true now as when written thirty years ago: the Sultan, like the Bourbons, has learned nothing and forgotten nothing. If any optimist fancies that the slightest guarantee for the stability of Turkey was obtained by the Crimean war, he is sadly deceived. The same agencies are at work now which produced the Greek insurrection, and from every portion of that magnificent country outbreaks are daily announced. No bolstering in the world can maintain Turkey much longer, and the inevitable result must be that the Christians will rise and take a terrible revenge for 'centuries of oppression. And then the work will all have to be done over again: one of the great powers will get possession of the Dardanelles, and a war will ensue, very different from the last in extent and duration. One thing is certain, however, that we should be prepared for such an eventuality at any moment, and, therefore, any retrenchment in our naval and military establishments must be deprecated. So long as present government remains in office, we have no fear of any mistaken economy, or a recurrence to that penny wise and pound foolish system which cost us such an enormous amount to repair at the outset of the last war; but with a Whig administration once more at the helm, have to deplore the same neglect of our resources as has so the we may deeply lowered us in the eyes of Europe. It is not so very long ago that a minister took credit for having three ships of the line available for the national defence, and it must not be forgotten that at the funeral of the Duke of Wellington, so far had we fallen back in our preparations, that the seventeen guns required for the procession could not be supplied by all our arsenals. Another very valuable paper drawn up by Radetzky refers to the political situation of Austria, and the possibility of a war with her neighbours. The two enemies that Austria has to fear, it is evident, are Russia and France; the latter having at her back Sardinia, to imperil the Austrian possessions in Lombardy. Even the Germanic Confederation furnishes no guarantee of security to Austria, for the smaller states might again unite themselves to France. But there is a way, according to Radetzky, by which the friendship of France may be secured: So soon as Austria resigns all hopes of aggrandisement in Germany-and this is quite in harmony with her interests-France will be perfectly satisfied that her frontier will never be menaced by Austria. All external aggrandisement on the part of Austria will take place in the opposed direction to France, and none of them can be injurious to that country, but, on the contrary, benefit it. France has great colonial losses to make up, and to restore the balance of power on the seas. These are its first and most pressing cares. She can be engaged in a war with Great Britain sooner than with any other country, whence, in order to concentrate all her strength on her navy, she must remain at peace with the continental powers. To this must be added that the new states now growing up in America will give a new shape to naval interests, in course of ages subjugate Europe or expose her to fresh dangers, so that it is highly probable that we shall all have to form a firm alliance. Hence, the present interests of France demand pressingly peace and friendship with Austria. The case is different with Prussia, who cannot give up all territorial aggrandisement in Europe. She now possesses a larger territory than before the battle of Jena; but still she is territorially weaker. It is the awkwardest state on the face of the globe. Its breadth bears no proportion to its length, and its possessions are divided from each other by foreign states. She cannot defend her whole line of frontier. Russia outflanks her on one side, France on the other, while Austria threatens her front. In the rear she has Sweden, Denmark, Hanover, and the Netherlands to fear. Hence she is continually tormented by the wish of filling out the whole extent of her frontier, which could alone secure her a firm position in Europe. Hence the North German states should watch her closely, and remember that the danger of being swallowed up by Prussia hangs over their heads like the sword of Damocles. Austria, however, can never permit Prussia any territorial aggrandisement, for her own course of progress tends to the south-east, and she must have her rear well protected. Prussia learned to her cost, in the seven years' war, what a dangerous neighbour Russia can prove. At the present day Russia borders on one half the Prussian territory. The frontier from Riga to Memel is always open to the Russians, and it must not be forgotten that the Czar, by the incorporation of Poland, can lay many claims to the Prussian possessions. Lastly, we must mention that in every war Prussia engages in against Russia there is much to lose but nothing to gain. All these considerations lead to the conclusion that Prussia, in her present position, cannot do without the support of Austria. On the other hand, circumstances may occur in which Prussia may step forward as the ally of an enemy to Austria. Whenever a war has broken out between Austria and Prussia, the latter power commenced it by an inroad into Silesia. These attacks were facilitated by the circumstance that Bohemia was then unfortified. Now, however, when the northern frontier of that country is tolerably protected, the Prussians would probably attack us in Moravia, and send off a corps into Hungary, as occurred in former wars. There is no doubt, however, that Radetzky is perfectly right when he says that Russia is the most dangerous foe to Austria, and that a permanent peace between the two countries is impossible. Her territory in Europe alone is sixfold as large as that of Austria; and though her population is scanty, it must be borne in mind that she makes greater progress in her growth than more densely populated countries. In Russia, the births are in a relation to the deaths, as one hundred and fifty to one hundred. Such a relation must double the inhabitants in fifty-four years. Again, regard being had to her size, Russia is the least indebted state in Europe. There are also other dangerous considerations: We must not overlook the fact that the cabinet of Petersburg, ever since the death of Peter the Great, has followed his suggestions without making the slightest alteration: that this cabinet, as the experience of the last few years has taught, surpasses all others in craftiness and consistency, and ever carries out in their integrity the carefully drawn up plans. It has given the kingdom of Poland a wise constitution, and gained this land over to its views as well as Austrian and Prussian Poland. In our own state, along the frontier of the Bukovina, there is a powerful party in favour of Russia, and among the Greeks there is a strong feeling of sympathy for her welfare and progress. All these circumstances combined lead us to the painful confession that Russia is the power from which alone great dangers threaten our state. These apprehensions are augmented by the fact that the Czar commands great hordes of barbarians, who, although unserviceable for regular warfare, are admirably adapted to desolate a country. The general tendency of European states to grant themselves permanent constitutions affords no relief from these apprehensions. The greater portion of the Russian population stands too low in civilisation to allow us to entertain the hope that it could be so far raised during the next century as to desist from offensive wars through the possession of a state constitution. As regards Constantinople, although Austria might be disposed to allow the western shore of the Bosphorus to be held by a King of Greece, and the eastern by the Sultan, or even go so far as to allow Russia an isolated fortress on the western coast, like Gibraltar, she could never suffer Russia to incorporate Greece, or even a portion of that country, for then she would be placed in precisely the same position as Prussia, by being enclosed and confined by the Russians. Among other considerations to which Radetzky devotes his attention is, whether standing armies can be reduced, and their place occupied by other forces? According to his views, the most certain strength of a state will be found in a properly drilled militia. This arrangement is the most natural, and consequently the best. It supplies the state with the greatest number of combatants in proportion to its population; it keeps up in the people the consciousness that it is defending itself, and at the same time a martial spirit which will not die out, because those who are animated by it never cease to be citizens. Such a spirit renders a nation irresistible. It can never be subjugated, much less be extirpated. The correctness of these views is nowhere proved so clearly as in ancient history. The states in those times were great and powerful through their militia. They sank generally in the same proportion as this national defence. Athens, in her most brilliant era, knew no other warriors than her own citizens; with them she withstood the power of Xerxes. Rome's citizen-soldiers subjugated the world, and maintained her supremacy till they were converted into standing armies. But the most memorable instance in later times is that of the Swiss. They conquered the powerful armies of the greatest princes, and although frequently weakened, always rose again with renewed vigour. In recent history the republic of the Netherlands offered the first example. Another will be found in the United States; but the greatest of all was the French Revolution and the Hispano-Portuguese war, in the years 1808 to 1812, in the Peninsula. It is curious to find a man like Radetzky, who gave such a terrible example to the Italian militia, writing in this style about them; stranger still, that Milan proved the correctness of his judgment in 1848, when the militia compelled him to fall back on Verona. The result he arrives at from his considerations is that the best way for Austria to defend herself against her dangerous neighbour is by building fortresses in the interior of the country, where the militia could congregate on an invasion, and bide their time to repulse the invader. Still, on the whole, he would evidently prefer the Russians remaining at home. Our only regret in noticing this curious and valuable work is that we find nothing in it relative to the campaigns of 1848 and 1849 in Italy. We should much have liked to form our opinion of the war from Radetzky's own statement, but a wise reticence has evidently presided over the choice of papers to be published. That his opinions as to the Sardinian war are in existence there can be no doubt; but whether they are safely locked up in the Austrian archives and not accessible, or whether the editor of this volume thought it advisable not to publish matters which might throw a strange light on the situation of Austria during the revolution, we are unable to decide. Still we must feel grateful for so much as is made known to us, and repeat our gratification at the publication of a work which throws a new and most pleasing light on the old field-marshal. We are also much pleased to find his opinions tallying so strongly with those of Marmont as to the campaign of 1813, for we have always had a firm belief in the authenticity of the Duke of Ragusa's statements, in spite of the ferocious attacks that have been made upon his memory. It has been too long the fashion in this country to regard Radetzky as an Austrian Gough, who won his battles by sheer obstinacy; but these opinions go far to prove that he was an able and far-sighted general. His memory is worthily revered in Austria, and the emperor has honoured him with a magnificent cenotaph; but we think he will find a monument more enduring than brass in the affectionate remembrance of the nation for which he fought so bravely and so well. THE YOUNG QUEEN-WIFE. BY WALTER THORNBURY. HOW MARGARET OF NAVARRE DISPORTED IN THE LOUVRE GARDENS. Struggle through mists of silvery water; To see with what a sweet caprice Queen Margaret runs to race the swallow, By courtly nodding poplar-trees, Or through the laurels in the hollow; And now with pretty angry haste She flies her little Persian hawk, Gold jesses on, at butterflies That skim the level terrace-walk. Then throws herself with witching grace And laughs to swooning at the page Claiming the jester's bells and rank Now mounts her dappled palfrey, which A She governs with a silver thread, rope of pearls about her breast, A Venice tiring on her head. A fight with rushes! How she swerves Or at the snowy rings of doves The fair young wife! her merry blood To light the fire break pike and lance |