little business was settled, the Milanese were invited to share the blessings of liberty, equality, and fraternity with the French, and a new constitution was drawn up for them. In the mean while, the siege of the citadel was being pressed on vigorously, and Napoleon was inflicting fearful punishments on those who wished to hold on to the old order of things. In his proclamation to the inhabitants of Lombardy, he says: "The general-in-chief, faithful to the principles adopted by the French nation, which does not make war on peoples, desires to leave a door open for repentance; but those who, within twenty-four hours, have not laid down their arms and taken anew the oath of obedience to the Republic, will be treated as rebels, and their villages burnt." What a practical satire on the boasted liberty. The Milanese, who actually dared to take up arms in defence of the old state of things, were mercilessly condemned by a military commission and shot. Such was the equality offered them, and if they naturally declined it, they took the responsibility on themselves. Pavia, too, had the audacity to withstand the French, and had the most exemplary punishment inflicted upon it: and, Bonaparte tells us, had the blood of a single Frenchman been shed, he would have erected on the ruins of the city a column, on which would have been inscribed "Here stood the town of Pavia." But, after all, this is a mere exaggeration of the doctrine of fraternity.

The battle of Valeggio expelled the Austrians from Italy, and the French outposts were stationed on the mountains of Germany. The capture of Verona caused a general flight of the émigrés, rather fortunately for the town, as Bonaparte told the deputies that if the King of France had not quitted Verona before the French passage of the Po, he would have burned to the ground a town bold enough to believe itself the capital of the French empire. The defeat of the Austrians was followed by an armistice between the French and the Neapolitans, the latter escaping, strangely enough, without having any little bill to pay. But Napoleon was by this time beginning to get into an awkward position, and hardly knew which way to turn. The siege of Milan, the troops to guard the Milanese, and the several garrisons, demanded fifteen thousand men ; the guard of the Adige and the positions in the Tyrol occupied twenty thousand men, and the blockade of Mantua twelve thousand, so that the conqueror only had six thousand men at his disposal. Most pleasant is the way in which he intersperses illustrative anecdotes in his letters to the Directory. Here, for instance, is a sample:

I must not conceal from you a trait which depicts the barbarism still prevailing in these countries. At St. George's there is a convent from which the nuns had fled, as it was exposed to cannon-shot. Our soldiers went in to occupy it. They heard cries; they rushed into a court-yard, broke into a cell, and found a young person seated on a miserable chair, her hands fastened by an iron chain. This unfortunate woman begged for life. Her irons were broken. By her face she was about two-and-twenty. She had been in this state for four years, because she had tried to escape, and obey, in the age and country of love, the impulses of her heart. Our gendarmes took particular care of her. She displayed great interest for the French. She had been beautiful, and joined to the vivacity of the climate the melancholy of her misfortunes. Whenever anybody entered, she appeared restless; and it was soon learned that she feared the return of her tyrants. She asked in mercy to be allowed to breathe the fresh air: they told her the grape was whizzing round the house. "Ah," she said, "it is death to remain here."

All this time Bonaparte was up to his neck in business: at one moment sending a million to General Moreau for the relief of the army of the Rhine, then corresponding with the Grisons and exchanging three thousand (stolen) quintals of wheat for horses, and promising to send some thousand firelocks if it were sure the Republicans would use them against the Austrians; or issuing stinging general orders to stop the abuses still too prevalent in the civil departments of the service. All this while proclamations are being showered upon the Tyrol, the imperial fiefs around Genoa, and quarrels picked on every feasible occasion with the governor of Venice to have an excuse for invasion. Next, the young general went to settle conclusions with the Pope, "a grenadier who stole a chalice being shot in front of the army at Bologna." This town was occupied by General Augereau, at the head of four thousand eight hundred men, and the Pope was politely invited to come to terms. The excuse for this outrage was the assassination of the French envoy Basseville, which must be paid for. An armistice was soon concluded, by which the Pope agreed that the legations of Bologna and Ferrara should remain in the hands of the French, and the fortress of Ancona delivered up to them. The other articles were as follow:

The Pope will deliver up to the French Republic one hundred pictures, busts, vases, or statues, to be chosen by commissioners to be sent to Rome; among which objects will be the bronze bust of Junius Brutus, and that in marble of Marcus Brutus, both now in the Capitol, and five hundred MSS. The Pope will pay the Republic twenty-one million livres in coin of France, of which fifteen million five hundred thousand will be paid in gold and silver, and the other five million five hundred thousand in merchandise, horses, and oxen, to be selected by the French agents. This sum will be independent of the contributions levied in the legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Faenza.

This result was not arrived at without a war of words; for M. d'Azara, Napoleon said, had the impudence to offer five millions in money and three in goods, while Bonaparte began by asking forty millions, ten of them in kind. However, the crafty Roman applied to the government commissioners, and gained from them the fact that it was impossible for the French, under present circumstances, to march on Rome. Hence Napoleon could only sack the twenty millions by making a night march on Ravenna, which brought the negotiator to his senses. In addition to the money, Bonaparte seized two hundred bronze guns, eight thousand firelocks, and a large quantity of ammunition, which fully paid the expenses of the expedition. Turning his attention to more pressing affairs, it is quite refreshing to find Bonaparte writing to General Despinoy at Milan: "Do not go to sleep among the pleasures of Milan, and, above all, do not write letters to turn the head of our poor chief of the staff; for, since you have told him about a pretty actress who awaits him at Milan, he is dying of impatience to get there." Before long the French and Austrians came into collision again at Borghetto, where the latter received a tremendous thrashing, as usual. From the report to the Directory we may quote the following, reminding us of our own Guards

in the Crimea:

Claude Roche, rifleman in the 2nd company of the 11th half brigade of light infantry, was the first to leap into the enemy's entrenchments, killed the officer, and without waiting to take his watch or plunder him, seized his sabre, killed an Austrian, and took three prisoners. Jean Gerin, of the same company,

aimed his firelock at twelve Austrians: it missed fire; he rushed upon them with his drawn sabre, cut off the arm of the first, and the others fell on their knees asking for quarter. Ardienne, sub-lieutenant in the same company, the same man who at Borghetto took the 13-pounder, was always present in the entrenchments at the head of his riflemen, animating them by his noble example.

In the mean while the siege of Mantua was being pushed on, although it was a novelty in warfare that Serurier had only seven thousand men to blockade at least ten thousand. Hence the Austrians made repeated sallies, in which they were always defeated; but they hoped to be soon relieved, for strong reinforcements were being pushed on to join Würmser. Napoleon estimates these at sixty-seven thousand men, while he had himself only forty-four thousand to oppose to them. Hence he is very anxious for the arrival of his own reinforcements, and writes to the Directory in the most pressing manner, though without any favourable result. All this time his eye was turned covetously towards Genoa, and the following letter, addressed to M. Faypoult, envoy of the French Republic in that city, we regard as a masterpiece of diplomacy:

Genoa's time has not yet arrived, for two reasons: 1st. The Austrians are being reinforced, and I shall soon have a battle; if a conqueror, I shall have Mantua, and then a corporal's guard will be worth the presence of an army at Genoa. 2ndly. The ideas of the Executive Directory do not appear to me fixed yet. It has ordered me to demand the contribution, but it has not prescribed any political operation. I have sent off a messenger extraordinary with your letter, and have asked for orders, which I shall receive in the first decade of the next month. Between whiles, forget all the causes of complaint we have against Genoa. Make them understand you and I no longer interfere in the matter, since they have sent M. Spinola to Paris. Tell them we are very pleased with their choice, and that it is a guarantee to us of their good intentions. Tell them positively that I was very satisfied with the measures they took as regards M. Gerola; in short, forget no circumstance which may cause hope to arise again in the heart of the senate of Genoa, and keep them lulled in security till the moment of awakening.

By this time General Bonaparte considered himself sufficiently strong to try conclusions with the government commissioners, and at Castiglione he gives an awful rap on the knuckles to a citizen Garreau, who had dared to make a requisition to General Vaubois, contrary to instructions. The conclusion of the letter is in Bonaparte's most nervous style: "When you were a representative of the people, you had unlimited powers all the world made it a duty to obey you. Now, you are a government commissioner, invested with great authority, but positive instructions regulate your conduct; so adhere to them. I know that you will repeat the statement that I shall behave like Dumouriez :' it is clear that a general who has the presumption to command the army a government has confided to him, and to give orders without the decree of the commissioners, can only be a traitor." But the time had now arrived when Bonaparte was to display his wondrous strategic ability, and by deserting the siege of Mantua and abandoning his forty guns, gain the most daring victory the world's history has ever yet known. But we must tell the story in the hero's own powerful language:

Head-Quarters, Castiglione, Aug. 24, 1796. CITIZEN DIRECTORS,-Military events have succeeded each other in such rapid succession since the 11th, that it was impossible for me to write to you before. Some days back, the twenty thousand men sent by the army of the

Rhine to the Austrian army had arrived, which number, added to the numerous recruits drawn from the interior of Austria, rendered this army extremely dangerous. The opinion was generally spread that the Austrians would soon be in Milan. On the 11th, at three in the morning, General Masséna's division was attacked by a very large force: it was obliged to give up the valuable post of La Corona. At the same time, a division of fifteen thousand Austrians attacked Sauret's division at Salo, and occupied this essential post. BrigadierGeneral Guien, with six hundred men of the 15th demi-brigade of light infantry, shut himself up in a large house at Salo, and braved all the efforts of the enemy who surrounded him. Brigadier-General Rusca was wounded. At the same time a body of Austrians fell upon Brescia, surprised four companies I had left there, and took two generals and several field-officers who had remained behind in sick quarters. General Sauret's division, which should have covered Brescia, fell back on Desenzano. In these difficult circumstances, pressed by a numerous army which the advantages it gained must necessarily embolden, I felt I must adopt a vast plan. The enemy, by descending from the Tyrol by Brescia and the Adige, placed me in the centre. If my army was too weak to face two armies, it could defeat them in detail, and by my position I was between them. It was therefore possible, by a rapid retreat, to surround the enemy's division which had arrived at Brescia, take it by surprise, and utterly defeat it, and then return to the Mincio and force Würmser back into the Tyrol. But, to execute this project, I must raise the siege of Mantua-which was almost taken in twenty-four hours, and abandon forty guns, and then recross the Mincio and not give the enemy's divisions time to effect a junction. Fortune smiled on this project, and the battle of Desenzano, the two combats of Salo, and the battles of Lonato and Castiglione, are the results of it.

This scheme Napoleon carried out with wondrous precision. On the 13th a desperate combat took place, in which the Austrians lost six hundred men on the battle-field, and six hundred prisoners. On the 14th Augereau entered Brescia and seized upon all the enemy's magazines, while, on the 15th, the position of the army was imperilled by the cowardly conduct of General Valette, who ran away from the enemy at the head of eighteen hundred men. Bonaparte, however, soon cashiered him, and made preparations for the coming battle. On the 16th the wonderful battle of Castiglione took place, which we must describe in Bonaparte's own words:

The 16th, at daybreak, we found ourselves face to face. General Guien, who was on our left, was to attack Salo. General Masséna was in the centre to attack Lonato, and General Augereau on the right menaced Castiglione. The enemy, instead of being attacked, attacked General Masséna's vanguard at Lonato. It was already surrounded, and General Pijon captured, and the enemy had even taken three horse-artillery guns. I then formed the 18th demibrigade and the 32nd in close columns of battalion, and while we advanced at quick march to pierce the enemy, they tried to surround us. This manœuvre appeared to me a certain guarantee of victory. Masséna merely sent some skirmishers on the enemy's wings to retard his progress. The first column, on arriving at Lonato, forced the enemy. The 15th regiment of Dragoons charged the Hulans, recaptured our guns, and delivered General Pijon. In an instant. the enemy was scattered. He tried to fall back on the Mincio. I ordered my aide-de-camp, Brigadier Junot, to put himself at the head of my company of the Guides to pursue the enemy, gain the start at Desenzano, and so force him to retire on Salo. On arriving there, he found Colonel Bender with a portion of his regiment of Hulans, which he charged. But Junot, not wishing to amuse himself by charging the tail, made a turn to the right, attacked the regiment in front, wounded the colonel whom he wished to take prisoner, when he was himself surrounded, and, after having killed six with his own hand, was ridden down, thrown into a ditch, and received six sabre cuts, none of which, I trust, will

VOL. XLIV.

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prove mortal. The enemy effected his retreat on Salo; but as the town was ours, this division wandered about the mountains, and nearly the whole of it was captured. During this time the intrepid Augereau had marched on Castiglione and taken the village. During the entire day he kept his ground against forces double his own. The élite of the Austrian army was there: it received reinforcements thrice. The resistance was vain: they were obliged to quit the field of battle and fly before our impetuous soldiers.

The enemy lost on this memorable day twenty guns, two thousand to three thousand men killed and wounded, and four thousand prisoners, among whom were three generals. The next day Bonaparte was in great peril at Lonato, from which he only escaped by his rare presence of mind. A flag came in while he was there, summoning the commandant of Lonato to surrender, because he was surrounded. The fact was, that the scattered divisions of the Austrians had reassembled, and wished to cut their way through. Bonaparte was greatly embarrassed, for he had only twelve hundred men at his disposal; but he sent for the messenger, ordered his eyes to be unbandaged, and told him that if his general entertained the presumption of capturing the commander-in-chief he need only advance; and added that, unless the division laid down its arms within eight minutes, he would grant no quarter. The whole column laid down its arms immediately on hearing that the terrible Boney was so close. They were in a strength of four thousand infantry, two guns, and fifty cavalry. The next day the contest was renewed, and resulted in the total defeat of the Austrians. Justly might Bonaparte pride himself on the result.

In five days, then, another campaign has been finished. Würmser has lost in these five days seventy field-guns, all his infantry caissons, twelve thousand to fifteen thousand prisoners, six thousand men killed and wounded; and nearly all his troops came from the Rhine. Independent of this, a large portion of his army is dispersed, and we continually make prisoners during the pursuit. We have lost, for our part, thirteen hundred prisoners, and two thousand killed and wounded. All the soldiers, officers, and generals have displayed under these difficult circumstances a great amount of bravery.

In the midst of all these triumphs Napoleon has family disturbances to fatigue his mind. Thus, in writing to Carnot, he begs him to look after his young brother, a commissary of war at Marseilles, who proceeded to Paris without leave. He complains that this youth (evidently Lucien) has always had a mania for politics, and begs he may be sent to the army of the North to keep him quiet. But it proves how critical his own position must have been when he is forced to swallow his enormous pride, and write to Carnot: "If there be in France a single man, pure and of good faith, who can suspect my political opinions, and venture any doubts as to my conduct, I will renounce at that moment the pleasure of serving my country. Two or three months of obscurity will calm envy, re-establish my health, and put me in a position to fill with greater advantage the confidential posts the government may wish to entrust to me. was only that I left Paris at the right moment that enabled me to render great services to the Republic. When the moment has arrived, it will only be by leaving the army of Italy opportunely that I shall be able to devote the rest of my life to the defence of the Republic. The great art of government should be not to let men grow old. On entering on a public career, I adopted as my principle, Everything for my country." Almost simultaneously he sends the Executive Directory the following estimate of the generals he has under his command:

It