objection to the reading by the District Attorney in his summing up to the jury from portions of the Pentateuch.

Murder is expressly forbidden by the divine; and demonstrably by the natural law; and from these prohibitions arises the true unlawfulness of this crime. Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human law; that is to say, no human law should be suffered to contradict these. -1 Blackstone's Commentaries, 42.

The time will never come when the Book of Books shall be excluded from our courts.

IX. It is a constitutional right, of which the accused cannot be lawfully deprived, and which cannot be waived, to be met by his accusers face to face. Of this right

John Coyle, Jr., the accused in this case, was deprived by the Commonwealth, in that its prosecuting officer neglected or refused to bring Mrs. Annie Goodyear, nee Myers, who, by the records in the cause, appears to be the prosecutrix and accuser of the prisoner in this cause, face to face with them, by calling her to the witness stand, and allowing her to be interrogated on oath or affirmation touching the matter of the said accusation.

S. H. Reynolds and Wm. S. Amweg, Esqs., for appellees.

This was a bill in equity filed in the Court below by the appellees, the facts of which are as follows :

The society of Seventh-day Baptists of Ephrata, in Lancaster county, was incorporated by Act of Assembly approved the 21st day of February, 1814. This Act provided, inter alia, for the election of seven trustees, who were "to be elected on the first Monday of January in every fourth after the year of the Act, passage at the town of Ephrata, in the county of Lancaster." An Act of Assembly was passed on the 10th day of February, 1865, reducing the number of trustees from seven to three. The sixth day of January 1879, being the regular and appointed time for holding the quadrennial election, notice was posted on the "Saal," or meeting house, that on that day between the hours of 12 m. and 4 o'clock, p. m., an election would be held for trustees of the Seventh-day Baptists. Some of the members, dissatisfied with the management of the society, resolved on the election of a new board of trustees, and, as a result, two sets of trustees, of three each, were returned as elected.

ment or for a new trial. Motion overruled.

SUPREME COURT.

Madlem's Appeal.

Where there are two judges in a Court, and a decree is made by one which is dissented to by the other, the Court being thus equally divided no valid order or decree can be made.

When no proper decree can be made by reason of the failure of the judges to agree, they have the power to call upon a judge from another district to hear and decide the case.

Cahill v. Benn, 6 Binney 99, distinguished.

Appeal from the decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster county, sitting in equity.

by the charter, the election returns with certificates attached, together with their bonds prepared asking for the approval of the same. The Court, after testimony taken and read, declined to approve either of the bonds, Judge PATTERSON delivering the opinion, but suggested that an election be held to elect trustees "to fill the vacancy that exists in the board of trustees and which has occurred through 'inability to serve." Whereupon notice was posted for an election to be held on the 7th day of July, 1879, when William Madlem, Lorenz Nolde and Jacob S. Spangler were returned as elected.

opinion approving the bond. Judge Liv

INGSTON dissented and objected to the approval of the bond.

The new board of trustees, not getting control of the property, filed a bill in equity praying that the defendants be enjoined and restrained from taking part in any way in the management of the property, &c., of the society. A master was appointed to take testimony and report, whereupon he dismissed the bill of complaint. The Court, upon exceptions to the master's report, sustained the exceptions and made the injunction perpetual. Judge PATTERSON delivered the opinion, Judge LIVINGSTON dissenting.

An appeal was taken from this decree to the Supreme Court, assigning as error, in addition to setting aside the master's report dismissing plaintiff's bill, and the entering of the above decree, the following: 3. "It was error in Judge PATTERSON to enter a decree against the defendants, the President Judge being present and dissenting.

4. "The two judges of the Court being present on the bench, and not agreeing to sustain the plaintiff's bill, it was not competent for one of them to enter a decree against the defendants, the bill, by the dissent of one of the judges fell, and should have been dismissed."'*

Opinion by PAXSON, J. Filed June 4th, 1883.

The decree in this case was entered in the Court below by the Additional Law Judge, the President Judge being present and dissenting. The Court was therefore equally divided, and the rule in such cases is that no valid order or decree can be made. If there is a motion before the Court it falls. This is the rule everywhere, and it requires no argument to vindicate it. Equal divisions sometimes occur in this Court owing to the absence of one of its members. The only order we can make in such a case is to affirm the judgment or decree of the Court below. The plaintiff in error or appellant, who is the actor, fails and his motion to reverse falls to the ground. An affirmance here by a dividend Court means merely that the judgment or decree below cannot be disturbed.

In order to reach his conclusion, the learned judge who entered the decree below, reversed the master and set aside his findings of fact. His decree included an

*See Seventh Day Baptists, 4 YORK LEGAL RECORD 29 for the opinion of the Court below on a contest subsequent to the decree from which this appeal was taken.

order for a perpetual injunction and the disposition of the costs.

To all this the President Judge, who possess at least equal power, dissented. He had an equal right to enter a decree embodying his own views of the case. We would then have had the unusual case of conflicting orders issued out of the same Court. To state such a proposition as this is to answer it.

The learned judge (A.L.J.) below was evidently misled by the case of Cahill v. Benn, 6 Binney 99. It does not sustain his position. In that case there had been a trial at law and a verdict for the plaintiff The defendant moved for a new trial, and upon this motion the Court were equally divided. The motion necessarily fell. Afterwards the plaintiff's counsel moved for judgment, and two judges being present, one ordered judgment as a matter of course, and the other objected to the entry.

The prothonotary entered judgment and upon a writ of error the judgment was sustained by this Court. It is manifest that the plaintiff was entitled as of course to judgment upon the verdict after the motion for a new trial failed, and it would have been wrong to have denied it. This was the view taken by TILGHMAN, C. J., who delivered the opinion of the Court, in which he said: "We cannot suppose that Judge CAMPBELL meant to act with such impropriety as to arrest the regular course of law by forbidding the prothonotary to make a proper entry. We rather think that he wished his opinion against the verdict to be entered upon the record, and to leave the rest to the law; any other proceeding would have been highly improper, and we will not without necessity suppose that Judge CAMPBELL intended to do what was wrong.

The distinction between entering a judgment pro forma upon a verdict, to which the party was entitled as of course, and granting a decree in equity is so palpable that we need not further discuss the case. The decree below was improvidently and unlawfully entered and must be set aside.

This leaves the case precisely as if no decree had been made. If the learned judges below cannot agree upon a proper decree, they have the power to call upon a judge from another district to decide the case for them. But until we have a lawful decree we cannot reach the merits.

The decree is reversed at the costs of the appellees.

pose of delivering to him the possession he violently and forcibly broke into and entered the premises, peaceably occupied by the prosecutrix and her children. The evidence shows that a mob of about one hundred and fifty persons were present at the time, apparently assembled to witness the breaking into the house. He has been arrested for forcible entry, and now asks to be discharged because he is the lessee of the premises, and is the licensee of the hotel kept there, and the husband of the prosecutrix. There can be but little doubt that resistance upon the part of the prosecutrix would have resulted in a breach of the peace, and as the preserva

May 7, 1883. CLAYTON, P.J. The relator is in the custody of his bail, charged with a forcible entry into the dwelling of his alleged wife who is the prosecutrix. She alleges that, supposing the relator to be unmarried, she wedded him and has lived and cohabited with him for several years as his wife; that she has recently discovered that she was deceived and that he had another wife living when the marriage was contracted between him and her; and that this discovery has caused a rupture of their former relations and a separation from each other's society as husband and wife. That he had withdrawn from her bed and had not slept in the part of the house occupied by her since Easter Sunday last. That she was left in peaceful possession of the dwelling part of the house leased by him as a hotel and dwelling. That since the separation he has admitted his former marriage and has publicly renounced the prosecutrix as his wife.

The evidence sustains the allegations of the prosecutrix and also shows that after the discovery by the prosecutrix of his former marriage, and after her withdrawal from his society, he sold the lease, good will, furniture and fixtures of the establish

tance than any mere private right, it is doubtful if the relator could, under the circumstances, forcibly enter his own house. If the prosecutrix were his wife, his right would seem to be clear to forcibly enter the house, but this is denied, and

the evidence is sufficient to raise a serious

doubt upon this vital point in the case.If she is not his lawful wife and is the innocent victim of his deception, to have longer cohabited with him would have been fornication on her part. therefore, morally as well as legally right in resisting his further control over her person, and had the right to forcibly exclude his further control over her or her

She was,

children. If she was left by him in the peaceful possession of the premises he could not after the discovery of his deception and crime, by force and violence thrust her and her children into the public street. She had a right to dwell where he had placed her until ejected by some higher authority than his. If he desired to reclaim his household goods, replevin was his proper remedy. If he desired to dispossess her of his land, ejectment was

his lawful action.

It may be admitted that a man can lawfully break into his own dwelling when it is forcibly detained from him by his

wife, children or servant. I Rus. Cr. 306;

Ash. 140.

Commonwealth v. Keeper of Prison, I But where the marriage relation has been disrupted, or where it is denied by the one in possession, neither the alleged husband or wife can forcibly and with such violence as will probably cause a breach of the peace enter the premises in the adverse possession of the other. This was decided by Lord C. J. Tenterden in Rex. v. Smith, 5 C. & P. 201, and is undoubtedly the law. In that case the wife living separate from her husband rented a house in her own name. The husband with the consent of the landlord

entered and was in possession when the wife with two others broke into the

house. It was held she could be convict

ed and the case was sent to the jury. If the prosecutrix in the present case is not

the lawful wife of the relator and is the

innocent victim of his deception, she had the lawful right when she discovered her unfortunate condition to forcibly exclude him from further control over her person. A continuance of their relations would

have been a crime upon her part and his attempt to forcibly enter her dwelling after she had peaceably possessed herself of it was unlawful.

The relator is therefore remanded.

Houpt, Garnishee v. Lewis.

Justice of the Peace--Attachment execution.

Where a garnishee in his answer denies any indebtedness to the defendant as an individual or principal, but admits that he has had dealings with him as agent, the answer will prevent judgment against the garnishee.

When the answer denies indebtedness to the defendant as a principal a claim by the defendant to have the fund set apart to him under the exemption law will not

conclude the garnishee, nor alone warrant the entering of judgment against him.

It is competent for the plaintiff; notwithstanding the answers of the garnishee, to require the issue to be tried before the justice; and if the record shows a trial, the court cannot, on certiorari, review the correctness of the justice's conclusions from the evidence.

It is possible, also, that upon the day of the hearing the plaintiff might cause additional interrogatories to be served upon the garnishee, and require him to answer them.

The verbal statements of the garnishee, made in the presence of the justice, after his answers have been dereconcilable with his former answers, will not authorize the justice to disregard his former answers, and to enter judgment against him.

Practice before justice of the peace in cases of attachment execution, considered.

Certiorari,

June 11, 1883. RICE, P. J. On December 6th, 1882, the alderman issued an

attachment execution against H. C. Gates, as defendant, and M. B. Houpt. On the same day the plaintiff filed interrogatories. The writ and a copy of the interrogatories and a rule to answer were duly served.On December 14th, 1882, the return day of the writ and the rule, all parties appeared before the alderman. The defendant in the writ put in a written claim for the benefit of the exemption law. The garnishee filed written answers to the interrogatories, as follows: "I have not had transactions with him" (the defendant) as an individual or principal since

the within attachment was served on me, nor was I then indebted to him as such, nor have I since been. Prior to the service of said attachment I had been deal

ing with said Gates as agent, and at the time of the service thereof I had ordered the manufacture of certain goods by him as such. Since, and prior to the service thereof, he has delivered said goods to me as such agent, amounting to $595.18, and I have paid him on account thereof, to wit, December 13th, 1882, the sum of $250." The interrogatory to which this answer was made reads as follows:"Have you had any business transactions with the said H. C. Gates by which you are indebted to him? If yes, state the amount of your indebtedness to him at the time of the service of this attachment.— State in your answers the particulars in relation to your indebtedness to him, and whether on account, note, or otherwise."

A garnishee is only required to answer the interrogatories that may be submitted to him. "And judgment will not be entered against him on his answer, unless he expressly or impliedly admits his indebt

edness to, or his possession of assets belonging to, the judgment debtor: and the admission ought to be of such a character as to leave no doubt in regard to its nature and extent;" 9 Sm. 361-364.

Although the facts of the case cited differ from those involved in this case, the principle controlling the decision is a general one, and is applicable here. The general denial by the garnishee of any indebtedness to the defendant, and of any

transactions with him as an individual or

a principal, was a complete answer to the interrogatory, and relieved him from the necessity of explaining his transactions with him as an agent. The garnishee asserts in his answer, not merely that the defendant in his transactions with him claimed to act as an agent, but that he was, in fact, such; and, therefore, if the answer was in itself sufficient to prevent judgment against the garnishee, no act of the defendant subsequent to the service of of the writ, as, for example, claiming the benefit of the exemption law, could destroy its effect. We do not wish to be understood as saying that evidence of such an act would not be competent for any purpose, or in any stage of the proceedings. It might be evidence to discredit the defendant, or to estop him from denying that the fund was his. But what we mean to decide is this, that when the garnishee denies in his answer any indebtedness to the defendant, and the record shows nothing further than a claim by the defendant to have the fund set apart to him under the exemption law, judgment cannot be entered against the garnishee on his answer.

The record further shows that the hearing was continued until December 16th, 1882, at which time the parties again appeared before the magistrate. On the last mentioned date the plaintiff filed a paper excepting to the answer of the garnishee, and concluding with a request "that the garnishee may be further examined and required to make further an

swers, and that the matter may be fully inquired into and tried before the alderman." The garnishee declined to file any further answers in writing to the interrogatories already answered, "but answered verbally" (as the transcript states) "that nothing was said about defendant being agent at the time he contracted the debt with defendant, and that the reason he paid a part of the claim was that he supposed it would make no difference, as he still had money enough in his hands to The record thus pay plaintiff's claim. concludes: "The alderman being of the opinion that the claim of the defendant is virtually an admission that the debt is owing to him personally, and not to him as agent, and the defendant and garnishee both failing to disclose whom defendant is agent for, and also failing to give the

particulars of the transaction, therefore judgment is publicly entered that the plaintiff have execution," etc.

In thus entering against the garnishee we think the alderman erred. It was competent for the plaintiff, notwithstanding the answers of the garnishee, to require the issue to be tried, and to introduce evidence to show that the attached money was a debt due to the defendant as an in

dividual or principal, and if after hearing such evidence the alderman had entered judgment for the plaintiff, the court could not, on certiorari, review the correctness of his conclusions from such evidence.The only remedy of the party aggrieved would be by appeal. So, also, upon the trial of the issue, the plaintiff could have required the defendant and the garnishee to be sworn, and to testify as if under cross-examination. It is possible, also, that upon the day of the hearing the plaintiff might have caused additional written interrogatories to be served upon the garnishee, and have required him, by rule, to answer them within the time fixed But the record, by which by the statute.

alone we must decide as to the regularity of this judgment, does not show that either