summons may be served on the company in any other county of the Commonwealth, in the manner provided by the original Act. It appears by the declaration that the insurance was effected in York county, and Elizabeth Schlagenhaft, the subject of the risk, died there. The court of that county therefore had jurisdiction of the cause of action, and there was error in setting aside the service of the summons. Decree reversed and procedendo awarded. E. W. Spangler and W. C. Chapman, Esqs., for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Cochran & Hay, for defendant in error. Quinn vs. The Fidelity Beneficial Society. Practice-Acts of April 24, 1857 and 1868. Suit may be brought in the county where the subject of the risk insured against was domiciled or located, and the summons may be served on the company in any other county of the Commonwealth in the manner provided by the original Act of April 24th, 1857. addition to the remedies thereto provided by law the Act of April 24th, 1857, Purd802, pl. 53, declares it shall be lawful for any one who may have a cause of action against an insurance company, "to bring suit in any county where the property insured may be located, and to direct any process to the sheriff of either of the counties of this Commonwealth," etc.Prior to the passage of that Act, the class of suitors, intended to be benefitted thereby, was obliged to seek redress in the courts of the county where the insurance companies might be located. This was generally attended with great inconvenience and expense in procuring testimony and securing the attendance of witnesses at points very often remote from their homes and the locality of this loss. In view of these and other considerations, and for the purpose of providing a suitable remedy, the Act of 1857 was doubtless passed; but, the language employed Error to the Court of Common Pleas did not clearly include life and accident of Schuylkill county. This was an action of debt to recover on a policy of insurance or certificate of membership issued to Patrick Quinn by the Fidelity Beneficial Society, assuring the life of Francis Quinn, the plaintiff's father, in the sum of $2000. The plaintiff resided in Schuylkill county, and the corporation defendant was located in Lancaster county. The writ was directed to and served by the sheriff of Lancaster county under the provisions of the Act of April 24th, 1857, and the supplement thereto of April 8th, 1868, by virtue of which the plaintiff claimed to have a right to bring suit in Schuylkill county against the defendant. After service and return of the writ the defendant obtained a rule to show cause why the proceeding should not be set aside for matters of record, and this rule was made absolute by the court.Exception was taken by the plaintiff to the ruling of the court and writ of error taken, assigning the ruling of the court as error. insurance companies, both of which were equally within the mischief that required a remedy, and hence the supplement of April 8th, 1868, P. L. 70, was passed, declaring that all the provisions of the former Act "shall apply to life and accident insurance companies." While the legislative intention is not as clearly expressed as it might have been, we have no doubt the supplement was intended to authorize suits to be brought against life and accident insurance companies to the county where the person insured resided; where the subject of the risk insured against was domiciled or located.— A consideration of the reasons which evidently prompted its enactment also tends to sustain this view of the supplement. If it is not susceptible of that construction it is utterly nugatory and meaningless. Such a conclusion would not harmonize with the principle that every statute should be so construed as to give it operation, if the language will permit. A remedial statute, such as this supple- property terminated when she ceased to ment evidently is, should receive a liberal be his wid ow. interpretation in advancement of the remedy contemplated. In view of these considerations, we are of opinion that the learned court erred in making the order complained of. Decree reversed and procedendo award ed. Bowersox's Appeal. Decedent's Estates-Right of Widow to Administer. The Act of Assembly giving the widow the preferred right to administer on the estate of her deceased husband, has not made an imperfect or defective education a legal disqualification. A knowledge of the value of property, and the practical business transactions of life are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute. Appeal from the decree of the Orphans' Court of the county of Snyder. October 2, 1882. MERCUR, J. John Bowersox died intestate. The Register granted letters of administration on his estate to the appellants, one of whom is a son, and the other a brother of the intestate. Susannah Bowersox claiming to be the widow of the decedent, and the right to administer on his estate, appealed to the Orphans' Court. After hearing the court vacated the letters issued to the appellants, and ordered that letters be issued to Susannah Bowersox. Two objections are made to the conclusions of the court, one to finding here to be the widow of the decedent, the other to deciding that she was a proper person to be entrusted with the management of the estate. We have carefully examined the evidence. think it amply sufficient to justify the court in finding that she had been married to John Bowersox. Not only was there positive evidence ol the fact of their marriage; but they undoubtedly lived together for some twenty years; and the clear weight of evidence shows, as husband and wife during all that time. The apparent desire not to make the marriage generally known, is accounted for by the fact that all right to her former husband's We The effort to prove her an improper person clearly failed. It is true she is rather illiterate. She cannot write. She cannot read printing unless it be in German. She had not a business education. In this respect she is like a large majority of the widows in this Commonwealth.The Act of Assembly giving the widow the preferred right to administer on the estate of her deceased husband, has not made an imperfect or defective education a legal disqualification. A good mind. and sound judgment; a knowledge of the values of property, and of the practical business transactions of life, are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute. All these the appellee has. They will enable her to select competent assistants and able advisers. This will secure an efficient and faithful discharge of the trust. It is further claimed, inasmuch as she has no separate property, that she comes within the prohibition declared in Cornpropst's Appeal, 9 Casey 537, by reason of insolvency. This is a misapprehension of the meaning of insolvency. It is not the mere absence of property liable to seizure on execution. It is the owing of debts in excess of the value of his tangible property. If he owes no debt he is not insolvent although he may have. no such property. A young mechanic or laborer out of debt, just starting for himself, with no property but his knowledge, brawny arm, and energetic will, is not insolvent. Nor is one without visible property, owing no debt, who has acquired a learned profession, which he is about to follow. In all these cases, each may by industry, labor and economy, pay his way and contract no debts. Without debts there can be no insolvency. Poverty and insolvency are not synonymous terms. The evidence in the present case does not show the appellee to owe a single dollar. If anything remains of her husband's estate after paying his debts, she will have property. That will be in addition to the undoubted security which she must give before the letters are issued to her. Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellants. O. C. of ORPHANS' COURT. Ward's Estate. that she cohabited with Randolph after she arrived, according to her own testimony at the age of twelve years, which would be a sufficient ratification of the marriage to make it binding. It follows, then, that the subsequent marriage of the appellee to M. B. Ward was void, and that the letters issued to her must be revoked. The question then arises as to whether this court should direct to whom new letters shall issue or only revoke the letters, Allegheny County. leaving the register to appoint another administrator. If a female under the age of twelve years enters into a The 31st section of the Act of the 15th marriage contract and ratifies it after she arrives at that of March, 1832, Purd. Dig. 1255, provides age, it is binding upon her. The powers of the register's court are now vested in the Orphan's Court, and when letters of administration are revoked by it, it should direct to whom the new letters should issue. Appeal from the decision of the register granting letters of administration to Rufena J. Ward as the widow of the decedent. April 19, 1883. OVER, J. The appellant alleges that Rufena J. Ward, to whom the register issued letters of administration on the estate of M. B. Ward, deceased, as his widow, is not the widow of the decedent, and claims therefore that the letters should be revoked. It is conceded by the appellee that prior to her marriage to the decedent she was married to William Randolph, who is still living: but she alleges that at the time ceremony was performed she was under the age of twelve years, that she never cohabited nor lived with him as his wife, and that the marriage was therefore void, and her subsequent marriage to M. B. Ward valid. The burden of proof is upon the appellee to show that her marriage with Randolph was void. She has failed to do so, but on the contrary, there can be but little doubt from the evidence that she was over the age of twelve years when the ceremony was performed, and therefore capable of entering into a valid marriage contract. But even if this were not the case, there is very satisfactory evidence that appeals may be taken from the judicial acts of the register to the register's court, and the 39th section, that such courts "may and shall do all such judicial acts in all matters lawfully brought before them as belong and of right ought to belong to the office of said register." The powers and jurisdiction conferred by these sections are in substance the same as by Act of 7th of June, 1812: Hood on Ex'rs, p. 473; under which it was held in Stoever v. Ludwig, 4 S. & R. 201, that when letters were revoked by the register's court, it should direct to whom new letters should issue. And as by the 22d section of Article V, of the Constitution of 1874, register's courts are abolished and their powers and jurisdiction are vested in the Orphans' Court, it is clear that this court should direct to whom the new letters should issue. The appellant, under the intestate laws, is next of kin to the decedent, and is prima facie entitled to administer, and as there is no doubt as to his competency, the new letters must be issued to him. YORK LEGAL RECORD. also proved the death of her husband, and that she furnished death proof. VOL. IV. THURSDAY, MAY 10, 1883. SUPREME COURT. No. 10 Fidelity Mutual Aid Association v. Leidig. Mutual Insurance-Admission of Policy without application-Death proofs. In a suit on a policy of insurance in a Mutual Aid Association, plaintiff proved notice to defendant to produce the application on which said policy was issued. Defendant failed to do so, alleging that the application was part of the records of another case, which was now before the Supreme Court. HELD, affirming the Court below, that the policy must be admitted in evidence, notwithstanding the absence of the application. The President of the Association in a letter written to plaintiff's attorney stated that they did not "contest the claim, nor refuse to pay it up to this time, but prefer to await developments," and defer payment until another suit now pending against the companies on the same loss had been determined. HELD, affirming the Court below, to be a distinct admission of notice of the loss, and a waiver of proof otherwise necessary. It appears that the application and the death proofs had been offered in evidence in another suit brought by this same plaintiff against the New Era Life Association of Philadelphia, and those papers were attached to that record, and are now in the Supreme Court That suit is still pending. Sufficient has been shown, in our opinion by the plaintiff in this case, to entitle her to recover a verdict for the amount she claims. And as regards any formality of preliminary proofs, as they are called, or any other matters which might, under some circumstances, be necessary for a plaintiff to prove, in order to establish his Error to the Court of Common Pleas of claim, they are in our opinion to be disYork County. On the trial of the case in the Court below, plaintiff offered in evidence the Certificate of Membership, proved notice on defendant to produce application, proved payment of assessments, death of insured and furnishing of death proofs, and also offered in evidence a letter from the President of the Association, which is given in the Court's charge. Defendant asked the Court for a compulsory non-suit, which was refused. Defendant then presented some points, which are given in the Court's charge. The Court below (GIBSON, A. L. J.) charged the jury as follows: Gentlemen of the Jury:-This is an action of covenant brought by Susan Leidig against the Fidelity Mutual Aid Association of Philadelphia. pensed with on account of an acknowledgment of this claim in the letter written by the President of this association to the counsel of the plaintiff. That letter is dated October 13, 1880, and reads as follows: "Edward W. Spanngler, Esq.. Attorney-at-Law, York, Pa. Dear Sir:-Your favor of yesterday received. In answer have to say that we have concluded to defer payment of the have concluded to defer payment of the Ludwig claim until the suits now pending vs. the Insurance Companies have been brought to final judgment; if they be in favor of Mrs. Leidig, we will promptly and immediately pay the claim against our association, and for this purpose the assessment had been made in order that we may be able to do so. We neither The plaintiff has produced in evidence contest the claim or refused to pay it up the policy of insurance, under the terms, to this time, but prefer to await developof which the association covenants to payments. I understand the suit in the her $2,000 on the death of her husband. United States Court will come up this She has proved to you the payment of the assessment that was sent her for collection through their agent in this place, it having been the only one that was ever sent to her. The premium was paid at the time the application was made. She has She has month. Yours truly, L. G. FOUSE, President. The plaintiff has nothing whatever to do with any question of abiding the event of another suit. There is no evidence of any agreement on the part of herself to abide such issue. nor is there any such offer in this case. It is an acknowledgment of a claim. We therefore instruct you, in the absence of any defence, either in law or in fact, that you render a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $2,000.00 with interest. But as matters of fact are to be submitted to the jury, there is evidence in this case, (in addition to the certificate) which has been given by the witnesses called upon the stand, and their credibility is to be determined by you. Unless you find anything in this case which effects their credibility, or anything which in your opinion will require you to find other wise, then your verdict would be for the plaintiff for the amount, with interest from July 3, 1880. If, however, on looking at the testimony of these witnesses, as you have heard them testify, you find any thing to the contrary, your verdict will be for the defendant. 2. That inasmuch as the plaintiff has given no evidence, that good and satisfactory proof of the death of said Jacob W. Leidig was duly made and furnished to the satisfaction of the defendant, as set forth and avered in her declaration, and that as this is necessary to her right to recover, their verdict must be for defendant. Ans. We answer this point by saying that if you believe the witnesses, the death proofs required by the defendant were furnished them; and as these death proofs after notice to the defendants were not produced bere, and as it is shown they are part of the papers attached to the record now in the Supreme Court, this point is refused. 3. That the plaintiff has not shown that anything was due and payable at the time this suit was brought, there being no evidence to show that sixty days had been elapsed from the date of the periodical The defendant has requested the Court mortality assessment first ensuing the to charge the jury as follows: 1. That inasmuch as the certificate or policy of Insurance offered in evidence by the plaintiff shows upon its face as well as by Art. 18 from the By-Laws on the back thereof, that the application of J. W. Leidig on which said certificate issued was expressly made part of the contract of insurance, and the plaintiff having neither given said application in evidence nor made any sufficient legal proof of its contents, their verdict must be for the defendant. Ans. We say to you in answer to this point that the certificate or the policy of Insurance was offered in evidence without objection, and that the application, which was given in evidence in another case and attached to the record now in the Supreme Court, was not produced here after notice having been given to the defendant to produce the same, so that it might be put in evidence with the policy. This point is therefore refused. death of said J. W. Leidig, or that any assessment was laid upon the approval of this loss, or that the loss itself was approved, all of which was necessary to her right of recovery. Ans. The policy of insurance itself we say to you shows the amount due at the time this suit was brought, and if the sixty days had not elapsed at that time, it would be a matter for the defendant to show and not the plaintiff; and as regards the assessment upon the loss, I think that the letter of the President of this Company defendant is sufficient and will answer any objection that may be made on that ground. This point is therefore refused. 4. That under the pleadings of this case the plaintiff is bound to prove to the satisfaction of the jury every material averment in her declaration, "that all the conditions and stipulations in said application of J. W. Leidig, and in the said instrument of writing mentioned, necessary to be complied with and performed according to the true intent and meaning of said cove |