Road in Ross Township, 36 Pa. St. 87, Sanderson v. Pa. Coal Co., 86 Pa. St. 401, Sawtelle v. Railway Passenger Ass. Co., 15 Blatchford, 216, School Directors v. James, 2 W. & S. 558, Trunick v. Smith, 13 P. F. S. 18, 78 117 114 Twines Case, I Smith's Leading Cases, part 1, pg. 34-77, 77 4 Vacation of Osage Street, 9 N. 117, 203 46 Vanderslice v.City of Phila., 10 W. N.C.373, Vinton's Appeal, 11 W. N. C. 244, 204 131 65 Voss v. The German Amer. Bank, 83 Ill. 599. 126 YORK LEGAL RECORD. ministration de bonis non cum testamento annexo should be issued. When by will, a trust for a widow is annexed to the office of the executor, on his death it can only be exercised by an administrator d. b. n. c. t. a. February 16, 1883. MCCLEAN, P. J.It can hardly be said that there is under this will a distinct and collateral trust and one which can be exercised independently of the executorship. There can be no separation allowed by the Will of the provisions for the widow. The whole existting estate is for her benefit. If she desires to have the real estate sold, the executor is ordered and directed to sell and convey the same. The conversion of it only awaits her desire. Then again not only the interest arising from the investments of personal estate and from the proceeds of "real estate if sold, is to be paid to the widow during her life, but if the interest is insufficient for her comfort able support, then so much of the principal to be applied to her support as shall be requisite for said purpose." The executor is not made a trustee nominatum but ratione officii. How can the office of a trustee in this case be distinguished or separated from that of Executor? Would there be propriety in appointing a trustee of the personal estate, when it may be, part of the principal would be required for the support of the widow or when she can at anytime require the sale of the real estate? Then if there could be an appointment of a trustee of part of the estate, excluding the real, the result would be that when the real estate is to be sold either during the life of the widow or after her death, by virtue of the authority given in the will, an administration must be raised.It seems appropriate that letters of ad Such a representative has the entire estate under his authority and is ready to dispose of it according to the provisions of the will and as occasion requires, and who will care for the interests of the residuary legatees, as well as of the widow. In my judgment the testator did not intend an imperium in imperio, but on the contrary, oneness of power and authority in the care and administration of his entire estate for all the purposes named in his will. As has been intimated any and all trusts were vested by him in the Executor as such, and the trust cannot be severed from that office, vide opinion of Sup. Court in Innes' Estate, 4 Wharton p. 184. The testator appoints Henry A. Picking the sole Executor of the Will, and we have no testamentary trustee nominatum for the widow's benefit alone, no such testamentary trustee as is contemplated and intended by section 1 of Act 22 April, 1846, 1 Purd. 455 pl. 244; which is claimed to be the authority for the appointment now asked. Section 3 of Act of 12 March, 1800, provides that when the Executor shall die, and letters of administration with the will annexed shall be granted, it shall and may be lawful for such administrators with the will annexed, to sell and convey the real estate and otherwise act, respecting the same, as fully and completely, as such deceased executor might or could have done, were he still living, and by the 67 section of the Act of 24 February, 1834, all and singular the provisions of that Act relative to the powers, duties and liabilities of executors are thereby extended to administrators with a will annexed; 1 Purdon's Dig. p. 417, pl. 66; p. 419, pl. 74. The 31 section of the same Act, 1 Purd. p. 425, pl. 99, gives the express power to administrators de bonis non with a will annexed to demand and recover from their predecessors in the administration, or their legal representatives, all moneys, goods 2 and assets remaining in their hands, due and belonging to the estate of the decedent. This right of the administrator de bonis non is exclusive; Com'lth v. Strohecker, 9 W. 479; Montgomery's Estate, 7 Phila. 504. The facts in the case of Lantz v. Boyer, Admin. d.b.n.c.t.a. 31 P.F. Smith 325, are very much like those that exist or that are suggested in the case at bar. There as here, the testator made a common fund of his estate, real and personal, a life estate given to the widow and absolute direction to the executors to sell if she should desire it and the proceeds of the sale to be invested, the interest to be paid to the widow for her life, &c. When the wife's life estate should expire, the distribution is to be made by the executors certainly, and that virtute officii. This duty of distribution then devolved of necessity upon the administrator de bonis non cum testamento annexo. If so he must be entitled to receive and invest the fund and hold it so invested until the period of final distribution shall arrive. This case must be considered as decisive of the very question now before us and which was raised and discussed by the counsel in that case. See also Olwine's Appeal, 4 W. & S. 492, although determined before 1846. Where by the will the trust for the widow is annexed to the office of the executor, on his death it can "only be exercised by an administrator de bonis non;" also Com'lth v. Barnitz,9 Watts 252. For above reasons the prayer of petition refused. O. C. of Lafferty's Estate. Philadelphia. Death of a widow three days after filing petition for ex death of her husband, notified the admin- It is emption, and before the approval of the appraisement by nothing to prevent the approval of the the Court, does not invalidate the claim. Sur exceptions to widow's exemption. February, 3, 1883. HANNA, P. J A novel question is raised by the exceptions, and as far as we can ascertain, without precedent. The widow of decedent within a reasonable time after the appraisement, the day of its filing, except by rule of Court, notice must be given by advertisement, to creditors and others interested, to object thereto, if they so desire. No objection was made, except by the administrator, and he is not affected by the claim to the exemption. If the claim had never been made by the widow, by was presented by her executor, the case would be far different, and clearly could not be allowed. It is a personal privilege, and if not claimed, is presumed to be waived. In this case, the widow promptly availed hereslf of the provision for her benefit, complied with the require ments of the statute, and we fail to discover any sufficient reason why the appraisement should not now be approved. The appraisement comprising only the household goods, etc., claimed, there being no money or other personal assets out of which to pay the balance to which the widow was entitled, and the real estate not having been appraised: (Hufman's Appeal, 31 P. F. S. 329; 2 W. C. 635; Nixon's Appeal, 6 id. 496; Somers' Estate, 38 Legal Intell. 95: Andress' Estate, 38 Legal Intell. 5.) it will therefore be ap proved as to the goods and chattels therein mentioned. Exceptions dismissed and appraisement approved nunc pro tunc. Q. S. of QUARTER SESSIONS. Lancaster Co. Road in West Cocalico Township. Roads-Public-When cently certain. termini suffici The 2d is that: "The public road as laid out does not show that it begins in a public road." of this Court did not insert in the order, In this proceeding it appears the clerk the exact words, as used in the petition to describe the road. That was a censurable omission and should not again occur. The order, however, in this proceeding on its face sets forth that the petitioners and divers inhabitants labor under incon venience, for want of a public road, and The law requires that the definite points then states its beginning and ending.The law requires that the definite points where a road, public or private, shall begin or end, should be set out with a reasonable certainty: (9 Smith 358). Unless it the order for opening the road cannot be so appears on the face of the proceeding, sustained. That requisite has been complied with in the proceedings before us.— The termini of the road proposed appearing in the order and in the report, are manifestly reasonably certain. Had the road petitioned for been asked as for a private road, the two exceptions above recited would have been fatal to the report in question and to these whole proceedings. For by the very terms of the road law of 1836, a petitioner for a private road must ask for a road from the respective dwellings or plantations of the petitioner or petitioners, "to a highway or place of necessary public resort, or to any It is not requisite in an order to viewers, that it shows private way leading to a highway." that the public road to be laid out is to begin in a public road, and to end in a public road, but is sufficent when the points of termini are set forth with reasonable certainty. Exceptions to report of viewers. January 13, 1883. PATTERSON, A.L.J.Notwithstanding the numerous exceptions filed to the report of viewers, there are but two, the 1st and 2d, which were argued before the Court by counsel, and which require our attention. The 1st is that: "The order to the viewers does not show that the public road to be laid out is to begin in a public road and to end in a public road.” But the provision made for public roads by the said Act, does not prescribe any specific termini in terms. Section 1st says: "The Court of Quarter Sessions of every county of the Commonwealth, on being petitioned to grant a view for a road, within the respective county, shall have power and are hereby required, in open Court to appoint, as often as may be needful, six persons, &c." The Act, it will be seen, does not require the petition to state that it is for a public road even. The 3d section of the Act, however, directs that the viewers shall make report, and specifies |