I. When a trustee expends judiciously and for the permanent improvement of the trust estate a larger sum of money than was originally contemplated, under an order of court authorizing such improvement, he will not be surcharged with the sum so expended.-Patterson's Appeal, 172.

2. A trustee acting in good faith is entitled to a commission on money borrowed or expended in the improvement of the trust estate, even though his account is so kept as to require testimony in explanation and a restatement thereof by the court, but the costs incident to such restatement are chargable to accountant.-Ib.

3. Where a cestui que trust furnishes money to aid in payment of improvements, in excess of of the amount provided for by order of court, he is estopped from denying the right of the trustee to make such additional expenditures.-Ib.

SURETIES OF. SUBROGATION, I. TURNPIKE.

LIABILITY TO REPAIR.

1. Under the act of March 19th, 1804, incorporating the President, Managers and Company of the Susquehanna and Lehigh Turnpike Road, and the directors were bound to keep the road in repair and good condition; and when not in repair, as found upon the report of the viewers appointed to examine the condition of the road, and notice of the same being given to the tollkeepers, they were not to exact any toll until the road was put in good repair, under a penalty for each collection, recoverable before a justice of the peace. A toll-keeper exacted toll after being notified of the condition of the road, and admitted the fact before a justice of the peace. HELD, that a good prima facie case had been made out against such toll-keeper, which could not be rebutted without affirmative proof that the condemned portion of the road had been put in order.-Fetterman v. Robbins, 20. VENUE. PRACTICE, 10-13.

WILL.

CONSTRUCTION OF.

I. The testator, by his will, devised "to my beloved wife, Rebecca Crone, the interest of onethird of all my personal estate absolutely, and the interest of one-third of all my real estate during life." Then, after a specific bequest of farming implements, he directs that "all the rest and residue of my estate, real, personal and mixed shall be divided among my children share and share alike, but the share coming to my son John I give, devise and bequeath unto his wife Mary Jane Crone for the use of my son John during life, and after his death to his children forever." HELD, recommitting the auditor's report, that the widow was entitled to one-third part of the balance of the personal estate after payment of a proportionate share of the debts, and to the interest of one-third of the real estate after a similar payment.-Crone's Estate, 13.

2. In a proviso to his will a testator directs the manner in which the net share of each child shall be ascertained. Afterwards he revokes the bequest to R., as contained in two sentences of his will quoted by him in his codicil, but carefully avoids changing or annulling the mode in which the share of each child is to be ascertained. He then gives the share of his son R. to his son's wife. HELD, reversing the court below, that the share to which R.'s wife was entitled to was the share which R. would have taken if his wife had not been substituted as a legatee in his stead.-Buehler's Appeal, 29.

3. A devise to testator's son and son's wife for life, with "remainder in fee simple to his heirs at law in case he should have issue, but in case he should die without issue, then the said tract of land to revert to the heirs at law of my three daughters, A, B and C in fee simple," gives only a joint life estate to the son and his wife. The failure of issue meant is not is not an indefinite failure of issue, and the rule in Shelly's Case does not apply. As soon as the son has a child, the remainder in fee vests in that child, opening to let in afterborn children. When once vested in such children the fee is absolute.—Thompson v. Ward, 57.

4. Testatrix in the body of her will bequeathed the residue of her estate to charitable uses. Within a month prior to her death she made a codicil to her will. HELD, That the codicil so made did not bring the bequest in the will within the Act of 1855.-Lohr's Estate, 18.

5. The Act of 1879 enacting that "every will shall be construed with reference to the real and personal estate comprised in it to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will," relates to the subject of the devise and bequest and not the object of the gift.-Ib.

EXECUTION of. TRUST, I.

6. It is not conclusive evidence of incompetency to make a will that the testator has been found, by a commission in lunacy, to be a habitual drunkard.-Hannum v. Worrall, 192.

LEGACY.

7. A devise to two sons of all testator's real estate, after the decease of the widow, "by pay ing" the pecuniary legacies, has the effect of charging these legacies upon the real estate devised.-Lake's Estate, 141.

8. Such a lien is not discharged by a sheriff's sale.-Ib.