lars, and the process shows that the damages claimed were less than one hundred dollars, the court will not reverse because the amount of the claim is not set out on the transcript.-Mulligan v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 28.

SUMMONS.

14. A summons issued on the 23d, returnable on the 27th of the month, and was returned served on the 23d by leaving a copy at the dwelling house of the defendant in presence of another. HELD, That upon this state of the record this issuing of a short summons was irregular.— Smythe v. Morgan, 157.

15. The summons was made returnable at eleven o'clock instead of between certain hours. HELD, That the Act of 26 April, 1855, while it permitted the justice to make the summons returnable between certain hours, did not make it obligatory upon him to do so, and if he did not, it is not fatal to the proceedings.-Metzgar v. Shetter, 7.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

BAIL.

I. Where a lease has the name of A. as lessee in the body of the paper, and is signed by A. and also by B. with the word "bail" added to his name, it is a joint undertaking by both.-Brown v. Peters, 170.

2. As between themselves they are principal and surety; in favor of the lessor they are both principals.-Ib.

LIABILITY FOR RENT.

3. A landlord, under a claim for rent, can hold possession of personal property previously sold by the tenant, demanded by the purchaser, but not delivered, and remaining on the premises, even though an actual formal distress had not been made.-Furbush v. Fisher, 85.

RENEWAL of lease.

4. Upon the question of an implied renewal of a tenancy all the terms of the former lease must be considered. Hence if a landlord elect to treat one holding over as a tenant, he thereby affirms the form of tenancy under which the tenant previously held.-Hollis v. Burns, 12. LEGACY. DECEDENT'S ESTATES, 8. WILL, 7. LIENS. DECEDENT'S ESTATES, 5. DISTRIBUTION, 8. WILL, 8.

MARRIAGE.

CONTRACT OF.

I. If a female under the age of twelve years enters into a marriage contract and ratifies it after she arrives at that age, it is binding upon her.-Ward's Estate, 36.

MARRIED WOMAN.

DEED TO.

1. The owner of land is not estopped from setting up his title against judgment creditors, though they had no actual or constructive notice of his title at the time they gave credit or filed the judgment against the occupant. A married woman is not bound to record her deed under pain of losing her land if seized by her husband's creditors.-Feig et al. v. Myers, 83.

PROPERTY OF.

2. A married woman alleging that at her suggestion her husband purchased land for her and she furnished the money for all the payments, must show that she had the means to buy with,

and that she so applied those means in payment of the purchase money.-Feig et al. v. Myers, 83.

SEPARATE EARNINGS.

3. A petition by a married woman, to secure her separate earnings, under the Act of 1872, must set forth what earnings the petitioner has or expects to have, or what business she expects to engage in, or how the earnings she desires to secure are to accrue.—Slaybaugh's Case, 132. MASTER AND SERVANT. NEGLIGENCE, 3-5. PROMISSORY NOTE, 4.

MECHANIC'S LIEN.

DEFECTIVE.

1. The omission of the middle initial of a defendant's name, in a mechanic's lien, will postpone the lien_to others correctly entered with the initial.-Scott v. Irvin, 156.

SURETY.

2. One who has joined, as surety, in a contractor's bond conditioned that no lien shall be filed against the building cannot subsequently acquire a lien as a sub-contractor.-Hinkson v. Fairlamb, 177.

TIME OF FILING.

certain date, according to the original plan. 3. The defendant finished his building on a Five months afterward he changed the flooring, and put in new material for the old. HELD, that a mechanics' lien filed three months after the change of flooring being eight months after the first completion was too late.-Stoner v. Leiberknecht, 130.

MORTGAGE.

WHAT IS.

being unable to pay the amount of the bid, borI. Where a purchaser of realty at Sheriff's sale rows the amount from another, and the Sheriff's deed is made to that other under an agreement that the said conveyance shall stand as security for said loan with interest, such conveyance is in law a mortgage, and equity will decree a reconveyance to the borrower on payment of the loan.-Logue's Appeal, 175. MUNICIPALITY.

POWERS OF.

1. A borough has no authority to purchase a judgment so as to make it a set off against a judgment against the borough.-Earley's Appeal, 127.

2. Article 9, section 7 of the Constitution prohibits a borough from loaning its credit to any individual.-1b.

SUIT UNDER ORDINANCE.

3. In an action to recover a penalty for violation of municipal ordinances, the suit must be brought in debt, and where the whole penalty is payable to the municipality, it must be brought in the name and title of the corporation, and not in the name of the informer.-Lemon et al. v. Reidel, 164.

4. Penal actions must be construed strictly, and cannot be so extended as to give authority in the absence of express words, to the peace officer to sue in his own name.—Ib.

5. The transcript of the alderman must set forth the offence and ordinances violated with sufficient clearness and precision. Every essential ingredient of the offense must be set out by the magistrate. The ordinance, if not in haec verba, should be designated by number, section or date of passage.—Ïb.

6. Where these ingredients are omitted, the judgment will be reversed.-Ib.

NAME.

CORRECTNESS OF. JUDGMENT, 3-7. MECHANIC'S LIEN, 8. ROADS, 14.

NEGLIGENCE.

OF DRIVER.

1. Where the defendant, through careless driving, collided with the plaintiff, it is no defence to an action for damages, that the plaintiff was deaf, and therefore did not hear the defendant's cries.-Smith v. Inners, 21.

2. The rule applicable to driving over a railroad track does not extend to an ordinary road. -Ib.

OF EMPLOYER.

3. Plaintiff was employed in defendant's shops where the machinery was driven by a small engine fed by a pipe from the large boiler and unattended by any one. By the breaking of the governor belt of this engine, the shafting was propelled at a high rate of speed, a pulley on this shaft was broken, and the plaintiff struck by one of the fragments, resulting in the breaking of a limb. HELD, That if the jury believed that the defendant did not exercise due care in having an engine thus unattended and the plaintiff was guilty of no contributory negligence, he was entitled to recover.-Cole v. Schall, 179.

4. It is the duty of an employer to use due and reasonable care as to the safety of the appliances and machinery furnished by him. But, on the other hand, where a servant accepts employment on defective machinery, either from its construction or want of proper repair, and with knowledge of the facts enters on the service, the master cannot be held liable for injury to the servant within the scope of the danger which both the contracting parties contemplated as incidental to the employment.-Ib.

5. If plaintiff was placed in a position of peril by the accident which happened to the governor belt of the engine, and the jury believe this occured because of a want of reasonable care on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff could not be held to the exercise of the soundest judgment under such circumstances of peril, and his right to recover would not be defeated because he was injured while trying to save the machinery in his charge.-Ib.

OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES.

6. The General Borough Law of 1851, invests municipal authorities with the management and control of the borough highways and this power includes the maintenance of such highways.Siltzer v. Wrightsville Borough, 199.

7. The duty to supervise and repair cannot be escaped because the act does not in so many words charge the corporate officers with it.-16.

8. It is the duty of the corporate officers to exercise reasonable vigilance in the supervision and repair of structures over which their jurisdiction extends.-Ib.

9. Mere absence of notice does not necessarily absolve a municipal corporation from the charge of negligence.-1b.

10. Where the evidence shows that the defect in the boardwalk was patent before the accident, and could, with the exercise of reasonable diligence on the part of those having charge of it, have been discovered and repaired, actual notice is unnecessary.—Ib.

II. The plaintiff, while walking along the highway upon a dark night, turned aside for the purpose of taking a footpath which led through private property, and, by reason of a miscalculation as to his position, fell over the unguarded edge of a culvert and sustained severe injury thereby. It was in evidence that he was familiar with the condition of the place, having habitually travelled that way about fifteen years, and that if he had not attempted to leave the street the accident would not have occurred. HELD, that the municipality was not liable.-City af Scranton v. Hill, 112.

12. Plaintiff brought suit against defendant for injuries occasioned to plaintiff and his horse, by reason of a road in said township not being opened and graded to its full width, and the absence of guards along a certain embankment. Defendant filed a special plea, alleging that the road was open of sufficient width for travelling by persons using ordinary care, and that the plaintiff was not in full control of his team at the time of the accident and negligently permitted them to occasion the injuries complained of. HELD, to be valid.-Hartman v. Hellam Township, 23.

RAILROAD.

13. Plaintiff in approaching a railroad crossing, stopped at a point somewhat remote from the track, (and from where he could not see the approaching train) listened, and failing to hear anything drove on. There was a point nearer to the track where he could have stopped, but failed to do so, drove on and was struck by the train. HELD, That whether his failure to stop at the place nearer to the track was such concurring negligence on his part as would prevent a recovery, is a question for the jury.-Dempwolf v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 129.

14. A brakeman in the employ of defendant company, was ordered on a car that was being run into a switch. The brakes on the car being defective he was unable to stop it and met with an injury which resulted in his death. In an action brought by his widow and minor children, HELD, That plaintiffs could not recover.-Rigney v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 163.

15. It was a rule of defendant company that the brakeman should examine brakes before cutting a car loose from a train and decedent had been told so by the conductor. HELD, his failure to do so was such contributory negligence as to relieve the defendant from liability.-Ib.

16. The brake chain having been unhooked, at a station along the line, by persons unknown the defendant company was not liable for injuries received thereby, the decedent having neglected to examine said brakes before getting on the car.-Ib.

NEW TRIAL.

REASONS FOR.

I. Where the question at issue is essentially one of fact, and the case presents the ordinary conflict of testimony a new trial will not be granted on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.—Anstine v. Mayer, 21.

2. Even when the jury may differ in opinion with the court, it is no ground upon which to grant a new trial, where there is a conflict of testimony; or where the cause is submitted on the credibility of the witnesses.-Ib.

1. The principles which govern cases of claims between parent and child have application to cases between persons standing in the relation of step-mother and step-son, where family_relation exists between them.-Guss' Estate, 81.

2. In such cases there must be proof of an express contract to pay for services or boarding, before there can be a recovery.—Ib.

3. If an actual agreement to pay be proved and the sum be not expressed a quantum valebat will be implied.—Ib.

4. It is not held essential that a witness should be present with the parties to hear their bargain. The question always is whether the parties contemplated payment and dealt with each other as debtor and creditor.-Ib.

PENAL ACTIONS. MUNICIPALITY, 3-6.
PERSONALITY. DECEDENT'S ESTATES, 8.
PHYSICIAN.

1. The acts of Assembly of the 8th of June, 1881, entitled "An act to provide for the registration of all practioners of medicine and surgery," is a constitutional and valid statute, and not within the prohibition as to laws ex post facto.-Commonwealth v. Taylor, 79.

2. A vested right of property in a business calling or profession can only exist when the pursuit or practice of it is in conformity with the law of the land.

VALIDITY OF. SEE NEGLIGENCE, 12.

I. In an action of trespass on the case for the killing of a dog, the defendant filed a special plea admitting the killing, but alleging that the plaintiff's dog had been in the habit of worrying his (defendant's) cattle, and that on the night of the alleged trespass some dogs were worrying his cattle and therefore in the dark he shot and

wounded the said plaintiff's dog, and further averring that if any damage was thereby occasioned to the plaintiff it was occasioned by the unlawful trespass and depredations of the said dog HELD, to be a valid plea-Sutton v. Coover, 22.

2. The matters of fact set out being certain to a common intent, and forming one connected proposition, the plea is not objectionable in form.-Ib.

PRACTICE.

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENCE. PROMISSORY NOTE, I ARBITRATION.

1. Where a rule to arbitrate has been entered and the time to choose arbitrators has gone by judgment by default may be entered without striking off the rule to arbitrate.-Heffner v. Confair, 4.

2. A rule to plead and a rule to arbitrate are inconsistent and cannot be entered at the same time. Esrey v. Gray, 174.

DIVIDED COURT.

3. Where there are two judges in a Court, and a decree is made by one which is dissented to by the other, the Court being thus equally divided no valid order or decree can be made.-Madlem's Appeal, 49.

4. Where no proper decree can be made by reason of the failure of the judges to agree, they have the power to call upon a judge from another district to hear and decide the case.-Ib.

EVIDENCE.

5. Of papers produced on call, the party calling may offer in evidence such as he choose. He is not bound to offer all, certainly such as he had not furnished himself and which he had not called for.-Heaffer v. New Era Life Insurance Company, 146.

6. When the court erroneously refuses to allow a party to prove an essential part of his case, he is not bound to go on and prove the remainder of his case.-16.

for Jury.

7. A. sent to B., a lard dealer and negotiator of loans, with whom he had been in the habit of transacting business, a certificate of stock with

instructions to sell when the stock should touch a certain price. No agreement was made as to B.'s receiving any compensation for his services. B., finding that the stock was rising, deposited it with C., a stock-broker, with instructions similar to those he had received from A. C., in turn, sent it to D., another stock-broker, with like inout all the securities deposited by him, including structions. Subsequently, C. failed, and D. sold the one in question, to cover C.'s indebtedness to D. In an action afterwards brought by A. against B. to recover the value of the certificate, the Court left it to the jury to say whether B. was a bailee for hire, or a gratuitous bailee, instructed them that in the former case he was liable for slight negligence, and in the latter for gross negligence only, and left it to them to say in either event whether B. had been guilty of the sort of negligence for which he would be liable. HELD, a verdict having been found for A., that it was error to leave it to the jury to say whether B. was a bailee for hire or not, as the law would imply that he had contracted for comhaving done B. no harm, constituted no ground pensation for his services, but that this error for reversal.-Swartz v. Hauser, 193.

8. HELD further that the question of B.'s negligence was properly submitted to the jury.—Ib.

mined in the suit, being water renters. HELD, not to be sufficient grounds for a change of venue. -York Water Company v. Glatfelter, 87.

II. The question in issue is purely one of fact, and is so abstract in its character that it cannot give rise to any bias or prejudice whatever.-Ib.

12. The defendant amended his application, and setting forth the list of stockholders of the plaintiff company, alleged that a large number of the inhabitants of the county had interest in the question involved therein adverse to the defendant. HELD, That the mere fact that these individuals were stockholders of the plaintiff company is not evidence of the fact that they have an interest in the question involved adverse to the defendant.

13. The interest that the stockholders might have by the benefit accruing from pure water, is one that can only arise after it is ascertained that the defendant caused the impurity of the water which is the subject of complaint.-16. PROMMISSORY NOTE.

DEFENCE TO.

1. An affidavit of defence alleged that the promissory note on which suit was brought had been obtained from the defendant under misrepresentation, and that the consideration had failed; that the plaintiff was present in a conversation between defendant's attorney and the holder of the note, when the attorney said to the holder that the note was a fraud and would not be paid; and that the original payee of the note was a person engaged in dishonest practices, and whose character should have been sufficient to put the plaintiff on his guard. HELD, to be sufficient to send the case to the jury.-Wagner v. Kline,57

DUTY OF BANK.

2. A bank is not obliged in favor of an endorser to appropriate money deposited by the maker of a note, one of its customers, towards the payment of the note after it becomes due.-People's Bank of Wilkesbarre v. Legrand, 123.

EXTENSION OF.

3. An indefinite or uncertain extension of time for the payment of a note, which does not tie up a creditor's hands, will not discharge an endorser.-People's Bank of Wilkesbarre v. Legrand, 123.

SET OFF.

4. In action on a promissory note defendant can set off a claim against plaintiff for damages done to defendant by plaintiff while he, plaintiff, was employed as engineer for defendant.-Nixon v. McCrory, 10.

5. If however it has funds of the maker in hand at the time of the bringing the suit against the endorser he may avail himself of the maker's right to set-off.-People's Bank of Wilkesbarre v. Legrand, 123.

RAILROAD. NEGLIGENCE, 13-16.
REALTY. DISTRIBUTION, 5.
RE-AUDIT.

COUNTY ACCOUNTS.

TAXATION, I.

1. Under the provisions of the Act of 1872, the County Re-auditors reported an indebtedness on the part of the defendant and his colleagues, Commissioners of York County, of $3,019.20. This report was filed in the Prothonotary's office, and judgment for that amount entered against defendant and his colleagues. Defendant appealed fom his report, but the appeal was never prosecuted. A scire facias was issued on the

judgment, and after the lapse of five years the defendant filed his petition praying the Court to quash the scire facias and strike off the report of the Re-auditors. HELD, That the petition must be dismissed.-York County v. Reeser, 207.

2. The defendant having appealed from the report, has himself brought it into Court for adjudication.-Ib.

3. There may be matter for judicial investigation, and this can only be determined upon the hearing of the appeal, upon an issue properly presented to the Court.—Ib. ROADS.

BOROUGH ORDINANCE.

I. A petition for a road set forth that the road of Carlisle, where South Street as ordered to be was to "end at a point in the line of the borough laid out and opened by the ordinances of that borough would meet the line of said township of South Middleton." The report set forth that they had "laid out for public use the following road," describing the termini as in the petition. By a borough ordinance three viewers were appointed, who laid out South Street, and assessed damages. Appeals were taken from this award of damages and are still undetermined. At a subsequent meeting the town council passed an ordinance repealing the "opening ordinance,' but this repealing act was never transcribed in the ordinance book or signed by the Chief Burgess, nor ever published in a newspaper. HELD, that an exception taken to the report on these grounds must be set aside.-Road in South Middleton Township, 63.

2. Dubiter, whether, after the passing of an ordinance to open a street, the appointment of viewers, assessment of damages, and confirmation of report, the town council can repeal the ordinance.-İb.

3. Although said South Street has not yet been opened, yet there is no ordinance to prevent its being opened, and therefore may terminate at said point.-Ib.

4. After the determination of the question of damages the Court can compel the opening of said South Street.—Ib.

DAMAGES.

5. The reviewers of a proposed road reported that the road was of such public utility that the damages ought to be paid by county. The Commissioners reported that the damages assessed were excessive. The report of the viewers was confirmed, but, on application of the Commissioners, a review of damages was granted. An order was issued to open the road, whereupon this order until their review of damages was disthe Commissioners moved for a suspension of refused.-Road in Lower Chanceford Townposed of. HELD, That the motion must be ship, 197.

6. The ultimate opening of a road does not depend upon the amount of damages to be paid by the county.-Ib.

7. When damages are assessed by a road jury the report must set out that the lands against which the damages are assessed are near and adjacent to the road.—Road in Ridley, 59.

PETITION.

8. Where an old is asked to be changed and straightened, the petition should also pray that the parts of the old road not required to be vacated, in order that the statute forbiding the width of a road to be more than fifty feet be complied with.-Adamstown Borough Road, 46.

REPORT.

9. When the prayer of the petitioners is that the jury may view both the old and the proposed road, and "if they should see occasion to lay out the same, to inquire of and vacate" the old road, a report which does not vacate the old road will be defective.-Road in Ridley, 59.

Io. Where the order to the viewers does not conform to the petition praying to view, change and straighten a road, it is a fatal defect and an exception on that ground will be sustained.— Adamstown Borough Road, 46.

TERMINI.

II. It is not requisite in an order to viewers, that it shows that the public road to be laid out is to begin in a public road, and to end in a public road, but is sufficient when the points of termini are set forth with reasonable certainty. -Road in West Cocalico Township, 3.

12. A road terminating at a point on the borough line has a sufficient public terminis.-Road in South Middleton Township, 63.

13. A report of viewers which sets forth that the terminis of a new road was at a "post in the Middletown and Arendtsville road," will be recommitted to the viewers for amendment, with instruction to more particularly describe the location of the post.-Road in Manellen Town ship, 128.

VIEWERS.

The Court appointed Jacob Tyson as a reviewer Jacob F. Tyson acted in that capacity. HELD, That there was a jacob Tyson residing in a neighboring township, and there is nothing to show who was intended, the report should be set aside and an alias review granted.-Road in Windsor Township, 210.

SALE.

CONDITIONAL.

1. As a rule, in cases of conditional sale, where possession is given to the purchaser, the right of reclamation, while good as between the parties, cannot be exercised against execution creditors of the vendee or bona fide purchasers from him without notice of the conditional agreement.Lee & Bro. v. Byers, 183.

2. A case which was held a conditional sale. -Ib.

FRAUDULENT.

3. L., the owner of an artesian well borer, was indebted to M., an employee, and gave him a judgment note for the same. Afterwards M. threatened to issue an execution, whereupon L. gave him a second judgment note in payment of the first. Afterwards M. issued execution upon the first judgment which had not been marked satisfied. After the levy of the property on this execution, L. sold the same to G., another employee, who had knowledge of the execution. The first execution was set aside and a second issued, when G. claimed the property. An issue was formed under the Sheriff's Interpleader Act, G. being plaintiff and M. defendant. Upon the the trial of the case these facts were proven, and also L.'s efforts to sell the property; the fact that G. paid no money for it, that L.'s contracts were all completed, and that there seemed to be no apparent change in the appropriation of the proceeds of the work and labor done for parties who engaged the machine. The jury found for the plaintiff. The Court (Gibson A. L. J.) set the verdict aside, as being against the weight of the evidence.-Gantz v. McCracken, 184.

SHERIFF'S. SHERIFF'S sale, 1.

WHAT CONSTITUTES.

4. J. & Co., being indebted to T. C. & Co., sold to them a powder car, with the understanding, however, that J. & Co. were to have the use of it by paying switch charges and a certain sum per year. The car was removed from the switch upon which it was standing, to another. Seven or eight days thereafter the car was used by J. & Co., and afterwards, and finally, while so used, was attached and sold as property of said J. & Co. HELD, in an action of replevin brought by T. C. & Co. against the purchaser at a constable's sale, that the plaintiff could not recover.-Thomas, Chambers & Co. v. Everhart & Co., 75.

5. The removal of the car from one switch to another, was a sufficient change of possession to vest the property in the plaintiff.-16.

6. The agreement that J. & Co. were to have the use of the car by paying "the switch rent, repairs and $18 per year, ,"such a qualification of the plaintiffs' possession, as to render the sale fraudulent in law.-Ib.

7. The possession of the car by the plaintiffs was not so continued as to make it available to them against the claims of the creditors of J. & Co. -Ib.

SEDUCTION. CRIMINAL LAW, IO.

SEPARATE EARNINGS. MARRIED WOMAN, 3
SET-OFF.

BY MUNICIPALITY. MUNICIPALITY, I.
ON NOTE. PROMISSORY NOTE, 4-5.
ON SUIT. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, 7.
SHERIFF'S SALE.

EFFECTS OF. WILL, 8.

LIABILITY OF SHERIFF.