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1. The Directors of the Poor of Bedford coun- CLAIM TO. ty notified the Overseers of Licking Creek town- 1. As a general rule, nothing earned by a corship to remove an insane inmate of the Bedford poration can be regarded as profits until it shall County Almshouse, but they failed to do so. A have been declared to be so lvy the corporation bill was presented to them for the maintenance itself, acting by its board of managers. The fact of said inmate, which they refused to pay. that a dollar has been earned gives no stockHeld, That the plaintiff was entitled to recover. holder a right to claim it until the corporation -Poor Directors of Bedford County v. Poor decides to distribute it as profit; Morris' Appeal, Overseers of Licking Creek Township, 196. (2 Norris 266) followed.-Ross' Estate, 131.
2. An insane person is within the meaning of DIVORCE. the Act of 1836.–16.
ALIMONY. 3. Where there has been a removal and an ac
1. A woman living in a state of adultery has ceptance without appeal, the district accepting no claim upon her husband for support, and is liable to the district removing for costs and where this is shown clearly the court will refuse charges.-16.
an application for alimony pendente lite.-Miller DISTRIBUTION.
v. Miller, 28. ASSIGNED ESTATE.
COUNSEL FEES. 1. The 3d section of the Act of 1872, does not 2. The wife petitioned for divorce on the give a lien on chose in action in favor of wages ground of desertion; the husband's answer simclaimants; the lien is limited to such property ply denied the allegation of the petition : HELD as is subject to seizure and sale on execution.
that she was entitled to a reasonable allowance Jones' Appeal, 255.
for counsel fees, etc.—Miller v. Miller, 28. 2. Moneys received from the insurance of a
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 8. woolen mill must be distributed pro rata among WHEN VACATED. all creditors; the wages of operatives in the mill
3. A decree of divorce obtained by fraud and are not entitled to a preference in such distri- coilusion, will always be vacated is brought to bution.-16.
the notice of the court promptly, and before the 3. The proceeds of a crop of wheat, growing rights of others have intervened; but when at the time the labor of operatives were per- many years have been allowed to elapse, during formed and severed, by sale or otherwise, before
which a second marriage has been contracted by the real estate is sold, is properly applicable to
the guilty party, and children have been born the payment of their wages, in preference to the to him who would bastardized by the annuling lien of a judgment on the land. That the severance was produced by the sale of a receiver will the record shows that there was no cause of
of the divorce, it will not be disturbed, unless not affect the rule.-16.
action.-Firmin v. Firmin, 58. 4. It seems that the proceeds of a grass crop; grown after claims for wages had accrued, should
DRIVING. NEGLIGENCE, I, 2. however, be awarded to lien creditors in their
DRUNKENNESS. JUDGMENT, 8. order.-16.
5: It seems, also, that the procec ds of old iron, EASEMENT. which had formed a part of the machinery of a 1. Where rain water has been accustomed to mill destroyed by fire, should be distributed as flow evenly from the lands of one over those of real estate.-16.
his eighbor, mere user will not give to the latDECEDENT'S ESTATES.
ter the right to have the even flow maintained. 6. The income or dividend from bank stock
-Malin v. Worrall, 161. was bequeathed to the testator's widow for life.
2. A land-owner cannot so change the natural She died June 3, and a dividend was declared on
confirmation of his land as to throw in a body, the 29th of the same month. HELD, that her
upon his neighbor's land, water which has been estate was not entitled to any portion of the
accustomed to flow evenly over the surface.-10. same.-Ross' Estate, 131.
BILL IN. 7. In the distribution of the proceeds of a 1. A., as surety for B., paid a judgment resheriff's sale of real estate, if the defendant has covered against them. B's wife to indemnify waived the benefit of the exemption laws in A., assigned two judgments which she held three judgments, he cannot claim it as against against B. Upon the distribution of B's asa judgment creditor in whose judgment there is signed estate, A. received a dividend on the two no waiver; Pitman's Appeal, 12 Wr. 315 followed judgments and also on his claim against B by - Weaver et al. v. Steacy et al., 205.
reason of his payment of the debt on which he 8. A claim for taxes, under the Act of June 2, was surety. Afterwards, E., assignee for A., 1881, (P. L, 45), must state what taxes are attached B's legacy under D's will and received claimed and when levied, and also in all other a sum much larger than the original debt. B. respects must conform strictly to the Act of as- and wife then filed a bill in equity, alleging that sembly. As the requirements of the Act were the assignment of the judgments by the wife to not observed in this case, the claim was not en- A was fraudulent; or if not, that she was entitled titled to priority of payment allowed by the to receive from A. and E., or either of them, the Act.-16.
amount received by them over and above the 9. Where a party is clearly entitled to the original sum of money paid by A. as surety for balance of the fund for distribution, the Court
B. and praying that the whole of the moneys rewill not subject it to the costs of an audit, but
ceived by A, and E., or all received by them in will order the sheriff to pay such balance over
excess of the amount paid by A. as aforesaid, be to the party legally entitled to it.-16.
decreed to be paid to the wife of E. HELD, on
demurrer, that a bill in equity will not lie in this DIVIDENDS.
case.—Bierbower et ux. v. Laird & Bentzel, 71.
2. All the facts necessary to a complete remedy veyance of land to be made to his wife, she takes
3. Under such a state of affairs, the filing by would be subject to liens which existed at and
! to such fraudulent grantee.-16
4. Lein creditors are not included among those
who may be defrauded by the conveyance of the
5. A creditor who approves or recommends a
conveyance to the wife of his debtor, is estopped
from denying the validity of such conveyance.
6. Marriage does not give the husband a vested
right to curtesy in the wife's estate.-Moninger
v. Ritner, 159.
FEME SOLE TRADERS
7. The act of 14th May. 1855, (feme sole tra-
ders) secures to the wife taking advantage of it
the privileges of the Act of 228 February, 1718,
and the absolute and unqualified right to dispose
of her own property, real, personal, by sale or
will.-Moninger v. Ritner, 159.
8. When a wife, who owns the house she lives
he has no remedy except divorce.--Com. v.
9. A husband will be required to give security
to keep the peace when the wife testifies that
in affecting a threatened entry to her house, the
| title to which she holds in her own name and
from which she has excluded him.--Ib.
ATTACHMENT AGAINST. ATTACHMENT, I-2.
1. When an arrangement is entered into with
minor children, through their guardian, the
rights of all parties must be carefully preserved.
The children will not be allowed to profit by an
2. Defendants, being minors, gave judgment
in consideration of a conveyance of land. While
of course an execution on such judgment must
BAND AND WIFE, 8, 9. not be permitted to refuse to pay their share of
said judgment and at the same time retain their
interest in the land.-16.
INSANITY. CRIMINAL LAW, 5-6; DIRECTORS
OF THE POOR, 2.
I. In a suit on a policy of insurance in a mu-
reason for the non payment of annual dues that
he failed to receive notice that such dues were
of the company that he would receive such no-
tice, and that it was the custom of the company
to send such notice. The Court rejected such
tion to take off the non-suit. Held, That such
offer was improper and the non-suit must be
sustained.-Ottemiller v. New Era Life Asso-
ciation, No. 2, 5.
2. The plaintiff knew, or was bound to know, and upon which mortuary assessments are paid. when the annual dues were payable, and the -Susan Leidig v, The New Era Life Associausage of the company, and his reliance of re- tion of 1876, of Philadelphia, Pa., 135. ceiving such notice, are no excuse for non-pay
11. It was for the jury to determine whether ment.--16.
the applicant had "read or heard read all the 3. The declarations made by the agents could answers in the application.”—16. not add to the original contract a condition to the effect that if he did not get notice he need not pay.-16.
12. In a suit on a policy of insurance in a Mu
tual Aid Association, plaintiff proved notice to 4. A Mutual Life Insurance company is un
defendant to produce the application on which der no obligation to give notice to its members
said policy was issued. Defendant failed to do of the time of payment of premiums or annual
so, alleging that the application was part of the dues.-16.
records of another case, which was now before BENEFICIARIES.
the Supreme Court. Held, affirming the Court 5. Where it appears from the by-laws of a below, that the policy must be admitted in evibeneficial association that its object was to per
dence, notwithstanding the absence of the appetuate a fund for the relief of the widows and plication.-Fidelity Mutual Aid Association v. orphans of its members, the words heirs and le- Leidig, 37. gal representatives, as used in its by-laws, and 13. The President of the Association in a letthe certificate of insurance issued by it, are con- ter written to the plaintiff's attorney stated that strued to mean children.-Meyer's Estate, 166. they did not "contest the claim, nor refuse to
6. The Odd Fellows' Endowment Association pay it up to this time, but prefer to await develissued a certificate of life insurance to J., which a
opments,” and defer payment until apother suit provided that the amount which would become now pending against the companies on the same due thereon at his death should be paid to his loss had been determined. HELD, affirming the wife E or her legal representatives. She having Court below to be a distinct admission of notice died prior to her husband, leaving two children of the loss, and waiver of proof otherwise neto survive her and he having remarried and left
cessary.-10. his second wife to survive him. HELD, that the JURISDICTION. See JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, 10. children were entitled to the fund.-16.
14. Suit may be brought in the county where CONSTRUCTION OF.
the subject of the risk insured against was domi7. Ambiguous words in a policy of insurance
ciled or located, and the summons may be served will be construed most favorably to the insured.
on the company in any other county of the Com-Burkhard v. Traveler's Ins. Co. of Hartford,
monwealth in the manner provided by the origConnecticut, 147.
inal Act of April 24th, 1857:-Spangler v. The
Pennsylvania Mutual Aid Society, 33, and 8. Stepping off the platform of a car through a hole left in the floor of a bridge for repairs, is
Quinn v. Fidelity Beneficial Society, 34. not a “voluntary exposure to unnecessary dan
15. The Acts of April 24, 1857, and April 8, ger" within the meaning of an accident insur
1858, refer to actions commencd in courts of reance policy, when the train had stopped on the
cord only.-Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Hesty, 89 bridge on a dark night, and the hole was not
16. A. was insured in York in the defendant visible, and the assured had no notice of or reason company, which had its office in Lehigh county. to apprehend such danger. Exposure to a hid- Afterward, she assigned the insurance to B., den danger without any knowledge of it does not then moved to Baltimore and died there. B constitute a voluntary exposure to it.- 1b. brought suit against the defendant company in 9. Neither does such an act violate the condi
York county, the writ being directed to the tion of the policy against “walking or being on
Sheriff of Lehigh county, and by him served on the roadbed or bridge of any railway.” The in
the defendant.-HELD that the service must be tent of this language is to exempt from respon
set aside.-Spangler v. Keystone Mutual Benesibility for injuries to the assured from traius fil Association, 73. moving thereon, and not to avoid liability for 17. The Act of 1857 permits suit to be brought injuries resulting from being on bridges unsafe in the county where the property insured is loin themselves.-10.
cated; this is a tantamount to saying where the 10. In the certificate of life insurance in suit,
property insured is destroyed. The place where the company covenanted and agreed in consid
the loss occurs determines the jurisdiction, for eration of certain payments and assessments,
then only does the right of action accrue. So "at the expiration of sixty-days after proof of
in life insurance, the place of death is the place the death of Jacob W. Leidig to pay or cause to
of loss, and the suit must be brought in that be paid unto Susan Leidig his wife, or their heirs
forum.-10. and legal representatives the sum of three ($3.00) dollars for every $1,000 the maxiinum sum of 18. Where insurance companies have paid losbenefit actually in force in this association upon ses upon property destroyed by fire through the the decease of the said Jacob Leidig, and upon alleged negligence of a third party they may which the mortuary assessments are paid; pro- bring suit against the wrong-doer, in the name vided the amount so paid shall not exceed the of the assured, without his consent, and the asmaximium sum of three thousand dollars." sured cannot prevent such use of his name, or, HELD, by the Court belom and affirmed by the by a release to the defendant, defeat the action. Supreme Court that the burden of proof was not
--Kennebec Ice and Coal Co. v. Wilmington and upon the plaintiff, but upon the defendant, to Northern R. R. Co., 59. show, that there were “$1,000 maximum sums 19. In such case the insurers are not obliged to of benefits actually in force in the defendant wait the pleasure of the assured whether he will company upon the decease of the insured
bring suit.- 1b.
RIGHT TO SUE.
20. Seven insurance companies, having paid AUTHORITY TO ENTER. losses upon the property of K., which was burnt 2. The following indorsement on the abstract through the alleged negligence of W., instituted of proceedings in a judgment in the Common suit in the name of K., but without K.'s consent Pleas, viz.: "I authorize any attorney or proWarrants of attorney having been filed, execu- thonotary to enter judgment against me for the ted by the several insurance companies a rule within amount, is sufficient to authorize the was taken by defendant to show why proceed- entry of judgment.-Cooper v. Shaver, 109. ings should not be stayed until a letter of attor
DEFECTIVE. ney was filed executed by K. An answer to the
3. In the absence of actual notice of a judgrule was filed showing the payment of the losses
ment, the defective entry on the records by the by the insurance companies, and the refusal of introduction of an initial letter is not recorded K to institute suit or join in the suit as institu- notice, and a judgment thus defectively entered ted, or authorize the use of K.'s name as plain
will be postponed to a judgment properly entiff. HELD, That the warrants of attorney filed tered.-King v. King and Miller, 54. were sufficient.-16.
4. B. held a judgment, entered against J. T. WAGER POLICY.
M. in 1871; K. recovered a judgment against J. 21. A policy of life insurance was issued to J., M. in 1872, both in fact, against the same defena son of the assured's daughter-in-law. J. as- dant. The defendant's name was J.M. He took signed it to G. who paid the assessments, &c., his title in this name, and so signed all legal and upon the death of the assured received the papers excepting the bond to B. K. had no amount of the policy. Suit was brought by the knowledge of B.'s judgment. In a distribution administrators of the assured to recover the of the fund produced by the sale of the real esamount received by G. less assessments and dues tate of J. M., HELD, that the judgment of K. is paid by him. HELD, That plaintiffs were enti- entitled to the proceeds to the exclusion of that tled to recover.-Gilbert v. Moose's Adminis- of B.-16. trators, 143.
5. Had K been aware of the judgment held by 22. A gambling policy will not be enforced in B, he would have been postponed.-16. this state.-16.
6. The omission of the middle letter in the 23. The proceeds of the policy could not go to name of a defendant, in the entry of a judgment J. or his assignee, since he had no insurable in- is fatal to the lien as against subsequent judgment terest.-16.
creditors, not having actual notice, and whose 24. The dictum of Sharswood in Insurance Co. judgments are properly entered. - Perkins & v. Sleau, 2 Casey 189, does not apply to this Miller v. Nichols, 113. case, for that is only applicable to a case where 7. Where the middle letter is omitted from the policy is bona fide, and founded on an in- each of two judgments, the fact that the initial surable interest.–16.
is inserted in the index of the latter judgment 25. H., the beneficiary in a mutual policy, as- will not give it priority over the other.- 1b. signed the same to third persons, who had no insurable interest. These assignees paid all as- 8. The note with warrant of attorney to consessments, and at the death of the insured, fess judgment, and upon which judgment was claimed the amount of the policy from the Asso- entered against the defendant, was signed by ciation. Before payment, H. notified the Asso- him when
he was in a drunken spree, and on a ciation that he claimed the amount of the insur
petition to open such judgment he testified that ance as heir-at-law of the insured, and contested
he had no knowledge of signing such note. The the assignment on the ground of the assignees plaintiff was unable to show clearly the defenhaving no insurable interest, and the entire tran
dant's indebtedness to him, to the amount of saction being a speculation, and brought suit the judgment. HELD, to be sufficient cause to against the Association. HELD, That H. was send the case to a jury.-Marshall v. Hale, 6. estopped from setting up such a claim, he hav
9. On a rule to open a judgment, unliquidated ing entered into the arrangement of his own ac- damages arising from a contract not a part of cord, and executed an assignment under seal to the judgment in controversy cannot be introthat effect.-Hettinger v. United Brethren Mu- duced to reduce the amount of the judgment. tual Aid Society, 39.
-Caffrey v. Carle, 189. INTEREST.
10. The act of April 15th, 1869, does not re
quire the evidence of a party in interest, though WARD, I, 2.
the only evidence on his side should be corrobWHEN STOPPED. DECEDENT'S ESTATES, 6, 7.
orated to make it effective.-Anthracite B. &
L. Association v. Lyons, 103. JUDGMENT.
11. M. borrowed a certain sum of money from
K. and gave therefor a judgment note. This 1. A petition was presented by the children of note was signed by M., and afterward by misA., deceased, alleging that the judgment origin- take, by K., who was also the payee in the note. ally given by B. to C. was to secure moneys which It was finally signed by W., as surety. Judgment c, as guardian of said children, had loaned to B; was entered on the note, when K. asked to have that the judgment had been assigned by C. to his name stricken off as one of the defendants. the present equitable plaintiffs, and praying the To this W. objected, averring that he only signed Court to set aside said assignment and that the the note as joint surety with K., and M. being judgment be decreed for the use of said children. solvent the striking off of K's name would renHELD, That the judgment being to C. absolutely der W. alone liable for the whole amount. The and having no ear-niarks on it so show the pres- Court below (WICKES, P.J.) struck off K's name ence of any secret equities, and there being no and refused to allow the judgment to be opened evidence that the assignees had notice of such as to W. HELD, affirming the Court below, that equities, the assignment will not be disturbed. K's name was properly struck off.-Weller's --Socks v. Socks, 66.
12. There was such irregularity upon the face 2. When the answer denies indebtedness to
fendant to have the fund set apart to him under
3. It is competent for the plaintiff notwith-
conclusions from the evidence.-16.
4. It is possible, also, that upon the day of the
terrogatories to be served upon the garnishee,
5. The verbal statements of the garnishee,
made in the presence of the justice, after his
answers have been delivered, and when not under
former answers, will not authorize the justice to
ment against him.-16.
6. Practice before justice of the peace in cases
of attachment execution, considered.--16.
7. M. brought suit against S. before a Justice
of the Peace and obtained judgment by default.
Afterward S. brought suit against M. before an-
other Justice. On the hearing M. offered in evi-
dence was rejected, and judgmententered against
the defendant. HELD, on certiorari, that the
neglect of the present plaintiff to bring in his
set aside.-Shetter v. Metzgar, 8.
come in question in an action before a justice of
the peace, under the Act of March 22, 1814, may
be made by the attorney for the defendant, ad
the jurisdiction of the justices thereby ousted. —
Acker v. Moore, 190.
9. In an action before a justice, the plaintiff's
demand was for “five dollars and twenty-five
cents damages, by reason of defendant's not re-
and receiving pay for it.” HELD, that the jus-
tice had jurisdiction.—Klinetob v. Roth, 95.
10. The act of April 5, 1873, in regard to for-
eign insurance companies, does not enlarge the
jurisdiction of the justices of the peace so as to
permit them to direct process to a constable of
another county.-Fidelity and Casualty Co. v.
II. It is misconduct on the part of a magis-
bail for an appeal, and paid the costs, that an
See MUNICIPALITY, 3-6.
12. The Justice's summons was "being in plea
of settlement of book account.” HELD, That
the claims and credits shown in the record not
ners or trustees, the exceptions to the summons
aud the judgment is less than one hundred dol-