the option to purchase after trial. He did purchase and gave the notes in question for the purchase moneys, as is expressly stated on the face of the notes. The transaction was not a bailment, but a conditional sale, wherein the property was to remain in the vendor until the goods were paid for with a right to reclaim them if not paid for, or if the vendor deemed the notes taken for the purchase moneys in

secure.

In the case of a bailment, the owner or bailor is entitled, as a rule, to the goods as against everybody, but, in a conditional sale such as this, where possession is given to the purchaser, the right of reclamation, while good as between the parties, cannot be exercised against execution creditors of the vendee or bona fide purchasers from him, without notice of the agreement This case cannot be distinguished from

those referred to and comes precisely

within the rulings there made. See also Krause v. Commonwealth, 9 W. N. C. 61.

The question was raised, on the argument, whether the circumstances attending the sale of the property by Samuel Byers to Gheen and Robert Byers were such as to take from the plaintiffs the right of reclamation as against them. We have no doubt on this point. They were innocent purchasers for value, and the agreement, giving the plaintiffs the right to retake possession of the property, was fraudulent and void as to them. The fact that, when the replevin was issued, they had not actually removed the property from the premises occupied by Samuel Byers, makes no difference. They had parted with their money on the faith of his ownership of the goods and had become the purchasers of it, and, so far as concerns the plaintiffs, removal from the premises was not necessary.

Let judgment be entered in favor of the defendants, Robert Byers and Francis H. Gheen, and that they have return of the goods irreplevisable.

Gantz v. McCracken. Sale-Change of possessson-FraudLien of Execution.

L., the owner of an artesian well borer, was indebted to M., an employee, and gave him a judgment for the same. Afterwards M. threatened to issue an execution, whereupon L. gave him a second judgment note in payment of the first. Afterwards M. issued execution upon the first judgment, which had not been marked satisfied. After the levy of the property on this execution, L. sold the same to G., another employee, who had knowledge of the execution. The first execution was set aside and a second issued, when G. claimed the property. An issue was formed under the Sheriff's Interpleader's Act, G. being plaintiff and M. defendant. Upon the trial of the case these facts were proven, and also L.'s efforts to sell the property the fact that G. paid no money for it, that L.'s contracts were all completed, and that there seemed to be no apparent change in the appropriation of the proceeds of the work and labor done for parties who engaged the machine. The jury found for the plaintiff. The Court (Gibson, A. L. J.) set the verdict aside, as being against the weight of the evidence.

Rule for new trial.

This is an issue directed by the court under the Sheriff's Interpleader Act, to determine the ownership of certain property levied upon under fi fa, No. 40, April Term, 1883. The material facts are these: Samuel M. McCracken held a judgment against James G. Ludwig for $639.00, on which a fi fa to August Term, 1882, was issued. The plaintiff stayed the writ at the instance of the defendant, and subsequently took from him a promissory note for $651.00 with warrant of attorney to confess judgment, in payment of the amount due on said judgment, but the judgment remained unsatisfied on the record.

Ludwig having failed to pay the note, McCracken directed his attorney to "collect the money" who, not knowing anything of the note having been taken in payment or substitution of the judgment. on record and unsatisfied, issued alias fi. fa. to April Term, 1883, under which Ludwig's property, consisting of a portable steam engine and machinery for boring artisan mills, was levied upon. Gantz was an employee of Ludwig, at the time of the levy, working by the day. Ludwig, immediately upon the levy being made, tried to sell the property seized. He failed to get a purchaser for it, owing to the fact that it was in the custody of the Sheriff, as was proven at the trial. He then applied to the Court for a rule to

show cause why the fi fa should not be set aside, alleging that it was void.

Pending the rule he sold the property levied upon to Gantz, the plaintiff, in this issue. No money was paid by Gantz, at the time of the alleged sale, but he gave Ludwig his promissory notes for the purchase money. The sale was made Feb. 23, 1883; on the 26th of the same month the rule was made absolute. McCracken entered judgment on the note for $651. On the same day the alias fi fa was set aside, and a fi fa was issued at once and the same property levied upon. The property was in Hellam township, about eight miles from York. The lien of the fifa attached at 11:10 o'clock A. M., February 26. Gantz went to take possession of the property about 6 o'clock P. M. of the same day. Upon his claim to the property the Sheriff's interpleader intervened.

N. M. Wanner and John Blackford for plaintiff.

James Kell and W. C. Chapman for

defendant.

January 12, 1884. GIBSON, A. L. J.With regard to the material facts of this case there is no conflict of testimony and no question as to the credibility of witnesses. The whole case is before us without dispute except as to the conclusion to be drawn from the facts as proved.

At the time of the transaction between Ludwig and the plaintiff in this issue, on the 23d of February, 1883, which is claimed to be a bona fide purchase and change of ownership of the property in question, the process upon which the property was then held was void. The question, therefore, of a fraudulent sale of the property arises just as though the transaction was done in contemplation of an execution against it. But, nevertheless, the property was held on the execution issued on 8th of February, though subsequently set aside on the 26th of the same month.—

The property was in custodia legis, sufficiently to prevent a transfer by delivery. Fieri facias, No. 27, April Term, 1883,

Now the

was set aside at 10:50 A. M. and fieri facias. No. 40 April Term, 1883, was issued on the same day at 11:10 A. M., twenty minutes afterwards. question whether the first execution was a lien or not, or whether there was any lien upon the property at all until the second execution issued at 11:10 A. M., on the 26th of February, does not effect the bona fides of the transaction; but the knowledge of this plaintiff of the first levy, which was pending at the time he bought the property as he alleges, on the 23d of February, the stopping of work at the time of the first levy, and the efforts to sell by Ludwig, are facts bearing upon the question of a fraudulent intent in the sale. But in addition to this and the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, such as the plaintiff being an employee of Ludwig and being possessed of no money or property whatever, the fact

of the working of the machine afterwards by both of them, whether they changed their relations to each other by the master becoming the servant and the servant the master, or whether the contracts for work, were Ludwig's or the plaintiff's, or which of them claimed or had the ostensible possession of the property.—all this conjoint operation of the machine and machinery, constituting the property in question, and the manner of the appropriation of its earnings, adds to the weight of the evidence tending to show a fraudulent transfer of its ownership. And here perhaps there was an inadequate conception of the case by the jury.

If Mr. Ludwig had relinquished all concern whatever in the property, and had gone away from this neighborhood, the bona fides of the transaction could still have been questioned from the circumstance immediately surrounding the transaction. But here arises the question as to the weight of evidence. The machinery had been bought by Mr. Ludwig on credit from this defendant, who is plaintiff in the pending execution, and the plaintiff in

this issue has also shown his alleged purchase to have been upon credit, with the exception of a small amount of money due him as employee. Ludwig's contracts as former owner are carried out, his debts are paid, he remains with the machinery, which he worked himself, as he said, "beause he knew better about working the machine than Gantz did." The payments on account of the purchase, as claimed by plaintiff, were from the earnings of the machine. In other words there is no apparent change in the appropriation of the proceeds of the work and labor done for parties, who engaged the machine, from what it would have been had Ludwig remained owner, while the man from whom Ludwig bought, this defendant, is prevented by the arrangement from collecting his claim.

There seems to be no conceivable ob

ject, no reason why Mr. Ludwig should have made sale to the plaintiff of this property, or why he should have parted with the possession of it in any way, except for the purpose of preventing Mr. McCracken from making his money out of it. The only question for the jury to determine was whether the plaintiff was cognizant of that intention and abetted him in it.

But apart from the question of the weight of evidence, I think, some confusion found its way into the jury box, arising from the evidence as to possession taken, which can, in my opinion, concern only the question of legal fraud. A question of fact went to the jury along with that of fraudulent transfer, as to whether such possession was taken of the property as the circumstances admitted of. That question apparently arose because the court could not pronounce the want of immediate delivery of possession a legal fraud on account of those circumstances, and hence it was for the jury to say whether there was a sufficient delivery to save it from being a legal fraud. But such an issue of fact has no bearing upon

the issue as to actual fraud.

After the transaction at the Pennsylvania House, on the 23d of February, as already stated, the property was not released from the custody of the law until the 26th of February, and twenty minutes after that release another execution of McCracken seized the property. Hence, of course, the plaintiff in this issue could not get possession of the machinery in question, except upon a claim of property and a bond given for its forthcoming to meet the demands of the execution issued by the defendants in this issue. Any effort in order to take possession by Gantz were of course idle till that claim was made and bond given. There is, then, no such question of fact in the case. If it was a bona fide sale, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property by law as soon as he can get it. The same efforts to get possession, whether real or not, would have been made whether the sale was bona fide or not, and cannot have any bearing upon the question of fraudulent

intent.

This is an issue directed by the court to determine the ownership of certain property levied upon. It is not an action for the recovery of goods involving merely the question of title. It involves the rights of an execution creditor depending upon the solution of a question of alleged fraud.

Under all the evidence in the case, the court is not satisfied with the verdict and, therefore, the rule for a new trial is made absolute.

Judgment-Married Women.-A judgment confessed by a married woman can be enforced only in the single instance where, when a conveyance is made to her, it forms part of an agreement under which she takes land subject to the condition that she shall pay its price. In every other instance it is void.-Vandike v. Wills, 14 Pittsburgh Legal Journal 217.

ceded he resided here when his name was placed in the wheel; his removal to Baltimore was rather an experiment, according to his own account-if he liked the business and the place he intended to remain-if he did not his purpose was to return. He left a considerable part of his furniture here in the house he had occupied, and after remaining in Baltimore about two months he was not successful or not pleased and returned here again. It has been repeatedly decided in this State and elsewhere, that residence is a question of intention, and that is a conclusion of law from the facts in each particular case. But it is uniformly held that the intention to reside outside the

State must be fixed and permanent, before the domicil is lost here and acquired elsewhere. We can gather no such intention from the evidence submitted. Nor does the alleged disqualifications of the juror (Myers) amount to any disqualification at all when tested by his own deposition. He had declared under oath, that he understood what the witnesses

testified to and what the Court said in charging the jury. He obviously belongs to that large class of our population of German extraction, who, while familiar with all the niceties of the Eng lish tongue, are sufficiently informed of its meaning for the practical purposes of our jury service.

The bank officers and others, whose depositions are now before us, with few exceptions, testified at both trials, that they believed the signature of Manifold to be genuine and not simulated; further than this they could not go and confessedly the evidence now offered of a comparison of hands by them is not legal evidence and could not be used if a new trial was granted. This duty of comparison of the alleged forged instrument with the test papers admitted in evidence is distinctly for the jury, and their duty and right to make it carefully, was greatly impressed upon them by defendant's

Luzurne County v. Galland Brothers & Co.

Manufacturing machinery affixed to the premises by the lessee, is subject to taxation as real estate. Case stated.

January 7, 1884. WOODWARD, J.-It appears from the facts submitted to us in the case stated, that the defendants are manufacturers, and, as such, are the owners of certain machinery upon which, for the year 1883, a county tax has been assessed. The question presented is, whether the machinery of the defendants is taxable, as real estate, for county purposes.

The house and lot are owned by one

Fitzpatrick, and have been assessed with Fitzpatrick, and have been assessed with ises, however, are leased to the defendtaxes against him as owner. The premmachinery in question was set up and is ants for manufacturing purposes, and the being operated by them as already stated.

The Act of Assembly of 15th April, 1834, section 4 (Purd. 1359) provides, that "manufactories of all descriptions" shall be subject to assessment as real estate.

In the case of Patterson v. Delaware county (20 P. F. S. 381), it was held that, under the 32d section of the act of 29th April, 1844, machinery was properly taxed as real estate. This section, so far as manufactories are concerned, does not

appear to be more definite or specific than the Act of 15th April, 1834, to which we have already referred.

The case of Patterson v. Delaware

county, however, differs from the present one in this, that the machinery upon which the assessment was made, belonged