loss of life in consequence of such exposure, or while thus exposed."

The insured was traveling by rail through Indiana, on his way to Kentucky. The train stopped on the bridge across the Ohio river, by reason of the draw part of the bridge being open. He went to the front platform of the coach in which he was riding and stepped off and through a hole in the floor of the bridge, causing his death. This hole was about three feet wide and four feet long. It was caused by the removal of some planks during the making of repairs.

1. Was this act of the insured voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger?

To make him guilty of a "voluntary exposure to danger," he must intentionally have done some act which reasonable and ordinary prudence would pronounce dangerous. The uncontradicted evidence shows that several other passengers got out of the coach, and some of them in advance of the insured. They certainly apThey certainly apprehended no danger. It is customary for male passengers to alight when a train stops for any length of time. No notice was given to passengers that it was dangerous to get out of the coach where it stood. So far as appears, the bridge, with the exception of this hole, was well covered with plank and entirely safe. When the intestate alighted other passengers were standing on the bridge near the breakman. The latter was sitting on timber that was lying on the foot-walk of the bridge, and was to be used in the repairs being made. The passengers had no knowledge of these repairs. The breakman held his lantern so placed on the floor that another timber cast its shadow over the hole, making it impossible for the insured to see it. He could see that portion of the floor lighted by the lantern, and the passengers standing thereon. could see the breakman near them. stepped out of the coach in plain sight of the breakman. He had a right to suppose he could land on a floor as firm as that on

He

He

which the others stood. Neither word nor sight gave him notice of danger. He did not approach the opening caused by the draw and was not injured thereby.

It is true he voluntarily left the car, but a clear distinction exists between a voluntary act and a voluntary exposure to danger. Hidden danger may exist, yet the exposure thereto without any knowledge of the danger does not constitute a voluntry exposure to it. The approach to an unknown and unexpected danger does not make the act a voluntary exposure thereto. The result of the act does not

necessarily determine the motive which prompted the action. The act may be voluntary, yet the exposure involuntary. The danger being unknown, the injury is accidental. Accident is defined by Worcester to be an event proceeding from an unknown cause, or happening without the design of the agent; an unforseen event, incident, casualty, chance. And by Webster, an event that takes place without one's forethought or expectation; an event which proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusal effect of a known cause, and therefore not expected; chance, casualty, contingency.

In view of the unquestioned facts the death of the intestate was accidental. The danger was unknown. The injury was not designed. We think there was not such a voluntary exposure to danger as to fairly bring the act of the insured within the meaning of the exception.

2.

Was he walking or being on the road-bed or bridge of the railway.

He certainly was not walking on the road-bed or bridge, and strictly speaking it is doubtful whether he was being on either. The evidence indicates that without touching either he evidently passed directly from the steps of the car through the hole in the bridge. We will not, however, put the case on the narrow ground that he did not come in contact with either road-bed or bridge. The language of the exception clearly implies two

thoughts. One, that the insured must not be on the road-bed or bridge for any length of time; the other that the prohibition is not to guard against injury resulting from a defective road-bed or defective railway bridge, but against the danger of injury from trains passing thereon. If the design was to apply the language to bridges defectively constructed or out of repair, it would not have been restricted to railway bridges. It would have included all bridges, both foot and wagon. The purpose is not to avoid liability for injuries resulting from being on bridges unsafe in themselves. The manifest intent is to exempt from responsibility from damage caused by collision with trains moving thereon.

The present is not like a case between a passenger and a railway company, in which the company may be exempt from liability for damages arising from negligence of the passenger, not voluntary. Nor did the act of the insured prove such a reckless exposure of his person, nor obvious risk of danger, as to bring him within the application of the rule declared in Morel v. Miss. Valley Ins. Co., 4 Bush, 535; Lovell v. Accident Ins. Co., 2 Ins. Law Jour. 877; Sawtelle v. Railway Pass. Ass. Co., 15 Blatchford 216 and kindred cases.

We therefore think, under the facts found and the rules of law which we have

stated, the learned judge erred in holding that the conduct of the insured brought

him within either of the exceptions, so as to relieve the company from liability.

We discover no merit in the seventh specification of error. The others are substantially sustained.

Judgment reversed, and Judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $3000, with interest thereon from the commencement of the suit, and costs.

Proceedings for the collection of legacies charged on land.

February 24, 1883. RHONE, P.J. We have no doubt but that legacies in question are a charge on land, for the testator says they are to be "secured and paid out of the property." Wertz's Appeal, 19 Smith 173. Smith 173. The legacy being a charge on the land, there is no question but that this court has jurisdiction, and it most likely has exclusive jurisdiction. Downer v. Downer, 9 Watts 60; Pierce v. Liv

ingston, 30 Smith 99. The amendments

allowed are sanctioned in Downer v. Downer, (9 Barr 302) and Railroad and Canal Co. v. Bunnell, 31 Smith 414. As the legacies are not expressly and exclu

sively charged on the land, they come under the general rule, that they are to be paid out of the personal estate, if there be sufficient to satisfy them. Breden v. Gilleland, 17 Smith 34; Hanna's Appeal, 7 Casey 53. It follows, then, as a matter of course, that there must be an account by the executor before it can be determined whether there be a deficiency of assets. It would seem clear, too, that

these legacies are not payable until the legatees arrive at age, but that they draw

interest from the date of the testator's death, and hence this proceeding can only be sustained for the collection of such interest. Magoffin v. Patton, 4 Rawle 113; Bowman's Appeal, 10 Casey 19; Seibert's Appeal,7 Harris 49; Clark v. Wallace, 12 Wright 80; Pages's Appeal, 21 Smith 402.

We, therefore, order that this proceeding be suspended until an account be filed by the executor of this estate, and until it

appears that there is a deficiency of per

sonal estate to pay the legacies.

The LEGAL RECORD at its inception paid very little more than expenses.When the editor became a partner in the publication of the Daily, the patronage it had began to diminish, and has declined ever since. For the purpose of keeping its columns of advertisements filled estate notices were kept in, in some instances, for more than six months, and newspaper advertisements inserted without authority and without pay. The following notices were then inserted to stimulate the bar to its support :

"We call the attention of our friends to the fact that a few estate notices fail to appear in our columns. As a matter of professional pride, for the covenience of brother Attorneys, and as a test of substantial friendship for the RECORD send

them in."

"ARE YOU helping to sustain the RECORD by a liberal construction of the Rules of Court relating to advertising in its columns?"

These were mild appeals, and they did not stimulate. On the 23d of June, 1883, the RECORD contained another notice:

"NOTICE-The publication of the YORK LEGAL RECORD will be discontinued un

less a sufficiency of patronage from the

members of the bar will be extended so that it can be published without loss. The law papers in other sections of the State do not only receive the most adequate encouragement from the members of the bar, but are also given for insertion all the bar, but are also given for insertion all the Register's and Prothonotary's notices of the presentation of accounts. THE YORK THE YORK LEGAL RECORD is recognized throughout the State as a most excellent legal publication, and has a considerable circulation out of this county, but its continuance cannot be expected, when the editor and publisher contributes his labor for less than nothing.

This was not intended to intimidate, and it didn't.

On July 26th, we sought support from another source, and issued the following:

"THE YORK LEGAL RECORD EDITION for our Banks, MERCHANTS, JUSTICES OF THE PEACE and Others.-The publication of the YORK LEGAL RECORD began on the 4th of March, 1880, and it is now in its fourth volume. It contains a

record of cases argued and determined in the various Courts of York county, as well as neighboring counties and important Supreme Court decisions. Four pages of the RECORD are devoted to legal notices and matters of various kinds that are of interest and importance to the Banks, Merchants, Justices of the Peace, and business people generally. The subscription price of the LEGAL RECORD is $2.00 per year. We will hereafter issue a special edition of the paper which will contain everything in the regular edition except the printed cases which are of special value only to members of the bar, for the low price of fifty cents per annum.

The extra edition will contain the railroad time tables, names of the judges, the members of the bar according to seniority, the lists of the Argument, Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas Courts, with the time of their convening and duration, and the issue of the RECORD. Also, Auditors next meeting of the Court succeeding each and Commissioners' notices of the distribution of decedent and assigned estates, and of monies arising from Sheriff's sales, and the time of the presentation of their reports to our Courts. Also Estate and Insolvent notices, and a full list of the letters Testamentary and Administration granted, and assignments made, judgbrought and executions issued, the week ments entered, mortgages recorded, suits preceding the issue of the RECORD. a full list of Estate accounts filed with the

date of their presentation to Court for

confirmation. Also the list and dates of

Widows' appraisements, Divorce notices, Sheriff's sales, Hotel and Restaurant licenses, and also all the special legal orders and decrees made by our Judges.

Much of the matter that is comprehended in this edition of the RECORD is scattered through the various newspapers of the county, and for a person to subscribe for all, so as to get all, would prove very expensive. This edition will not only prove interesting, but useful to our business-men, corporations and justices of the peace, for it will keep them posted with the affairs of the legal world, and thus apprise them of facts which are often of

great concern in their private and business relations. The RECORD will be sent by mail free of postage, or delivered by carrier to subscribers residing in York at 50 cents per year. Send in your names.

We

In pursuance, we distributed the LEGAL RECORD with this legal information broadcast among the merchants and banks of the county, and made a personal canvass; and instead of obtaining several hundred business subscribers, we got less than a dozen. Besides, the venture was looked upon by some as a sort of legal inquisition, and the disclosure of the financial standing of some to their injury. were also scowled at by some of the Court House officials, who claimed that the disclosure of such information would stop all searches and thus impair their revenues. One officer threatened forcible ejectment if the project was continued Therefore the business edition was stopped, and the prospects of revenue which was to assist the RECORD in its support quickly vanished.

As a final appeal we respectfully ask the Court to amend the Rules of Court relative to publications in the RECORD as follows:

All administration, executors, and assignee's notices shall be published in the LEGAL RECORD three times, the charge for each notice to be one dollar, the first two to be collected by the Register at the granting of the letters, and the last by the Recorder at the time of filing the assignments; that the presentation notices of the accounts of administrators, executors, trustees and assignees shall be published in the LEGAL RECORD four weeks preceding their presentation at a cost of fifty cents each to be collected in the offices of their filing. The notice of the filing of married women's petitions for the benefit of the separate earnings act shall be inserted free. A synopsis of each tract of real estate advertised for sale by the Sheriff shall be inserted in the LEGAL RE

CORD four weeks preceding the sale for which the charge shall be fifty cents for

each tract, to be included in the costs of sale. All other notices required to be published by the Sheriff shall be inserted in the LEGAL RECORD, except the election proclamation, the rates to be charged not to exceed those charged by other papers for advertisements of the same character.

This would make the RECORD the

medium of legal information in fact, and confer upon it the support that is extended to other law papers of the State.Many of them even have authority to publish all Orphans' Courts sales in full. The rates we have asked are very low, and much lower than that charged by our legal contemporaries. For instance here are the rates charged by the Luzurne Legal Register:

Ordinary Auditors notices, four times,
Executor and Administrators notices,
six times,

Divorce notices, four times,
Charter notices, three times,
Insolvent notices, two times,

$3.00

3.00

3.00

3.00

2.50

While our rates for the same are $1.50, $1.00, $1.50, $1.50 and $1.50 respectively.

Nearly all the opinions of our Judges are copied in our provincial legal exchanges, and the LEGAL RECORD has become a recognized authority in the Courts of the State. A number of neighboring Judges as well as many foreign members of the bar are subscribers. It also enters into nearly every county law librrry in the State. Although we have had a score or more of extra copies of the first and second volumes on hand, they are all exhausted, and we are now engaged in reprinting many of the numbers to supply the demand. The LEGAL RECORD is now completing its fourth volume, and it would not reflect much credit to have its publication now stopped for want of adequate encouragement. We trust that this appeal will not, like others, be in vain.

-A covenant by which the covenanter restrains himself, generally and absolutely, without limitation as to time or place, from exercising his skill and knowledge, is repugnant to public policy and void: Albright v. Teas, 37 N. J. Eq.

SUPREME COURT.

Weller's Appeal.

Note-Signing of-Defence to.

M. borrowed a certain sum of money from K., and gave therefor a judgment note. This note was signed by M., and afterward, by mistake, by K., who was also the payee in the note. It was finally signed by W. as surety. Judgment was entered on the note, when K. asked to have his name stricken off as one of the defendants. To this W. objected, averring that he only signed the note as joint surety with K., and M. being insolvent, the striking off K.'s name would render W. alone liable for the whole

amount. The Court below (WICKES, P. J.) struck off K.'s name, and refused to allow the judgment to be opened as to W. HELD, affirming the Court below, that K.'s name was properly struck off.

There was such an irregularity upon the face of the note as to put W. on inquiry.

pellant was a surety, and that when he signed the note it had attached to it the names of John Keener and Daniel Miller as makers. In point of fact Keener was the payee, Miller the principal and the appellant his surety. It was alleged by the appellee that the name of Keener as maker was signed by mistake, and upon his own motion the Court below subsequently amended the record of the judgment by stiking out his name, leaving it to stand as a judgment of John Keener v. Daniel Miller and Henry Weller. This

Daniel Miller borrowed a certain sum of money from John Keener, and gave judgment note therefor. Under the direction of Henry Kohr, who acted as amanuensis, Keener also signed this note, which was afterward signed by Henry Weller. Miller proved insolvent, judgment was entered on the note, when the fact of Keener being both plaintiff and defendant was discovered, and the court asked to amend by striking out his name as defendant. This was refused, (see Keener v. Miller et al., YORK LEGAL RECORD 180,) but on a petition to open judgment, and leave Keener on to defend, his name was struck off, against the petition of Henry Weller, who averred that he only signed the note as joint surety with Keener. The Court below, WICKES, P. J., held that the name of Keener as maker, was an error apparent on the face of the note, and in the absence of any evidence of collusion between Keener and Miller, Weller must be held responsible, (see Keener v. Miller et al., No. 2 YORK LEGAL RECORD 217.

From the decree striking off Keener's name as one of the defendants in the judgment, (thus leaving Weller liable for the whole amount, Miller being insolvent) Weller appealed to the Supreme Court.

PAXON, J. This was an appeal from the refusal of the Court below to open a judgment entered upon a warrant of attorney. It was not denied that the ap

to open the judgment are assigned for

error.

It was urged that the amendment came within the second section of the Act of 4th May, 1851, P. L. 574, which provides: "That all actions pending or hereafter to be brought in the several Courts of this Commonwealth, and in all cases of judgments entered by confession, the said Courts shall have power in any stage of the proceedings to permit amendments by changing or adding the name or names of any party, plaintiff or defendant, whenever it shall appear to them that a mistake or omission has been made in the name or names of any such party.'

The Act of 12th April, 1858, P. L. 243, declares that the second section of the Act of 1852 above cited "shall be so constructed as to authorize the said Courts whereby reason of there being too many persons included as plaintiffs or defendants by mistake, as will prevent the cause from being tried on its merits, to permit an amendment by striking out from the suit such persons as plaintiffs or defendants."

Statutes of amendment very properly receive a liberal construction. But amendments which deprive the opposite party of any valuable right should not be allowed. Kille v. Ege, 1 Norris 102.

Has the appellant been injured by the amendment or deprived of any valuable right? He alleges that he signed the