value to the defendant, and the rule to show cause why the execution should not be stayed, must therefore be discharged. Rule discharged.

SUPREME COURT.

Cooper v. Shaver.

The following indorsement on the abstract of proceedings in a judgment in the Common Pleas, viz.: "I authorize any attorney or prothonotary to enter judgment against me for the within amount," is sufficient to authorize the entry of judgment.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford county.

On the 8th of December, 1873, Orin Conner entered judgment against H. Connor for $225, and on the 11th of January, 1876, assigned in the record this judgment to J. P. Ames, who on the 20th of January, 1876, assigned the judgment to Geo. Markham, and on the 24th of April, 1876, the latter person and one J. C. Looker assigned the judgment to Ezra Cooper. This latter assignment was made on the back of the prothonotary's abstract. dorsed on the same abstract appears the following words:

In

the abstract both are taken to evidence the transfer. Shaver's guaranty is also so indorsed, and the abstract, assignment and guaranty together, as if one instrument, evidence his contract, The judgment is particularly described, and so is the court where it is entered: the real debt, date of interest, and plaintiff's costs, are stated; then follow the assignment to Cooper, and Shaver's guaranty of the collection. Hypercriticism would fail to exclude understanding that Shaver guaranteed collection of the judgment described in the abstract, and authorized any attorney or prothonotary to enter judgment against him for the amount of that judgment.

For present purposes let it be understood that Shaver is not bound to pay the money unless it be shown that it could not have been collected from the defendant in the judgment by due diligence. The pending question is not one for stay of execution until Shaver's liability be determined, nor for an issue to try that; but whether the warrant of attorney is void.

Of the words "Apr., 1876," there appears in the original papers to be an attempt at an erasure.

Upon this paper E. Cooper procured the entry by an attorney of the court below of a judgment against Clark Shaver for the amount of the original judgment upon an ordinary narr., and without the assignments of breaches.

The defendant asked the court below to strike off the judgment as having been entered without authority.

The rule to strike off the judgment was made absolute, and judgment stricken off at costs of plaintiff.

The plaintiff thereupon took a writ of error, assigning the striking off of the judgment against Shaver as error.

December 30, 1882. TRUNKEY, J. It has not been pretended that title is the judgment set forth in the abstract is not vested in Cooper. But the conclusion that he has such title is reached only by reading the abstract with the assignment. Standing alone the assignment would be void for uncertainty; being indorsed upon

instrument of writing, or where the instrument contains a warrant for an attorney at law or other person to confess judgment. But if the warrant authorizes the prothonotary to enter judgment for the amount named in the instrument, it is within the spirit of the statute, a chief object of which was to enable parties to dispense with the services of an attorney. Before the date of the statute it had long been within the power of attorneys to confess judgments and cause them to be entered, as it has been since.

Attorneys are officers of the court, and before admission take a prescribed official oath. In the sections of the Act of 1834 regulating their admission, prescribing penalties for misbehavior in office, and defining their powers and duties, they are styled attorneys; but it is plain that word means attorneys at law. The context definitively fixes the meaning. By law, in certain cases, the prothonotary may enter judgments, attorneys may confess judgments, and the courts are defined having jurisdiction of such judgments. The prothonotary is an officer of the court, as well known to be be such as the judges.

In the instrument signed by Shaver, the

meaning of the words, "I authorize my attorney or prothonotary to enter judgment against me," is determined by the context, keeping in view the laws which define in what courts judgments may be confessed or entered, and what officers may confess or enter them. The word attorney as certainly means an officer of the court as does prothonotary, and the warrant authorizes any attorney of the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania to confess judgment, or the prothonotary of any such court to enter judgment, as clearly as if written in so many words. The word confess is not used, but the prothonotary is authorized to enter judgment, which indicates that the attorney shall reach the same end by the proper means in performance of his duties.

The judgment entered April 14, 1882, is reversed, and the judgment confessed by virtue of the warrant of attorney, entered December 13, 1877, is reinstated.

Church's Appeal.

The court below may amend its record after a certiorari has issued to remove it to the Supreme Court.

When an attachment would lie against a party for nonperformance of a decree in equity, it is also the proper remedy to enforce the payment of the costs. In such a case it is not contravention of the Act of July 12th, 1842.

Appeal from the decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzurne county.

A bill was filed against Charlotte Church and Joseph Church, her husband, to have the former declared a trustee as to certain land. The husband had no interest. A decree was entered in favor of the plaintiffs, with costs, from which an appeal to the Supreme Court was taken by the defendants. After the certiorari had gone out, and before the return day, the decree was amended by the court below, and, being certified in this shape, was affirmed by the Supreme Court.The record was in due time remitted to the Common Pleas, about a year after, the costs not being paid, an order for an attachment for contempt was duly made against Joseph Church. His wife had died some time previously. This order was the subject of the assignment of error.

May 7, 1883. TRUNKEY,J.-From the final decree the respondents appealed, and filed the certiorari in the Court of Common Pleas on March 10th, 1877. wards and before the return day of the writ, said decree was amended in the court below, and the record, setting forth the decree as amended, was certified and returned. That is the decree which was affirmed and remitted for enforcement,

and whether there had been irregularities. in the procedure for the amendment is a matter of no concern in the execution.— The alleged irregularities were prior to the final hearing and adjudication in the appellate court, and if it be conceded that the court below erred in making the amendment, the time for its correction was at or before that hearing; the decree, as affirmed, is valid until vacated by the court.

The bill was against Joseph Church and Charlotte, his wife, for a decree that they convey to the plaintiffs certain undivided interests in a tract of land, in accordance with an alleged trust created before and at the time the legal title to the land was vested in said Charlotte. Joseph Church was a necessary party, and it appears that he was an active party in contesting the plaintiff's demand. The result was a decree that Charlotte Church held the legal title to the land; that the defendants should convey said interests to the equitable owners thereof, and that the defendants pay the costs.

The Act of 1842 provides that no person shall be arrested or imprisoned on any civil process issued in any proceeding for the recovery of money due upon a judgment or decree founded upon contract, or due upon any contract, or for the recovery of damages for the non-performance of a contract. This suit was not for the recovery of money, but for the enforcement of a trust, and, therefore without the statute. It may be that the trust grew out of a contract, and that the suit was akin to a proceeding for specific performance, yet it is not within the spirit of the statute, for breaches of duty by trustees are excepted out of its operation: Chew's Appeal, 44 Pa. St. 247.

Where the decree against a party is founded upon his tort, or upon his breach of duty as a trustee, the costs imposed upon him follow his wrongful acts. In an action for recovery of money founded upon a contract, the costs are of the same nature, and the defendant is not liable to arrest for either debt or cost: Pierce v Scott; 40 Legal Intell. 320. But where the party is liable to arrest to enforce the payment of money, or the performance of a specific thing, he is, also, for the costs taxed against him in the judgment or decree.

v.

The order awarding an attachment is affirmed, and appeal dismissed, at the costs of appellant.

YORK LEGAL RECORD.

VOL. IV. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1883. No. 28

Q. S. of

QUARTER SESSIONS.

Lancaster County. Bridge in Rapho and West Hempfield Twps. Bridges--Reports of Views--Grand Jury.

The action of the Grand Jury upon the reports of viewers, re-viewers and re-re-viewers of a bridge determines the proceedings. Hence, when one of the reports is approved by that body, the Court has no right to set aside their action, unless for irregularity or want of jurisdiction in the Grand Jury.

Bridge view, re-view and re-re-viewers. Rule granted April 24, 1883, to show cause why the action of the grand jury, on the reports made on the several views,

should not be set aside.

August 18, 1883. LIVINGSTON, P. J.At November Sessions, 1881, a petition was presented to the Court and viewers were appointed to view a site for a bridge over "Big Chickies Creek," between the townships of Rapho and West Hempfield, on the road leading from Silver Spring to Mount Joy, in Lancaster county. The viewers reported in favor of a bridge, fixed its location, and viewed and reported the changes necessary to be made in the said road to make the proper connection with such bridge. This report was confirmed nisi January 16, 1882.

On April 17, 1882, a petition for a review was filed and presented and reviewers were appointed. They reported in favor of a bridge also, but fixed its location at a point different from that reported by the viewers, making no change in the road. Their report was confirmed nisi August 21, 1882.

And, on November 20, 1882, a petition was filed and presented, and re-re-viewers were appointed, who reported also in favor of the erection of a bridge, and adopted the location reported by the first viewers, making the changes in said road necessary to connect it with such bridge when erected. Their report was 'confirmed nisi January 15, 1883.

All these reports were duly presented to the grand jury for their approval by the counsel representing them at April Sessions, 1883, and, after hearing testimony and the counsel interested, the grand jury on April 19, 1883, returned to the Court the report of the re-viewers "approved," and the reports of the viewers and re-re-viewers "not approved."

And, on April 24, 1883, on motion of E. D. North, Esq., a rule was granted to show cause why the action of the grand jury on the above reports should not be set aside and annulled, and the reports be referred to another grand jury.

Section 35 of the Act of 13th of June, 1836, relative to roads, highways and bridges, declares that: "When a river, creek or rivulet, over which it may be necessary to erect a bridge, crosses a public road or highway, and the erecting of such bridge requires more expense than it is reasonable that one or two adjoining townships should bear, the Court having jurisdiction as aforesaid shall, on the representation of the supervisors, or on the petition of any of the inhabitants of the respective townships, order a view in the manner provided for in the case of roads: and if, on the report of viewers, it shall appear to the Court, grand jury and commissioners of the county, that such bridge is necessary, and would be too expensive for such township or townships, it shall be entered on record as a county bridge."

Section 37 of the same Act declares that: "Viewers of the site of a bridge, appointed as aforesaid, shall have authority by virtue of their appointment to report also whether any change in the course or bed of the road to be connected therewith will be necessary in order to the erection of such bridge at the most suitable place, or at the least expense, or in the best manner; and the same being approved by a majority of the commissioners of the county, and also by the Court, such road shall be altered accordingly." And, by the same Act, the

Court is authorized to appoint re-viewers. etc., etc.

Here three views were had, and three reports made and submitted to the grand jury, all favoring the erection of a bridge, but one of them locating it at one point, the other two at a different point: the grand jury could approve but one report, one location or cite, and they after investigation and hearing evidence, approved the report of the re-viewers, as we have stated. Why should their action be set aside? No testimony has been taken or presented, showing that they behaved improperly, or exceeded their jurisdiction in passing upon these reports.

In the Pequea Bridge case, 18 Sm. 427, the Supreme Court says; It is evident that the Legislature intended that these three bodies, the Court, grand jury and commissioners of this county, shall act as checks upon each other in the necessary expenditure of public money in the erection of county bridges. When either of them, therefore, have put their disapprobation on record the proceeding falls.

That, where a report of viewers recommending a bridge was referred to a grand jury, who approved it, the action of the grand jury was set aside for irregularity, and the report referred to another grand jury who reported "no bridge," the proceeding was set at an end, and referring the report to another grand jury was error. The dissatisfied parties should have commenced anew. As there has been no legal or reasonable ground shown for annulling or setting aside the action of the grand jury on the above reports, we need not discuss the propriety or legality of referring such reports, where the action of the grand jury, as to them, has been annulled or set aside, to another grand jury. The rule must be discharged, and the action of the grand jury and their return to the Court be permitted to stand. Rule discharged.

SUPREME COURT.

City of Scranton v. Hill.

The plaintiff, while walking along the highway upon a dark night, turned aside for the purpose of taking a foot path which led through private property, and, by reason of a miscalculation as to his position, fell over the unguarded edge of a culvert and sustained severe injury thereby. It was in evidence that he was familiar with the condition of the place, having habitually travelled that way about fifteen years; and that, if he had not attempted to leave the street, the accident would not have occurred. HELD that the municipality was not liable.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna county.

May 7, 1883. 1883. STERRETT, J.-The plaintiff below was severely injured by falling from the end of the culvert constructed under and across Main street, in the city of Scranton, and terminating somewhat abruptly several feet beyond the northwesterly line of the street. From a point on the same side of the street, a short distance beyond the culvert, a foot path diverged in the direction of plaintiff's home. According to the uncontradicted evidence in the case, including his own evidence in the case, including his own testimony, he intentionally left the street with the view of taking the path and following it homeward; but, by mistake, he turned off the street too soon, before he had crossed the culvert and reached the point where the path commenced, and was thus led to the end of the culvert from which he fell. If he had not purposely gone beyond the line of the street, or had not turned off quite so soon, it is very evident he would have encountered no

danger. The unfortunate accident which befell him resulted not from the want of proper guards for the protection of those passing and re-passing along the street, but solely from the fact that he had determined to leave and did leave the street for the purpose above stated. In answer to a question on cross-examination, the plaintiff himself says he would not have fallen if he had not turned off the street. It cannot be doubted that if he had intended to keep within the lines of the street and proceed thereon in the directtion he was going before he turned off to the left, he would have passed the cul