Графични страници
PDF файл
ePub

Atterbury v. Stafford.

Mr. James Buchanan, for the complainant.

Mr. Linton Satterthwait, for the defendant.

REED, V. C.

The bill charges that there is no such person as Doctor James B. Stafford; that there is a James B. Stafford, but that he is not a doctor. It charges that Joseph B. Stafford was a physician and that he was the person intended by the testator, whom he described as Dr. James B. Stafford. The extrinsic testimony displays an alleged ambiguity. The legateę whose children are to take is said to be either misdescribed or misnamed. Therefore, to enable the court to strike out what is false in the designation of the legatee, and so carry out the intent of the testator, parol testimony has been introduced to show the number, the degree and the kinship of the testator's relations as well as how he regarded them and talked about them. Lord Camoys v. Blundell, 1 H. L. Cas. 778; Thomas v. Thomas, 6 Durn. & E. 671; Vernor v. Henry, 3 Watts 393; Smith v. Smith, 1 Edw. Ch. 189; affirmed, 4 Paige 272.

The evidence I think establishes the fact that James B. Stafford, while not educated as a physician, and although not practicing as a physician, yet was familiarly known among his associates as "Doc." or Dr. It seems to have been a matter of reputation that he had once been a clerk in a drug store, and So, probably in that way, acquired the prefix to his name.

It seems to be proved that he not only was so styled Dr. or Doc. amongst his associates, but that the testator knew all this, and he himself was accustomed to allude to him in the same manner. This being so the prefix to his name would not indicate that the testator had mistakenly applied the name to the wrong person. It is true that in a previous will made by the testator he distinguished Joseph B. from James B. by styling the former "Dr." and the latter merely James B. While this is a circumstance which would, in case there were doubt whether the testator had ever called the latter Dr., be of great importance, it loses nearly all of its force in view of the very strong testi

Atterbury v. Stafford.

mony that the testator, as already remarked, had frequently alluded to and addressed James B. as Dr.

It is urged also on behalf of the children of Dr. Joseph B. Stafford, that the testator in his former will had provided for, and had spoken kindly of Mrs. Lappeous, a daughter of Dr. Joseph B. Stafford, and therefore it is insisted that it is unlikely that he intended to cut her out from any benefit under the present instrument. But it is to be remarked that in the former will he recites that he had in a still earlier will provided for the purchase of a house for James B. So it appears that at one time James B. was exceptionally warm in the regard of the testator. It is true that in the former will he announces his intention of giving nothing to the children of James B., James B. being then dead; but in the same will he announces that no part of his estate shall be inherited by any persons claiming to be children of Dr. Joseph B. Stafford, except Mrs. Lappeous. Therefore the provisions of the present will, whether Joseph B. or James B. was intended, exhibits a radical change in sentiment from that presented by the former will.

In addition it appears that the testator, who had lived in Virginia, occasionally on his way from Virginia north stopped off at Philadelphia, and visited James B. Stafford, who lived there. It is quite as probable that the old regard which he had manifested for James B. in the earlier will had later revived in favor of his family, as it is that he had changed his mind in favor of all the children of Dr. Joseph B., after announcing that no part of his estate should reach any of them except Mrs. Lappeous.

I am therefore constrained to the conclusion that the name must control, and it must be assumed that James B. Stafford was the person meant.

[blocks in formation]

1. A certificate issued by a beneficial insurance association upon the life of a member in favor of a third person, where neither the constitution nor by-laws of the society nor the certificate confer upon the members a power to change the beneficiary, invests the beneficiary with a vested interest in the certificate. 2. The member cannot defeat such vested interest by surrendering the old and taking out a new certificate.

3. In case of such change of certificates, the extent of the vested right of the beneficiary in the old certificate is its value at the time of the change.

4. In this kind of insurance the value is the difference between the amount payable upon the death of the member and the amount of payments, with interest, which will be required to keep the certificate alive during the probable period of the member's life.

5. A by-law adopted after the issuance of the certificate, giving a member power to change a beneficiary, held not to be retroactive.

The Locomotive Engineers' Mutual Life and Accident Insurance Association was incorporated in 1894. Before that time the organization had existed and insured lives as a voluntary association. In 1884, George Winterstein, a locomotive engineer, insured his life in said association in one policy for $3,000 for the benefit of his second wife, who was then living. This wife died on November 14th, 1889. After her death George Winterstein went from Easton, where he had lived, taking with him his daughter Fannie, to live at Mauch Chunk with his brother John and sister Martha Winterstein. After his wife's death he sent the policy of insurance back to the company's office in Cleveland, Ohio, and caused a new policy for $3,000 to be issued, payable to his daughter Fannie. This seems to have been about January 1st, 1890. Some time after this he moved from Mauch Chunk to Phillipsburg, and left

.

Locomotive Engineers' Ins. Ass'n v. Winterstein.

Fannie and the policy of insurance with his sister Martha at Mauch Chunk. In April, 1894, while he was boarding at Phillipsburg, New Jersey, he married Julia Rustay. Julia says that he told her, before their marriage, that if she would marry him he would give her his insurance in the brotherhood of engineers. After the marriage George, who was running his engine between Phillipsburg and Mauch Chunk, saw his daughter Fannie, or his sister Martha, or both, at the station at Mauch Chunk, and told her or them that he had to have new policies issued on account of the association making a new constitution and by-laws, and requested that the old policies should be sent to him. His sister gave the policies to Fannie, who met her father at the station and gave the papers to him. It seems to be a fact that the voluntary association, after it became incorporated, called in all outstanding policies and issued new certificates in their stead. George upon receiving the old policies forwarded them to the company, and caused to be issued in their stead two new policies for $1,500 each on July 18th, 1894, payable, not to Fannie, his daughter, but to his third wife, Mrs. George Winterstein. These two policies seem to have been delivered to the beneficiary. This was the condition of affairs until April 21st, 1897, on which date George again caused a new certificate to be issued to his daughter Fannie, and seven days later, April 28th, 1897, he died. The amount of the benefit fund is claimed on the one hand by Fannie, the daughter, and on the other hand by Julia, the widow. The company have filed a bill of interpleader and paid the amount into court, and Fannie and Julia now interplead.

Mr. John I. B. Reiley and Mr. William H. Morrow, for the defendant Julia Winterstein.

Mr. Sylvester C. Smith, for the defendant Fannie Winterstein. REED, V. C.

The policy issued in 1894, in which the wife was named as beneficiary, was in her possession at the time of the death of

Locomotive Engineers' Ins. Ass'n v. Winterstein.

her husband, but as already remarked, he had, in the manner pointed out by the by-laws, changed the beneficiary in 1897 and substituted his daughter for his wife. If George, as a member of the order of locomotive engineers, had the power in 1897 to change the beneficiary, then having executed the change in conformity with the rules of the order, the fund belongs to his daughter Fannie.

But the claim made on behalf of the widow is, that she had a vested interest in the policy, of which she was not divested by the attempted change in the beneficiary made in 1897. This claim of a vested interest is put upon two grounds—first, that there was no power in the insured to change the beneficiary in any event; and second, that the policy was issued to her in consideration of marriage, and therefore she held it for a valuable consideration. The question whether apart from the consideration of marriage there was a vested right in the wife, which could not be defeated by the subsequent change of beneficiary, must be answered by the construction of the plan of insurance itself. The question of the power of a person insured to strip a named beneficiary of all interest in the policy and transfer it to another arises in two classes of insurance contracts. One class is the ordinary class of life insurance and the other class is where the contract is executed by a beneficial society. In the first class the beneficiary is named in the original contract and becomes a party to the contract, whose interest becomes vested at once. Bliss L. Ins. § 318; Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray 227; Ferdon v. Canfield, 104 N. Y. 143; Landrum v. Knowles, 7 C. E. Gr. 594.

In certificates given by beneficial orders there is usually merely a power conferred upon the member whose life is insured, to appoint beneficiaries from a certain class of relations and change the same. In this class of policies the contract is held to be made solely with the member, and that the beneficiary appointed has only a contingent interest in the policy, of which he is liable to be stripped by the member naming a new beneficiary in the manner required by the rules of the association. Bac. Ben. Soc. § 289.

But the presence or absence of the unlimited power of change

« ПредишнаНапред »